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Résumé 
Cette thèse s’intéresse aux choix institutionnels des législateurs. Elle propose une 
analyse diachronique et comparative du développement des Chambre Nationale des 
Députés argentines et chiliennes des années 1940 aux années 2000. Inspiré de la 
théorie du Cartel (Cox et McCubbins, 1993), ce travail se concentre sur le rôle des partis 
politiques dans ce développement institutionnel. Il montre qu’en dépit de leurs 
différences, les partis uniques, coalitions, forces majoritaires ou minoritaires qui ont 
dirigé ces chambres ont adopté un large éventail de règles et de normes 
organisationnelles qui les avantagent. Ils se sont, en un mot, comportés comme des 
coalitions procédurales. 
L’analyse des modifications des règles de fonctionnement de ces chambres et de leurs 
systèmes de direction et de commissions montre que les partis et coalitions au pouvoir 
ont, pendant cette période, renforcé leur pouvoir, contrôlé l’agenda législatif, structuré 
les systèmes de commission et adopté des règles qui leur ont profité. 
Les résultats obtenus suggèrent en particulier que les coalitions qui ont dirigé la 
chambre Chilienne ont installé certains de leurs membres à plusieurs postes comme les 
présidences d’assemblée et de commissions. Ils montrent l’existence d’un pouvoir de 
véto sur l’agenda législative plus importante au Chili qu’en Argentine. L’étude du cas 
argentin montre que les partis au pouvoir ont, en particulier depuis les années 1960, 
conservé le contrôle de la chambre, non seulement en modifiant les règles et les 
structures du système de commissions, mais également en créant et distribuant à 
l’opposition des postes permanents mais sans réel pouvoir. 
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Cette analyse confirme également les résultats obtenus par de récentes études 
concernant ce champ de recherche, notamment le professionnalisme du système de 
commission chilien et le caractère amateur des législateurs argentins. A l’inverse, elle 
met à jour des différences, négligées jusqu’alors, entre l’Argentine et le Chili 
concernant le contrôle de l’agenda législatif. 
Cette thèse est divisée en sept chapitres. Le premier introduit le sujet, l’hypothèse 
générale et les questions posées par la thèse, en expliquant également pourquoi les 
choix institutionnels des législateurs importent. Le chapitre II présente la théorie et la 
méthodologie. Il propose une définition du développement institutionnel et explicite 
les prédictions et critères permettant de tester l’hypothèse générale. Les chapitre III et 
IV, qui concernent respectivement l’Argentine et le Chili, décrivent  le système politique 
de chaque pays et l’organisation des chambres durant la période étudiée. Les chapitre 
IV et VI, respectivement pour l’Argentine et le Chili, analysent les réformes des règles 
régissant les chambres, l’évolution de l’autorité qui les dirige et celle du système de 
commission. Ces chapitres se concluent par un résumé des différents schémas mis en 
évidence et une évaluation préliminaire de l’hypothèse générale. En conclusion, le 
chapitre VII résume les découvertes, donne un verdict global sur la fécondité de la 
théorie et suggère de nouvelles pistes de recherche. 
 
Mot-clés : Dessin institutionnel ; développement institutionnel ; partis politiques ; 
chambres basses ; législateurs ; théorie du Cartel ; contrôle de l’agenda; Argentine ; 
Chili.  
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Abstract 
This thesis is about the institutional choices of legislators. It provides a comparative and 
diachronic analysis of the institutional development of the National Chambers of 
Deputies of Argentina and Chile from the 1940s to the 2000s. Based on Cartel Theory 
(Cox and McCubbins 1993), it focuses on the role played by parties in this institutional 
development. It demonstrates that despite their differences, the various majorities and 
pluralities, single-parties and coalitions that ruled these Chambers have maintained and 
adopted a constellation of organizational rules and norms that advantaged their 
interests. In other words, they have behaved as procedural coalitions. 
The analysis of the reforms to the rules of these Chambers and of their directing 
board and committee systems indicates that ruling parties and coalitions have increased 
their power during the period, controlled the legislative agenda, structured the committee 
system, and adopted rules that benefit them on the floor.  
In particular, the results suggest that Chilean ruling coalitions have endowed 
several offices, such as the Presidency, the Chairs of committees, the committee on 
Finance (Hacienda) and on Rules, with negative agenda-setting power, and that some of 
them are more powerful than their Argentine’s counterparts. In the case of the Argentine 
Chamber, specifically since the 1960s, ruling parties have kept control of the Chamber 
not only by reforming the rules and structuring the committee system but also creating 
and distributing powerless but permanent positions to the opposition.  
The analysis also confirms previous findings made by recent studies in the 
subfield, specially the professionalism of the Chilean Committee system and the 
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amateur character of Argentine legislators. By contrast, it shows differences in the 
agenda control between the Argentine and Chilean Chambers that were overlooked.    
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I introduces the general 
hypothesis, the purposes and main questions of the thesis, and explains why the 
institutional choices of legislators matter. Chapter II presents the theory and the 
methodology. It provides the definition of institutional development and the criteria and 
predictions used to test the general hypothesis. Chapters III (Argentina) and V (Chile) 
offer an account of each country’s politics and a description of the Chambers’ 
organization during the period. Chapters IV (Argentina) and VI (Chile) analyze the 
reforms to the rules of the Chambers, and the evolution of the directing board and 
committee systems and conclude with a summary of the patterns found and a 
preliminary assessment of the general hypothesis. Chapter VII concludes. It sums up the 
findings, provides a final assessment of the theory, and suggests further avenues of 
research.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords : Institutional design; institutional development; political parties; lower 
chambers; legislators; Cartel Theory; agenda control; Argentina; Chile. 
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CHAPTER I 
The Institutional Choices of Legislators 
Why Do They Matter?  
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Why do legislatures change? How should we understand shifts in their rules? Whose 
goals do these changes serve?  
 These questions have received a variety of answers regarding the U.S. Congress, 
and particularly the House of Representatives of the post-New Deal era.1 The constant 
growth of the subfield of Congressional Studies, and the consequent improved 
understanding of the Modern House, contrasts sharply with scanty knowledge about the 
institutional evolution of legislatures of other presidential countries. Furthermore, the 
contribution of Congressional Studies to the development of a general legislative theory 
has been limited (Mezey 1993; Brady and McCubbins 2002; Gamm and Huber 2002).   
 
This thesis is about the institutional choices made by legislators of other presidential 
countries. Using the Cartel Theory that has been applied to the study of the U.S. House, 
the objective is to provide a comparative and diachronic analysis of the institutional 
development of the national lower chambers of two Latin American countries (Argentina 
and Chile).2 This task is guided by two purposes. First, I intend to establish the patterns 
or central features of the Chambers’ institutional development. Second, I plan to 
ascertain whether parties determined or not the key features of this development. In 
other words, I plan to assess the merits and limits of the Cartel Theory to explain the 
institutional choices made by deputies through time.  
                                                            
1 I will refer to the U.S. House of Representatives as the “U.S. House.”  
2 These two lower chambers are the Honorable Cámara de Diputados del Congreso Nacional (Argentina) and  the 
Cámara de Diputados del Congreso Nacional (Chile) or the Corporación. I will refer to them as “the Chambers.”  
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The main claim of the Cartel Theory is that “parties in the House are a species of 
“legislative cartel.” These cartels usurp the power resident in the House to make rules 
governing the structure and process of legislation” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2). Based 
of this claim the general hypothesis to be tested is when a legislative party or coalition 
becomes the ruling party or coalition in the Chamber, it will function as a procedural 
coalition, that is, it will usurp the rule-making power of the Chamber to its favor. It will take 
a large part of chapter II to fully explain the Cartel Theory and the genesis of this 
hypothesis. At this point I would stress that this study is focused on the structure, on the 
internal organization of legislatures, on the largely unknown territory of the 
arrangements legislators make in the pre-floor stages of the legislative process.   
Unlike most studies in the past, recent works about legislative politics in Latin America 
have begun to consider the Chambers’ organization and its relation to parties. Yet, these 
contributions focus on the 1980s and 1990s and mention only indirectly some aspects of 
the aforementioned internal arrangements. Instead, there is a vast literature on “both 
sides” of the pre-floor stages, that is to say, executive-legislative relations and party 
discipline on the floor. I believe that it is necessary to achieve a balanced understanding 
of the three phases -executive-legislative relations, parties as procedural coalitions, 
parties as floor coalitions- to connect the dots and foster more diversified research 
regarding the strategies of parties in legislatures. This dissertation is designed to provide 
a comparative analysis of two unexplored aspects in Argentine and Chilean lower 
Chambers: the evolution of their institutional design and the role played by parties in it. 
In this introduction I look at why the institutional choices of legislators matter (section 1), 
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at what we know until now about these choices (section 2), at the purposes and main 
questions of the dissertation (section 3), and at its contents (section 4). 
Section 1.  Why do the Institutional Choices of Legislators Matter? 
The institutional choices of legislators define the rules of the legislative game and 
constitute, as such, an essential part of the policymaking process. This straightaway 
reason means, among other things, that this dissertation is not targeted to legislative 
sceptics. My work will not capture the attention of those who consider Latin American 
legislatures as superfluous or trivial institutions.  
The rigorous assessment of the institutional choices of legislators is essential to measure 
legislatures’ capacities. The analysis provided in this study is helpful to those who deal 
with the intricate task of measuring policymaking activities and are concerned about 
veto players and agenda control. They will find in the following chapters how offices 
endowed with agenda-setting power emerged and the way in which they exercise their 
power. In addition, the study of the institutional design and of the role played by parties 
in its shaping is the necessary complement of those works that focus on the analysis of 
party behavior on the floor.  
Institutional design matters not only for academics, but also for politicians. As Cox and 
McCubbins (1993, 125) explain, reelection and good policymaking are not the only 
interests legislators pursue. They also strive for internal advancement and for party 
majority status. As we will see, legislators understand pretty well that the rules of the 
legislative game determine their position, power, and legislative perquisites.  
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If institutional design did not matter, there would be no reforms to the Reglamentos, no 
harsh debates about the functions of those who are in charge of the Chambers, no 
disputes about who speaks first, second (or not at all) on the floor, no arguments about 
the way Chairs are assigned, no demands of the opposition to occupy more positions in 
the committee system. If institutional design did not matter, there would be no 
Reglamentos (Rules of the House). If the institutional choices of legislators did not 
matter, the Chambers would function, as Cox (2006, 141) explains, in the “legislative 
state of nature (…) an assembly in which all business is conducted in the plenary session 
(no committees) and members’ ability to talk and make motions is largely unrestricted 
and unregulated.” Despite the appearances, our legislators do not function in a 
legislative state of nature. They consciously design every aspect of their organizations 
and consistently defend their advantages.     
If a quick inventory of the present rules and norms of the Chambers could satiate the 
interest of academics and legislators, why should we care about the institutional 
development of the Chambers? 
We should, and we must care because the understanding of the Argentine and Chilean 
politics remains partial without a comprehensive analysis of what took place inside the 
Chambers during the last sixty years. Cox and McCubbins (1993, 277) concluded that 
there has been “a version of “party government,” in the House at least, throughout the 
postwar period.” Did Chilean and Argentine parties determine the key features of their 
Chambers through time? When were the rules and norms that regulate the activity of 
legislators enacted or adopted? Did they change? If they changed, who changed them? 
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Only a study of the Chambers’ institutional development can help us answer these 
questions. The analyses of party systems, though extremely rich -specially in the case of 
Chile-, have not covered the organization of the Chambers.    
The need to understand in a comprehensive way both countries’ politics brings to other 
two main reasons for considering the Chambers’ institutional development.  
The first is related to the influence of dictatorships over the legislative organization. The 
analysis of the evolution of legislative rules and norms will help understand how 
authoritarian laws impacted on the legislative organization and also how parties 
responded to authoritarian legacies inside the Chambers. We will see that parties 
managed to adapt and even make use of these rules.    
The second reason concerns the assessment of the consolidation of democracy. How the 
obscure and distant legislative arrangements are related to one of the main subjects in 
comparative politics? The response is that the study of the institutional choices of 
legislators during the last decades can help understand their performance. Did parties 
control the Chamber’s tools needed to implement their campaign promises? Could 
opposition parties veto any step of the legislative process? How did the opposition 
participate? Were committees independent from party influence? Once in charge of the 
Chamber, what did parties do with its rules? Why did they change them? What is the 
impact of their decisions?    
The answers to these questions are particularly relevant to Argentina and Chile because 
they are democracies with an authoritarian past. The return to democracy left behind the 
insulated “Legislative Advisory Committee” (C.A.L. “Comisión de Asesoramiento 
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Legislativo”) established in the Argentine National Congress by the military coup in 1976 
and the three (1974-1980) and four (1981-1989) “legislatives committees” of Pinochet, all 
of them composed of captains, colonels, and generals in charge of proposing legislation 
to the Executive Power. Congresses in Chile and Argentina bear with the responsibility of 
being one of the main institutions that contribute to the stability of the democratic 
system.   
Finally, this dissertation will be interesting to those concerned with comparing 
democratic legislatures. The analysis of the institutional development of two Latin 
American Chambers with the lenses of a theory conceived for the U.S. House, that is, the 
demonstration that diverse regime histories, constitutional and internal rules were not 
obstacles to apply the Cartel Theory may contribute to build a general theory of 
legislatures in presidential regimes.  
Section 2.  What We Know About the Institutional Development of the  
Chambers  
We do not know much about the institutional development of the Chambers 
because the attention from the scholarly community in the subfield of Latin American 
legislative politics emerged after the last wave of democratization in the region. In part 
because they have been overshadowed by presidents and frequently closed by militaries, 
Morgenstern (2002, 5) argues, Latin American legislatures have received limited study. 
Note, for instance, that the “first stab” about the analysis of committee systems in Latin 
American legislatures was made in the early 2000s (Morgenstern 2002, 11).  
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As in any legislative subfield, the first approach to the literature of Latin American 
congresses is through constitutional and normative studies that describe the functioning 
of legislatures and compare legislative rules (Andrade Geywitz 1945; Ahumada Muñoz 
1967; Bugatti 1974; Sabato and Cavarozzi 1984; Macris 1986; Pellet Lastra 1993; Gentile 
1997; Crescenzi 1998). Thanks to the increased interest about legislative politics in Latin 
America after the 1990s, the content and the methodology of the studies substantially 
changed. Recent analyses in the new-institutionalism vein examine the role these 
legislatures play in the policymaking process and the executive-legislative relations -
particularly the agenda-setting power of the Executive- (Jones 2001; Casar 2002; Eaton 
2002; Siavelis 2002; Weldon 2002; Amorim Neto et al. 2003; Nacif 2003; Tsebelis and 
Alemán 2005; Alemán and Schwartz 2006; Spiller and Tommasi 2007; Toro Maureira 
2007; Alemán 2009; Alemán and Navia 2009).  
Within this wave of recent studies, a few works have indirectly examined some legislative 
rules or norms either as “a cause of” or as “a consequence of” the party, electoral system 
or party discipline in the Chamber. The first type of studies states that legislative rules or 
norms help explain: a) the high level of party discipline (Jones 2002; Morgenstern 2002; 
Weldon 2002); b) the functioning of majority parties as cartels (Jones and Hwang 2003a; 
Jones and Hwang 2003b; Jones and Hwang 2005); c) the sources of presidential support 
and political stability (Mustapic 2002; Nolte 2003), and d) the legislative agenda and, 
consequently, the policymaking process (Alemán 2006). In the second type of studies 
rules or norms appear as the result of: a) a centralized party government model (Nacif 
2002); b) the stability and cohesion of legislative coalitions (Carey 2002; Alemán and 
9 
 
 
Saiegh 2007), and c) the electoral reform (Carey 2002; Morgenstern 2002; Nacif 2002; 
Dworak 2003; Rivera Sanchez 2004).  
Some of the previous citations belong to Morgenstern and Nacif’s book Legislative 
Politics in Latin America (2002). These authors, as well as the contributors in the volume, 
adapted questions and hypotheses applied to the study of Western consolidated 
democracies, namely U.S. theories, to the analysis of legislatures in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, and Mexico. One of their themes is “parliamentary parties and legislative structure.” 
In this rubric they analyzed the relation between procedural coalitions, committee 
systems, and floor voting coalitions and partisan, electoral, and constitutional 
arrangements.  
In what follows the works that have associated legislative rules or norms to the role of 
parties in the Argentine and Chilean Chambers, namely those from Legislative Politics in 
Latin America, are summarized. At the end of this summary, I point out their 
contributions and limits regarding this dissertation.  
 2.1 The Studies 
Beginning with the Argentine Chamber, I mention the works of Jones (2002), 
Mustapic (2002), Jones and Hwang (2003b; 2005), and Alemán (2006).  
Jones (2002) studied the primary determinants of the Chamber’s high level of party 
discipline in the post-1989 period through the analysis of roll-call votes. The substantive 
cohesion on the floor, he argues, “stems primarily from a combination of institutional 
rules governing the elections and intralegislative organization” (Jones 2002, 184). 
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Concerning the electoral rules, Jones explains that there is a strong relation between the 
party and the political careers of legislators.3 About the intralegislative organization Jones 
(and also Mustapic 2002) stresses the functions of the President of the Chamber and of 
the party leader and their influence on the behavior of legislators. While the former 
decides, in consultation with other party leaders, which committee leadership positions 
correspond to which party, the latter determines how committee assignment will be 
allocated. Party leaders also possess important resources such as delegation 
assignments, budgetary resources, and control over the flow of legislation, and over the 
participation in floor debates. In sum, the rules governing the election of deputies, 
combined with the power the President and party leaders exercise, “helps in large part to 
explain the rarity of legislators voting against their party’s position on the Chamber 
floor” (Jones 2002, 184).  
In subsequent articles Jones and Hwang (2003b; 2005) applied the Cartel Theory to 
analyze party politics in the Argentine Chamber. The authors argue that the success of 
the majority party -the Peronist/Justicialist Party -PJ- (Partido Justicialista)- in the 1989-
2003 period stems from its functioning as an effective cartel (Jones and Hwang 2003b). 
The origins of this cartel, however, are distinct from those in the U.S. House. While in the 
latter legislators are the crucial actors who delegate power to the party leader (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993), in Argentina provincial-level party bosses are the key players who 
                                                            
3 Following the same line of research Jones and Hwang (2003a; 2005) explain that parties in Argentina have a 
great deal of control over legislators’ access to the ballot. Argentine deputies are elected from closed party lists in 
multi-member districts (with a median district magnitude of 3 and a mean of 5). These lists are created at the 
provincial-level through elite arrangement or party primary (Jones and Hwang 2003a). Between 1989 and 2003 
only a median of 19% of deputies (20% and 12% for the Peronist Party and the Radical Civic Union Party, 
respectively) achieved immediate reelection, with an overwhelming majority returning to political posts in their 
province, or going to national level posts, often in representation of their province. In most instances the 
reelection decision for Argentine deputies, they argue, lies primarily with the provincial-level party boss, and not 
with the individual legislator (Jones and Hwang 2005). 
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engage in this delegation, but the end effect on the functioning of the legislature is quite 
similar. Majority control of the legislature in the U.S. House is based on an ideological, 
reputational, and, to a lesser extent, distributive logic (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 
Finocchiaro and Rohde 2002). In Argentina “this majority control is based on a similar 
mix, but with distributive incentives easily dominating ideology and party reputation” 
(Jones and Hwang 2003b, 16).  
As would be expected in a legislature where the majority party functions as an effective 
cartel, the authors argue, the Chamber rules provide the majority party leadership with 
substantial power and nearly complete control over legislative agenda. Accordingly, 
although the Rules Committee operates in part based on consensus, when a 
disagreement occurs the majority party’s position always prevails (Jones and Hwang 
2003b, 20). 4 As to the committee system they explain that “during the 1989-2003 period 
the majority party occupied a median of 77% of the [committee] chairs, but only 47% of 
the seats” (Jones and Hwang 2005, 277). In reference to these “committee incentives” 
Mustapic (2002) explains that they generate cohesion both within and among parties. 
Committee positions (and the increase in the number of committees) are clientelistic 
rewards or payments for service. To Mustapic, whose main subject is executive-
legislative relations (1983-1995 period), legislative positions are one of the factors on 
which the Executive Power relies to foster party discipline and to generate legislative 
support.  
                                                            
4 In Argentina this is the Committee on Parliamentary Business -CLP- (Comisión de Labor Parlamentaria). The 
President and the Vice-Presidents of the Chamber and the party delegation’s leaders constitute this committee. 
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Alemán’s article Policy Gatekeepers in Latin American Legislatures (2006) explores the 
control of the legislative agenda in the region, analyzing in particular the Argentine, 
Chilean, and Mexican cases. The author focuses on the rules of the Chambers and on the 
agenda-setting power of majority leaders -who lack codified gatekeeping rights in 
Argentina and Chile-. As to rules, he mentions the existence of a joint meeting of a 
partisan committee and Chamber authorities to set the order of business and of simple 
procedures for majorities to force the vote to schedule a bill for plenary debate in both 
Chambers (Alemán 2006; 132,134). Majority leaders display their de facto power in those 
joint meetings. In addition, he mentions three factors as relevant for the analysis of the 
agenda control: the (positive) agenda power of certain Executive Powers, the lack of 
committee autonomy from the leadership of legislative parties, and the fragmentation 
and discipline of parties (Alemán 2006, 128).  Discussing the lack of autonomy of 
standing committees in Latin American countries Alemán mentions some particular 
aspects of their legislative organizations: the power of referral (i.e., the common use of 
multiple referrals) and the fact that the finance (Hacienda) and constitutional 
committees “have a more stable and more professional membership than most others” 
(Alemán 2006, 130). After describing the rules and norms related to agenda-setting 
power in Argentina and Chile, Alemán examines roll-call data from Argentina (1983-
1997) and Chile (1997-2000). His results “reveal not only leadership control over the 
policy agenda but also the strength of Argentine and Chilean parties in government” 
(Alemán 2006, 151).  
In addition to Alemán’s article, but focused exclusively on the Chilean lower 
Chamber, we find the works of Carey (2002), Nolte (2003), Alemán and Saiegh (2007), 
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and Toro Maureira (2007). The first author examines the post-transition Chilean 
legislative party system. He argues that this system differs from the highly fluid mid-
century system because, throughout the 1990s, it has been characterized by the stability 
and cohesiveness of the two main legislative coalitions, a product of the M=2 reform of 
the electoral system (Carey 2002, 224).5 The Chamber, he explains, is organized on the 
grounds of coalition control. In reference to floor coalitions, his roll-call votes analyses 
(1990-2001) demonstrate that “legislators from the two main coalitions tend to vote with 
each other and that the coalitions also tend to vote against each other” (Carey 2002, 
250). Among the mechanisms that generate cohesiveness within coalitions he identifies 
ideological spread, the executive’s authority to control the legislative agenda, and the 
coordination at the level of coalition leadership. In reference to the latter, the author 
highlights the importance of the weekly Concertación meetings, the consistent coalition 
majorities in committee composition, and the majority-controlled Mesas Directivas (the 
directing boards of the Chamber). Coalitions, he argues, “are clearly central actors in 
structuring congressional decisions” (Carey 2002, 251).  
Similarly, Alemán and Saiegh (2007) argue that competition between the two stable 
multiparty coalitions (the Concertación of the Center-left, and the coalition of the Right, 
Unión por Chile) has dominated electoral and legislative politics in post-Pinochet Chile. 
Therefore, the Chilean electoral coalitions are not merely electoral pacts. Rather, they 
constitute two distinct policy-based coalitions. 
                                                            
5 Chilean legislators are elected from open ballot lists in a two-member district (60 districts) electoral system. This 
system was imposed by the outgoing military regime. 
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Toro Maureira (2007) also investigates Chilean deputies’ behavior considering bills sent 
by the Executive Power during the legislative term 2002-2006. The evidence (analysis of 
roll-call votes) indicates that one of the most relevant reasons of President Lagos’ 
legislative success was the high unity of the governmental party and the heterogeneous 
action of the opposing bloc. 
In addition to their cohesive behavior on the floor, Carey argues that Chilean coalitions 
also control the agenda and structure the committee system. In Carey’s opinion the 
fundamental institutions of the Chamber are the Mesas Directivas (Directing Boards), 
which have some control over the legislative agenda and committee assignments-, and 
the “17 permanent committees” (Carey 2002; 237, 238). The Concertación, the author 
explains, maintained a majority, of either 7;6 or 8;5, on all committees at all times (1994-
2001) (Carey 2002, 239). As to committee Chairs, while 5 of 17 committees were chaired 
by members of the opposition in 1997, the majority coalition has asserted a near 
monopoly over Chairs in the 1998-2001 period (holding 16 of 17 Chairs) (Carey 2002, 
239). The domination of the Concertación, Carey and Nolte (2003) argue, did not prevent 
the development of a strong committee system. Chilean legislators, who endeavor to 
build careers through reelection to Congress, are concerned with committee work, local 
politics, and have a hierarchical committee system that has accumulated experience and 
expertise (Carey 2001, 243). 6 The importance of certain committees, namely the 
Hacienda Committee, is evidenced by an analysis of reassignment rates. Carey concludes 
that this Chamber is highly professionalized, and that its committee system is 
accumulating substantial expertise.  
                                                            
6 In Chile 76% of the deputies renominated and, of these, 78% won in 1993.  
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To recapitulate, studies of the Argentine Chamber focus on the behavior of parties as 
floor coalitions. Their main evidence comes from the analysis of roll-call votes and from 
statistics about its composition from 1989 to 2003. The rules and norms of the Chamber 
that give majority leaders agenda-setting control, coupled with the power of parties -
specially provincial-level party bosses- to decide the diversified political careers of 
legislators and to reward them with legislative positions, help explain the cartel behavior 
at the floor level. In addition, parties are the main actors in the Argentine Chamber. As 
part of the “intralegislative organization” these studies discuss the functions of the 
President of the Chamber and of party leaders, the structuring of the committee system, 
and the activities of the Committee on Parliamentary Business. Their authors emphasize 
the power of the President of the Chamber and of party leaders to set the agenda and to 
control the allocation of committee seats, namely of committee Chairs. Jones and 
Alemán, in particular, explain how the Committee on Parliamentary Business is 
controlled by the majority party. Alemán discusses also the power of referral (of the 
President of the Chamber), the prerogative of majorities to expedite committee reports, 
and points out that some committees are more important than others.   
In the case of the Chilean Chamber studies focus on the behavior of parties on the floor 
but discuss a little bit more their role as procedural coalitions. The analysis of roll-call 
votes is used to trace the discipline of the two Chilean multiparty coalitions of the 1990s 
and 2000s. The cohesiveness of these coalitions, the authors argue, differs from the 
transient alliances of the pre-transition era. In contrast to Argentina, coalitions are the 
principal actors in the Corporación. Their leaders, majorities, and Chamber authorities, 
however, structure Chambers’ decisions, control the legislative agenda (heavily 
16 
 
 
influenced by the Executive Power), and committee assignments as well as their 
Argentine counterparts do. The examination of committee assignments (1994-2001) 
shows, like in Argentina, a near monopoly over Chairs. The fact that permanent 
committees are not all alike, especially the Hacienda committee, is confirmed by Carey, 
Nolte, and Alemán. According to Carey and Nolte, despite coalitional control, Chilean 
deputies have built a strong committee system.          
2.2 Contributions and Limits  
The studies reviewed provide useful information about the actual organization of 
the Chambers. I refer in particular to the central role of parties (Argentina) and coalitions 
(Chile) in their functioning; to the power these parties and coalitions concentrate 
regarding the legislative agenda and the allocation of committee seats; to the 
prerogatives of the Presidents of the Chambers and party leaders; to the stratification of 
the committee system; and to the difference we can infer about the organization of the 
committee systems in Argentina and Chile. Through the chapters we will see not only 
the integral analysis of the aspects discussed by the authors, but also the confirmation of 
most of their findings for previous periods.   
These studies, however, provide partial information about the Chambers. They are 
neither focused on the analysis of pre-floor stages of the legislative process nor to its 
development through time. The examination of parties as procedural coalitions is: a) 
considered among other factors that affect/is affected by the behavior of parties as floor 
coalitions; b) obscured sometimes by the prerogative of the Executive Power over the 
legislative agenda (Chile); and c) limited to a few aspects of the agenda-setting control or 
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the structuring of the committee system. In addition, they cover short periods of time, 
always after the 1980s.  
This time-bound and partial focus, I hasten to add, makes sense, in particular regarding 
the availability of data.7 For one part, roll-call votes -the data privileged by most authors- 
is not difficult to find. For the other part, committees’ memberships and the Reglamentos 
(Rules of the House), can be found in the websites of the Chambers. In sum, since almost 
nothing is known about the institutional evolution of the Chambers, it is sensible to start 
with the recent past and with the data available.  
Section 3.  The Purposes and Main Questions of the Dissertation 
The objective of this study is to provide a comparative and diachronic analysis of 
the institutional development of the Argentine and Chilean lower Chambers. The general 
hypothesis to be tested, which derives from the Cartel Theory, is that when a legislative 
party or coalition becomes the ruling party or coalition in the Chamber, it will function as a 
procedural coalition, that is, it will usurp the rule-making power of the Chamber to its favor. 
Two purposes guide the study. First, I intend to reconstruct the patterns or central 
features of the Chambers’ institutional development. This primary step, which I call the 
reconstruction task, is the most important difference between my dissertation and the 
studies reviewed. While I develop the definition of institutional development at length 
in chapter II here I can briefly note that, for one part, I identify institutional development 
                                                            
7 I can attest that doing fieldwork in the Chambers, particularly collecting data from the 1940s to the 1970s, is not 
an exciting endeavor because it implies, as Jenkins (2001) notes, “[f]lipping through old, dusty journals, [and] 
digging around in poorly-organized archives.”  
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with the evolution of the rules and norms associated with the structuring of the committee 
and the directing board systems and the pre-floor and floor procedures. I call these 
dispositions the “organizational rules and norms.” For the other part, I identify 
institutional development with both the preservation and the change of these rules and 
norms over time. Therefore, the question associated with the first purpose is: what are 
the patterns that characterize the institutional development of the Chambers (i.e., 
the preservation and change of their organizational rules and norms) over time? I plan 
to establish these patterns specifying when, by whom, how, and why the 
organizational rules and norms were adopted or modified.  
The second purpose is to assess the merits and limits of the Cartel Theory to explain the 
institutional choices made by deputies through time. To put it differently, the goal is to 
ascertain whether ruling parties acted as procedural coalitions. The questions related to 
this second step are: what was the role of majority (ruling) parties in the institutional 
development of the Chambers? 8 Did the institutional development of the Chambers 
advantage ruling parties?  
This second purpose also distinguishes my study because I will make a comprehensive 
assessment regarding the evolution of rules and norms over time and I will focus on the 
role of parties as procedural coalitions. Despite this distinction, this second step will 
establish a link with the works mentioned above. In this sense, we will be able to detect 
the origins of several features and confirm partial trends highlighted by the authors.  
                                                            
8 Contrasting with the U.S. House, the Argentine and Chilean Chambers were seldom in charge of a majority 
party. That is why the adjective “ruling” in parenthesis is beside the adjective “majority.” See chapters III and V 
for a complete explanation about the parties and coalitions/pluralities and majorities that ruled the Chambers.  
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Section 4.  Content of the Dissertation 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II presents the theory and 
methodology. It provides, in particular, the definition of institutional development and 
the criteria and predictions I will use to support or disconfirm the general hypothesis. 
Following Morgenstern’s advice (2002, 5), who argued that in order to understand the 
unknown Latin American legislatures it is “necessary to first generate a view of what we 
are explaining,” chapters III (Argentina) and V (Chile) offer an account of each country’s 
politics and a description of the Chambers’ organization during the period over analysis. 
This description comprises their partisan composition by legislative periods. Chapters IV 
(Argentina) and VI (Chile) deal with the reconstruction task. After analyzing the reforms 
to the Reglamento, and the evolution of the directing board and committee systems, 
both chapters conclude with a summary of the patterns found and a preliminary 
assessment of the limits and merits of the Cartel Theory to explain the institutional 
development of the Chambers. Chapter VII concludes. I sum up the findings, I give my 
final assessment about the theory, and I suggest further avenues of research.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
Analyzing Institutional Development  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
 
Once the literature review and the study of the party systems in Argentina and 
Chile had been completed I had no doubt about the theory to test for my research. The 
problem was how to proceed. There was no dataset about deputies, no precise 
information about the parties or coalitions that had been in charge of the Chambers. 
Were they majorities or pluralities? Another problem was how to examine institutional 
development through time. What aspects of the Chambers should I study to detect this 
evolution?  The analysis of committee assignments from 1945 to 2002 was a main 
concern. I could not find information about this issue before the 1990s. And after 1990, 
I had only partial analyses. In view of these limits I decided to conduct fieldwork in both 
Chambers, to create my own datasets, and to integrate quantitative and qualitative 
analyses.  
Part I of the chapter presents the Cartel Theory, explains why I chose it, and shows how 
I derived my general hypothesis. In Part II I provide the definition of institutional 
development. I then present, in Part III, the criteria and predictions derived from the 
theory and two norms from the committee-government model that I will use to 
support or disconfirm the general hypothesis. Part IV focuses on a second theory that I 
test and introduces a typology of majorities and pluralities. Finally, in the last section I 
detail how I created the datasets and explain how I combine quantitative and 
qualitative methods.    
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Part I. The Cartel Theory  
Section 1.  Situating the Theory 
Different eras of congressional organization have been identified according to 
their degree of centralization of power.9 In the post-New Deal period studies are 
traditionally divided between the so-called textbook Congress era studies, which 
appeared after WW II as a result of scholarly work done in the 1950s and 1960s, and the 
postreform era studies, which emerged in the middle of the 1980s after the main reform 
of the Rules of the U.S. House in the 1970s. The former describe the U.S. Congress as a 
modern and professionalized institution characterized by “committee government”, that 
is to say, a decentralized structure with weak parties and party leaders and an 
autonomous committee system controlled by powerful committee barons who strictly 
adhere to seniority and apprenticeship norms.10 The postreform era studies, by contrast, 
characterize the U.S. Congress as an organization made up of subservient committees 
and a relevant chamber floor or a majority party as the locus of decision-making. 11 The 
                                                            
9 Cox and McCubbins identify twelve eras or partisan arrangements in Congress between 1789 and 1995 (Cox and 
McCubbins 2002).  
10 The early studies, thickly descriptive, were made by political scientists working in the traditions of anthropology 
and sociology (Matthews 1960; Peabody and Polsby 1963; Polsby 1968; Huitt and Peabody 1969; Dexter 1969; 
Fenno 1978). This era also included the first-generation of formal models (Shepsle and Weingast 1995) to which the 
existence of autonomous committees and strict adherence to the seniority system reflect gains from cooperation. 
The second-generation of formal models -distributive models - enriched the institutional content of rational choice 
theories of legislatures, providing ways in which exogenous institutional arrangements channelled expressions of 
legislative self-interest (Shepsle 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Shepsle and 
Weingast 1995). The theories of this era claimed that reelection was the prime goal of congressmen (Mayhew 
1974; Fiorina 1989 [1977]; Loomis 1988; Arnold 1990).   
11 In the relevant-chamber-floor approach non-partisan goals are salient and political parties are denied a 
consequential role. Among these studies we find those that focus on floor majorities, the problems of legislative 
decision making under uncertainty, and the role of information (Austen-Smith 1990; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989; 
Krehbiel 1991); competing groups (Dodd 1986; Diermeier 1995), and floor unanimity/cross-coalitions vis à vis the 
Executive Power or inter-chamber rivalry (Davidson and Oleszek 1976; Dodd 1977; Sundquist 1981; Maass 1983; 
Cooper 1988; Born 1990; Diermeier and Myerson 1999). 
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main claim of party-centered analyses is that parties are crucial in the U.S. House. 
Particularly, this institution is well organized to serve the collective interests of the 
majority (Cooper and Brady 1981; Sinclair 1983, 1995; Stewart 1989; Strom 1990; Kiewiet 
and McCubbins 1991; Rodhe 1991; Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rodhe 2000, 2001; 
Finocchiaro and Rohde 2002, 2005; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 1994, 1997, 2002, 2005, 
2007).  
Section 2.  The Cartel or Party Government Theory 
The theory that guides my dissertation comes from the party-centered approach. 
It is the Cartel or Party Government Theory presented by Cox and McCubbins in 
Legislative Leviathan (1993). In this book the authors deal with several problems that the 
committee government model faces when it comes to understanding the systemic 
structure of the U.S. House and its institutional development in the postwar period (Cox 
and McCubbins 1993, 276). Their work reevaluates the role of parties and committees in 
the U.S. House. In this sense, Legislative Leviathan presents the most direct challenge to 
the standard wisdom about the existence of a committee government in the U.S. House. 
In the authors’ view “congressional parties are a species of legislative cartel. These 
cartels usurp the rule-making power of the House in order to endow their members with 
differential power (e.g., the power of committee chairs) and to facilitate and stabilize 
legislative trades that benefit their members” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 278). In 
articulating their view of parties, they discuss the incentives of party leaders and the 
behavior of parties as procedural coalitions.  
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Beginning with the incentives of party leaders, Cox and McCubbins explain that legislative 
parties arise in order to ensure that the usual problems of providing and maintaining 
public goods are overcome. Majority party members are united by their stake in the 
value of their common party label. They suffer electorally if voters believe the party 
failed to adopt needed legislation, just as they benefit if voters credit the party with 
legislative accomplishments. Therefore, individual members’ desire for reelection 
generates a collective interest in their party’s reputation. In this context, faced with 
members who want to pursue individual goals (majority party dilemma), the party 
creates leadership posts that are both attractive and elective, and that induce its leaders 
to internalize the “collective electoral fate of the party” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 133). 
Their occupants have both the wherewithal (monitoring responsibility-arbiter), and the 
incentives (rewards) to solve collective dilemmas. In relation to these rewards, Cox and 
McCubbins state that reelection is not the only interest legislators pursue. They also 
strive for internal advancement and for party majority status because, the authors say, 
not all reelections are created equal: “the payoff to being reelected is higher if one’s 
party wins a majority, as evinced by the obvious payoffs in terms of the Speakership and 
committee chairmanships” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 125). 
As regards parties as procedural coalitions Cox and McCubbins underline the influence 
of the majority party on the pre-floor stages of legislation.12 They explain that they “see 
the translation of procedural into substantive advantages as occurring on both “active” 
                                                            
12 Procedural coalitions are formed by those legislators who join to distribute/benefit from the institutional 
advantages (select the institutional leaders of the chamber, structure its committee system, and get a 
disproportionate share of staff and other legislative resources). Morgenstern gives, in my view, a clear and brief 
definition when he argues that procedural coalitions, which may be quite different from floor coalitions, are 
formed by “those legislators who join to elect legislative leaders, approve voting rules, select staff, and dole out 
committee assignments, or generally organize the legislative business” (Morgenstern 2002, 10). 
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and “latent” tracks” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 8). They relate the active track with the 
scheduling power of the Speaker and committee Chairs and the latent track or 
“automatic pilot” with the substantive advantage the majority party can attain by 
structuring the committee system, which also affects the legislative agenda. The most 
important function of the majority party, they argue, “is precisely to usurp the House’s 
power to structure the committee system” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 253). 
They test this view of the majority party as a procedural coalition through an 
examination of the committee assignment process and of the power of the majority 
party to set the legislative agenda.  
With respect to the former they provide statistical evidence about the limits of the 
main claims of the committee-government model (e.g., the “pure self-selection model” 
and the seniority norm), and the relative influence of party leaders on committee 
assignments, in particular in the case of freshmen.  
In relation to the scheduling power, they present two models that show a partisan bias 
in the selection of bills, and analyze the tools with which majority parties influence the 
committee system.13 These tools, which they call “the instruments of control,” are the 
creation and destruction of committees, the (re)definition of their jurisdictions, the 
substantive agenda-setting power of Chairs, the referral power of the Speaker, the 
regulation of committees’ memberships and appointments, and finally the creation of 
control committees (i.e., committees that can review and revise other committees’ 
                                                            
13 The first model is related to the preferences of a rational Speaker to set the agenda. The second refers to the 
influence the expectations of the Speaker have on the bills committees report.   
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decisions). Their main conclusion is that there has been “a version of “party 
government,” in the House at least, throughout the postwar period” (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993, 277).  
In an article published in 1997 Cox and McCubbins argued that party government is not 
conditional on the level of agreement within the party. The question, they explained, is 
whether party government disappears during the period in which the majority party is 
divided or if majority party members still retain substantial institutional advantages. If 
one considers that even during the heyday of committee government in the U.S. House 
“no minority party member served as chair of any committee (…) [or] as Speaker, the 
majority got the lion’s share of staff allocations on all committees, and majority party 
members got a more than proportional share of seats on the key committees, it seems 
clear that the deck was stacked” (Cox and McCubbins 1997, 1379). To put the point 
another way, they explained, “if one accepts the following premises: (1) election of the 
Speaker and of committee members is by straight party-line votes controlled by the 
majority party; (2) allocation of committee staff is controlled by the majority party; (3) 
the Speaker and the committee chairs have substantial agenda power; (4) the 
committee system as a whole (…) is consistent with the majority party’s interests, then 
one has bought the key assumptions of our argument” (Cox and McCubbins 1997, 1379).  
In Setting the Agenda (2005), Cox and McCubbins stressed the “majority party’ ability to 
set the agenda as the key to its success,” in contrast to traditional partisan theories that 
pointed out to its ability to marshal its troops on the floor as the source of its power 
(Cox and McCubbins 2005, 7). In particular, they explain that the agenda is cartelized 
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when special agenda-setting powers are formally delegated in various offices (the 
chairmanships, the Speakership, and the Committee on Rules), and when the majority 
party secures most of these offices for its senior partners (and ensures their minimally 
fiduciary behaviour). (Cox and McCubbins 2005; 18, 21). In addition, they performed a 
qualitative study of the changes in the U.S. House Rules. They showed that the 
structure of agenda power that enables the majority party to legislate, erected in the 
late 1880s, has not substantially changed. They mention, specifically, that minority 
party’s prerogatives have not been restored, that the Committee on Rules has 
maintained its central position, and that “the powers of the Speaker have waxed and 
waned, but when they have changed, they have simply been redistributed within the 
majority party, not allocated to any minority party members” (Cox and McCubbins 
2005, 45). Their central conclusion is that “changes in the House rules during the 1880s, 
culminating in Reed’s rules, greatly advantaged the majority party; and that 
subsequent changes in House rules and organization have not significantly altered that 
advantage”  (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 24). 
Although the idea may seem familiar, it is appropriate to clarify what the authors mean 
when they argue that parties act as “cartels.” They use the term cartel because 
“procedural cartels, like economic cartels seek to establish a collective monopoly on a 
particular resource (in this case, agenda-setting power), seek to restrict supply of 
products made with this resource (in this case, bills that are placed on the floor 
agenda), and face problems of free-riding (in this case, members reluctant to vote for a 
party measure when such a vote will not sell well back home, or members eager to use 
their delegated agenda powers for personal gain)” (Cox and McCubbins 2005; 42,43).  
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Section 3.  Why Cartel Theory?  
The straightforward answer is that I chose it because it considers parties as the 
most important actors, the central features in the legislative arena. Considering the 
predominant role parties and coalitions have played in the Argentine and Chilean lower 
Chambers (see chapter I), I believe that the Cartel Theory is appropriate to understand 
their institutional development. Previous works in the subfield about this issue also 
encouraged my choice. Jones et al (2002) have demonstrated the inapplicability to the 
Argentine Chamber of Deputies of theories for which parties are irrelevant actors (such 
as distributional and informational theories). Mezey (1993) argues that party-centered 
models seem adequate in the case of political systems with strong parties that select 
candidates, finance their campaigns, and where PR implies that several legislators 
(elected from closed lists) represent the same constituency.  
In addition to these reasons, I chose this theory because it differs from the rest regarding 
its assumptions about legislators’ interests. This approach includes as legislators’ goals 
not just reelection but also advancement in the internal hierarchy of posts within the 
House, good public policy, and majority status for their parties. A theory that assumes 
that reelection is the only goal of legislators would be particularly dubious in the case of 
Argentina since electoral rules in this country limit legislators’ ability to develop a 
professional legislative career (Jones et al. 2002, 656).   
Leaving aside the advantages of the theory vis à vis other approaches, I want to make a 
remark about the evolution of the theory itself and how it relates to my research. As we 
saw in section II, the Party Government Theory (1993), now the Procedural Cartel 
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Theory (2005), has had its own development. The accent now is on the use of agenda 
control and on the role of senior partners (in 1993 the focus was on the Speaker and the 
top few leaders). Even though I pay attention to the evolution of the theory, namely in 
Setting the Agenda (2005), my research is guided by the Cartel or Party Government 
Theory as it was defined in Legislative Leviathan (1993). Despite its close relation with 
the agenda-setting power, in the latter the structuring of the committee system is 
emphasized, and that is exactly what I wish to investigate in my research. Why? 
Because we do not have piles of articles about this issue (as it is the case for the U.S. 
House). Therefore, nothing can be taken for granted. The patterns of the structuring of 
the committee systems of the Chambers are waiting to be discovered.  
Section 4.  Adapting the Theory  
Cox and McCubbins present their theory in different ways in Legislative 
Leviathan. The most specific definition is perhaps the following: “Our view is that parties 
in the House -especially the majority party- are a species of “legislative cartel.” These 
cartels usurp the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the 
structure and process of legislation” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2). The two main 
consequences of the possession of this rule-making power, they argue, is that “the 
legislative process in general -and the committee system in particular- is stacked in favor 
of majority party interests” and that the “key players in most legislative deals are 
members of the majority party” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2). 
To adapt the theory to the Chambers:  
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a) I do not speak of majority but of ruling party (in order to consider majorities and 
pluralities);  
b) I do not speak only of ruling parties but also of ruling coalitions (in order to consider 
the coalitions that ruled both Chambers, specially the Corporación); 
 c) I formulate the general hypothesis combining the view of the Cartel Theory with 1) 
and 2).  
 
The general hypothesis to be examined is then:  
When a legislative party or coalition becomes the ruling party or coalition in the 
Chamber, it will function as a procedural coalition, that is, it will usurp the rule-making 
power of the Chamber to its favor. 
 
From this general hypothesis I derive the predictions that will guide the analysis of the 
evolution of the rules and norms.  
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Part II. The Institutional Development of the Chambers: the Evolution of  
 Organizational Rules and Norms   
As mentioned in chapter I, the first purpose of this study is to reconstruct the 
patterns of institutional development of the Chambers, what I call the reconstruction 
task. I identify the institutional development of the Chambers with the evolution of their 
organizational rules and norms. The definition of these terms is essential to understand 
the meaning and sense of the reconstruction task. This is the objective of this part.  
According to Schickler (2001, 3), “whatever else a national legislature may be, it is a 
complex of rules, procedures, and specialized internal institutions (…) Particular 
configurations of these rules (…) may serve the interests of individual members, parties, 
pressure groups, sectors of society, or the legislature as a whole. As a result, as any 
legislature evolves through time, little is more fundamental to its politics than recurrent, 
often intense, efforts to change its institutions.”  
Beyond the constitutional settings in which the Chambers operate, their members are 
empowered to enact their own organizational rules and norms. When I refer to rules, I am 
speaking of the precepts contained in the Reglamentos of the Chambers (the Rules of the 
House in the U.S. House of Representatives), which regulate pre-floor and floor 
procedures.  
When I refer to norms, I am considering the non-codified rights or procedures, the 
precedents or established practices, and the interpretations deputies make of certain 
rules.  
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When I use the adjective organizational, I am speaking of the aspects that structure the 
activity of deputies.  
The aspects of the organization I chose to examine in this study are the Reglamentos 
and the directing board and committee systems. In relation to Reglamentos, I analyze 
their reforms considering the political context, which party tabled the reform, its 
content, and the rules finally amended. As regards the directing boards, I examine their 
partisan composition, their functions and the procedure and practice to elect them. The 
analysis of the committee system considers its structure, and the process of committee 
assignment.   
I do not examine the rules and norms related to these aspects as they are regulated 
today, but their evolution through time. In this way I will be able to establish the patterns 
of institutional development.  
The analysis of the evolution of the norms and rules related to the structuring of the 
directing board and committee systems cover mainly the pre-floor stages of the 
legislative process. Nevertheless, some of the reforms to the Reglamentos and certain 
precedents or legislatives practices will let us know measures adopted by ruling parties 
or coalitions in order to control floor proceedings.    
Summarizing, I identify institutional development with the evolution of the rules and 
norms associated with the structuring of the committee and the directing board systems 
and the pre-floor and floor procedures. I call these dispositions the “organizational rules 
and norms.” In addition, I identify institutional development with both the preservation 
and the change of these rules and norms over time.  
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Part III. How to Support of Disconfirm the General Hypothesis  
The second purpose of this study is to ascertain whether parties acted as 
procedural coalitions. This part presents the tools that will help me find out the role 
played by ruling parties or coalitions in the institutional development of the Chambers. 
Section 5 deals with the criteria and predictions to support or disconfirm the general 
hypothesis. Section 6 defines the two norms of the committee-government model: the 
apprenticeship and the seniority norms.  
Section 5.  Criteria and Predictions to Support of Disconfirm the General  
        Hypothesis 
I assess the cartel behavior of the ruling party or coalition through two main 
criteria and several predictions that derive from the Cartel Theory. To make the 
predictions I used two guides: the main conclusions regarding the cartel behavior of the 
majority party contained in Legislative Leviathan and also the analysis of the primacy of 
Reed’s Rules in the U.S. House developed by Cox and McCubbins in Setting the Agenda. 
The predictions refer to the proposal and approval of reforms to the Reglamentos and to 
each norm or rule related to the directing board and committee systems.  
 
General Hypothesis 
When a legislative party or coalition becomes the ruling party or coalition in the Chamber, 
it will function as a procedural coalition, that is, it will usurp the rule-making power of the 
Chamber to its favor. 
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The general criterion supporting the hypothesis is:  
 
“Any change in the organizational rules or norms that accrues the advantages of ruling 
parties supports the general hypothesis” 
 
The general criterion that would disconfirm the hypothesis is:   
 
“Any change in the organizational rules and norms that benefits the opposition/minority 
parties disconfirms the general hypothesis” 
 
Below I present the predictions in three simple tables. Though simple, their content is 
important because it will be applied in chapters IV (Argentina) and VI (Chile), which are 
devoted to the reconstruction task. As noted the predictions refer to the proposal and 
approval of reforms to the Reglamentos (Table 1), and to each norm or rule related to the 
directing board system (Table 2) and the committee system (Table 3).  
 
Table 1 - PREDICTIONS DERIVED FROM THE CARTEL THEORY – REFORMS TO THE REGLAMENTOS 
1 - Reforms to the Reglamento proposed by ruling parties or coalitions are adopted on straight 
party-line vote. 
2- The changes that are approved are those that suppress dispositions detrimental to ruling parties 
or coalitions and/or accrue their advantages.  
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Table 2 - PREDICTIONS DERIVED FROM THE CARTEL THEORY BY NORMS/RULES OF THE DIRECTING 
BOARD SYSTEM 
 
Organizational rule/norm 
Predictions 
 
Election procedure 
The election of the members of the directing board or
Mesa is by straight party-line votes controlled by ruling 
parties or coalitions. 
Censure motions  Censure motions moved against the Mesa are rejected.
Partisan composition  
No member of the opposition serves as President or 
Vice-President of the directing board or Mesa. 
 
Power (functions) 
 
The power of the members of the directing board or 
Mesa increases or is redistributed within the ruling party 
or coalition.   
 
The prediction related to the partisan composition of the directing board (Table 2) is new 
in the sense that it could have never been considered by Cox and McCubbins. In the U.S. 
House there exists only the Speaker, who belongs always to the majority party. In 
addition, the prediction regarding the censure motion is examined only in Chile because 
this institution is not legislated in Argentina.      
 
The committee system has its own main prediction:  
“Committees are agents of the ruling party or coalition” 
 
I then derive more specific predictions presented in Table 3.  
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       Creation of leadership  
                     positions                  2 -    Ruling parties or coalitions control this process and keep the lions’  
                                                                       share of the new committee leadership positions.  
 
Committee assignments 
  
 
The allocation of committee seats is controlled by ruling parties or 
coalitions. 
 
 
Partisan composition 
1- Party ratios in committees are consistently set in ruling parties’ 
or coalitions’ favor.  
 
2- Ruling parties or coalitions have super-proportional share of 
seats in important committees. 
 
Chairmanships 
 
  
Assignment process 
The assignment of committee Chairs is controlled by ruling parties or 
coalitions. 
  
 
Table 3 - PREDICTIONS DERIVED FROM THE CARTEL THEORY BY NORMS/RULES OF THE STANDING 
COMMITTEE SYSTEM 
 
Organizational rule/norm Prediction
 
Creation of standing 
committees 
1 -    The increase in the number of committees is not due to the need      
         for matching the structure of ministries or for generating greater   
         expertise but an answer to requests from members of ruling and     
         opposition parties or coalitions to occupy a place in the       
         committee system. 
 
2 -    Ruling parties or coalitions control this process and get the   
         majority of Chairs of the new committees. 
  
Membership   
Enlargement of 
committees’ memberships 
Although the enlargement of committees’ memberships is meant to 
enhance the representation of delegations in the committee system, 
ruling parties or coalitions control this process and preserve their 
prevalence in the distribution of committee seats. 
  
 
1- The increase in committee leadership positions is due to requests 
from opposition parties to occupy a place in the directing boards 
of committees. 
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The predictions about the creation of standing committees, the enlargement of 
committees’ memberships, and the creation of leadership positions are adaptations of 
the instruments of control the majority party uses to structure the committee system 
(Cox and McCubbins 1993, 254).  
 
Section 6.  The Apprenticeship and Seniority Norms 
 
As Cox and McCubbins did for the U.S. House, the analysis of the allocation of 
committee seats in the Chambers will consider the impact of the apprenticeship and 
seniority norms since they suppose a limit to the influence of parties over assignments. 
The latter refers to committee-specific seniority and implies that the committee 
member of the majority (ruling) party with the longest continuous service on the 
committee becomes Chair (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 46). The former suggests that 
committee appointments “operate under an “apprenticeship” norm that guarantees 
mediocre assignments to incoming members” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 42).14 As will be 
discussed in chapters IV (Argentina) and VI (Chile), I consider committee-specific 
seniority, but also the impact of “seniority in Chamber” (i.e. total service in the 
Chamber) more generally. 
 
 
                                                            
14 Cox and McCubbins explain that this norm was suggested by Bullock (1976) and additionally that “In 
somewhat the same vein, Dodd and Oppenheimer (1977, 41) suggest that a “congressional seniority” norm has 
reserved the choicest assignments to those who have accumulated many years of House experience” (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993, 42). 
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Part IV. The Margin Hypothesis  
The examination of the committee assignment process considers another 
prediction that also stems from the party-centered literature: the margin hypothesis of 
Young and Heitshusen (2003).  
These authors argue that majority party incentives to influence committee composition 
vary by victory margins. Differing from the U.S. House, the Chambers were ruled not 
only by single-party majorities, but also by single-party pluralities, majority coalitions 
and plurality coalitions.  These pluralities and majorities, in turn, were not equal in 
terms of the seats they secured in Chamber. This fact makes Young and Heitshusen’s 
line of investigation particularly interesting.  
To test this theory I needed a typology. Therefore, I created a codification of pluralities 
and majorities (Table 4).   
Table 4 - CODIFICATION OF PLURALITIES AND MAJORITIES 
 
Type of Plurality – Majority 
 
 
Criterion 
 
 
Regular Plurality 
 
s ≤ 0.46 
 
Exceptional Plurality 
 
0.46 < s < 0.50 
 
Regular Majority 
 
0.50 ≤  s ≤ 0.55 
 
Exceptional Majority 
 
0.55 < s < 0.67 
 
Qualified Majority 
 
s ≥ 0.67 
 
Note: s is the share of seats of the ruling party in the Chamber.  
The “Type of Plurality – Majority” labels of Table 1 are in accordance and complement 
the labels commonly used in the literature on voting systems (Bergman 1993; Teasdale 
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1996; Colomer and McLean 1998; Nurmi 2003; Barbera and Jackson 2004; Freixas 2004; 
Baharad and Nitzan 2007). I refer particularly to the following labels: “plurality” or 
“relative majority” (the party that secures more [votes] seats than the rest in Chamber); 
“absolute majority” (50% + 1 of the [votes] seats), and “qualified or super majority” (2/3 -
67%- or more of the [votes] seats).  
With this typology I am ready to test the prediction of Young and Heitshusen. 
According to the authors, “A majority party with a small margin faces more difficulties 
in overcoming the minority party’s obstructive tendencies [Dion 1997] and thus has 
greater incentives to influence committee composition in ways favourable to the 
majority party [McCarty et al. 2001]” (Young and Heitshusen 2003, 663). 
The prediction, adapted to the Chambers’ scenario, can be stated as follows: since 
pluralities and regular majorities face “more difficulties in overcoming the opposition 
delegation’s obstructive tendencies” (Young and Heitshusen 2003, 663), they will 
exercise (in proportion) greater control of the standing committees’ composition than 
qualified or exceptional majorities.  
The general criterion supporting the hypothesis is:  
 
“Pluralities and regular majorities secure (in proportion) a greater share of committee seats 
than qualified or exceptional majorities do” 
 
 The general criterion that would disconfirm the hypothesis is:   
  
“All types of ruling parties exhibit an equal share of committee seats” 
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Part V. Time Frame - Datasets - Analyses 
The study will cover the institutional development of the Chambers from 1945/6 
to 2001/2. The exact year for each country is determined by their legislative periods.15  
In Argentina the exact period is 1946-2001. It begins with the congressional and 
presidential elections of 1946 (first term of President Juan D. Perón), and ends before the 
renewal of the Chamber after the 2001 mid-term congressional elections (President 
Fernando de la Rúa’s term). The study in Chile covers fifty-seven years. It begins with the 
renewal of the Chamber after the 1945 mid-term congressional elections (President Juan 
Antonio Ríos Morales’ term), and ends in 2001 during the Presidency of Ricardo Lagos 
Escobar.  
There are two reasons for adopting such a time frame. On the one hand, the study 
demands a long extension of time to examine intra-country temporal variation. On the 
other hand, this extension of time allows a reconstruction of all the information needed. 
The further one goes back in time, the more difficult the task gets regarding legislative 
archival sources. 
Except otherwise indicated, the information shown in tables, figures, and the empirical 
analyses of chapters IV and VI rely on two new extensive datasets of Argentine and 
Chilean deputies.  
                                                            
15 The legislative period in Chile and Argentina is the time the Chambers function between two elections. In 
Chile the legislative period lasts four years. It opens with the election of the Mesa and the committee 
assignments and coincides with the four-year terms of its deputies. In Argentina the legislative period lasts two 
years. It opens with the election of the directing board and the committee assignments but does not coincide 
with the four-year terms of its deputies. Note that in Argentina one-half of the Chamber is renewed every two 
years and that the directing board is elected every year.   
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The datasets cover practically the same period (Argentina: 1946-2001; Chile: 1945-2002). 
The unit of observation (3.945 in Argentina; 1538 in Chile) is member (name)-legislative 
period. For each unit of observation the following variables were considered: party 
affiliation; region of provenance; number of terms in Chamber (in order to distinguish 
freshmen from seniors); committee assignments; positions in the Chamber (President or 
Vice-President), within delegations (party leader) and in committees (Chair-Vice-Chair-
Secretary-Regular member); and type of ruling party the deputy belong to (single-party 
or coalition / plurality or majority). To my knowledge, this is the first research based on 
such a collection of data.  
All the information comes from official archives, and was gathered during extended 
fieldwork in Argentine and Chile.  
In Argentina I conducted research in the “Oficina de Informacion Parlamentaria” of the 
Chamber of Deputies (Capital City - Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires). In Chile I 
worked first in the “Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional” (Capital City - Santiago), and then 
in the “Oficina de Informaciones” of the Corporación, situated in the city of Valparaiso. 
The bulk of the work consisted primarily in a systematic search through the indexes of 
the Journals of Sessions of the Argentine and Chilean Chambers from 1945 to 1973. I 
looked for the debates about the reforms to the Reglamento, committee assignments, 
censure motions (only in Chile), and the sessions devoted to the election of the directing 
boards. I also examined special publications about the composition of the Argentine 
Chamber, and few works about the evolution of the Chilean committee system until the 
1950s. For the post-dictatorship period in Chile, I used the information available on the 
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Corporación’s website and data I had gathered for my MA thesis in my previous visit to 
the Chilean Chamber in 2001. When I was about to finish my work in Chile, the officials of 
the “Oficina de Informaciones” informed me that since the 1990s the Journals of 
Sessions did not have indexes. Hence, from 1990 to 2002 the search was done session by 
session. In the case of Argentina I continued to rely on the paper version of the Journal of 
Sessions for the 1980s and early 1990s because the Chamber’s website has no 
information of these periods. Indexes also disappeared from the Argentine Journal of 
Sessions since 1989.  The information related to the functions of the members of the 
directing boards or Mesas and Chairs were obtained from different versions of the 
Reglamentos of each Chamber. 16 
The analyses of the reforms to the Reglamentos; the composition of the directing boards, 
their functions, elections, the evolution of the standing committee system and the 
procedure and practices about the committee assignment process are all based on the 
debates found in the Journal of Sessions and in the successive versions of the 
Reglamentos.    
I test my hypotheses about ruling parties or coalition shares in Chamber and 
committees, the impact of the margin hypothesis and the influence of the seniority and 
apprenticeship norms using contingency tables, OLS regression models, and logit 
regression models. The details regarding the empirical analyses are provided in 
individual country chapters.  
                                                            
16 The list of official publications, websites and the definitions of terms that are often used in the study can be 
consulted in APPENDIX A. 
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Throughout the analyses attention is paid to the electoral system in force, and the ruling-
party type in the Chambers at the time of the reform or maintenance of organizational 
rules and norms, to check for the influence of these factors.  
This study is about the institutional design of two Latin American Chambers of 
Deputies. It intends to provide a comparative and as far as possible complete view of 
their institutional development over time. To that end, it examines specific rules and 
norms of these organizations. The analytical framework is the Cartel Theory. Therefore, 
it focuses on the roles parties played in this development. The goal is to ascertain 
whether these parties acted as procedural coalitions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
Getting to Know the Argentine Chamber of Deputies 
1946-2001 
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My main goals are to reconstruct the patterns that underlay and shaped the 
institutional development of the national lower chambers of Argentina and Chile and 
determine if the Cartel Theory can explain them. As mentioned in chapter I, the first 
step to reach my goals is to generate a view of these organizations through time, a 
subject neglected in the literature before the 1980s and partially studied since then. 
Therefore, starting with the Argentine case, I present a summary account of the 
country’s politics during these fifty-five years (Part I) and then provide a detailed 
description of the Chamber’s organization (Part II).  
 
Part I.  Overview of Argentine Politics  
Basic information about the interplay among constitutional, military 
governments, and parties is offered in this part. This information is needed to grasp the 
surrounding circumstances in which the institutional development of the Chamber 
took place. Section 1 briefly describes constitutional changes and identifies democratic 
and authoritarian periods. Section 2 gives an overview of the two main Argentine 
political parties. 
Section 1.  Constitutions, Democratic and Authoritarian Periods   
Argentina is a federal republic consisting of 23 provinces and an autonomous 
Federal Capital (24 electoral districts). It has a presidential form of government with a 
bicameral legislature.  
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The National Constitution, originally adopted in 1853, has had several reforms. Among 
the most important are the 1949 and the 1994 amendments. The former took place 
during the first term of President Juan D. Perón (1946-1952) and was annulled by the 
de facto government of 1955. The 1994 reform -the actual text of the Constitution- was 
a result of a pact between the two main political parties: the Peronist/Justicialist Party 
-PJ- (Partido Peronista/Justicialista) and the Radical Civic Union -UCR- (Unión Cívica 
Radical). This reform reduced the presidential term from six to four years, and 
abolished the indirect system of electoral college established for the election of the 
President (and the Vice-President) in 1853. Since 1995, the Executive Power is elected 
via a modified majority runoff. 17   
The 1949 and the 1994 reforms have one element in common: both introduced the 
presidential reelection, an institution explicitly forbidden in the original text of 1853. 
The actual Constitution set a limit of two consecutive four-year terms.18  
In the period over analysis, ten presidential elections were held. Six presidents 
belonged to the PJ, and four to the UCR. As Table 5 shows only three presidents 
completed their terms in office.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
17 No electoral college brought a majority different from the one decided by popular vote from 1853 to 1989, 
and no presidential runoff has been held since 1995.  
18 The 1994 reform also raised the composition of the upper Chamber from 48 to 72 senators, changed its 
renewal period (from every three to every two years), and reduced senators’ tenure from nine to six-year terms. 
Since 1994 each province elects three senators: two seats go to the party obtaining the first plurality, and the 
third seat goes to the runner up. Before the reform, each province -and the Federal Capital- was represented by 
two senators elected indirectly by provincial legislatures -an electoral college in the Federal Capital-. 
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Table 5 - PARTY, TENURE, AND CAUSE OF TERM CONCLUSION OF DEMOCRATIC ARGENTINE 
PRESIDENTS 1946-2001 
 
President 
Party-Coalition in 
Government  a 
Period 
Term 
Conclusion 
Juan D. Perón 
 
National Front b  
 
June 46 - June 52 
 
 
Completion of 
legal term  
Juan D. Perón 
 
 
PJ 
  
 
June 52 - Sep. 55 
 
 
 
Overthrown 
by a coup 
d’état 
Military Coup 
 
Arturo Frondizi c 
 
 
UCRI d
 
 
May 58 - March 62 
 
 
Overthrown 
by a coup 
d’état 
Military Coup 
Arturo U. Illia e 
 
 
UCRP f
 
 
Oct. 63 - June 66 
 
 
Overthrown 
by a coup 
d’état 
Military Coup 
Héctor J. Cámpora g PJ May 73 - July 73 Resigned 
 
Raúl A. Lastiri h PJ July 73 - Oct. 73 Interim 
 
Juan D. Perón PJ Oct. 73 - July 74 Died in office 
María E. M. de Perón 
 
 
PJ 
 
 
July 74 - March 76 
 
 
 
Overthrown 
by a coup 
d’état 
Military Coup 
Raúl R. Alfonsín i UCR Dec. 83 - July 89 Resigned 
 
Carlos S. Menem j 
 
PJ 
 
July 89 - July 95 
 
Completion of 
legal term 
Carlos S. Menem 
 
PJ 
 
July 95 - Dec. 99 
 
 
Completion of 
legal term 
Fernando de la Rúa k 
 
ALIANZA l 
 
Dec. 99 - Dec. 01 
 
 
Resigned 
 
a. For a list of political parties and coalitions see APPENDIX B.  
b. The National Front consisted of the Labor Party (Partido Laborista), the Labor and Independet Party (Partido Laborista e 
Independiente), and the Radical Reorganizing Group -UCR/JR- (UCR-Junta Renovadora). 
c. Arturo Frondizi was twice deputy for the UCR (1946-1948; 1948-1952). 
d. Intransigent Radical Civic Union (UCR Intransigente).  
e. Arturo U. Illia was deputy for the UCR (1948-1952).  
f. People’s Radical Civic Union (UCR del Pueblo).  
g. Héctor J. Cámpora was twice deputy for the PJ (1946-1950; 1952-1958).     
h. Raúl A. Lastiri was deputy for the PJ (1973-1977).  
i. Raúl R. Alfonsín was deputy for the UCRP (1963-1967) and senator for the UCR (Dec. 2001-July 2002). 
j. Carlos S. Menem is senator for the PJ since 2005.   
k. Fernando de la Rúa was deputy (1991-1992) and three times senator for the UCR (1973-1977; 1983-1989; 1992-1996).  
l. The Alliance for Jobs, Justice, and Education (Alianza por el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación) was a coalition composed of 
the UCR and the Front of a Country in Solidarity -FREPASO- (Frente País Solidario).  
Source: Own elaboration upon data from Potash (1959), Hodges (1988), Manzetti (1993), and Jones (2002).  
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From 1955 to 1983 Argentina had four military coups. The armed forces stood in power 
for intermittent periods that covered more than eighteen years. All coups ordered the 
dissolution of the Congress (Table 6). 19   
 
Table 6 - TENURE ARGENTINE DE FACTO PRESIDENTS, DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTS DEPOSED AND 
CHAMBER’S DISSOLUTION AND RE-OPENING SESSIONS 1955-1983 
 
Source: Own elaboration upon data from Potash (1959), Snow (1971), Hodges (1988), Manzetti (1993), and Journals of 
Sessions of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies (1955-1983).  
 
The coup that deposed President Perón (the “Liberating Revolution”) was led by 
General Eduardo A. Leonardi. He was immediately replaced by General Pedro E. 
Aramburu when the hard-line group in the armed forces, whose main goal was to erase 
any Peronist legacy, knew about Leonardi’s reconciliation plans with Peronists. 
General Aramburu dissolved and banned the PJ, confiscated its assets, made illegal the 
naming of “Perón,” and annulled the 1949 Constitution.  
                                                            
19 Before 1955 Argentina had two interventions of the armed forces: the 1930 coup (06.09.30) that overthrew 
President Hipólito Yrigoyen (UCR), and the 1943 coup (04.06.43) that put an end to President Ramón Castillo’s 
term (Conservative Party -CONSR- Partido Conservador). 
De Facto President and Term in Office 
Date of 
Military 
Coup 
Democratic 
President 
Deposed 
Date of 
Chamber's Last 
Session before 
the Coup 
Date of Chamber's 
Re-opening 
Session 
Period 
Known as the  
Eduardo A. Lonardi (Sept. '55 - Nov. '55) 
16.09.55 Juan D. Perón 15.09.55 31.03.58 
“Liberating 
Revolution” Pedro E. Aramburu (Nov. '55 - May '58) 
José M. Guido (March '62 - Oct. '63) 27.03.62 Arturo Frondizi  23.04.62 12.08.63 - 
Juan C. Onganía (June '66 - June '70) 
28.06.66 Arturo U. Illia 24.06.66 03.05.73 
“Argentine 
Revolution” 
Roberto M. Levingston (June '70 - March '71) 
Alejandro A. Lanusse (March '71 - May '73) 
Jorge R. Videla (March '76 - March '80) 
24.03.76 
María E. M. de 
Perón 
17,18.03.76 29.11.83 
“Process of 
National 
Reorganization”  
Roberto E. Viola (March '80 - Dec. '81) 
Leopoldo F. Galtieri (Dec. '81 - July '82) 
Reynaldo B. A. Bignone (July '82 - Dec. '83) 
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President Arturo Frondizi (Intransigent Radical Civic Union -UCRI- UCR 
Intransigente) was overthrown in March 1962. The Supreme Court appointed José M. 
Guido, pro-tempore President of the Senate, as interim president until the elections 
scheduled for July 1963. During Guido’s period a new electoral law that introduced the 
PR system was adopted by members of the People’s Radical Civic Union -UCRP- 
(UCR del Pueblo) and the Conservative Party -CONSR- (Partido Conservador) in 
charge of the Ministries of Interior (Home Affairs) and Defence. Besides, Aramburu’s 
measures banning the PJ were re-enacted.  
Almost three years later the armed forces deposed President Arturo U. Illia (UCRP). 
Generals Juan C. Onganía, Roberto M. Levingston and Alejandro Lanusse 
consecutively led this military government labelled the “Argentine Revolution.” 20 
The bloodiest, most violent, and economically devastating de facto regime Argentina 
has ever suffered was the one that deposed María Estela Martínez de Perón (PJ) in 
1976. The “Process of National Reorganization” was in charge of four “juntas” made up 
of three generals each.21 After the defeat in the Malvinas War (June 1982), the military 
regime, completely delegitimized, began a rapid withdrawal that led to the democratic 
elections held on October 30, 1983.22 
 
                                                            
20 General Onganía’s dictatorship collapsed in June 1970. His comrades forced him to resign after the 
assassination of General Aramburu by “Montoneros” (a guerrilla organization). Onganía was replaced by 
General Levingston who was also forced to resign after confronting mass demonstrations against the 
government. General Lanusse replaced Levingston in March 1971. He stood in power until the inauguration of 
President Héctor J. Campora’s (PJ) constitutional government in March 1973.  
21 These juntas are still being prosecuted for human rights violations. 
22 The Malvinas Islands are situated in the South Atlantic Ocean, near the East Argentine coast. Argentina and 
the United Kingdom have disputed over their sovereignty since the 19th century. The Malvinas war was caused 
by the Argentine invasion of the islands on April 2, 1982 (decided by the then de facto government). The war 
ended with the Argentine surrender on June 14, 1982.        
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Section 2.  Main Political Parties  
Argentina’s political history is characterized by the hegemony of three parties in 
the period 1880-1976 (the Conservatives -1880-1916-, the Radicals -1916-1945-, and 
the Peronists -1946-1976-), and an emerging two-party system since 1983, although 
Peronists “have scored more victories, obtained more seats, and registered a more 
stable performance [during the last two decades]” (Malamud and De Luca 2005, 5). In 
particular, between 1946 and 2001 the most important parties were the middle-class 
UCR and the urban working-class and petite bourgeoisie PJ.  
2.1  The Radicals 
The UCR was founded in 1890. Immigrant middle class formed the base for 
Argentina’s first non-aristocratic political party. Radicals were opposed to Conservative 
regimes that ruled the country through restricted suffrage and/or fraudulent elections. 
Their goal was the “recognition of the right of the middle class to participate fully in 
the economic, social, and political life of the country” (Snow and Manzetti 1993, 15). 
The first Radical president was Hipólito Yrigoyen. He won the presidency twice: in 
1916, the first election after the passage of the “Saenz Peña Law,” and in 1928. 23 
Marcelo T. de Alvear was the second Radical president (1922-1928). In his second term, 
President Yrigoyen retained power for less than 2 years (he was deposed by 
Argentina’s first military government in September 1930). Radicals would not regain 
the presidency until the late 1950s. During almost thirty years the country was ruled by 
                                                            
23 The Sáenz Peña Law, named after the president who introduced it (President Roque Sáenz Peña), 
established the “incomplete list” system, made male voting compulsory, guaranteed the secret ballot, and tied 
voting to military service. Only natives and naturalized men could vote (this excluding most of the then working 
class).                                                                 
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military (1930-1932 – 1943-1945 – 1955-1958), Conservative (1932-1943), and Peronist 
(1946-1955) governments. 24 
A few months before the elections of February 1958 (by the end of General Aramburu’s 
regime), Radicals split into two separate organizations: the UCRI (the Intransigent 
Radicals) headed by Arturo Frondizi, and the UCRP (the People’s Radicals), led by 
Ricardo Balbín. While the UCRI’s main goals were integration (the reincorporation of 
Peronism into national political life) and development (industrialization and foreign 
investments), the UCRP rejected electoral alliances with the PJ and adopted a 
nationalistic posture.  
The 1958 elections were won by the UCRI. Arturo Frondizi attained the presidency 
primarily due to a bargain with Perón who, from the exile, traded about two million 
votes for a promise of legality for his banned movement (Snow and Manzetti 1993). 
Keeping his word, President Frondizi (UCRI) allowed the PJ to nominate candidates in 
the legislative and provincial elections of 1962. The Peronist victories led to the March 
1962 military intervention that voided the results of provincial elections, annulled 
legislative elections, and dissolved Congress.25  
During the 1963 political campaign the UCRI formed a front with the PJ. The UCRP, 
whose presidential candidate was Arturo U. Illia, refused to take part in this 
agreement. When the provisional government in charge announced that all votes cast 
                                                            
24 In this period Radicals were subject to factionalism. As the major opposition party, it denounced the use of 
electoral fraud by Conservatives, competed electorally against President Perón and came in conflict with his 
authoritarian rule. On the contrary, the UCR Antipersonalista movement, which broke with the party in 1931, 
entered the conservative coalition, and the Radical Reorganizing Group -UCR/JR- (Unión Civica Radical-Junta 
Renovadora) supported Perón in the 1946 elections (Potash 1959). 
25 In 1962 the PJ obtained 45 of the 95 seats at stake in the lower Chamber and 9 governorships including the 
crucial province of Buenos Aires. 
52 
 
 
for candidates of the UCRI-PJ front would be voided, Frondizi (UCRI) and Perón asked 
their followers to cast blank ballots in protest. Arturo U. Illia (UCRP) attained the 
presidency with 26% of the popular vote (blank votes attained 19%). After three years 
that were notable for the lack of government action, President Illia (UCRP) was 
deposed by General Onganía (Snow and Manzetti 1993, 22). 
By the time of the 1973 elections Ricardo Balbín led the only party that included the 
name “Radical” in its label. Frondizi’s followers had reorganized in 1964 as the 
Movement of Integration and Development -MID- (Movimiento de Integración y 
Desarrollo), while the UCRI radicals reorganized as the Intransigent Party -PI- 
(Partido Intransigente) under the leadership of Oscar Alende (1973). In the two 
successive presidential elections of 1973 Radicals were defeated by Peronists. Until the 
1976 coup they were again the main opposition party.  
Almost eighteen years after the military intervention that overthrew President Illia 
(1966), another Radical candidate, Raúl R. Alfonsín, was elected president (1983). This 
was the first national defeat of the PJ in legitimate elections and Alfonsin’s (UCR) 
administration was the first democratic government after the 1976-1983 dictatorship. 
Until the legislative and provincial elections of 1987 Alfonsín (UCR) remained a popular 
president. Nevertheless, that year marked the first of five consecutive electoral defeats 
for the UCR. Due mainly to the outbreak of hyperinflation Alfonsín resigned in July 
1989, five months before the end of his term.  
During President Menem’s (PJ) administrations (1989-1995; 1995-1999), the UCR was 
immersed in a deep crisis of both ideas and leadership (Snow and Manzetti 1993). All in 
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all, Radicals fell from 52% of the presidential vote in 1983 to 17% in 1995 (Levitsky and 
Murillo 2005). Furthermore, in 1995 the UCR presidential candidate finished third 
behind the candidate of the newly created Front of a Country in Solidarity -
FREPASO- (Frente País Solidario).  
The political landscape changed when the UCR and the FREPASO formed the Alliance 
for Jobs, Justice, and Education -ALIANZA- (Alianza por el Trabajo, la Justicia y la 
Educación), a coalition that defeated the PJ in the legislative elections of 1997.  
The 1999 presidential elections were also won by the ALIANZA whose candidate, the 
Radical Fernando de la Rúa, obtained 45.5% of the votes. “The Alianza promised to 
combat corruption and address the social costs of neoliberalism (…) However, de la 
Rúa failed to deliver on both of these fronts” (Levitsky and Murillo 2005, 37). After the 
resignation of Vice-President Carlos Alvarez (FREPASO-ALIANZA), following the burst 
of a corruption scandal in the Senate and turbulent economic months, the ALIANZA 
was defeated by the PJ in the October 2001 legislative elections. Only two years after 
his inauguration, President de la Rúa (UCR-ALIANZA) resigned in the midst of the 
unprecedented political, economic, and social crisis that provoked the middle-class 
uprising against his administration in December 2001. The slogan of this wave of 
rioting and protest was “throw everyone out” (que se vayan todos). The FREPASO was 
virtually wiped out in the 2001 crisis. 
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2.2 The Peronists 
The de facto regime that deposed President Yrigoyen (UCR) in 1930 was followed 
by the “infamous decade” that ended in 1943.26 That year the armed forces led by the 
GOU lodge (Grupo de Oficiales Unidos) deposed President Ramón A. Castillo 
(CONSR).27 Although General Edelmiro Farrell was the de facto president, Colonel Juan 
D. Perón, one of the GOU’s leaders, became the real power behind the government.28 
In October 1945, after being detained and imprisoned by a group of army officers, 
“hundreds of thousands of workers converged in the huge plaza in front of the 
government house to demand Perón’s return. He was released and for the next decade 
was the master of Argentina” (Snow and Manzetti 1993, 19).   
In the 1946 elections, Perón was the presidential candidate for the National Front 
formed by the Labor Party (Partido Laborista), the Labor and Independent Party 
(Partido Laborista e Independiente), and a faction of the UCR, the Radical 
Reorganizing Group -UCR/JR- (UCR Junta Renovadora). The Labor Party and the 
UCR/JR officially merged in June 1946 to constitute the Unified Party of the National 
Revolution -PURN- (Partido Unificado de la Revolución Nacional), and later 
reorganized in January 1947 as the Peronist Party (in 1963 Perón, who was exiled in 
Venezuela, founded the Justicialist Party as a continuity of the Peronist Party).  
 
                                                            
26 This decade was governed by Conservative politicians who reached power through fraudulent elections and 
run the country almost exclusively for the benefit of the landed aristocracy, commercial and industrial elites of 
Buenos Aires, and foreign interests (Snow and Manzetti 1993). 
27 The GOU was composed of middle-grade officers that were as much pro-Axis as Anti-Communist. 
28 Perón implemented pro-labor policies that benefited the neglected new urban working class. By 1945 he 
headed the Vice-presidency, the Secretary of Labor, the Minister of War, and the Postwar Council. 
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In the presidential elections of November 1951, the Perón-Teissaire formula defeated 
the Radical ticket Balbín-Frondizi. Peron’s second constitutional mandate lasted until 
the military coup of 1955.  
Even though Peron’s administrations resolutely benefited neglected sectors of society, 
he was first criticized and then fought for his authoritarian measures against the press, 
the judiciary, and opposition leaders. By 1955 he had lost the support of the main 
political actors that had backed his candidacy in 1945: the Catholic Church, organized 
labor, and the armed forces (Snow and Manzetti 1993). As Snow and Manzetti argue 
(1993, 21), although it was “relatively simple for the military to get rid of Perón, it was 
much more difficult to rid the country of Peronism.” In this sense, note that the PJ, 
despite successive bans, remained the largest political party during the 1950s and 
1960s and that neo-Peronist parties obtained significant victories during the 1960s.29  
General Lanusse, the last de facto president of the “Argentine Revolution,” mandated 
that all Peronist candidates but Perón were allowed to compete for the presidency in 
the 1973 elections. The elections held in March were won by Héctor J. Campora, the 
candidate of the Justicialist Front of Liberation -FREJULI- (Frente Justicialista de 
Liberación). Nevertheless, his tenure did not last long. After eight weeks in office he 
resigned and called for new elections to allow Perón to take charge. In September 1973 
Perón again defeated his main opponent, the Radical Ricardo Balbín, by a landslide 
(62% of the vote) (Manzetti 1993). Perón stood in power less than ten months because 
                                                            
29 The outlawing of the Peronist Party (Nov. 1955) created a political void into which several neo-Peronist 
parties (known as “Peronism without Perón”) sought to move. “Organized in most instances by men who had 
served President Perón at one time only to break with him subsequently, these parties tended to resemble the 
banned organization in their emphasis on labor, in their party programs, and, in several instances, in their 
deliberate choice of a name beginning with the letter “P””(Potash 1959, 520).  
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he died on July 1st, 1974. He was replaced by Vice-President María Estela Martínez de 
Perón, who ruled the country until the military coup of 1976. 30 
The failed PJ presidential candidate in 1983, Italo Luder, was an upper-middle-class 
intellectual who tried to lead a campaign damaged by outdated, violent, and 
demagogic speeches made by other Peronists.  
After the 1983 electoral defeat, a group of moderate Peronists emerged. The 
Renewers (Los Renovadores), as they called themselves, performed impressively in 
the mid-term elections of 1985 and gained control of the majority of the provinces in 
1987. When the Peronists selected their presidential candidate for 1989, however, the 
powerful governor of Buenos Aires, the Renewer Antonio Cafiero (PJ), was defeated by 
Carlos S. Menem (PJ), a caudillo of the poor province of La Rioja, who was allied with 
the old union bosses.              
On May 14, 1989, Carlos S. Menem obtained 47% of the popular vote against 37% for 
the Radical competitor. Leaving aside his populist platform, he responded to the 1989 
hyperinflationary crisis with a dramatic policy shift to neoliberalism (Levitsky and 
Murillo 2005, 27). After this shift, the PJ won four national elections in a row (including 
the presidential elections of 1995) and even reformed the Constitution in 1994. The 
absence of transparency and the high-profile scandals of Menem’s administrations 
eroded the electoral support of the PJ (Levitsky and Murillo 2005). After two 
                                                            
30 In the aftermath of Perón’s death Peronism split in three factions: the Peronist youth (or the guerrilla group 
Montoneros) that went underground, the ultra-right wing headed by Social Welfare Minister José López Rega, 
and the union bosses led by Lorenzo Miguel. As Snow and Manzetti (1993) argue, the military period only hid 
the profound crisis that affected Peronism after its leader’s death. 
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consecutive electoral defeats (1997 and 1999), the PJ won the mid-term elections of 
2001.  
 The Argentine political setting of the period covered by this thesis (1946-2001) 
may be well defined in this way: in fifty-five years only three presidents completed 
their terms in office. This being the case, the idea of exploring the functioning of the 
lower Chamber may appear somewhat dubious. The following sections and the next 
chapter deal with this challenge. I will demonstrate that beyond political circumstances 
and external influences, the Chamber has had its own institutional dynamic.       
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Part II. The Description of the Chamber’s Political Organization31  
My first objective is to specify when, by whom, how, and why the organizational 
rules of the lower Chambers were adopted or modified. Part I gave the general context 
in which that development took place in Argentina. Now I turn to a detailed description 
of the organization of its lower Chamber through time. This information is essential to 
fully understand the emergence of those patterns.  
The lack of systematic information about the Argentine lower Chamber is almost 
complete, particularly before 1983. The following sections address basic subjects such 
as quorums, legislative periods, and majorities and pluralities that ruled the Chamber. 
Section 5, in particular, offers a description of its partisan composition from 1946 to 
2001. 
Section 3.  Membership, Quorums, and Legislative Periods 
The 257 Argentine deputies are elected for four-year terms from 24 
multimember districts. One-half of the Chamber is renewed every two years, and 
deputies can be reelected indefinitely. The legislative year lasts from March 1st to 
February 28th/29th of the following year. Ordinary sessions cover a period of eight 
months -from March 1st to November 30th-. Extraordinary sessions go from December 
1st to February 28th/29th. Every two years, preparatory sessions are held in December 
(to elect the directing board and make the committee assignments), and annually in 
                                                            
31 Except otherwise indicated, all data employed in the rest of this chapter were obtained from official 
publications of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies (see APPENDIX A).  
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February (to establish hours and days of ordinary sessions).32 The quorum is the 
“absolute majority of the members meaning this that present members outnumber 
absent ones” (rule 15 of the Reglamento). In other words, the actual quorum is 129/257.  
The main institutional features of the Chamber (i.e., deputies’ terms, the biannual 
renewal, legislative periods, and legislative calendar) come from the 1853 and 1994 
constitutions. Its actual membership, by contrast, has several sources. In addition, it 
has changed quite a few times as a result of decennial census updates, amendments to 
the electoral system, the achievement of provincial status of national territories, laws, 
and de facto decrees. 
 
In the 1853 Constitution, the legislative year went from May 1st to April 30th of the 
following year (ordinary sessions covered a period of four months -from May 1st to 
September 30th- extraordinary sessions went from November 1st to April 30th, and the 
preparatory sessions were held in April or November). A law approved on December 2, 
1854, apportioned one deputy per 20,ooo people or fraction over 10,000.  
The 1898 constitutional reform fixed the proportion of one deputy per 33,000 people or 
fraction over 16,500 and established that this proportion should be updated by the 
Congress according to decennial censuses.  
Leaving behind years of electoral fraud, in 1912 the Congress approved the Sáenz Peña 
Law, also known as “incomplete list.” This law gave two thirds of the seats to the party 
                                                            
32 The directing board of the Chamber is composed of a President and three Vice-Presidents (I will refer to the 
latter as VP1, VP2, and VP3). 
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that got the most votes in a district, and the remaining third to the second largest 
party. Nine years later, and based on the 1912 census, Law 10.834 apportioned one 
deputy per 49,000 people or fraction over 16,500. From 1920 on the Chamber would be 
made up of 158 deputies.  
Thirty years later, Perón’s administrations brought substantive though fleeting 
changes. The 1949 Constitution modified not only the proportion established in 1919 
(from then on it would be one deputy per 100,000 people or fraction over 50,000), but 
also established that no district would receive fewer than two deputies, that they 
would be elected for six-year terms (instead of four-year terms), and that one-half of 
the Chamber would be renewed every three years (instead of the biannual renewal). 
Before ending the first term of Perón, the Congress introduced the uninominal system 
that established a congressional redistricting at the national level. 33 These reforms, the 
incorporation of “delegates” from national territories, and the achievement of 
provincial status of national territories increased the Chamber’s membership from 158 
in 1946 to 166 in 1955.34  
                                                            
33 Law no. 14.032.  
34 The national territories of Chaco and La Pampa attained provincial status in 1951 (Law no. 14.037) - until the 
overthrowing of President Perón these provinces were known as Presidente Perón and Eva Perón, respectively. 
The first deputies representing Chaco and La Pampa entered in the Chamber in 1953 (two deputies from Chaco 
and four deputies from La Pampa). Misiones changed to province in 1953 (Law no. 14.294) and sent two 
deputies to the Chamber in 1955. The rest of the territories became provinces in 1955 (Formosa, Neuquén, Río 
Negro, Chubut, and Patagonia by Law no. 14.408). Before changing to provinces those territories were 
represented in the Chamber through “delegates” that only could vote in committees (they did not have the 
right to vote on the floor). In 1952 eleven delegates entered in the Chamber representing the territories of 
Comodoro Rivadavia (1), Chubut (1), Formosa (2), Misiones (2), Neuquén (1), Río Negro (2), Santa Cruz (1), and 
Tierra del Fuego (1). In 1957 the military regime split the Patagonia province to form the province of Santa Cruz, 
and the national territory of Tierra del Fuego, Antártida e Islas del Atlántico Sur which was the last territory to 
attain provincial status in 1991. The first deputies representing the territories which changed to provinces in 
1955 entered in the Chamber in 1958. From 1955 to 1966 Tierra del Fuego had no national legislative 
representatives.  
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The military government of 1955 annulled the legislation enacted by Perón’s 
governments, established a new proportion for the 1958 elections (one deputy per 
85,000 people), but maintained the minimum of two deputies per province. After 
President Frondizi’s oust in 1962, the Sáenz Peña Law was abrogated and replaced by 
the PR electoral system, which was first applied in 1963.  
The incorporation of deputies representing the territories that changed to provinces in 
1955, coupled with the aforementioned changes, increased the number of deputies 
first to 187 (1958-1962), and then to 192 (1963-1966).   
The dictatorial regime of 1972 adopted three main changes in view of the 1973 
elections. First, the biannual renewal of the Chamber was annulled. Second, no district 
would receive fewer than three deputies. Third, the national territory of Tierra del 
Fuego, Antártida e Islas del Atlántico Sur would elect two deputies. Therefore, the 
Chamber reopened in 1973 with 243 members whose terms would end in 1977 (the 
Congress was dissolved by the 1976 military coup). These changes were applied only 
for the 1973 elections.   
On July 12, 1983, General Reynaldo B. A. Bignone (the then de facto President) signed a 
decree calling for elections on October 30. This decree established that: a) the 
proportion from then on would be of one deputy per 161,000 people or fraction over 
80,500; b) no district would receive fewer than five deputies; and that c) no district 
would receive fewer deputies than it possessed during the 1973-1976 democratic 
period. Consequently, using the 1980 census the number of deputies to be elected 
was established in 254.  
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In 1990 the national territory of Tierra del Fuego achieved provincial status, receiving 
five instead of two deputies. Accordingly, the number of deputies increased from 254 
to 257 in 1991. As Jones argued (2002, 148), “while a new allocation of seats should 
have been conducted following the 1991 census, this has not occurred, and it is unlikely 
to occur any time in the near future.” The author was right because the last distribution 
of seats (2009) was carried out using the 1980 census. 
The last two changes of the period were also adopted in the 1990s. The first, 
introduced by the constitutional reform of 1994, fixed the actual periods of ordinary 
and extraordinary sessions. The second, adopted by a reform to the Reglamento 1996, 
established the actual quorum. This amendment modified the traditional criterion to 
fix the quorum that until 1996 was the “50% + 1 of the total number of deputies” (rule 
10 of the Reglamento) which meant that 130 deputies were needed to open a session. 
The new rule lowered the quorum from 130 to 129 deputies.  
The biannual renewals and re-openings after military coups, coupled with the 
institutional changes described, led to eighteen different legislative periods in the 
period 1946-2001. They differ not only for their memberships but also for the length of 
their terms (Table 7).  
In this sense, while 13 of the 18 legislative periods followed the constitutional rule of 
“biannual renewal of the Chamber”, there were two terms that lasted less than a year, 
two terms of three years, and even one case of four years. These distinct legislative 
periods were governed by various ruling parties and coalitions. This is the subject of the 
next section.  
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Table 7 - LEGISLATIVE PERIODS AND NUMBER OF DEPUTIES  
 
           ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001 
 
Legislative 
Period 
1946 
1948 
1948 
  1952 a 
1952 
1955 b 
 1955 c
1958 
1960 
1960 
1962 
1963 
1965 
1965 
  1966d
1973 
   1976 e 
1983 
1985 
1985 
1987 
1987 
1989 
1989 
1991 
1991 
1993 
1993 
1995 
1995 
1997 
1997 
1999 
1999 
2001 
Number of 
Deputies 158 158 160 166 187 192 192 192 243 254 254 254 254 257 257 257 257 257 
 
a. The 1949 constitutional reform extended the terms of those who were deputies in 1948 until 1952. 
b. According to the 1949 constitutional reform deputies were elected for six-year terms and one-half of the 
Chamber was renewed every three years.  
c. The Congress was dissolved by the Liberating Revolution.  
d. The Congress was dissolved by the Argentine Revolution.  
e. According to the 1972 de facto rules deputies were elected for four-year terms without biannual renovation. 
Nevertheless, the Congress was dissolved by  
the Process of National Reorganization.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 4.  Majorities and Pluralities in Control of the Chamber   
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The eighteen legislative periods shown in Table 7 were ruled by eight single-
party majorities, seven single-party pluralities, two majority coalitions and one 
plurality coalition. Peronists as well as Radicals were four times the single-party 
majority in Chamber. Two Peronist majority coalitions controlled the Chamber (1946-
1948; 1973-1976). The only plurality coalition was the ALIANZA UCR-FREPASO (1999-
2001). Peronists and Radicals were the single-party plurality four and three times 
respectively (Table 8).   
Table 8 - MAJORITIES-PLURALITIES / SINGLE PARTY-COALITION, RULING PARTY-COALITION BY 
LEGISLATIVE PERIOD ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001 
 
Legislative Period  
Majority-Plurality/ Single Party-
Coalition 
Ruling Party/Coalition 
 
1946-1948 Majority  Coalition 
 
National Front  
 
1948-1952 
Single-Party Majority  PJ 
1952-1955 
1955 
 
1958-1960 Single-Party Majority UCRI  
1960-1962 
 
1963-1965  
Single-Party Plurality  
 
UCRP  
1965-1966 
 
1973-1976 Majority Coalition  
 
FREJULI 
 
1983-1985  
Single-Party Majority  
 
UCR  
1985-1987 
 
1987-1989 Single-Party Plurality 
 
UCR 
 
 
Single-Party Plurality 
 
PJ 
1989-1991 
1991-1993 
1993-1995 
 
1995-1997 Single-Party Majority  
 
PJ 
 
1997-1999 Single-Party Plurality 
 
PJ 
1999-2001 Plurality Coalition 
 
ALIANZA 
 
 
65 
 
 
The ruling party (the party or coalition in control of the Chamber) was always the same 
as that of the Executive Power. In other words, although presidents in Argentina did 
not have almost half of the time the majority in the lower Chamber, they did not have 
to deal with a different ruling party there.     
4.1.  Ruling Pluralities  
Ruling pluralities and majorities differed by the number of seats they secured in 
Chamber. Beginning with pluralities, I classified them using the typology presented in 
chapter II (Regular Plurality: S ≤ 0.46; Exceptional Plurality: 0.46 < s < 0.50).  
Table 9 - NUMBER, PERCENTAGE OF SEATS, PARTY AND TYPE OF RULING PLURALITIES BY 
LEGISLATIVE PERIODS 
ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001 
 
RULING PLURALITIES 
Legislative 
Period 
Ruling 
Party/Coalition 
Seats 
(No.) 
Seats 
(%) 
Total 
Seats 
(No.) 
Plurality 
Type 
1963-1965 UCRP  71 36,98 192   RP a 
1965-1966 UCRP 69 35,94 192 RP 
1987-1989 UCR 113 44,49 254 RP 
1989-1991 PJ 120 47,24 254   EP b 
1991-1993 PJ 117 45,53 257 RP 
1993-1995 PJ 128 49,81 257 EP 
1997-1999 PJ 119 46,3 257 EP 
1999-2001 ALIANZA  118 45,92 257 RP 
a. Regular plurality         (S ≤ 0.46) 
                b. Exceptional plurality           (0.46 < s < 0.50) 
         
Table 9 shows that the Chamber was ruled by three exceptional pluralities (all of them 
Peronist), and five regular pluralities (three Radical, one Peronist, and one from the 
ALIANZA). Radicals register the lowest plurality (1965-1966) and Peronist the highest 
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(1993-1995). Additionally, half of the 1960s and almost all of the 1990s were ruled by 
pluralities.  
While being the ruling plurality Radicals obtained, on average, 39.1% of the seats, with 
the highest number of seats in 1987-1989. As noted, Peronists were the ruling plurality 
in four occasions. Instead of Radicals, the PJ had an exceptional plurality three times 
(1989-1991, 1993-1995, and 1997-1999). It is interesting to note that: a) being the 
quorum 130/257 in 1993-1995, the PJ with 128 members was only two seats short of 
majority in this legislative period; and that b) the worst percentage of seats the PJ 
secured as a ruling plurality -45.5% in 1991-1993- was higher than the highest UCR 
ruling plurality -44.5% in 1987-1989-.     
The only plurality coalition that ruled the Chamber was the ALIANZA in 1999-2001, 
which had 118 seats (81 UCR, 37 FREPASO). Nevertheless, it is important to stress that 
the UCR and the FREPASO never formed a delegation in the Chamber. Their official 
label was the “ALIANZA Inter-group” (Interbloque de la ALIANZA). In other words, 
there has never been an “ALIANZA delegation” in the Chamber, but an UCR and a 
FREPASO separate delegations, each one with its own authorities and correlative 
legislative benefits.35   
Differences among parties and through decades in terms of the type of pluralities can 
be appreciated in figure 1.  
                                                            
35 Following Jones and Hwang (2003) I call delegation (also known as bloc, party fraction or caucus) to the 
principal organizing unit of parties in the Chambers.    
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4.2.  Ruling Majorities 
As shown in Table 10, the Chamber was ruled by five qualified majorities that exceeded 2/3 of 
the seats (one Radical and four Peronist), two exceptional majorities (one Peronist and one 
Radical), and three regular majorities (one Peronist and two Radical). This classification was made 
following the typology established in chapter II: Regular Majority: 0.50 ≤  s ≤ 0.55; Exceptional 
Majority: 0.55 < s < 0.67; Qualified Majority: S ≥ 0.67).  
Table 10 - NUMBER, PERCENTAGE OF SEATS, PARTY AND TYPE OF RULING MAJORITIES BY LEGISLATIVE PERIODS 
ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001 
RULING MAJORITIES  
Legislative 
Period 
Ruling 
Party/Coalition 
Seats 
(No.) 
Seats 
(%) 
Total 
Seats 
(No.) 
Majority 
Type 
1946-1948 National Front 108 68,35 158  QMa 
1948-1952 PJ 112 70,89 158 QM 
1952-1955 PJ 146 91,25 160 QM 
1955 PJ 154 92,77 166 QM 
1958-1960 UCRI  133 71,12 187 QM 
1960-1962 UCRI  112 58,33 192  EMb 
1973-1976 FREJULI 146 60,08 243        EM 
1983-1985 UCR  129 50,79 254  RMc 
1985-1987 UCR 129 50,79 254 RM 
1995-1997 PJ 131 50,97 257 RM 
a. Qualified majority  (S ≥ 0.67) 
b. Exceptional majority (0.55 < s < 0.67) 
            c. Regular majority  (0.50 ≤  s ≤ 0.55) 
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While the largest majorities concentrate in the periods 1946-1960 and 1973-1976, regular majorities 
can only be found in the 1980s and 1990s (see also figure 2).  
When Radicals were the majority party in Chamber they obtained, on average, 57,7% of the seats, 
with peaks of 71,12% in 1958-1960 and drops of 50.8% in 1983-1987. Radicals (UCRI Radicals) 
obtained a qualified majority in 1958-1960, during Frondizi’s administration. All Peronist qualified 
and exceptional majorities in Chamber coincide with the presidencies of Juan D. Perón.   
This collection of majorities and pluralities were in charge of different compositions of the 
Chamber. The following section provides detailed information about the parties that shared the 
Chamber with those ruling majorities and pluralities.      
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Section 5.  Partisan Composition of the Chamber by Legislative Periods 36 
I describe the compositions of the eighteen legislatures paying attention to the 
main delegations, were they parties or coalitions. This distinction is important because 
it is the criterion adopted in 1963 to define the term “delegation.” In this sense, a 
delegation can either be a group of members of a party (i.e., delegation=party) or a 
coalition of parties formed in Chamber after the election (i.e., delegation=coalition). In 
what follows delegations are presented as they appear in the official booklets of the 
Argentine Chamber of Deputies called “The Composition of the Chamber and 
Committees’ Memberships.”  
 
5.1  Legislative Periods 1946-1948 _ 1948-1952 _ 1952-1955 _ 1955 
 The increasing pre-eminence of the PJ ruling party in the Chamber from 1946 
to 1955 left little room for the opposition. As shown in Tables 11, 13, 15, and 17, parties 
of the opposition progressively disappeared, the UCR being the only delegation that 
shared the Chamber with the PJ in 1955.  
During President Peron’s first term (1946-1952), the majority of the opposition in 
Chamber was known as the “44 delegation” (el Bloque de los 44) in reference to the 44 
seats the UCR (then UCR-Comité Nacional) had won in the 1946 elections (Table 11). 
 
 
 
                                                            
36 For a list of political parties and coalitions see APPENDIX B. 
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   Table 11      Table 12 
    Chamber's Partisan Composition     Directing Board and Ruling Coalition - 1946  
    Legislative Period 1946-1948 
Delegation Seats Seats (%) Directing Board 
PLab a 50 31.65 Position Party 
UCR-CN b 44 27.84 P UCR-JR 
UCR-JR c 28 17.72 VP1                Plab 
LeI d 27 17.08 VP2                LeI 
UCR-Iri e 3 1.9 Ruling Coalition 
CONSR 1 0.63 Party Seats Seats (%) 
DemN f 1 0.63 PLab 50 31.65 
DemP g 1 0.63 UCR-JR 28 17.72 
UCR-Bl h 1 0.63 LeI 27 17.08 
UCR-Anti i 1 0.63 UCR-Iri 3 1.9 
NOP j 1 0.63 Total 108 68,35 
Total 158 100
a. Labor Party (Partido Laborista) 
b. Radical Civic Union - National Commitee (UCR-Comité Nacional) 
c. Radical Reorganizing Group (UCR-Junta Renovadora) 
d. Labor & Independent Party (Partido Laborista e Independiente) 
e. Irigoyenista Radical Civic Union  (UCR-Irigoyenista) 
f. National Democratic Party (Demócrata Nacional) 
g. Progressive Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Progresista) 
h. Bloquista Radical Civic Union (UCR Bloquista) 
i. Antipersonalista UCR (UCR-Antipersonalista)   
j. Chamber’s records do not identify the party of the deputy  
 
 
The rest of the opposition was composed of the CONSR and the DemN (conservative 
parties whose traditional strength sunk during Perón’s regime -Potash 1959-), the 
Antipersonalista and the Bloquista UCR (splinters of the UCR that had backed the 
conservative presidential candidates), and the DemP (a moderate, left-of-center and 
anti-clerical party of the province of Santa Fé that was founded by Lisandro de la Torre 
in 1914).   
In addition to the UCR-JR, the PLab and the LeI, we find the Irigoyenista UCR in the 
ruling coalition (Table 12). This was a faction of the UCR that had supported the ticket 
Perón-Quijano.  
In 1948-1952 the PJ, already unified, is the ruling party in Chamber and occupies all the 
positions on the directing board (Table 14).  
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Table 13       Table 14 
Chamber's Partisan Composition     Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1948  
Legislative Period 1948-1952 
Delegation Seats Seats (%) Directing Board 
PJ 112 70.89 Position Party 
UCR 44 27.85 P PJ 
UCR-Anti 1 0.63 VP1 PJ 
DemN 1 0.63 VP2 PJ 
Total 158 100 Ruling Party 
Party Seats Seats (%) 
PJ 112 70.89 
Total 112 70.89 
 
The UCR membership of the first two legislative periods contrast sharply with the 14 
and 12 seats the party secured in 1952 and 1955, respectively (Tables 15 and 17).  
 
Table 15                Table 16 
Chamber's Partisan Composition      Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1952  
Legislative Period 1952-1955 
Delegation Seats Seats (%) Directing Board 
PJ 146 91.25 Position Party 
UCR 14 8.75 P PJ 
Total 160 100 VP1 PJ 
VP2 PJ 
Ruling Party 
Party Seats Seats (%) 
PJ 146 91.25 
Total 146 91.25 
 
Radicals blamed the uninominal system in force from 1952 to 1955 for these results.37 
They argued that it had been designed to gerrymander the lines in favor of the PJ and 
to the minority’s detriment. Peronists, for their part, claimed that the uninominal 
system benefited minorities (they recalled that it had allowed the prestigious 
Argentine Socialist politician, Alfredo Palacios, to be elected to the Chamber in 1904), 
and argued that their representation came from the electoral results (in 1951 the PJ 
had obtained 62,49% of the votes against 31,81% of the UCR). The historical evidence 
supports both claims. For one part, the margins of victory of the PJ steadily increased 
                                                            
37 Deputy Donato Latella Frías (UCR) called this system “the cunning law of districts” (la mañosa ley de las 
circunscripciones), claiming that the UCR should have gotten 50 or 60 deputies according to the number of 
votes they obtained in the legislative election. Journal 06.05.55, p. 99. 
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from 1946 to 1955, and the initial advantages of the redistricting of 1951 hold over the 
1955 elections. For the other part, the PJ won more deputies than they had before 
redistricting while the UCR dropped 30 seats.  
The uninominal system, however, was not the only problem of Radicals. Internal 
conflicts would further reduce their strength in Chamber. By 1955 the small UCR group 
(12 members) split into “unionistas” and “intransigentes.”  
 
 Table 17         Table 18 
 Chamber's Partisan Composition       Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1955  
 Legislative Period 1955 
Delegation Seats Seats (%) Directing Board 
PJ 154 92.77 Position Party 
UCR 12 7.23 P PJ 
Total 166 100 VP1 PJ 
VP2 PJ 
Ruling Party 
Party Seats Seats (%) 
PJ 154 92.77 
Total 154 92.77 
 
In 1952 women entered the Chamber. The passage of the women’s enfranchisement 
law in 1947 (Law no. 13.010) allow them to be candidates for the 1951 elections. As a 
result, twenty-three female deputies (and six female senators) joined Congress that 
year. In 1953 a woman was elected for the first time to the directing board of the 
Chamber. 38 
 
 
 
                                                            
38 Deputy Delia Degliuomini de Parodi (PJ) was elected VP1 for 3 consecutive years (1953-1955). Women should 
wait 44 years to be part again of the directing board of the Chamber.   
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5.2  Legislative Periods 1958-1960 _ 1960-1962 
In the first elections after the military government of the “Liberating Revolution,” 
the UCRI, supported by Peronist votes, won 71% of the seats in Chamber and got all 
the positions on the directing board (Table 20). The other faction of the UCR, the 
UCRP, was the second party in Chamber. After the UCRP came the Liberals from the 
province of Corrientes (Table 19).  
Table 19                                Table 20 
Chamber's Partisan Composition                Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1958  
Legislative Period 1958-1960 
Delegation Seats Seats (%) Directing Board 
UCRI 133 71.12 Position Party 
UCRP 51 27.27 P UCRI 
LIB  a 2 1.07 VP1 UCRI 
NOP 1 0.53 VP2 UCRI 
Total 187 100.00 Ruling Party 
a. Liberal Party (Partido Liberal de Corrientes). Party Seats Seats (%) 
UCRI 133 71.12 
Total 133 71.12
 
 
In the period 1960-1962 the UCRI lost its qualified majority decreasing from 71% to 
58% of the seats (Tables 20 and 22). The UCRP, by contrast, improved its position 
getting 74 seats. For the first time in the period over analysis two parties, the Liberals 
and the National Democrats, presented themselves in Chamber as a delegation: the 
Parties of the Center -PdeC- (Partidos de Centro), and demanded their place in 
committees like the other delegations (Table 21).39  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
39 Journal 11.05.60, p. 46. 
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Table 21                        Table 22 
 Chamber's Partisan Composition     Directing Board and Ruling Party – 1960 
Legislative Period 1960-1962 
 
Delegation Seats Seats (%) Directing Board 
UCRI 112 58.33 Position Party 
UCRP 74 38.54 P UCRI 
PdeC  a 4 2.08 VP1 UCRI 
DPBB  b 1 0.52 VP2 UCRI 
UCR 1 0.52 Ruling Party 
Total 192 100.00 Party Seats Seats (%) 
a. Parties of the Center (Partidos de Centro) 
b. Provincial Defense White Flag Party            
   (Partido Defensa Provincial Bandera   
    Blanca de Tucumán) 
UCRI 112 58.33 
Total 112 58.33 
 
In 1961, nine deputies left the UCRI delegation and formed the Radical National and 
Popular group (7 members), and the Dissident UCRI group (2 members).    
5.3  Legislative Periods 1963-1965 _ 1965-1966 
The “first Congress of the proportionality rule”  (i.e., after the introduction of the 
PR electoral system), brought to the Chamber twenty-five parties.40  Despite the fact 
that the UCRP of President Illia obtained only 71 of the 192 seats, it refused to consider 
the formation of a legislative coalition (Snow 1971). The second plurality, with 20% of 
the seats, was the UCRI. In contrast to precedent periods, this time a third party 
obtained a significant presence in Chamber. It was the Union of the Argentine People 
-UdelPA- (Unión del Pueblo Argentino) created to back retired General Aramburu’s 
candidacy for the presidency. 41 The UCRP, the UCRI and the UdelPA formed the 
directing board (Table 24).   
 
 
                                                            
40
 This is the label Arturo Mor Roig -UCRP- (President of the Chamber), gave to this legislative period in his first 
speech to the Chamber. Journal 12.08.63, p. 12. 
41 The party disintegrated after Aramburu’s assassination in 1969. 
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Table 23                  Table 24 
Chamber's Partisan Composition                                                    Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1963 
Legislative Period 1963-1965  
 
Delegation Seats Seats (%) Directing Board 
UCRP 71 36.98 Position Party 
UCRI 39 20.31 P UCRP 
MPProv a 17 8.85 VP1 UCRI 
UdelPA b 14 7.29 VP2 UdelPA  
FedPCe c 12 6.25 Ruling Party 
DemP  11 5.73 Party Seats Seats (%) 
DemC d 7 3.65 UCRP 71 36.98 
PSA e 6 3.13 Total 71 36.98
FPProv f 5 2.60 
PSD g 5 2.60 
NOD h 3 1.56 
PAL i 2 1.04 
Total 192 100.00
a. Popular Provincial Movements (Movimientos Populares Provinciales)              
b. Union of the Argentine People (Unión del Pueblo Argentino)  
c.  National Federation of Center Parties (Federación Nacional de Partidos de Centro)                         
d. Democratic Christian Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano) 
e. Argentine Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Argentino)    
f.  Federation of Provincial Parties (Federación de Partidos Provinciales) 
g.  Democratic Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Democrático) 
h.  Deputy belonging to no delegation 
i.  Partido Autonomista Liberal de Corrientes 
 
Some parties that entered in the Chamber for the first time decided to gather in 
delegations. As Table 23 shows, this was the case of the Popular Provincial 
Movements -MPProv- (Movimientos Populares Provinciales), a group of six parties 
that represented the Peronist movement; the National Federation of Center Parties -
FedPCe- (Federación Nacional de Partidos de Centro); and the Federation of 
Provincial Parties -FPProv- (Federación de Partidos Provinciales). 42   
In 1964, dissident UCRI members led by former President Frondizi formed a new party, 
and consequently a new delegation in Chamber: the Movement of Integration and 
Development -MID- (Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo). This delegation 
appears in the booklets of the Chamber in 1965.   
 
                                                            
42 Peronists were not allowed to use the label PJ and could present candidates only to the lower Chamber. 
Therefore, they were obliged to create a handful of provincial parties to participate in the electoral process of 
1963. See Appendix B for the list of parties that formed these delegations.  
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Table 25                                                  Table 26 
Chamber's Partisan Composition              Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1965  
Legislative Period 1965-1966  
 
Delegation Seats Seats (%) Directing Board 
UCRP 69 35.94 Position Party 
PJ 54 28.13 P UCRP 
MID a 14 7.29 VP1 PJ 
FedPCe 10 5.21 VP2 MID 
UCRI 10 5.21 Ruling Party 
DemP 9 4.69 Party Seats Seats (%) 
UdelPA 7 3.65 UCRP 69 35.94 
PSA 5 2.60 Total 69 35.94
DemC 4 2.08 
FPProv 4 2.08 
PSD 2 1.04 
PAL 2 1.04 
NOD 2 1.04 
Total 192 100.00
                        a. Movement of Integration and Development (Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo) 
 
In the legislative elections of March 1965, the UCRP declined to 69 seats (the 
lowest plurality from 1946 to 2001). The most important loss, however, was 
suffered by the Intransigent Radicals who became the fourth delegation in 
Chamber together with the Federation of Center Parties as we can see in Table 25. 
The PJ delegation had 54 deputies, and was composed of a group of neo-peronist 
parties. The most important of those parties was the Popular Union Party -PunPo- 
(Partido Unión Popular) with 36 seats. The remaining 18 seats belonged to the 
parties that formed the MPProv (eleven parties in 1965). Frondizi’s MID won 14 
seats, reaching in this way the third place in Chamber (Table 25). The directing 
board was elected in proportion to the seats secured by each party (Table 26).    
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5.4   Legislative Period 1973-1976 
The Congress re-opened in 1973 after seven years of dictatorship. 
       Table 27      Table 28 
         Chamber's Partisan Composition                        Directing Board and Ruling Coalition - 1973  
         Legislative Period 1973-1976  
         
Delegation Seats Seats (%) Directing Board 
FREJULI 146 60.08 Position Party 
UCR 51 20.99 P  FREJULI (PJ) 
APFe  a 13 5.35 VP1        FREJULI  (PPC) 
APR  b 7 2.88 VP2             FREJULI (MID) 
BSJ  c 3 1.23 Ruling Coalition 
CONSR 3 1.23 Party Seats Seats (%) 
PCRev  d 3 1.23 FREJULI 146 60.08 
MPPSL  e 3 1.23 Total 146 60.08
PAL 3 1.23 
UdelPA 3 1.23 
MPN  f 2 0.82 
CRSJ  g 1 0.41 
MPCat  h 1 0.41 
MPSal  i 1 0.41 
PACh  j 1 0.41 
POLe  k 1 0.41 
PPRN  l 1 0.41 
Total 243 100.00
a. Federalist Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular Federalista) 
b. Revolutionary Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria) 
c. Bloc from San Juan (Bloquista de San Juan)                    
d. Christian Revolutionary Party (Partido Cristiano Revolucionario)   
e. Provincial Popular Movement from San Luis (Movimiento Popular Provincial de San Luis) 
f. Popular Movement from Neuquén (Movimieto Popular Neuquino)  
g. Cruzada Renovadora from San Juan (Cruzada Renovadora de San Juan) 
h. Popular Movement from Catamarca (Movimiento Popular Catamarqueño) 
i. Popular Movement from Salta (Movimiento Popular Salteño) 
j. Action for Chubut Party (Partido Acción Chubutense) 
k. Legal Orientation Party (Partido Orientación Legalista) 
l. Provincial Party from Rio Negro (Partido Provincial de Rio Negro) 
 
 
 
According to de facto rules, this Chamber was made up of 243 deputies, and was 
expected to last until 1977 (the biannual renewal was annulled).  
Peronists, who led a coalition of twenty-five organizations labelled FREJULI, secured 
in this period an exceptional majority. In addition to the PJ, the most important parties 
in the FREJULI were the Popular Christian Party -PPC- (Partido Popular Cristiano), 
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and the Frondizi’s MID. Members of these three parties occupied the directing board 
(Table 28).  
After the UCR were the Federalist Popular Alliance -APFe- (Alianza Popular 
Federalista), composed of five provincial parties, and the Revolutionary Popular 
Alliance -APR- (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria), a delegation of three parties of the 
left (Table 27). Note that provincial parties that in precedent periods gathered to form 
a delegation decided to stand alone in Chamber. This process would grow on in the 
next periods.    
5.5 Legislative Periods 1983-1985 _ 1985-1987 
In December 1983, the Congress re-opened for the sixth time after a military 
government. In the polarized presidential and legislative elections of 1983, the winning 
UCR and the PJ got almost all the seats (94.49%). The third party was the Intransigent 
Party -PI- (Partido Intransigente) of Oscar Alende with three deputies (Table 29). As 
Table 30 shows, this was the first period in which the majority (UCR) shared the 
directing board with the first plurality (PJ).  
Among the new groups, we find the Union of the Democratic Center -UCeDe- (Unión 
de Centro Democrático). This party was founded in 1982 by a retired military officer, 
Alvaro Alsogaray, who publicly supported the 1966 and 1976 military coups. His creed 
was deregulation, privatization, and free-market economics. 
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Table 29                              Table 30 
Chamber's Partisan Composition              Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1983  
   Legislative Period 1983-1985              
 
Delegation Seats Seats (%) Directing Board 
UCR 129 50.79 Position Party 
PJ 111 43.70 P UCR 
PI a 3 1.18 VP1 UCR 
BSJ 2 0.79 VP2 PJ 
MPN 2 0.79 Ruling Party 
UCeDe b 2 0.79 Party Seats Seats (%) 
DemC 1 0.39 UCR 129 50.79 
MFPam c 1 0.39 Total 129 50.79
MPJ d 1 0.39 
PAL 1 0.39 
PAutC e 1 0.39 
Total 254 100.00
a. Intransigent Party (Partido Intransigente)  
b. Union of the Democratic Center (Unión de Centro Democrático) 
c. Federal Movement from La Pampa (Movimiento Federalista Pampeano) 
d. Popular Movement from Jujuy Movimiento Popular Jujeño) 
e. Autonomist Party from Corrientes (Partido Autonomista de Corrientes)  
 
   
  
 
 
Table 31                                   Table 32 
Chamber's Partisan Composition               Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1985  
Legislative Period 1985-1987  
             
 
Delegation Seats Seats (%) Directing Board 
UCR 129 50.79 Position Party 
PJ/FR a 61 24.02 P UCR 
BUJ b 29 11.42 VP1 UCR 
NOD 7 2.76 VP2        PJ (FR) 
PI 5 1.97 Ruling Party 
PJ/17Oct c 4 1.57 Party Seats Seats (%) 
UCeDe 3 1.18 UCR 129 50.79 
DemC 2 0.79 Total 129 50.79
MPJu 2 0.79 
MPN 2 0.79 
PAutC 2 0.79 
BSJ 1 0.39 
DemP 1 0.39 
DemMza d 1 0.39 
FREJCat e 1 0.39 
LIB 1 0.39 
MID 1 0.39 
MPCat 1 0.39 
PRSlta f 1 0.39 
Total 254 100.00
a.  PJ Renovation Front (PJ Frente Renovador)  
b.  Bloc of the Justicialist Unity (Bloque de la Unidad Justicialista) 
c.  Peronist Bloc October 17 (Bloque Peronista 17 de Octubre)               
d.  Democratic Party from Mendoza (Partido Demócrata de Mendoza) 
e.  FREJULI from Catamarca (FREJULI de Catamarca) 
f.  Renovation Party from Salta (Partido Renovador de Salta)    
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In the legislative period 1985-1987 Radicals neither lost nor increased their seats. The 
situation of the PJ was different as we can see in Table 31. Peronists not only lost seats 
but also divided in three factions: the Justicialist Party Renewal Front -PJ/FR- (PJ 
Frente Renovador), the Bloc of the Justicialist Unity -BUJ- (Bloque de la Unidad 
Justicialista); and the Peronist Bloc October 17 -PJ/17 Oct- (Bloque Peronista 17 de 
Octubre). 
Nonetheless, a delegation of the PJ (the FR) with less than half of the seats of the 
majority managed to be part of the directing board of the Chamber (Table 32).  We 
can also see in Table 31 the continuous growth of provincial parties initiated in the 
legislative period 1973-1976.      
     
5.6 Legislative Periods 1987-1989 _ 1989-1991 _ 1991-1993 
The electoral support of the UCR decreased substantially in 1987. The party lost 
sixteen seats in the Chamber and the governorships of many provinces. The losses of 
the UCR in the legislative arena and at the national level were the gains of the then 
almost reunited PJ.  
Being now the first plurality, the UCR shared the directing board with the PJ and the 
UCeDe (Table 34).  
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Table 33                                    Table 34 
Chamber's Partisan Composition               Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1987  
Legislative Period 1987-1989              
                                               
Delegation Seats Seats (%) Directing Board 
UCR 113 44.49 Position Party 
PJ 99 38.98 P UCR 
UCeDe 7 2.76 VP1 PJ 
PI 5 1.97 VP2 UCeDe 
DemC 3 1.18 Ruling Party 
DemP 2 0.79 Party Seats Seats (%) 
LIB 2 0.79 UCR 113 44.49 
MPJ 2 0.79 Total 113 44.49
MPN 2 0.79 
NOD 2 0.79 
PAutC 2 0.79 
PRSlta 2 0.79 
PSUC a 2 0.79 
BSJ 1 0.39 
DemMza 1 0.39 
DPBB 1 0.39 
FREJCat 1 0.39 
MID 1 0.39 
MPCat 1 0.39 
PFed b 1 0.39 
PJ/17Oct 1 0.39 
PJ/FR 1 0.39 
PPRN 1 0.39 
US c 1 0.39 
Total 254 100.00
a. Unified-Christian Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Unificado-Cristiano) 
b. Federal Party (Partido Federal) 
c. Socialist Unity (Unidad Socialista)  
 
The decline of the UCR continued in the presidential and congressional elections of 
1989. As mentioned, these elections were won by the Carlos S. Menem (PJ) in the 
midst of a chaotic economic situation. In the Chamber, the PJ increased its 
representation from 99 to 120 deputies becoming the first plurality (Tables 33 and 35). 
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  Table 35                                   Table 36 
 Chamber's Partisan Composition              Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1989  
    Legislative Period 1989-1991  
            
Delegation Seats Seats (%) Directing Board 
PJ 120 47.24 Position Party 
UCR 90 35.43 P PJ 
UCeDe 11 4.33 VP1 PJ 
DemC 3 1.18 VP2 UCR 
DemP 3 1.18 Ruling Party 
FRep a 2 0.79 Party Seats Seats (%) 
HyL b 2 0.79 PJ 120 47.24 
LIB 2 0.79 Total 120 47.24
MPJ 2 0.79 
MPN 2 0.79 
PFed 2 0.79 
PI 2 0.79 
PRSlta 2 0.79 
DPBB 1 0.39 
BSJ 1 0.39 
CRSJ 1 0.39 
DemMza 1 0.39 
MAS – IZU c 1 0.39 
MID 1 0.39 
PAutC 1 0.39 
PBJub d 1 0.39 
PPRN 1 0.39 
PSUC 1 0.39 
US 1 0.39 
Total 254 100.00
a. Republican Force (Fuerza Republicana) 
b. Humanism and Liberation (Humanismo y Liberación)           
c. Movement to Socialism - Unified Left (Movimiento al   Socialismo - Izquierda  Unida) 
d. White Party of Retired People (Partido Blanco de los Jubilados)  
The third place in Chamber was occupied by the antithesis to the PJ: the UCeDe. The 
months to come, however, would show that the PJ would benefit from this fact. 
Although a recalcitrant anti-peronist, Alsogaray (the head of the UCeDe) supported 
President Menem’s shift to neoliberalism and several members of his party occupied 
positions in his government.  
In Table 36 we can see that Peronists did not follow the tradition of pluralities 
regarding the directing board (Tables 24, 26, and 34). In this legislative period they 
kept for themselves the presidency and the VP1, leaving only the VP2 for the UCR.   
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     Table 37                         Table 38 
     Chamber's Partisan Composition                         Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1991  
 Legislative Period 1991-1993  
    
Delegation Seats Seats (%) Directing Board 
PJ 117 45.53 Position Party 
UCR 84 32.68 P PJ 
UCeDe 10 3.89 VP1 PJ 
MOPE a 5 1.95 VP2 UCR 
FRep 4 1.56 Ruling Party 
APer b 3 1.17 Party Seats Seats (%) 
DemP 3 1.17 PJ 117 45.53 
MODIN c 3 1.17 Total 117 45.53 
PRSlta 3 1.17 
US 3 1.17 
CRSJ 2 0.78 
LIB 2 0.78 
MID 2 0.78 
MOPOF d 2 0.78 
MPJ 2 0.78 
MPN 2 0.78 
PI 2 0.78 
Ach e 1 0.39 
BSJ 1 0.39 
DemC 1 0.39 
DemMza 1 0.39 
MAS f 1 0.39 
PAutC 1 0.39 
PBJub 1 0.39 
PFed 1 0.39 
Total 257 100.00
a. Peronist Movement (Movimiento Peronista) 
b. Afirmación Peronista 
c. Dignity and Independence Movement (Movimiento por la Dignidad y la 
Independencia) 
d. Popular Movement from Tierra del Fuego (Movimiento Popular Fueguino)     
e. Action for El Chaco (Acción Chaqueña) 
f. Movement to Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo) 
 
The same distribution of the positions on the directing board was kept in the 1991-
1993 legislative period, even though the PJ had lost three seats in the 1991 mid-term 
elections (Table 38). This period marks the emergence of a dissident movement inside 
the PJ. Its first expression is the Peronist Movement -MOPE- (Movimiento 
Peronista) (Table 37). This delegation, composed of Peronists who were against the 
policies implemented by President Menem, would be the first step towards the 
creation of the FREPASO.   
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5.7  Legislative Periods 1993-1995 _ 1995-1997 
 In the 1993 mid-term elections, the PJ increased its representation from 117 to 
128 seats. As mentioned, the party was two seats short of majority (Table 39).   
    Table 39                              Table 40 
    Chamber's Partisan Composition                              Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1993  
                                  Legislative Period 1993-1995  
             
Delegation Seats Seats (%) Directing Board 
PJ 128 49.81 Position Party 
UCR 83 32.30 P PJ 
MODIN 6 2.33 VP1 PJ 
US 5 1.95 VP2 UCR 
UCeDe 4 1.56 Ruling Party 
FG a 3 1.17 Party Seats Seats (%)
FRep 3 1.17 PJ 128 49.81 
MOPOF 3 1.17 Total 128 49.81
PRSlta 3 1.17 
Ach 2 0.78 
DemP 2 0.78 
LIB 2 0.78 
MPJ 2 0.78 
MPN 2 0.78 
PAutC 2 0.78 
BSJ 1 0.39 
CONSR 1 0.39 
CRSJ 1 0.39 
DemMza 1 0.39 
MID 1 0.39 
PCB b 1 0.39 
PI 1 0.39 
Total 257 100.00
a. Frente Grande  
b. Popular Christian Bloc (Bloque Popular   
Cristiano) 
 
While the UCR continued its decline, the UCeDe lost its third place in Chamber. As 
Table 39 shows, Alsogaray’s party was replaced by an ephemeral and Buenos Aires-
based organization named the Dignity and Independence Movement -MODIN- 
(Movimiento por la Dignidad y la Independencia). This movement was headed by 
former Colonel Aldo Rico who had been the leader of the 1987 and 1988 military 
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rebellions against President Alfonsín.43 With half of the members of the MODIN, we 
find the second step towards the creation of the FREAPSO: the Frente Grande -FG- 
delegation (Table 39). It is interesting to note that this was the first legislative period 
of the implementation of the Women’s Quota Law (“Ley de Cupos”), that is, the law 
that established that a minimum of 30% of all candidates on the party lists in all of the 
nation's 24 electoral districts should be women.  
   Table 41                       Table 42 
   Chamber's Partisan Composition                      Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1995  
Legislative Period 1995-1997  
 
 
             
Delegation Seats Seats (%) Directing Board 
PJ 131 50.97 Position Party 
UCR 68 26.46 P PJ 
FREPASO 22 8.56 VP1 PJ 
MODIN 3 1.17 VP2 UCR 
PAIS 3 1.17 Ruling Party 
PRSlta 3 1.17 Party Seats Seats (%) 
DemMza 2 0.78 PJ 131 50.97 
DemP 2 0.78 Total 131 50.97
LIB 2 0.78 
MOPOF 2 0.78 
MPN 2 0.78 
PAutC 2 0.78 
UCeDe 2 0.78 
Ach 1 0.39 
BSJ 1 0.39 
CG  a 1 0.39 
FRep 1 0.39 
LAb  b 1 0.39 
MAzB c 1 0.39 
MoReCi d 1 0.39 
MPJ 1 0.39 
MPPSL 1 0.39 
P&J 1 0.39 
PC 1 0.39 
PI 1 0.39 
ReDe e 1 0.39 
Total 257 100.00
a. Corriente Grande 
b. Línea Abierta  
c. Blue and White Movement (Movimiento Azul y Blanco) 
d. Civic Renovation Movement (Movimiento de Renovación Cívica)  
e. Republican & Democratic (Republicano Democrático) 
 
                                                            
43 These rebellions were organized by Rico to demand a halt to the trial of military officers accused of human 
rights violations under the preceding military regime (Cabrera and Murillo 1994, 153). 
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The year 1995 was by far one of the best for the PJ. In addition to the economic success 
of his government, President Menem was reelected -thanks to the 1994 constitutional 
that was approved in record time-, and the PJ secured the majority of seats in the 
Chamber. The UCR lost sixteen seats but maintained the VP2 on the directing board 
(Table 42). The opposition to the PJ, however, kept growing with the emergence of the 
FREPASO delegation (Table 41). This party was an alliance among different factions of 
Peronist dissidents, socialists and other social-democrats and leftists groups (Cabrera 
1996). The coalition campaigned on issues of political change, clean government, and 
institutional integrity in order to “end with Menemism.”  
   5.8  Legislative Periods 1997-1999_1999-2001 
The composition of the Chamber in the legislative period 1997-1999 was not only 
affected by the mid-term elections of 1997, but also by internal reforms. Regarding 
elections, the PJ dropped from 131 to 119 seats losing its majority in Chamber. The 
UCR suffered the worst election results since the return to democracy obtaining only 
66 seats. The party that best performed was the FREPASO. This front became the third 
most important party in the Chamber ever with 14.79% of the seats (Table 39 and 
figure 3). 44 
As to internal reforms, deputies approved the creation of the VP3 in 1996. This new 
position on the directing board was occupied by the FREPASO (Table 44). As we will 
                                                            
44 The Chamber had two other “important third parties” in the past: the UCRI (11.98% of seats in 1965), and the 
BUJ (11.42% of seats in 1985). The remaining third parties from 1946 to 2001 always had less than 10% of the 
seats (see figure 3).   
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see shortly, the creation of the VP3 would allow the PJ and the UCR to keep the first 
three positions of the directing board of the Chamber. 
Table 43                                                                                          Table 44 
Chamber's Partisan Composition                                                   Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1997  
 Legislative Period 1997-1999  
 
 
             
Delegation Seats Seats (%) Directing Board 
PJ 119 46.30 Position Party 
UCR 66 25.68 P PJ 
FREPASO 38 14.79 VP1 PJ 
AR a 3 1.17 VP2 UCR 
DemMza 3 1.17 VP3 FREPASO 
PRSlta 3 1.17 Ruling Party 
MPN 2 0.78 Party Seats Seats (%) 
DemP 2 0.78 PJ 119 46.30 
FC-S b 2 0.78 Total 119 46.30
FPNu c 2 0.78 
FRep 2 0.78 
LIB 2 0.78 
MOPOF 2 0.78 
PAIS 2 0.78 
BSJ 1 0.39 
CRSJ 1 0.39 
D&J d 1 0.39 
LAb 1 0.39 
MPJ 1 0.39 
MPPSL 1 0.39 
PAutC 1 0.39 
ReDe 1 0.39 
UCeDe 1 0.39 
Total 257 100.00
a. Action for the Republic (Acción por la República)  
b. Civic-Social Front (Frente Cívico-Social) 
c. New Party Front (Frente Partido Nuevo) 
d. Justice and Development (Desarrollo y Justicia) 
 
The presidential and congressional elections of 1999 brought the ALIANZA UCR-
FREPASO to power. In the Chamber the ALIANZA was the ruling plurality (the only 
ruling plurality coalition of the period).  
After the ALIANZA came the PJ, which lost twenty seats in these elections, the Federal 
Inter-bloc -FEDInt- (Interbloque Federal), and the Action for the Republic -AR- 
(Acción por la República). The FEDInt was composed of nine traditional provincial 
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parties that decided to gather and form a delegation. The AR, the third political force in 
the 1999 elections, was a center-right party led by Domingo F. Cavallo, former Minister 
of Economy of President Menem and of President de la Rúa. 45 
Table 45                                                           Table 46 
Chamber's Partisan Composition                                       Directing Board and ALIANZA - 1999 
Legislative Period 1999-2001  
 
                        
             
Delegation Seats Seats (%) Directing Board 
PJ 99 38.52 Position Party 
UCR 81 31.52 P UCR 
FREPASO 37 14.4 VP1 FREPASO 
FEDInt a 14 5.46 VP2 PJ 
AR 11 4.28 VP3 FEDInt 
FC-S 4 1.56 ALIANZA (Ruling Coalition) 
FPNu 3 1.17 Party Seats Seats (%) 
FRep 3 1.17 UCR 81 31.52 
MPN 2 0.78 FREPASO 37 14.4 
MS&ER b 1 0.39 Total 118 45.92
UB c 1 0.39 
UCeDe 1 0.39 
Total 257 100.00
a.         Federal Inter-bloc (Interbloque Federal) 
b.         Movimiento Social y Entrerriano 
c.         Unity from Bs. As. (Unidad Bonaerense) 
 
Although Cavallo’s AR was the fourth political party in the Chamber (it had supposedly 
the right to get the VP3), the last position on the directing board was occupied by the 
FEDInt (Table 46).    
                                                            
45 Cavallo was “the father” of the convertibilidad (a law by which the government equalized the Argentine peso 
to the U.S. dollar in 1991) and also of the corralito (a decree that imposed severe limits on banks withdrawals 
and led to the devaluation of the Argentine peso in 2001).  
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FIGURE 3. RULING , SECOND AND THRID PARTIES - SEATS (%) BY LEGISLATIVE PERIOD 
ARGENTINE LOWER CHAMBER
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From 1946 to 2001 Argentines have intermittently elected six Peronist and four 
Radical presidents, and suffered more than eighteen years of de facto governments. 
Democracy returned to the country in 1983. Considering the past experience, eighteen 
years of democratically elected governments (1983-2001) is a strong sign of 
democratic consolidation.46  
The party system has offered four main options. First, a predominant party (PJ) that 
governed the country sometimes with authoritarian (1950s) or unexpected neoliberal 
measures (1990s), and exerted its power even while being banned or in the opposition. 
Second, a traditional party (UCR) that split into two factions during almost a decade 
(1958-1966), improved its electoral performance after the last dictatorship, suffered a 
gradual decline during the 1990s, and had a transient success as part of a coalition that 
dissipated its electoral support in less than two years of government (1999-2001). 
Third, some short-lived third parties that were incapable to became a sustained 
challenge to the PJ or the UCR (UdelPA, PI, UCeDe, MODIN, APFe, MID, FREPASO, 
and AR). Fourth, a myriad of traditional provincial parties that at the end of the period 
began to gather in order to capitalize their representation. Within these party system 
and political circumstances takes place the analysis of the six-time closed Argentine 
lower Chamber.  
This is a Chamber whose institutional framework was shaped by constitutional rules. 
Its membership, by contrast, is the result of a combination of de facto decree-laws and 
democratic rules. Taking a look inside the Chamber we see that this is an institution 
                                                            
46 Despite economic, social, and political crises that sign of democratic consolidation continues until today 
(2010).   
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that has been governed by parties. Except for three periods, coalitions are unusual at 
the high level of the Argentine legislative arena. Besides, during these past fifty-five 
years the Chamber has been ruled half by majorities, half by pluralities. While the 
former pertain mostly to the 1940s and 1950s, when the majoritarian electoral system 
was in force, the latter appeared after 1963 with the introduction of the PR system. 
Peronists ruled the Chamber during ten legislative periods (22 years), and Radicals 
were in charge of it in nine opportunities (15 years). Successive constitutional reforms, 
de facto rules, and military interventions explain this difference. Considering the 
number of seats, Radicals were always the second delegation when Peronists 
controlled the Chamber. The sometimes banned PJ was the second delegation after 
the ruling UCRP in 1965-1966, and during the 1980s and 1990s. While the majoritarian 
electoral system was in force, third delegations either did not exist or were represented 
by few deputies. As expected, this bipartisan composition changed in 1963 with the 
then new “Chamber of proportionality.” Nonetheless, except for a handful of cases, 
namely the FREPASO, third parties continued to have a low representation.     
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
Reconstructing Patterns of Institutional Development 
 Argentine Chamber of Deputies 
1946-2001 
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Now that a general view of the organization of the Argentine lower Chamber 
has been presented, I proceed with what I call the reconstruction task, an in-depth 
description and analysis of the patterns of the Chamber’s institutional development. As 
mentioned in chapter II, I identify that development with the evolution (preservation or 
change) of its organizational rules and norms, that is, those rules and norms associated 
with the structuring of the committee and the directing board systems and the pre-
floor and floor procedures. Therefore, the main question of this chapter is: what are the 
patterns that characterize the evolution of the organizational rules and norms in the 
Argentine Chamber?  
I plan to establish these patterns specifying when, by whom, how, and why rules and 
norms concerning the reforms to the Reglamento (Part I), the directing board system 
(Part II), and the standing committee system (Part III) were preserved or changed. Part 
IV concludes summarizing the patterns found, and providing a preliminary assessment 
of the merits and limits of the Cartel Theory regarding the Argentine case.    
The analysis is guided by expectations that stem from the general hypothesis 
mentioned in chapter II: when a legislative party becomes the ruling party in the 
Chamber, it will function as a procedural coalition, that is, it will usurp the rule-making 
power of the Chamber to its favor.  
Throughout the analysis special attention is paid to the electoral system in force, and 
the ruling-party type in the Chamber at the time of the reform of organizational rules 
and norms. The U.S. literature is of little use, however, for such endeavors. Therefore, I 
do not have specific expectations as to what impact the 1963 electoral reform and the 
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type of majority or plurality governing the Chamber have on these aspects. I approach 
these issues with empiricist lenses, hoping to bring forth new insights in the process.  
 
Part I. Reforms to the Reglamento  
The Reglamento of the Chamber had several minor and general reforms from 
1946 to 2001. In this section I study the main general reforms of 1955, 1963, and 1996, 
and one precise amendment that took place in 1989. Changes to the directing board 
system and the standing committee system are studied in the following sections. The 
expectations to be tested through the analysis of these main reforms are: 1- Reforms to 
the Reglamento proposed by ruling parties are adopted on straight party-line vote; 2- The 
changes that are approved are those that suppress dispositions detrimental to ruling 
parties and/or accrue their advantages.  
To help understand the following description keep in mind that reforms to the 
Reglamento require a report of the standing Committee on Rules before being 
considered on the floor. The analysis of each reform begins with a brief description of 
the political situation in the Chamber as well as the authors and their objectives, 
continues with an account of the main changes, and ends with an assessment about 
how well the Cartel Theory fares in this case. 
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Section 1.  The 1955 Reform: “The Innocent Tentative to Improve the 
Reglamento” 47 
In 1955 the Chamber was ruled by the largest qualified majority of the period. It 
was a Peronist majority that had 93% of the seats. On May 04, the Chamber approved 
a resolution tabled by Peronist deputies to create a special committee to reform the 
Reglamento. This committee was immediately constituted by six PJ and one UCR 
members under the chairmanship of a PJ deputy.48 The committee report was 
considered two days later on the floor and approved by the majority delegation (PJ) in 
one sitting.  
This fast-track treatment was in spite of the criticisms of the opposition (UCR) that 
claimed the reform was a violation to the right of free expression, and a curtailment to 
the power of minorities.  Joaquín Díaz de Vivar (PJ), by contrast, explained that this 
revision was an “innocent tentative to improve the Reglamento of the Chamber.” 49 It 
aimed at adapting the Reglamento to the “Constitution of Perón” (i.e., the 1949 
Constitution), and a new ministerial Law. 50  
The most contested amendment was the replacement of traditional oath of office 
formulas (referring to “God” and “the Country”) for a secular formula that only 
mentioned “the allegiance to the National Constitution.” 51 
                                                            
47 See debate of the reform in Journal 06.05.55, pp. 87/112. 
48 Journal 04.05.55, pp. 48/9. 
49  Journal 06.05.55, p. 106.  
50 These were the goals of the reform according to Jorge S. Pellerano (PJ), Chair of the special committee in 
charge of the revision (Journal 06.05.55, pp. 91/2).  
51 The suppression of the clerical formula, in particular, was one of the legislative measures adopted by the 
Peronist government due to its conflictive relationship with the Catholic Church in 1955. 
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Three other changes were a new majority to discuss questions of privilege, the 
reduction of terms to speak, and the suppression of bills’ “justifications.” 52 The first 
change fixed a qualified majority (2/3 of the members) to discuss questions of privilege 
on the floor. 53 Otherwise, these motions would be sent to the Committee on 
Constitutional Affairs (to be piled with the rest of the pending questions of privilege 
this committee usually accumulates). It is important to note that these motions most 
of the time are not moved to defend a privilege but to criticize the government or to 
bring up a scandal or political problem. That is why they are seldom approved to be 
discussed on the floor. With reference to the terms to speak, the reform reduced the 
period known as “The Hour,” which was considered the opposition’s time or the 
“backup/B plan” when questions of privilege were sent to committee.54  
Finally, the revision established that certain Chamber’s officials would be elected by 
the plenary (instead of the Presidency), and increased the number of standing 
committees and their membership (to match new ministries created by law).    
 
                                                            
52 Traditionally the Journal of Sessions published deputies’ bills with their correlative “justifications,” that is, a 
text where they stated the reasons for their initiatives. UCR deputies claimed that this suppression implied a 
violation to the republican principle of publicity of government acts. 
53 Legislative privileges are the privileges, immunities and powers held, enjoyed and exercised by the Senate, 
the Chamber of Deputies, and their respective members. Legislative privileges enable them to perform their 
constitutional functions free from external interference. They are one of the safeguards of the constitutional 
separation of powers. Any claim that a privilege has been infringed is raised in the Chamber by means of a 
“question of privilege.” 
54 Deputies in the opposition or minor delegations use this period, as well as the questions of privilege, to 
express their views about current events, justify their position in certain issues, and exercise the congressional 
oversight of the executive branch. The reform reduced from one hour to 30’ the term to consider bills and 
written or oral questions to the Executive Power (requests of information), and included in this 30’ the 
consideration of petitions to committees, motions of preference, and the Table of resolutions previously asked 
by deputies. 
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This reform produced political and decentralizing amendments. Within the first 
group are those political-technical reforms that accrued ruling party’s advantages and, 
at the same time, limited the participation of the opposition (e.g., a tighter control of 
floor proceedings through a qualified majority to discuss questions of privilege and the 
reduction of “The Hour”), and those purely political  that did not imply new advantages 
for the ruling party, but a showing of its power to adapt Chamber’s rules to the 
authoritarian turn of the last year of Perón’s regime (e.g., the approval of the secular 
oath of office formula and the suppression of bills’ justifications).  
The transfer from the President to the plenary of the prerogative to elect certain 
Chamber’s officials is a decentralizing (democratizing) measure that does not harm the 
power of the majority.    
In brief, this first reform supports the Cartel Theory. It was proposed and approved in 
totum by the ruling party. While the purely political reforms demonstrate its cohesion, 
the political-technical ones indeed accrued its advantages.     
         Section 2.  The 1963 Reform: “Adapting the Reglamento to the PR System” 55 
Ruled by a plurality that controlled 37% of the seats, the first Chamber elected 
by the PR electoral system approved in December 1963 a mega reform to the 
Reglamento. Given that PR’s direct consequence was the proliferation of delegations, 
changes focused on decentralizing the control of the agenda and basic aspects of 
debates, reducing the time-allotting on the floor, and promoting the participation of 
                                                            
55 See debate of the reform in Journals: 18.12.63, pp. 898/925; 19.12.63, pp. 951/74; 20.12.63, pp. 1015/79; 
26.12.63, pp. 1108/28.   
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pluralities. A unanimous report of the Committee on Rules was considered on the floor. 
Among the most important changes of this reform are: a) the creation of the 
Committee on Parliamentary Business -CLP- (Comisión de Labor Parlamentaria); b) 
the introduction of rules about delegations; c) the institution of “in” minority reports in 
committees; d) the reintroduction of “The Hour”; 56 and e) the reduction of certain 
terms to speak and the suppression of the “free debate” during the analysis “rule by 
rule” of bills.57 In addition, this reform reintroduced the traditional oath of office 
formulas making reference to “God” (including the reference to the “Holy Bible”), and 
“the Country.”    
The creation of the CLP was the “key element of the reform.”58 Its structure, functions 
and decisional system were largely debated. The CLP would be chaired by the 
President of the Chamber and composed of the Vice-presidents (VPs) and the leaders 
of delegations. It would prepare the long-term legislative agenda and the order of 
business for each sitting (both functions previously performed by the President of the 
Chamber), receive reports about committees’ activities, and implement measures to 
expedite debates on the floor.  
Except for the UCRI, which was against the creation the CLP, the rest of the opposition 
proposed some corrections -that would not be accepted by the Committee on Rules-. 
Héctor Gómez Machado (UCRI) complained that they were giving the CLP functions 
                                                            
56 The reform not only reintroduced the “The Hour” but also established the possibility to prorogue it for one 
more hour (2/3 of the votes was needed), and 30’ to the consideration of petitions to committees, motions of 
preference and the Table of resolutions and bills previously asked by deputies. 
57 In the Argentine Congress a bill must be approved in each Chamber “in general” (debate about the subject 
matter of the bill) and “in particular” (debate rule by rule) to become a law.   
58  Pablo González Bergez (FedPCe), member of the Committee on Rules (Journal 20.12.63, p. 1029).   
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that should belong to the President of the Chamber. The UCRI, he explained, was in 
favor of setting up an advisory committee to the President, but not a substitute of the 
President. The MPProv (the undercover PJ) demanded basic rules of functioning (e.g., 
the fixing of quorums), and the suppression of the VPs as members of the CLP.  León 
Patlis (DemP) suggested the adoption of a weighted voting system (every delegation 
leader would possess a number of votes equal to the size of her delegation).  
In response, Pablo González Bergez (FedPCe) argued that the CLP was established to 
advise the Chamber, not its President, and that the goal was to create a committee to 
coordinate and organize the legislative business according to the interests of 
delegations. Rafael J. Martínez Raymonda (DemP) remarked that this would be a bona 
fide committee and expressed: “[Before] the majority prepared the order of business 
and it did it according to its will (…) now nobody owns the quorum, and we need to 
agree.”59  
The fact of being a bona fide committee implied that: a) it would not represent 
proportionally the Chamber, so there would not be a weighted voting system; 60 b) it 
would prepare an order of business subject to the approval of the Chamber (the 
President’s order of business was definite); c) it would not be empowered to report to 
the Chamber (there would be no majority or minority reports); d) it would have neither 
a fixed membership nor a quorum; and that it e) it would include the VPs only to keep 
                                                            
59 Rafael J. Martínez Raymonda was the member of the Committee on Rules in charge of presenting the report 
on the floor (Journal 20.12.63, p. 1035).  
60 Martínez Raymonda explained that the introduction of a weighted vote would imply the creation of a 
“parallel body” or a “little parliament” inside the Chamber (Journal 20.12.63, p. 1035).  
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them informed of the business of the Chamber. Additionally, they pointed out that if 
the CLP did not meet, the President would prepare the order of the business in its place.  
Besides the CLP, this reform introduced rules about delegations. From then on three or 
more deputies could form a delegation according to their political allegiances 
(affinities), and one or two deputies could also do so if their parties existed before the 
electoral process. From the discussion it came clear that in the Reglamento political 
party and legislative delegation are different things because a delegation does not 
represent necessarily a political party. In other words, a delegation can assemble 
members of a political party (it usually does), but also can be formed by a coalition of 
parties.  
Finally, two changes were introduced inside committees. First, committees were 
allowed to produce “in” minority reports if two reunions failed because of lack of 
quorum. 61 Second, a bill should be included in the committee schedule if at least three 
members of the committee demanded so.  
A Chamber ruled by a plurality, approved changes that benefited pluralities. This 
reform supports the Cartel Theory. It was proposed and approved with the consensus 
of a handful of pluralities (the ruling plurality among them). It adopted rules that 
created and reintroduced pluralities’ advantages. 62 
                                                            
61 Not to be confused with “minority reports.” “In” minority reports are those adopted by a minority of deputies 
when there is no quorum in the committee.   
62 The reintroduction and extension of the “The Hour” was the main advantage (and one of the main revenges) 
regained by pluralities regarding the floor. The other revenge? The reintroduction of the oath of office formulas 
annulled by the 1955 reform. 
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The substantive new benefits touched the control of the agenda and basic aspects of 
debates (the creation of the CLP), the functioning of committees (the introduction of 
“in minority reports”), and the formation of delegations (fixing very flexible and low 
minima to form them). The reduction of the time-allotting and suppression of the free-
debate seem to be related to the need of handling the discussion of 192 deputies (the 
Chamber had 166 deputies when the last reform was adopted).  In short, the reform 
was tailor-made to the pluralities of the “first Congress of the proportionality rule.”  
Section 3. The 1996 Reform:  “Adapting the Reglamento to the 1994 
Constitution” 63 
As mentioned in chapter III, in the 1995 elections the PJ secured the majority of 
seats in Chamber. Before that year, however, the PJ was the virtual majority because it 
easily reached the quorum with the help of some allies (e.g., the UCeDe).  
After five years of discussions in the Committee on Rules, in July 1996 began the 
analysis of a general reform to the Reglamento proposed by the ruling PJ. The 
controversial document was composed of a majority report signed by members of the 
PJ and two minority reports and six dissenting opinions signed by parties of the 
opposition.64 Although the member presenting the majority report (Horacio Macedo -
PJ-) explained that the document was meant to adequate the Reglamento to the 1994 
Constitution and to speed up debates, all opposition and minor delegations 
emphatically rejected it.  
                                                            
63 See debate of the reform in Journals: 10.07.96, pp. 2008/63; 07,08.08.96, p. 2476; 04.12.96, pp. 5896/5959. 
64 The majority and minority reports are published in the Orden del Día No. 331/96.  
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The majority report had three main proposals: a) new decisional powers and a 
“weighted voting system” for the CLP; b) the vote of the President in ordinary 
legislative proceedings and double vote in case of tie (I will refer to this as the 
“President’s right to vote issue”), and c) the shortening and the suppression of terms to 
speak on the floor.65   
With reference to the CLP, the PJ proposed that it could change days and hours of 
sessions, approve the long-term agenda and the order of business for each sitting, 
decide over questions of privilege and the opportunity to express commemorations, fix 
the time to vote, and determine the type of voting system to be applied. 66 In case of 
lack of consensus, the CLP could apply a weighted voting system.67 The CLP decision 
required absolute majority of votes, and the President should decide in case of tie.  
Four other proposed reforms are worth mentioning. The majority report sought to 
change the system to fix the quorum (to reduce it in a nutshell), increase from five to 
ten the number of deputies needed to demand a special session, and establish that if a 
committee produced two reports on the same bill with the same number of signatures, 
the majority report would be the one signed by its Chair. The fourth reform is special 
because, in contrast to the rest, it implies a benefit to minority delegations: the 
                                                            
65 The PJ proposed to shorten the following terms: a) Discussion and approval of CLP’s decisions (from 5’ to 3’); 
b) Justification of questions of privilege (from 10’ to 5’); c) Discussion in the general debate of a bill (committee 
reporters, authors of the resolution and delegation leaders would have 30’ instead of 60’, and the rest of the 
deputies would have 10’ instead of 30’); d) Discussion in the particular debate of a bill (committee reporters, 
authors of the resolution and delegation leaders would have 10’ instead of 20’, and the rest of the deputies 
would have 2 opportunities of 5’ each instead 2 opportunities of 10’ and 5’ each). Besides, “The Hour” and the 
debate that usually followed certain motions were suppressed, and failed motions could not be tabled again in 
the same sitting. 
66 Instead of the plenary of deputies, from now on the CLP would decide if questions of privilege would be 
analyzed on the floor or sent to the Committee on Constitutional Affairs.  
67 Recall that by this system (called “voto ponderado”) every delegation leader possesses a number of votes 
equal to the size of her delegation in the Chamber. 
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number of deputies needed to demand a roll-call (nominal) vote was reduced from 1/5 
to 1/10.  In the session held to analyze this reform, most of the minority delegations 
and all the opposition abandoned the floor to prevent the approval of the report. 
Opposition leaders criticized it arguing that it violated the principle of popular 
representation because it gave super powers to the ruling-party leader and to the 
President of the Chamber.68 One month later, the report was sent back to the 
Committee on Rules, and in December 1996 a new report reached the floor.69 In this 
document the weighted voting system and the most controversial decisional powers of 
the CLP were eliminated. Furthermore, during the debate the PJ renounced to give the 
CLP the power to decide over questions of privilege. The majority delegation (PJ), 
however, insisted on the President’s right to vote issue, the lowering of the quorum, 
and the shortening and suppression of terms to speak on the floor.  
The PJ managed to get quite a few of its proposals, but lost the roll-call vote on the 
President’s right to vote issue. How? The majority party simply did not have enough 
deputies on the floor at the time of the roll-call vote.70 Furthermore, in a weird debate 
the PJ first refused and then accepted a FREPASO proposal to create a Third Vice-
                                                            
68 While Laura Musa (UCR) expressed that “all issues will be resolved beforehand in the CLP” and Alberto A. 
Natale (DemP) said that this report was “an abuse the majority wants to impose on minority rights”, Rodolfo  
Rodil (FREPASO) argued the goal was to “discipline the delegation of the majority party and to gag minority 
delegations.” See Journal 10.07.96, pp. 2047, 2058 and 2954, respectively. 
69 The new report can be read in the Orden del Día 1208/96.  
70 Due to the importance of this long and debated amendment about the President’s right to vote issue, 
opposition delegations demanded a roll-call vote. This type of vote must be approved by the Chamber in order 
to proceed. But President Marcelo E. López Arias (PJ) ordered the nominal vote omitting that approval. To the 
surprise of all deputies when the votes were counted the result was 71 in favor, 80 against, 5 abstentions and 4 
non-registered votes. The President immediately ordered a second vote arguing that the abstentions and the 
non-registered votes could change the result. In this moment some of the PJ deputies who were in the galleries 
near the floor tried to enter to the plenary to reach the necessary number, but opposition leaders claimed that 
the second vote should be carried out with the same deputies present in the first vote. After a failed second 
roll-call vote, one break and much discussion, the PJ finally lost the vote in the third roll-call vote (Journal 
04.12.96, pp. 5937/49).      
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Presidency in the Chamber.71 It is worth to mention that this substantial change to the 
structure of the Chamber was never proposed in any previous resolution or report, and 
also never discussed in any of the debates about this reform.  
Finally, a maternity leave and the already mentioned change benefiting minority 
delegations were also approved.  
In this reform the ruling majority gained important prerogatives, renounced to 
proposals that would have accrued its advantages, accepted an unexpected and 
substantial amendment, approved rules that benefited minority parties, and lost one 
of the main votes. All in all, this implies a partial confirmation of the Cartel Theory. Let 
me explain this.   
What did the PJ get? In this reform the PJ got new decisional powers to the CLP, 72 all 
the proposed shortening of terms to speak on the floor including the suppression of 
“The Hour”, the reduced quorum, 73 more power to the chairs of committees, and the 
increase of the number of deputies needed to demand a special session.  
                                                            
71 The unexpected creation of the Third Vice-Presidency was tersely proposed during the general debate by 
Rodolfo Rodil (FREPASO). He argued that to be representative the directing board of the Chamber should 
include the political force that had gathered more than five million votes in the last election. Once the 
particular debate began, Rodil asked for the inclusion of this amendment and the UCR delegation supported 
the proposition. Horacio A. Macedo (PJ), Vice-Chair of the Committee on Rules, rejected the amendment. 
Immediately the FREPASO leader asked for a roll-call vote and a UCR deputy called (for the third time) the 
attention of the Presidency explaining that “if the vote proceeded, they would be rejecting the FREPASO 
amendment.” Minutes later the majority leader announced “the PJ delegation has decided to accept the 
proposal regarding the creation of a Third Vice-Presidency” (Journal 04.12.06, pp. 5926/7 and 5931/3). 
72 From then on the CLP would fix the time to vote and the type of voting system to be applied on the floor, 
implement measures to expedite work on committees, and decide over the opportunity to express 
commemorations.   
73 The Chamber passed from the “50% + 1 of the total number of deputies” quorum formula (until 1996 the 
quorum was 130/257), to the “absolute majority” formula which means: “when present members outnumber 
absent ones” (since 1997 the quorum is 129/257).  
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Why did the PJ renounce to its first proposals? It is important to underline that the PJ 
left aside extreme amendments that were not only rejected by the opposition but also 
by some of its own members. Therefore, the hypothesis of an approval on these 
subject matters is implausible. In other words, this is not the subject that disconfirms 
the theory.  
Why did the PJ accept the creation of the Third Vice-Presidency? The PJ and the UCR 
occupied all the positions of the directing board from 1989 to 1997 (see Tables 32 to 38 
in chapter III) against the objections and protests of minority and opposition parties 
that demanded “a seat in the government of the Chamber,” namely the VP2 (see Part II 
in this chapter). The creation of the VP3 benefited the ruling majority (PJ) and the first 
plurality (UCR) because in this way they kept for themselves the VP1 (PJ) and the VP2 
(UCR) of the Chamber. By the way, it is obvious that the PJ Vice-Chair of the 
Committee on Rules (who was in charge of commanding the debate on the floor) was 
not aware of this amendment. This was a last minute “agreement” among party 
leaders.  
Though formally the approval of benefits to minority parties disconfirms the theory, 
the lonely amendment (the reduction of the number of deputies needed to demand a 
roll-call vote) is worthless if compared with the changes adopted in favor of the ruling 
party. These last reforms assured the latter the tightest control of the work in 
committees and of floor proceedings a party has ever had in the Chamber (see Table 
64 at the end of this chapter). The vote lost by the PJ on the President’s right to vote 
issue disconfirms the theory. In particular, the first prediction (“Reforms to the 
108 
 
 
Reglamento proposed by ruling parties are adopted on straight party-line vote”) is not 
supported. This disconfirmation shows that the cohesion of a majority or plurality must 
not be taken for granted. 74 
Section 4. The 1989 Reform: “New Positions that Reflect the Current State 
of the Country, not the Nation we Idealized from our Past that no 
Longer Exists”75 
From 1946 to 1989 the Chamber had two Chief Officers and two Chief Officials.76 
The election of these four functionaries (the highest functionaries of the Chamber) was 
always controlled by the ruling party. Nevertheless, there is a difference among the 
periods 1946-1966, 1973-1989 and 1989-2001. In the period 1946-1966 each party 
proposed its candidate, most of the time an experienced functionary with a long 
legislative career, and the four elected ones (always ruling-party candidates) lasted in 
their positions until death, retirement or resignation. From 1973 on, by contrast, there 
were only ruling-party candidates, most of the time former members of the ruling-
party delegation, who changed every time the ruling party changed. The great 
difference between those periods and the 1989-2001 term is that the Chamber not 
                                                            
74 This is also the reason that explains why I will affirm in the next chapter that the theory is supported when 
majorities or minorities reject amendments that can suppress their advantages. In these cases majorities or 
pluralities are ratifying their power and cohesion, both things that cannot be assumed.  
75 In this way the first plurality leader César Jaroslavsky (UCR) justified the creation of new permanent positions 
(one Chief Officer and One Chief Official) in the Chamber (Journal 31.08, 01.09.89, pp. 3056). This reason 
differed markedly from the justifications expressed in the bill tabled to create these positions. This document 
mentioned the “constant increase of the activities of the Chamber” and the “multiple functions modern times 
impose to the Argentine Parliament.” See debate in Journal 31.08, 01.09.89, pp. 3054/58. 
76 The Chief Officers were the Administrative and Parliamentary Officers (“Secretarios Administrativo y 
Parlamentario”) and the Chief Officials were the Administrative and Parliamentary Officials (“Pro-secretarios 
Administrativo y Parlamentario”).  
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only created two new positions, but also institutionalized their political character in the 
Reglamento.  
The circumstances of this reform need a detailed explanation. In July 1989, President 
Menem (PJ) assumed power following the resignation of President Alfonsín (UCR), six 
months prior to the end of his term. Even though the renewal of the Chamber would 
take place in November 1989, both parties agreed to give the Presidency of the Chamber 
to the PJ in July. Therefore, while the Executive Power and the Presidency of the 
Chamber of Deputies were in charge of the PJ, the first plurality in the Chamber was 
Radical until the November renewal. In short, the PJ chaired a Chamber where Radicals 
were the first plurality. In addition, immediately after the election of the new PJ 
President of the Chamber, the four (UCR) highest functionaries of the Chamber were 
replaced by four (PJ) new officials.   
In this context, before the day break of September 1st, 1989, in the midst of a critical 
sitting devoted to approve the “Emergency Economic Law” and through a dubious 
legislative procedure, the UCR and the PJ agreed on creating two new permanent 
positions in the Chamber: one Chief Officer and one Chief Official. 77 Against the 
criticisms of minority groups, they also approved that the now six highest functionaries 
of the Chamber would be politically elected, four of them by the delegation “with more 
deputies,” and the rest by the delegation that “follows in number of seats.”  
The reform did not benefit the PJ since the party had already elected its four 
functionaries in July (and would continue to do so until they keep the Presidency of the 
Chamber). In contrast, it did benefit the UCR: Radicals would be the delegation that 
                                                            
77The new positions created in 1989 were the Coordination Officer (Secretario de Coordinación Operativa) and 
the Coordination Official (Pro-secretario de Coordinación Operativa).  
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would “follow in number of seats” to the PJ after the November renewal, so they 
gained the prerogative to nominate the two new functionaries at the end of 1989. 
Furthermore, the UCR did not wait until the end of the year. On September 14, 1989, 
the two new (UCR) functionaries were elected by the Chamber.   
 
This reform to the Reglamento deserves special attention. At first sight it 
disconfirms the Cartel Theory: the PJ, in exchange of nothing, benefited the UCR (the 
main delegation of the opposition) with two new positions (which have no function in 
the Reglamento), and even voted to elect them before the renewal of the Chamber.  
Actually, the PJ indeed exchanged something, but it had done so three months ago, in 
May 1989. The political agreement, which can be found only in newspapers, was that 
the PJ would support the creation of new positions in exchange of getting the 
Presidency of the Chamber before the November renewal, and a larger share of 
chairmanships in all committees at the time of the renewal. While the latter can be 
confirmed by the data shown in Table 58 (section 9.4), the fact that the PJ held the 
Presidency of the Chamber before the biannual renewal, that is, being the UCR the first 
plurality in the Chamber, is an event, a surprising event, overlooked in the literature, 
and only known by legislative journalists for whom this is one of the many anecdotes 
about political agreements in the Chamber.  
As to the Cartel Theory, this is a fascinating case that supports its predictions. A ruling 
party (PJ) in control of a Chamber composed of a first plurality of the opposition (UCR), 
adopts on straight party-line vote the creation of benefits favoring that first plurality 
(two new permanent positions), in order to secure actual and future advantages (the 
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Presidency before the renewal and a larger share of chairmanships in all committees). 
To put it another way, as the (adapted) general hypothesis of the Cartel Theory 
explains: when a legislative party becomes the ruling party in the Chamber, it will function 
as a procedural coalition, that is, it will usurp the rule-making power of the Chamber to its 
favor. 
Ruling parties (majorities as well as pluralities) shaped the reforms to the 
Reglamento and their implementation. They did so sometimes against the opposition 
(1955), but most of the time with their explicit (1963, 1989) or implicit (1996) accord. In 
particular, the rules of the Chamber were modified by the PJ twice when this party was 
the ruling majority (1955-1996), once by a Chamber of minorities (1963), and once by 
the PJ, when it was in charge of a Chamber in which Radicals were the first plurality 
(1989).  
The reforms of 1955 and 1963 support the Cartel Theory predictions. Both of them were 
adopted on straight party-line vote and approved rules that accrued ruling parties’ 
advantages (a majority ruling party in 1955, a plurality in 1963).  
While the reform of 1989 also gives credit to the theory, the one that took place in 
1996 partially supports its predictions. Let me briefly explain the reasons of this 
statement.  
The 1989 reform was the result of a deal between the UCR and the PJ by which the 
latter secured substantive advantages in exchange of two powerless but permanent 
positions to the former. One of the main changes of the 1996 reform, the creation of 
the also powerless but attractive Third Vice-Presidency of the Chamber, was also the 
result of a deal: a place in the directing board for the FREPASO, in exchange of 
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maintaining the most coveted positions for the PJ (the Presidency and the First Vice-
Presidency of the Chamber).78 In both cases, the ruling party altered the structure of 
the Chamber (creating powerless but permanent positions), in exchange of keeping or 
improving its preeminent status. As noted, it used of the rule-making power of the 
Chamber to its favor. 
But the 1996 reform changed other rules that also support the predictions of the 
theory. Among the most important, it suppressed dispositions of the 1963 reform 
(“The Hour” was annulled), lowered the quorum, increased the powers of the CLP, and 
reduced the time-allotting on the floor.  
One may ask how a reinforced CLP (an institution created in 1963) can benefit a ruling 
majority, and why a reduced time-allotting on the floor would benefit a ruling majority 
or ruling parties in general. Beginning with the CLP, the fact is that the bona fide CLP, 
so loosely defined, did not end with the President’s and the ruling party’s control over 
the legislative agenda. Since 1973 the CLP has become a new “instrument of control” 
of ruling parties because they command its functioning and decisions. 79 This is the 
reason why the PJ in 1996 sought to add (not to reduce) the CLP decisional powers. 
This is also the explanation to the strong minority delegations’ opposition to this 
amendment. If the CLP had been the bona fide committee imagined by the 1963 
deputies, minority parties would have never been opposed to giving it more power. 
                                                            
78 The Vice-Presidents of the Chamber substitute the President in case of her absence or sickness. Besides this 
function, they have legislative perquisites (e.g., an office in the Chamber’s building, permanent employees of 
the Chamber’s staff at her service, and the right to designate advisors).   
79 As Jones and Hwang (2005, 278) explain, “[w]hile the CLP operates in part based on consensus, when a 
disagreement occurs the majority party's position prevails. When the CLP meets is left to the majority party's 
discretion. The CLP decides which bills will be discussed during the session, who will speak during floor debate, 
the session hours, etc. The majority leadership often unilaterally modifies the agenda without consultation or 
warning when it considers the modification to be in its best interest.” 
113 
 
 
As to the substantive reduction of terms to speak, this is a measure that benefits ruling 
parties, especially in a Chamber where party discipline is the rule (i.e., there is no need 
to listen to long speeches of the opposition), particularly at the end of the legislative 
year, when legislation must be approved. As Döring (2003, 148) explains, “timetable 
restrictions grant to the agenda setter scheduling power for speeding up the business 
of the House against delaying attempts up to outright obstruction from opposition 
parties.”  
 At the same time, Peronists failed to increase the power of the President of the 
Chamber. This faux pas shows that the cohesion or consensus of a majority/plurality 
must not be assumed. Every time their members vote together they are ratifying the 
existence and functioning of their cartels. Though in this case I am almost sure that the 
failure was due to the disorder that reigned in that session, the fact is that the ruling 
party failed to adopt a reform that would have benefited it.    
Considered together, the four reforms support the Cartel Theory. The 1996 
amendment, in particular, partially supports the theory: the ruling party gained 
important prerogatives, but renounced to accrue its advantages and failed to increase 
the power of the President. Nonetheless, note that in the late 1980s and 1990s -
specially in 1996- the PJ accorded with the UCR and the FREPASO substantial changes 
in the structure of the Chamber. These changes allowed the PJ to preserve its 
preeminent position. As mentioned, it used the rule-making power of the Chamber in 
its favor. This is a cartel behavior.      
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Part II. The Directing Board System  
In this part I analyse the functions, rules and practices regarding the election 
procedure and partisan composition of the directing board of the Chamber. In the U.S. 
House, the institution studied by Cox and McCubbins, there is no directing board, but 
only the position of the Speaker who always belong to the majority party. Therefore, 
the predictions I will test are specially elaborated for my cases, though always based on 
the principles of the Cartel Theory. 
 
Section 5.  The Composition of the Directing Boards 
Were the directing boards composed only of members of the ruling party? Did 
directing boards have a bipartisan membership? Where do their members come from? 
Were they freshman or senior deputies? As noted in the last chapter, the partisan 
composition of the directing boards has changed through time. This section provides a 
first approach of these boards that will be helpful for the rest of the chapter. 
During the period 1946-2001 the Chamber elected 39 directing boards. For the 
statistical analyses I consider the 18 directing boards elected at the beginning of each 
legislative period (at the time of the biannual renewal of the Chamber). 80 As noted, I 
will refer to the three Vice-Presidents of the Chamber as VP1, VP2, and VP3. 
 
                                                            
80 Although the directing boards of the second (or third) year of each legislative period were not considered in 
the dataset, it is interest to note that these boards have always had the same partisan composition as the first 
year.  
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While Presidents always belonged to the ruling party, 33 of the 39 directing boards 
have had VP1s that belonged to the ruling party. Except for the period 1973-1975, since 
the PR system is in force (1963) almost all VP2s were picked from the second 
delegation in Chamber. VP3s (only two cases in the period over analysis) belonged to 
the third delegation.  
Considering the directing boards of the eighteen legislative periods Table 47 shows the 
distribution of the 56 positions between ruling and opposition parties. The last column 
shows that 71% of the members of the directing boards were elected from the ruling 
party. See also that while Presidents and VP1s came from the party in control of the 
Chamber (100% and 83%, respectively), the largest number of VP2 were chosen 
among members of opposition parties (61%).  
Table 47 - RULING AND OPPOSITION PARTY MEMBERS OF THE DIRECTING BOARDS - ARGENTINE 
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001 
 
Ruling/Opposition 
Parties 
Directing Board Positions 
Total 
President VP1 VP2 VP3 
Ruling Party 18 15 7 0 40 
% 100.0 83.3 38.9 0.0 71.4 
Opposition Parties 0 3 11 2 16 
% 0.00 16.7 61.1 100.0 28.6 
Total 18 18 18 2 56 
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 
Since being a member of the ruling party was always a necessary condition to be 
President, and to be VP1 most of the time, it is an obvious result the leading presence 
of the PJ in the most important positions of the directing boards during the whole 
period (54%) (Table 48).  
 
116 
 
 
Table 48 - MEMBERS OF THE DIRECTING BOARDS BY PARTY - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 
1946-2001 
                                                   
Parties 
Directing Board Positions 
Total 
President VP1 VP2 VP3 
PJ 10 12    8 a 0 30 
% 55.6 66.7 44.4  0.0 53.6 
UCR 4 2 5 0 11 
% 22.2 11.1 27.8  0.0 19.6 
UCRI 2 3 2 0 7 
% 11.1 16.7 11.1  0.0 12.5 
UCRP 2 0 0 0 2 
% 11.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 3.6 
FREPASO 0 1 0 1 2 
%  0.0 5.6  0.0 5.6 3.6 
OTHER PARTIES 0 0    3 b    1 c 4 
%  0.0  0.0 16.7 5.6 7.1 
Total 18 18 18 2 56 
% 100.0 100.0          100.0 100.0 100.0  
a. The VP2 belonged to the LeI in 1946 and to the PJ/FR in 1985.   
b. The VP2 belonged to the UdelPA in 1963, to the MID in 1965, and to the UCeDe in 1987. 
c. The VP3 was occupied by the Federal Inter-bloc in 1999.  
 
In particular, the PJ registers the highest percentages for President and VP1 (55.6% and 
66.7%, respectively). Moreover, as to the VP2 the PJ can be situated in second place 
only if we consider the rest of the parties altogether. If we take into account the 
percentages of the UCR and its two factions in the directing boards (35.7% in total), this 
party registers almost 20 percentage points less than the PJ.   
 
Almost 80% of the Presidents came from Buenos Aires province. For VP1 and VP2 the 
highest percentages concentrate in the Centro and Capital regions (27.8% in both 
cases). As Table 49 shows, the Centro, Litoral, Norte, and Cuyo regions never reached 
the Presidency and had a modest representation in the VP1 and VP2 positions.  
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Table 49 - MEMBERS OF THE DIRECTING BOARDS BY REGION - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 
1946-2001 
 
Regions 
Directing Board Positions 
Total 
President VP1 VP2 VP3 
Buenos Aires 14 4 4 1 23 
% 77.8 22.2 22.2 50.0 41.1  
Capital 4 3 5 0 12 
% 22.2 16.7 27.8 0.0 21.4  
Centro 0 5 4 0 9 
% 0.0 27. 8 22.2 0.0 16.1  
Litoral 0 2 1 0 3 
% 0.0 11.1 5.6 0.0 5.4  
Norte 0 2 3 0 5 
% 0. 0 11.1 16.7 0.00 8.9  
Cuyo 0 2 1 1 4 
% 0.0 11.1 5.6 50. 0 7.1  
Total 18 18 18 2 56 
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Table 50 - TERMS IN CHAMBER MEMBERS OF THE DIRECTING BOARDS BY REGION - ARGENTINE 
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001 
 
Terms in 
Chamber 
Directing Board Positions 
Total 
President VP1 VP2 VP3 
1 6 9 13 0 28 
% 33.3 50.0 72.2 0.0 50.0  
2 7 5 2 2 16 
% 38.9 27.8 11.1 100.0 28.6  
3 4 4 3 0 11 
% 22.2 22.2 16. 7 0.0 19.6  
4 1 0 0 0 1 
% 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8  
Total 18 18 18 2 56 
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  
 
Half of the members of the directing boards were freshmen. Seniority in Chamber 
(measured by the number of terms in Chamber) seems to be a variable to consider in 
order to explain the election of Presidents and VP1s, particularly for those deputies 
with 2 and 3 terms (Table 50).  
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The preliminary portrait seems supported by the results shown in Table 51. There we 
see the effect of the variables region (R1=Buenos Aires), seniority, and ruling party over 
the probability of being elected President, VP1, and VP2. 81 
Table 51 - EFFECT OF REGION, SENIORITY, AND RULING PARTY OVER THE PROBABILITY OF BEING 
ELECTED PRESIDENT, VP1, AND VP2 - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001 
 
 
President VP1 VP2 
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
R1 (Bs. As.) 2.26*** .57 -.30*** .57 -.26 .57 
Seniority 1.00*** .22 .85* .25 .348 .30 
Ruling Party - - 1.58 .64 -.61 .49 
Constant -8.14*** .67 -7.67*** .77 -5.50*** .56 
R2   0.16   0.06   0.02 
N   3945    3945   3945 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
The logit regressions show positive and significant coefficients for the Buenos Aires 
region and seniority in the case of Presidents (ruling party is not considered because it is 
a constant in this case), and also positive and significant coefficients for seniority and 
ruling party for VP1. Nevertheless, as we will see later in this chapter, when seniority is 
consider in the Argentine case it is essential not to lose sight of the fact that very few 
legislators are seniors.  
This first approach shows that from 1946 to 2001 the positions of President and 
VP1 have been occupied by members of the ruling party. Deputies of the opposition 
have had a tiny representation in the VP1s, occupied 61% of the VP2s, and 
monopolized the VP3s (though in the latter case we are considering only two cases). 
Fifty percent of all members were freshmen and the majority belonged to the PJ. More 
                                                            
81 See description of variables in section 9.3. 
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than two-thirds of the Presidents came from the all-important province of Buenos 
Aires.  
Section 6.  Functions  
In this section I analyze if the members of the directing board have lost, acquired, 
or transferred their powers to the sphere of the ruling party (e.g., a President’s 
prerogative is transformed into a decision of the plenary that can be adopted by the 
majority/plurality of those voting). The prediction to test is in this case: The power of 
the members of the directing board increases or is redistributed within the ruling party.   
The directing board is composed of a President and three Vice-presidents. In the 
Chamber it is not usual to talk about the “directing board” or the “Presidency,” but 
about “the President.” This is not strange because the directing board is not even 
mentioned in the rules. Vice-presidents have no function but substituting the President 
in case of illness or disability, they are members of the CLP, and they may be assigned 
to committees. The central authority in the Chamber is the President to whom the 
Reglamento has always provided substantial power.  
In 1946, besides the general administrative tasks and legislative duties related to the 
sittings, the President had six main functions: to refer bills to committees; to prepare 
the order of business for each sitting; to appoint standing, special, and bicameral 
committees; to hire and dismiss employees; to determine the functions of all the 
highest functionaries and designate some of them; and to submit the internal budget 
to floor approval. In addition, the President was not allowed to vote, except in case of 
tie, or if he had participated in the debate of a particular bill.  
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During these fifty-five years the President never performed one of these functions, lost 
two of them, and gained a new position in the Chamber.  
The duty Presidents never performed was the submission of the internal budget to 
floor approval.82 As mentioned, in 1955 the election of some functionaries was 
assigned to the plenary, and in 1963 the preparation of the order of business was 
transferred to the CLP. Finally, since 1964 the President chairs the CLP meetings and 
prepares the order of business if the CPL does not meet (this is her new position).  
Although the transfer of the agenda-setting function (to the CLP), and the election of 
the functionaries (to the plenary) may indicate some sort of democratization of 
Chamber’s decisions, this is not the case. For one part, the President and the ruling 
delegation leader exercise ample authority over the CLP. For the other part, the 
election of the functionaries was always controlled by the ruling party. The transfer of 
these functions in this case implies a redistribution within the ruling party.    
Summarizing, the central authority of the Chamber is in 2001 as strong as it was 
in 1946.  The President kept the most important functions a legislative authority can 
have: the referral, agenda-setting (now as Chair of the ruling-party controlled CLP), 
and committee-assignment powers. We should not lose sight of the fact that the 
                                                            
82 In the Chamber the compilation of departments’ requests as well as the preparation, implementation, and 
financial management of the Budget has always been done at presidential level. Deputies neither receive 
information about the Chamber’s annual budget, nor approve or control it. Furthermore, basic oversight rules 
were eliminated in the 1963 reform to the Reglamento. Until this year Chamber’s rules assigned to the 
Committee on Rules the report on the implementation of the Chamber’s annual budget. During the debate 
about the reform  Salvador F. Busacca (DemC) proposed to assign this function to the Committee on the 
Budget.  Rafael J. Martínez Raymonda (DemP) explained that this rule had not been reformed, and that there 
was no reason to insist on this text because the Committee on Rules had never reported on this issue. 
Therefore, he argued, there was no need to add this phrase to the jurisdiction of the Committee on the Budget 
and also no problem to suppress this task from the list of the Committee on Rules’ functions. This suppression 
was approved by the Chamber (Journal 26.12.63, p. 1109).   
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President also kept decisive administrative functions: the elaboration and 
implementation of the budget and the human resources management.  
It would be inaccurate to say that the Cartel Theory is disconfirmed because the 
functions of the extremely powerful Argentine President of the Chamber have not 
increased (what other function could this central authority have?) I will bring up this 
subject in the conclusion to this section. By now I just want to mention that it is difficult 
to find such extreme concentration of power in the head of a lower Chamber in the 21st 
century.      
Section 7.   The Election of Directing Boards:  Procedure and Practice 
This section deals with the procedure followed to elect the directing boards and 
the criteria applied to determine their partisan composition. The expectations to 
support or disconfirm the influence of the ruling party are: 1- The election of the 
members of the directing board is by straight party-line votes controlled by ruling parties; 
2- No member of the opposition serves as President or VP of the directing board.  
The data analyzed in this section can be found in APPENDIX C.  
The rules to elect the Chamber’s authorities were never modified. They are elected for 
one-year term in preparatory sessions. To be elected President, VP1, VP2, or VP3 a 
plurality of those voting is needed, the vote is public, and a nominal (i.e., roll-call) 
voting system is mandatory.  
Legislative practice, however, has changed the voting system and the traditional way 
to nominate candidates. The nominal vote was mandatory from 1946 to 1975 and, in 
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practice, is optional since 1983. That year deputies agreed on implementing a weighted 
voting system: the nomination made by each delegation leader represents the vote of 
the members of her group. Nevertheless, if a motion for a nominal vote is supported by 
at least 1/5 of the deputies in attendance, a roll-call is mandatory.83  
Regarding the nomination, while the Sáenz Peña Law was in force (1946-1962) each 
delegation proposed and voted for its own candidate. On the contrary, since 1963 
delegations have gathered to nominate and elect candidates (APPENDIX C). 
Furthermore, the first and second delegations almost always voted together for 
electing President and VP1, 84 and most of the time for VP2.85 As to the VP3, in 1997 the 
UCR and the PJ voted together to elect a FREPASO deputy, but in 1999 they supported 
different candidates.86   
As APPENDIX C shows, no candidate to any position of the directing board different 
from the one proposed or supported by the ruling party was ever elected. This is the 
main conclusion to be drawn from the analysis of the 39 preparatory sessions in which 
the authorities of the Chamber were elected from 1946 to 2001.  
Besides this main pattern, four other particular criteria were applied to determine the 
partisan composition of the directing boards. I will refer to them as: “The winner takes 
all the positions” (1946-1962/1973-1975), “Mixed directing boards” (1963-1966/1987-
                                                            
83 After 1983 the nominal voting system to elect the directing board was used in two disputed cases: the 
election of VP2 in 1987 and the election of VP3 in 1999.     
84 In 1997 the UCR abstained in the election of Alberto Pierri (PJ) and Marcelo López Arias (PJ) as President and 
VP1, respectively. In 1973 the UCR supported a UCR candidate for VP1 while the PJ did so for a PJ (PPC) 
candidate.    
85 In 1963 the UCRP supported a UdelPA candidate for VP2. By contrast, the UCRI voted for a MPProv 
candidate. In 1973 the PJ voted for a member of the PJ (MID) delegation for VP2 while the UCR voted for an 
APFe deputy. In 1987 the UCR and the PJ also voted differently for VP2: while the former picked a UCeDe 
deputy, the latter picked a MPN member.   
86 In 1999 the UCR voted for a Federal Inter-bloc deputy, while the PJ supported an AR candidate.  
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1988), “The President and VP1 positions belong to the majority” (1983-1986), and “The 
President and VP1 positions belong to the ruling party” (1989-2001).  
Table 52 is useful to follow the description of these criteria and the periods in which 
they were applied.  
Table 52 - DIRECTING BOARD POSITIONS BY TYPE OF MAJORITY-PLURALITY/SINGLE PARTY-
COALITION, RULING, SECOND, AND THIRD PARTIES - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001 
 
Legislative 
Period 
Majority-Plurality/Single Party- Directing Board Positions 
Coalition President VP1 VP2 VP3 a 
1946-1948 Majority Coalition   RP b RP RP - 
1948-1952 Single-Party Majority RP RP RP - 
1952-1955 Single-Party Majority RP RP RP - 
1955 Single-Party Majority RP RP RP - 
1958-1960 Single-Party Majority RP RP RP - 
1960-1962 Single-Party Majority RP RP RP - 
1963-1965 Single-Party Plurality RP  S c   t d - 
1965-1966 Single-Party Plurality RP S t - 
1973-1976 Majority Coalition RP RP RP - 
1983-1985 Single-Party Majority RP RP S - 
1985-1987 Single-Party Majority RP RP S - 
1987-1989 Single-Party Plurality RP S t - 
1989-1991 Single-Party Plurality RP RP S - 
1991-1993 Single-Party Plurality RP RP S - 
1993-1995 Single-Party Plurality RP RP S - 
1995-1997 Single-Party Majority RP RP S - 
1997-1999 Single-Party Plurality RP RP S t 
1999-2001 
 
 
Plurality Coalition 
 
 
RP 
 
RP 
 
S 
 
t 
 
    a. The Third Vice-Presidency of the Chamber was created in 1996. 
       b. Ruling Party. 
       c. Second Party. 
       d. Third Party. 
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The first criterion is simple: all positions go to the majority party. It was applied during 
the Saénz Peña Law period and from 1973 to 1975, that is, when ruling parties had 
qualified and exceptional majorities.  
The second criterion, “Mixed directing boards,” is also simple: positions are assigned in 
proportion to the membership of each “party.” It was applied for the first time in 1963-
1966 and then in 1987-1988, that is, when pluralities were in charge of the Chamber. 
In 1983, the UCR and the PJ agreed on a new criterion. Neither winner takes all, nor PR. 
The majority keeps the President and VP1 positions and the VP2 goes to the first plurality. 
Actually, this criterion would last only for the “radical years” 1983-1986.  
The fourth and last criterion was imposed by the PJ and the UCR in 1989: no matter the 
type of majority or plurality the ruling party holds in Chamber, the President and the 
VP1 positions will be filled by ruling-party members, and the VP2 by a deputy of the 
second delegation. 
The successive criteria regarding the partisan composition of directing boards were not 
always welcomed by all parties. Let me briefly mention the most interesting debates 
about this subject.   
- In 1973-1975, the PJ (then the FREJULI) applied the criterion “The winner takes 
all the positions” even though the Chamber had been electing the directing 
board according to the second criterion (“Mixed directing boards”) since 1963, 
and disregarding the fact that the PJ had supported this second criterion from 
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1963 to 1966.87 Ferdinando Pedrini (FREJULI) responded to the complains of 
the opposition explaining that his group could not follow the proportionality 
criterion because the FREJULI was a coalition formed by quite a few parties 
that deserved representation in the directing board. 88 
- When the second criterion, “Mixed directing boards”, was first applied (1963) 
the UCRP ruling party fixed a norm: directing board positions would be 
assigned to parties, not to coalitions or alliances formed in the Chamber after the 
election. 89 The opposite norm was sustained by the UCRI and the DemC: they 
would elect delegations, be they a party or a coalition. 90 The ruling-party 
criterion (UCRP) prevailed. The “Mixed directing boards” criterion was again 
applied in 1987 when Radicals lost its majority in Chamber. Being the first 
plurality, Radicals agreed to give the VP1 to the PJ and the VP2 to the UCeDe.    
- The fourth and last criterion, as mentioned, was imposed by the PJ and the 
UCR in 1989. In that year Peronists, though being the first plurality (regular 
plurality), kept for themselves the VP1 (until now ruling pluralities gave the VP1 
to the second delegation). The reasons stated by the leaders of both 
delegations (PJ and UCR) to make this decision were “the order of Presidential 
                                                            
87 In the election of authorities of 1965 Paulino Niembro, in representation of the PJ delegation, announced 
they would vote for the UCRP (ruling party) candidate for President because they were following the criterion 
of proportionality. Journal 26.04.65, pp. 6/8.  
88 Journal 03.05.73, pp. 6/12. From 1973 to 1976 the Presidency belonged to the PJ (FREJULI), the VP1 to the 
PPC (FREJULI), and the VP2 to the MID (FREJULI).  
89 Following this norm the UCRP, UdelPA, SocD and DemP voted for candidates from parties electing a UCRP 
deputy for President, an UCRI deputy for VP1, and an UdelPA deputy for VP2. 
90 Following this norm the UCRI and DemC voted for a UCRP (President), UCRI (VP1), and MPProv (VP2) 
directing board. The MPProv delegation was a group of provincial parties that represented the peronist 
movement. Their members explained that they deserved the VP2 because they were the third group in 
Chamber (they had 17 members, while the UdelPA had 14). See speeches of deputies Juan A. Luco (PJ) -Journal 
12.08.63, p. 11- , and Alberto Serú García (PJ) -Journal 20.12.63, p. 1023-. 
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Succession” 91 and the “need to have an efficient management of the 
Chamber.” 92 This criterion was many times criticized, especially in 1995 by a 
FREPASO leader who demanded (unsuccessfully) the VP2 for his party. 93 
Despite minority parties’ protests, the PJ kept the Presidency and the VP1 and 
the UCR the VP2 even in 1991, when the PJ delegation was split in three 
factions and Peronists held the lowest percentage of seats as a plurality.94  
- The same distribution of positions -PJ (P); PJ (VP1); UCR (VP2) - remained in 
1997, when the PJ suffered a major electoral defeat and lost the majority in 
Chamber. The difference then was that the newly created VP3 went to the 
FREPASO. That year, some weeks before the election of the directing board, 
the UCR and the FREPASO (the ALIANZA) publicly announced they would vote 
against the election of a Peronist as President of the Chamber. They were “the 
coalition that had come to end with the Menemismo in the Chamber.”  
Nonetheless, in the session they abstained. The rest of the delegations 
denounced collusion between the PJ and the ALIANZA: “they exchanged the 
VP1 for important positions on committees and the VP3 for the FREPASO.”95 
Finally, and even though the ALIANZA was the first plurality in 1999 and 2000, 
                                                            
91 In Argentina the President of the Chamber of Deputies is third in the line of succession after the President 
pro-tempore of the Senate (second), and the Vice-President (first).   
92This decision was repudiated by some minority delegations. Francisco de Durañona y Vedia (UCeDe) argued 
that his delegation would abstain because two traditional practices had been violated: the PR criterion to elect 
authorities when no delegation had the majority, and the previous consultation with delegations (this election 
was negotiated only between the PJ and the UCR). Journal 29.11.89, pp. 5648/56.  
93 Journal 29.11.95, pp. 5555/60.  
94  Fernando de la Rúa (UCR) said that although his delegation considered that the VP1 should be occupied by 
the second minority, they would vote for the PJ candidate in order to avoid unnecessary arguments. Journal 
28.11.91, p. 4901. 
95 Speeches of Amalia Isequilla (MPPSL) and Rafael A. Bulacio (ReDe). Journal 03.12.97, in the official records of 
the debates available online at www.diputados.gov.ar - 
http://www.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dtaquigrafos/frames.html 
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it also kept the Presidency and the VP1, leaving the VP2 to the PJ and the VP3 
to the Federal Inter-bloc.96  
Before concluding, it is worth mentioning that reelection is the rule regarding 
Presidents in the Argentine Chamber. Since 1946, Presidents have been almost always 
reelected the second year of the legislative period or the second or third legislative 
period (if the party remained in power or the Chamber was not closed by a military 
coup). 97  That being said, I wanted to highlight that the Radical Juan C. Pugliese was six 
times President of the Chamber (1983-1988), and that the controversial and criticized 
Peronist Alberto R. Pierri broke all the records because he was elected eleven 
consecutive times to occupy that position (1989-1998).98  
To conclude, the election of the directing board is based on an old rule that 
benefits ruling parties (only the plurality of those voting is needed). The practice has 
replaced the mandatory roll-call voting system to elect the authorities by a weighted 
voting system. In other words, it adapted the procedure to the strict party discipline 
that reigns in the Chamber. The weighted voting had indeed benefited ruling parties. 
The analysis of the preparatory sessions shows that dissident voices inside delegations 
can be easily overlooked using this system. 99      
                                                            
96 The election of VP3 in 1999 presented a similar scenario as that of 1963 for VP2, but the result was the 
opposite. Differing from the criterion adopted in 1963 by the UCRP (only parties can get positions on the 
directing board), the ruling party in 1999 (ALIANZA) supported the Inter-Federal Bloc for VP3 which was 
composed of a 9 parties. The PJ, by contrast, supported the AR delegation for VP3 (the AR was Cavallo’s party). 
Journal 09.12.99, official records of the debates available online at www.diputados.gov.ar - 
http://www.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dtaquigrafos/frames.html 
97 See the authorities of the Chamber of Deputies in 
http://www1.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dip/congreso/aut.ses%20prep1109.pdf 
98 Alberto Pierri was elected twice in 1989 (in July and November). 
99 The best example is the preparatory session of 1997. Five PJ deputies were against the election of Pierri, 
among them the actual President of Argentina, Cristina Kirchner. She literally shouted to Pierri announcing that 
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As to the powers of the head of the Chamber, note that the idea that the President is 
(and should remain) the administrative, legislative, and political authority is a norm 
(and a rule) that has survived electoral changes, reforms to the Reglamento, and that 
has been supported by all ruling parties. The remarkable situation in this aspect it is not 
the fact that the PJ had always tried to increase the President’s powers, but the fact 
that the rest of the parties have not tried to redistribute all this power in an “Internal 
Affairs Committee”, as it is the case in other legislatures. The bona fide CLP -until now 
the most serious intent to decentralize at least the agenda-setting power- was 
controlled by the following ruling parties after 1965.  
Evidently, this extreme concentration of power is an advantage that no party with 
chances to get the Presidency is willing to lose. It is in this sense that I affirm that the 
unreformed powers of the President support the Cartel Theory.        
Regarding the partisan composition of the directing boards one fact tells it all: no 
candidate to any position of the directing board different from the one proposed or 
supported by the ruling party was ever elected in the Chamber during these fifty-five 
years.  
The four criteria related to the partisan composition of the directing boards also 
support the predictions of the theory. The electoral reform of 1963 produced a 
substantial change: for the first time mixed (proportional) directing boards were 
elected. This fact credits the theory: in a Chamber of pluralities, pluralities chose the 
most beneficial distribution of those positions according to their interests. Outside the 
“Chamber of the proportionality rule” (1963-1966) that criterion was replaced by 
                                                                                                                                                                         
she would vote against him and demanding the right to speak to the Chamber but Pierri did not allow her to 
speak to the plenary during that session. Journal, 03.12.97.     
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patterns oriented to favor the ruling party. Furthermore, since 1989 the ruling party 
advantages the rest of the delegations in the directing board, no matter which type of 
plurality rules the Chamber. The opposition, however, is in those directing boards and 
this fact appears to disconfirm the theory. But consider that those bipartisan directing 
boards are the result of negotiations that gave ruling parties the lion’s share of the 
authority positions (the Presidency and the First Vice-Presidency). Furthermore, the 
PJ, with the agreement of the UCR, clearly preferred to create a Vice-Presidency for 
the FREPASO (the VP3) before losing its pre-eminence (concretely, before ceding the 
VP1 to the Radicals). This is the same pattern that was found in the 1989 reform to the 
Reglamento: modify rules, alter the structure of the Chamber to keep advantages. This, 
again, is a cartel behavior.  
In chapter II I mentioned that one of the predictions to test in this section was “All 
motions entertained to remove the President or the directing board from office are 
rejected.” The Argentine Reglamento has never regulated the removal procedure of the 
directing board and the journals of sessions register no debate about this subject 
matter from 1946 to 2001.100 That is why this prediction is not tested in the Argentine 
case.  
 
 
 
                                                            
100 The only record I found was a “confidence question” (an institution not regulated in the Reglamento) tabled 
by President Rodolfo J. Tercera del Franco (PJ) himself because one deputy had objected his decision regarding 
a question of privilege. Although deputies recongnized that this procedure was not regulated in the 
Reglamento, they voted and dismissed the confidence question (Journal 21.07.65, pp. 1311/12).   
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Part III. Structuring the Committee System 
When Cox and McCubbins presented the Cartel Theory, they had against them 
evidence showing that from the 1920s to the 1970s there had been a committee 
government in the U.S. House. Therefore, they made their case through the analyses 
of the incentives of party leaders, and parties as procedural and floor coalitions. My 
point of departure is different. Actually, I have to find out first of all whether there was 
a party or a committee government before the 1970s in the Argentine Chamber, and to 
evaluate if my results confirm what other authors have argued regarding the 1983-2001 
term.  
In this section I investigate the type of standing committee system prevalent in the 
Chamber from 1946 to 2001. Was it an autonomous committee system? Or, by 
contrast, were committees agents of the ruling party? Based on expectations from the 
Cartel Theory I look for ties between the ruling party and the organization of the 
standing committee system. To this end section 8 explains the expansion of the 
Chamber’s standing committee system through the analysis of descriptive data. Then, 
section 9 deals with a systematic analysis of the committee assignment process.  
 
Section 8.   The Expansion of the Standing Committee System  
Reviewing the studies on committee size manipulation in the U.S. Congress, 
Eulau (1984, 592) stated that “[p]olitical units are more likely to increase than decrease 
in size, and efforts to reduce their size are invariably offset by tendencies toward 
growth, as if growth were a law of nature.” If we were to find confirming evidence of 
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such a “law” of committee growth, a good place to start would be the standing 
committees of the Argentine Chamber. In this section I describe the relentless 
expansion of the standing committee system, and analyze if this process can be 
explained as an instrument of partisan control. Three “instruments of control” (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993, 254) are examined: the creation of standing committees, the 
enlargement of committees’ memberships and leadership positions.   
8.1  The Creation of Standing Committees  
I consider the following expectations that suppose an influence of the ruling party 
over the committee system: 1- The increase in the number of committees is not due to 
the need for matching the structure of ministries or for generating greater expertise but an 
answer to requests from members of ruling and opposition parties to occupy a place in the 
committee system; 2- Ruling parties control this process and get the majority of Chairs of 
the new committees. The description of the creation of standing committees can be 
followed in APPENDIX D.  
From 1946 to 2001 the number of standing committees increased from 19 to 45, while 
the number of deputies went from 158 to 257. This expansion was moderate from 1946 
to 1976, when 9 committees were created (and 2 committees were dissolved). During 
the period 1983-2001, by contrast, the committee system increased by 19 units; the 
1990-1998 term experiencing the greatest expansion (14 committees).  
- During the moderate period (1946-1976) the creation of (the 9) committees 
followed three patterns.  
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First, members of ruling parties authored all but one resolution tabled to create 
them. 101 This means that ruling parties controlled the creation of committees. 
That is why I will call this pattern the “controlled-creation pattern.” Note that 6 
of the 9 resolutions were also signed by opposition parties.  
Second, except for 3 committees (those created in the 1955 reform), the 
remaining 6 were the result of consensual decisions among parties which 
aimed at dealing with social problems (e.g., committees on Aboriginal Affairs 
and on Housing) or at matching the ministries of the Executive Power (e.g., 
Committee on Energy and Fuels).  
Third, ruling parties chaired all these 9 new committees.  
- From 1983 to 2001 the creation of (the 19) committees followed five patterns.  
First, the “controlled-creation pattern” (opposition parties signed 10 of the 19 
resolutions).  
Second, committees were created in a record time (summary proceedings 
going from 12 days to a few hours, that is, the same day resolutions were 
tabled). Except for the controversial sittings of December 1987 and 1991, the 
approval of these resolutions on the floor was quick and smooth.102 The 
approval of the future new committees would be even easier. Since 1996 the 
resolutions were signed by members of the three main parties: the PJ, UCR, 
and FREPASO. I will call these summary and consensual proceedings the “fast-
track pattern.”  
                                                            
101 The exception was the creation of the Committee on Turism and Sports in 1973. The resolution was signed 
by UCR deputies (the opposition in this period).   
102 In those sittings minor delegations vehemently criticized the procedure applied to Table the resolutions 
creating the committees and their jurisdictions -that superposed those of pre-existent committees. See 
Journals 21.12.87 and 19.12.91.  
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Third, 15 of the 19 new committees were approved “in groups” (two, three or 
four committees per sitting) during sessions which took place immediately 
after the Chamber’s biannual renewal.103 I will call this the “renewal-negotiation 
period pattern.”  
Fourth, regarding the justifications to the resolutions, a simple reading shows 
that they are poorly written and that they use similar phrases such as “the need 
to fill jurisdictional holes,” or the fact that “the Senate has already created this 
committee.” In other cases the realpolitik reasons (for instance, to carry out 
political deals about the distribution of Chamber positions) are explicitly stated 
by delegation leaders.104  
Fifth, despite electoral defeats and an “increasing number of delegations” (a 
phrase repeated to justify the expansion of the committee system) ruling 
parties, in particular the Peronists, kept for themselves most of the chairs of 
the new committees.105     
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
103 See in APPENDIX D the creation of committees in the following sessions: May 1984, December 
1987/1991/1993, and March 1998. 
104 I refer specially to the creation of the standing committees in 1987 and 1998. See resolution 2353-D-87 of 
delegation leader César Jaroslavsky (UCR), and the speech of Eduardo Camaño (PJ) in the session of March 11, 
1998.     
105 During the period 1983/2001, 68% (13/19) of the chairs of new committees went to the ruling party. See 
APPENDIX D.  
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8.2  The Enlargement of Committees’ Memberships 
The representation of all delegations, as much as possible, is one concern of the 
committee assignment process. Ruling parties can decide to implement strictly the 
proportionality rule -obtaining committees that mirror their Chambers- or enlarge 
committees’ memberships -to keep their (over)representation and, at the same time, 
give place to other parties in committees-. My prediction in this section is based on the 
latter strategy. Therefore, the expectation in this case is: Although the enlargement of 
committees’ memberships is meant to enhance the representation of delegations in the 
committee system, ruling parties control this process and maintain their prevalence in the 
distribution of committee seats. The description of the enlargement of committees’ 
memberships can be followed in APPENDIX D.  
 
In the Chamber committees’ membership is established in the Reglamento. During the 
period 1946-1976 committees were assigned a fixed number of deputies. Since 1983, 
minima and maxima have been established.  
While the number of deputies increased by 63 percentage points (from 158 to 257), the 
majority of committees has almost tripled its membership, going from a mean of 9 
members in 1946 to 26 in 2001. The committees whose membership has increased the 
most are Budget, Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Affairs (i.e, the most important 
committees of the Chamber).106  
                                                            
106 See the stratification of committees based on their size and the number of authority positions in APPENDIX 
D.   
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In this fifty-five-year period, the Chamber adopted 13 resolutions to increase 
committees’ membership. From 1946 to 1961 almost all the resolutions received a 
consensual approval. 107 As to those tabled from 1963 to 2001 (8 in total), their passage 
was smoother and even more expedient than those that created committees. 
Moreover, these 8 resolutions were signed by leaders of the two largest delegations, 
and most of them also by leaders of the third and fourth delegations in Chamber. The 
justifications to these resolutions are all pretty the same (e.g., “to ensure the 
representation of all delegations”). From 1983 the approval of resolutions followed the 
“controlled-creation”, “fast-track,” and “renewal-negotiation period” patterns. 
 
It is possible to relate the increase in the number of deputies, with the share of 
committee seats of the ruling party by legislative period, and the date of the 
enlargement. Data about the share of committee assignments accruing to the ruling 
party as compared to its share of seats between 1946 and 2001 is presented in Table 57 
(section 9.4). The increase in the number of deputies and the date of the enlargement 
of committees’ memberships can be found in APPENDIX D. Paying attention to these 
tables we can see that the increase in the number of deputies in 1955, 1963, and 1983 
was followed by the enlargement of committees’ memberships. In these years, the gap 
between the share of seats of the ruling party in Chamber and its share of committee 
assignments was not significant. I conclude that the enlargements were justified by the 
increase in the number of deputies, and that proportional committee assignments 
                                                            
107 The exception is again the enlargement of committees’ membership in 1955.  
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were made (by the way, no enlargement was approved in 1958 and 1973, when the 
Chamber increased the number of deputies to 187 and 243, respectively).   
By contrast, the three consecutive enlargements of 1994, 1998, and 2000 followed no 
increase in the number of deputies and the above mentioned gap for the 1997-1999 
and 1999-2001 periods is significant. Furthermore, the number of delegations 
decreased during these periods (see Tables 43 and 45 in chapter III). Therefore, ruling 
parties (PJ and ALIANZA) enlarged committees’ memberships to secure their over-
representation.        
Two cases about committee enlargements are worth mentioning because they reveal 
the intention of the ruling party to maintain its prevalence in the committee system. 
The first was the 1960 enlargement. That year the UCRI ruling party decided that 
committees should have 2/3 of UCRI members. After a long and harsh discussion about 
the ratio to assign committee seats, the UCRI imposed its criterion and approved the 
(2/3) assignment. Nevertheless, a couple of days later the Chamber approved an 
enlargement (it was the only way for the UCRI to maintain its 2/3 in each committee 
and at the same time give to the second (UCRP) and minor parties a more appropriate 
representation in the committee system).108  
                                                            
108 As will be analyzed in more detail in Section 8.2, the Reglamento establishes that committee assignments 
will be made “to the fullest extent feasible” in proportion to the seats held by parties in the Chamber. I call this 
the “proportionality rule.” In 1960 the UCRP (then the opposition) demanded a partisan ratio of 5 (ruling 
party):4 (opposition) -committees having 9 members then. The UCRI (the ruling party) claimed that the 
proportionality rule was inspired in the Sáenz Peña Law, that is, partisan ratio in committees should be 6:3. The 
UCRP argued that the Sáenz Peña Law had nothing to do with the appointments to committees and that rules 
were inspired in the PR system. A UCRI deputy said the problem was that while the membership of the 
Chamber had increased since 1955, the number of committees and their membership had remained the same. 
Hence, the solution was to increase the number of committees and their membership. Finally, both delegations 
authorized the Presidency to make the appointments, but only the UCRI delegation voted in favor of the Sáenz 
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The second case was the enlargement of the membership of the Committees on Labor 
and on Pensions in 1961. These two committees could not work because of the split of 
the ruling party (UCRI) in two factions. This increase was approved to maintain the 2/3 
criterion altered by that division.    
An obvious corollary to this expansion is that there are multiple assignments, which are 
not restricted by the Reglamento. Table 53 shows the sharp increase in multiple 
assignments Chamber since 1946. The mean number of assignments by deputy is 2.4 
for the whole sample, going from 1.05 in 1948-1952 to 4.72 in 1999-2001.      
Table 53 - THE GROWTH OF MULTIPLE ASSIGNMENTS THROUGH TIME - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF 
DEPUTIES 1946-2001 
 
Legislature No. of Committees 
No. of 
Assignments 
Average No. of Assignments  
1946-1948 19 149 0.97 
1948-1952 20 164 1.05 
1952-1955 20 162 1.05 
1955 22 216 1.30 
1958-1960 21 203 1.09 
1960-1962 20 239 1.24 
1963-1965 23 320 1.67 
1965-1966 23 352 1.83 
1973-1976 24 555 2.28 
1983-1985 26 617 2.43 
1985-1987 28 673 2.65 
1987-1989 31 738 2.91 
1989-1991 31 758 2.98 
1991-1993 33 815 3.17 
1993-1995 38 964 3.75 
1995-1997 39 929 3.60 
1997-1999 44 1,216 4.73 
1999-2001 45 1,212 4.72 
Total  7856,42  
Average 28.16 436 2.4 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Peña criterion (Journal 11.05.60, pp. 45/138). One week later both delegations approved the enlargement of the 
membership of all standing committees (Journal 19.05.60, pp. 318/20).   
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8.3  The Creation of Leadership Positions 
Besides multiple assignments and the increase in the number and size of 
committees, the 1946-2001 time-period has also witnessed the proliferation of 
committee leadership positions. The expectations to be tested in this case are: 1- The 
increase in committee leadership positions is due to requests from opposition parties to 
occupy a place in the directing boards of committees; 2- Ruling parties control this process 
and keep the lions’ share of the new committee leadership positions.  
Data about the creation of leadership positions in committees can be found in 
APPENDIX D. 
While in 1946 committees had one Chair and one Secretary, in 2001 they had one 
Chair, two Vice-Chairs (I will refer to them as VC1 and VC2), and three Secretaries 
(important committees having four Secretaries). The proliferation of committee 
leadership positions began in 1963 with the creation of a Vice-Chair (VC1) for all 
committees, and had a peak in 1987 when a second Vice-Chair (VC2) and a second 
Secretary for all committees were approved.  
The creation of leadership positions was included in the resolutions tabled to increase 
the number of committees or their membership. Therefore, the creation of these 
positions follows the already mentioned patterns (“controlled-creation”, “fast track,” 
and “renewal-negotiation period” patterns).  According to these documents, the 
increase was needed to “improve the direction of committees” or “make more efficient 
the work in committees.” These justifications are curious, most of all if we consider 
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that the Reglamento establishes no functions for Vice-Chairs and secretaries and that, 
in practice, they have no decisional power in committees.  
Which parties benefited from the creation of these new positions? Tables 54, 55, and 
56 show the assignment of CV1, CV2, and Secretaries by parties from 1963 to 2001. 
Two patterns can be established from the data presented there: ruling parties secure 
over-representation in VC2, leaving most of the VC1 to the second delegation in 
Chamber (1987-2001), and ruling parties get the lion’s share of Secretaries (1963-2001).  
 
Table 54 - ASSIGNMENT OF COMMITTEE FIRST VICE-CHAIRS BY RULING, SECOND, THIRD AND OTHER 
PARTIES - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1963-2001 
 
Legislative 
Period 
First Vice-chairs  
Total 
T 
(%) Ruling 
Party 
RP 
(%) 
Second 
Party 
SP 
(%) 
Third 
Party 
TP 
% 
Other 
Parties 
OP 
(%) 
1963-1965 4 23,5 3 17,6 3 17,6 7 41,2 17 100,0 
1965-1966 9 39,1 9 39,1 2 8,7 3 13,0 23 100,0 
1973-1976 10 45,5 10 45,5 1 4,5 1 4,5 22 100,0 
1983-1985 13 50,0 11 42,3 2 7,7 0 0,0 26 100,0 
1985-1987 14 50,0 10 35,7 1 3,6 3 10,7 28 100,0 
1987-1989 13 41,9 15 48,4 1 3,2 2 6,5 31 100,0 
1989-1991 7 23,3 23 76,7 0 0,0 0 0,0 30 100,0 
1991-1993 7 21,2 26 78,8 0 0,0 0 0,0 33 100,0 
1993-1995 9 23,7 29 76,3 0 0,0 0 0,0 38 100,0 
1995-1997 10 27,0 26 70,3 1 2,7 0 0,0 37 100,0 
1997-1999 17 38,6 15 34,1 7 15,9 5 11,4 44 100,0 
1999-2001 12 28,6 27 64,3 2 4,8 1 2,4 42 100,0 
 N=371  
Note:  The number of vice-chairs in the column “Total” may not coincide with the legal number of vice-chairs according to the Reglamento. The 
reason is that some positions are vacant at the time of the publication of the booklets the Composition of the Chamber and Committees’ 
Memberships (“Cámara de Diputados de la Nación – Composición y Comisiones”).  
 
From 1963 to 1987 the distribution of VC1 between ruling and second parties was 
mostly equivalent (Table 54). The situation changed markedly with the introduction of 
the VC2 in 1987. That year second parties began to increase their presence in the VC1 
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(securing more than 60% until 2001). 109  We can see also that there was a distribution 
of VC1 between the parties of the ALIANZA (UCR and FREPASO) in 1997 (see “second 
party” and “third party” columns) and that despite losing its majority Peronists secured 
39% of the VC1. 
 
It may be clear by now that ruling parties in the Argentine lower Chamber rarely give 
positions to the opposition freely. Take a look at Tables 56 and 57. VC2 belong to ruling 
parties (they have secured more than 2/3 of these positions since 1989). They had over-
representation (1973 to 1985), and the plurality (1963-1966/1987-2001) in the case of 
Secretaries (Table 34).         
Table 55 - ASSIGNMENT OF COMMITTEE SECOND VICE-CHAIRS BY RULING, SECOND, THIRD AND 
OTHER PARTIES - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1987-2001 
 
Legislative 
Period 
Second Vice-chairs   
Total 
T 
(%) Ruling 
Party 
RP 
% 
Second 
Party 
SP 
% 
Third 
Party 
TP 
% 
Other 
Parties 
  
1987-1989 17 54,8 8 25,8 2 6,5 4 12,9 31 100,0 
1989-1991 22 71,0 4 12,9 2 6,5 3 9,7 31 100,0 
1991-1993 23 71,9 4 12,5 3 9,4 2 6,3 32 100,0 
1993-1995 30 81,1 3 8,1 0 0,0 4 10,8 37 100,0 
1995-1997 35 97,2 1 2,8 0 0,0 0 0,0 36 100,0 
1997-1999 34 79,1 3 7,0 4 9,3 2 4,7 43 100,0 
1999-2001 31 79,5 4 10,3 3 7,7 1 2,6 39 100,0 
N=249  
Note:  The number of vice-chairs in the column “Total” may not coincide with the legal number of vice-chairs according to the Reglamento. The 
reason is that some positions are vacant at the time of the publication of the booklets the Composition of the Chamber and Committees’ 
Memberships (“Cámara de Diputados de la Nación – Composición y Comisiones”).  
 
 
 
                                                            
109 There were two exceptions. The first was in 1987 when the PJ held 48.4% of the VC1, and in 1997 when the 
ALIANZA secured 50% of the same position.   
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Table 56 - ASSIGNMENT OF COMMITTEE SECRETARIES BY RULING, SECOND, THIRD PARTIES AND 
OTHER PARTIES - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1963-2001 
 
Legislative 
Period 
Secretaries   
Total T (%) 
Ruling Party 
RP 
(%) 
Second 
Party 
SP 
(%) 
Third 
Party 
TP 
% 
Other 
Parties 
OP 
(%) 
1963-1965 10 43,5 4 17,4 2 8,7 7 30,4 23 100,0 
1965-1966 7 31,8 5 22,7 2 9,1 8 36,4 22 100,0 
1973-1976 23 100,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 23 100,0 
1983-1985 17 65,4 9 34,6 0 0,0 0 0,0 26 100,0 
1985-1987 16 61,5 5 19,2 2 7,7 3 11,5 26 100,0 
1987-1989 28 47,5 22 37,3 2 3,4 7 11,9 59 100,0 
1989-1991 27 49,1 18 32,7 4 7,3 6 10,9 55 100,0 
1991-1993 26 41,3 20 31,7 4 6,3 13 20,6 63 100,0 
1993-1995 30 40,5 23 31,1 4 5,4 17 23,0 74 100,0 
1995-1997 30 45,5 18 27,3 1 1,5 17 25,8 66 100,0 
1997-1999 33 35,9 24 26,1 15 16,3 20 21,7 92 100,0 
1999-2001 51 45,5 34 30,4 9 8,0 18 16,1 112 100,0 
N=641  
Note:  The number of secretaries in the column “Total” may not coincide with the legal number of secretaries according to the Reglamento. The 
reason is that some positions are vacant at the time of the publication of the booklets the Composition of the Chamber and Committees’ 
Memberships (“Cámara de Diputados de la Nación – Composición y Comisiones”).  
 
To recapitulate, the descriptive data portrayed in sections 8.1 to 8.3 partially 
support the theory. The influence of ruling parties in the creation of committees began 
in the 1980s, it is limited to four cases in relation to the enlargement of memberships 
and to different periods and positions in the case of leadership positions. Pluralities 
made the most important changes regarding the enlargement of leadership positions, 
a process that started after the introduction of the PR (1963). The type or majority or 
plurality and the change of electoral system do not seem to influence the enlargement 
of committees’ memberships.  
Regarding the creation of committees a distinction must be made. In the moderate 
period (1946-1976), only the second prediction is supported (Ruling parties control this 
process and get the majority of Chairs of the new committees). Ruling parties controlled 
the process and monopolized its Chairs, but the creation of committees was due to the 
need for matching the ministries or dealing with social problems. Therefore, the first 
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prediction is disconfirmed  (The increase in the number of committees is not due to the 
need for matching the structure of ministries or for generating greater expertise but an 
answer to requests from members of ruling and opposition parties to occupy a place in the 
committee system).  
The situation in the 1983-2001 period is different because both predictions are 
confirmed. Ruling parties authored all resolutions and secured 68 % of the new Chairs. 
But more can be said. The creation of committees was summary and consensual (the 
agreement between ruling parties and the main opposition parties is omnipresent). 
The “need for matching the structure of ministries” as a justification was abandoned (it 
is difficult to justify on these grounds the creation of 19 committees, furthermore when 
the Chamber already had 26 committees and the Executive Power never had more that 
15 ministries). Pitiful justifications led way to the explicit mention of realpolitik reasons. 
In addition, 80% of the committees were created “in groups” after the renewal of the 
Chamber. In other words, during the period all the benefits of the Chamber are 
distributed.  
In the case of the enlargement of committees’ memberships, the theory is partially 
confirmed. Even though ruling parties controlled the process during the whole period, I 
only proved that ruling parties maintained their prevalence in the distribution of 
committee seats after the enlargement twice during the 1960s and twice at the end of 
the 1990s. The rest of the cases does not support the prediction.   
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Finally, ruling parties, based again on paltry justifications and with the ample support 
of opposition parties, commanded the proliferation of inutile committee leadership 
positions but did not get the lion’s share of all the new positions.  
Two years are important in this process: 1963 (creation of the VC1), and 1987 (creation 
of VC2 and a second Secretary). In both cases, pluralities needed to respond to the 
demands of the parties of the opposition (the 1963 was the “Chamber of the 
proportionality rule”; the 1987 was the Chamber of the mid-term elections in which 
Radicals were defeated and Peronists managed to get the VP1).  
The over-representation of ruling parties is clear since 1973 in the case of secretaries 
(after 1985 there was a decline) and since 1989 for VC2. The distribution of VC1 was 
mostly equivalent until 1987. After that year it benefited the second party in Chamber. 
In simpler terms, in 1987 the UCR and the PJ decided not only that three new 
committees would be created, but also that the second delegation would be 
permanently represented in the committee system through the VC1. Once this 
position was granted to the second delegation, the ruling party secured over-
representation in VC2 and the position of first plurality in the case of secretaries.  
Section 9.  Committee Assignments 
The study of committee assignments is central to test the influence of ruling 
parties in legislatures. In this section I provide a detailed description of rules and 
practices on assignments in the Chamber. Then I introduce the predictions and outline 
the methodological approach I apply to the analysis of the allocation of committee 
seats. Finally, I present the results and conclusions regarding each aspect considered.  
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9.1  The Committee Assignment Process: Rules and Practices  
In order to understand the committee assignment process, it is necessary to 
distinguish between rules and practices. According to the Reglamento, every two years, 
following the Chamber’s partial renewal, the Chamber decides if the allocation of 
committee seats will be made “by the Chamber itself”, or by “its President” (rule 29). 
Committee assignments will be made “to the fullest extent feasible” in proportion to 
the seats held by parties in the Chamber (rule 105). As mentioned, this is the 
“proportionality rule.” Rule 106 states that once committee assignments are made, 
each committee will elect its authorities (plurality of votes is required).  
In spite of several reforms to the Reglamento these three rules were never modified.110 
In addition, these are the only rules related to the assignment process. Differing from 
other congresses, in the Chamber there are no initial freshman committee assignment 
requests or non-freshman transfer requests. There is neither a committee on 
committees devoted to prepare the assignment slate for each party, nor delegations or 
floor approval of those committee nominations.111  
The eighteen preparatory sessions and the debates about committee assignments that 
took place between 1946 and 2001 show three features of this process: a) presidents 
have always been entitled by the Chamber to allocate committee seats (I call this the 
“first phase of the process”); b) once the Chamber delegates the allocation of 
committee seats to the President, the process is in her hands (I call this the second 
                                                            
110 Rule 106 was modified in terms of the number of leadership positions, but not regarding the procedure to 
elect them. The proportionality rule was introduced in the general reform to the Reglamento of 1941.   
111 Sometimes deputies declare themselves interested in particular committees in delegation meetings, 
through memos addressed to the delegation leader or to the President. As any document addressed to the 
Presidency of the Chamber, the latter rare requests are published in the “Boletín de Asuntos Entrados.” There is 
no official record of the former.    
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phase of the process); c) the authorization the Chamber gives to the President to make 
the assignments implies consultation with delegation leaders.  
Regarding this second, non-regulated phase of the committee assignment process 
Jones et al. (2002, 660) explain that the President “decides, in consultation with the 
party delegation leaders, which committee leadership positions (President, Vice-
President, Secretary) correspond to which parties. Once this allocation is decided, each 
party’s leadership distributes its committee assignments.” The analysis of the 
aforementioned debates allows me to make five observations to the process.  
First, consultation is discretionary. It depends on who sits in the President’s chair. In 
1952 a UCR deputy addressed the President and claimed: “it is understood that this 
authorization [of the President to assign committee positions] implies a consultation 
with the delegations.” The President (Héctor J. Cámpora - PJ) answered that this 
consultation was “a simple parliamentary practice […], if it were an imposed condition, 
this would mean a limitation to the authorization the Chamber gives to the 
Presidency.”112  
Second, there is no agreement on the subject matter of consultation. For instance, 
while in 1960 the Chamber debated the ratio implied in the proportionality rule (see 
section 8.1), in 1961 a deputy explained that consultations were meant to name the 
specific deputies proposed in each committee,113 and in 1987 the President openly 
                                                            
112 Journal 05.05.52, p. 57. 
113 Journal 15.06.61, p. 961.   
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denied having the responsibility to allocate committee leadership positions explaining 
that this was not part of the consultations.114  
Third, although all delegation leaders are supposed to be consulted, the practice shows 
that most of them are completely unaware of the negotiations.  
Fourth, negotiations about the leadership positions on committees are entangled with 
negotiations regarding the Vice-Presidencies of the Chamber. Usually delegation 
leaders from minor parties denounce and lament these agreements during the 
preparatory sessions. 115   
Fifth, negotiations sometimes take more time than expected. Although committees 
are supposed to be appointed before the opening of ordinary sessions, it is not unusual 
for committees to be appointed two or three months after that date. 
 
In short, the committee assignment process in the Chamber has the following 
features: a) the Reglamento establishes who can make the assignments and the 
criterion to follow to allocate seats; b) the practice shows that Presidents are always 
delegated the task by the Chamber, and that they decide the allocation through 
informal consultations with party leaders; c) what is consulted and what exactly 
Presidents decide is not uniform from one legislative period to another; c) it does not 
                                                            
114 In 1987 the problem was the number of authorities the PJ would get in committees. The PJ delegation leader 
José L. Manzano asked for a special session to make the appointments. President Juan C. Pugliese (UCR) 
explained that the Presidency had nothing to do with the appointment of committee authorities, that that was 
an issue that each committee should arrange. Manzano said that “the PJ could not delegate committee 
appointments.” Federico T. Storani (UCR) motioned to respect the traditional procedure. Manzano tried to 
respond but he was denied the right to speak and the President closed the debate (Journal 27.11.87, pp. 
4354/56).        
115 See the preparatory sessions in Journals 27.11.87, pp. 4345/54 and 29.11.89, pp. 5648/56, and in the official 
records of debates available online at http://www.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dtaquigrafos/frames.html: 
03.12.97 and 01.12.99.  
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ensure the participation of all delegation leaders; and d) it is part of a broader 
negotiation that includes other positions in the Chamber.  
Let’s now turn to theories to examine the patterns of committee assignments that 
emerge empirically.  
9.2  Predictions  
Considering the characteristics of the Chamber as well as evidence from previous 
research, I expect party-centered theories to be particularly relevant for the 
examination of the Chamber committee assignments.116 I follow in this section the 
steps taken by Cox and McCubbins in Legislative Leviathan (1993) to evaluate the use 
of assignments as an instrument of partisan control.  
Therefore, I consider two factors that may limit the influence of party leaders: seniority 
and apprenticeship norms. As mentioned in chapter II, the former refers to committee-
specific seniority and implies that the committee member of the majority (ruling) party 
with the longest continuous service on the committee becomes Chair (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993). The latter suggests that committee appointments “operate under an 
“apprenticeship” norm that guarantees mediocre assignments to incoming members” 
(Cox and McCubbins 1993, 42). As will be discussed below, I consider in this study 
committee-specific seniority, but also the impact of chamber seniority (i.e., total 
service in Chamber) more generally. 
                                                            
116 Jones et al. (2002) have demonstrated the inapplicability of the distributional and informational theories to 
the Argentine system (1983-1997 period), and Jones and Hwang (2005) demonstrated the general applicability 
of the Cartel Theory to the Chamber by examining deputy behavior through roll-call vote analysis (1989-2003 
period). 
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Of course, I also investigate “whether partisan criteria enter the assignment process” 
(Cox and McCubbins 1993, 163) testing four predictions. The first three are related to 
the Cartel Theory, and the fourth to the margin hypothesis of Young and Heitshusen 
(2003). 117 
Following this order I test: 1) whether party ratios in standing committees are 
consistently set in ruling parties’ favor; 2) the extent to which ruling parties have super-
proportional share of seats in important committees; 3) the extent to which ruling parties 
have super-proportional share of authority positions (chairmanships) in committees; and 
4) if pluralities and regular majorities exercise (in proportion) greater control of the 
standing committees’ composition than qualified or exceptional majorities do.  
In brief, while considering the extent to which seniority and apprenticeship norms 
matter in committee assignments, I test predictions stemming from the party-
centered literature. First, the cartel hypothesis that predicts super-proportions of 
ruling-party members in the standing committees’ composition, in important 
committees, and in authority positions. Second, the margin hypothesis that states that 
cartel-behavior tendencies are enhanced when the ruling party has won by slight 
margins.  
 
 
                                                            
117 As explained in chapter II Young and Heitshusen (2003) argue that majority-party incentives to influence 
committee composition vary by party margins. In this sense, pluralities and regular majorities will exercise (in 
proportion) greater control of the standing committees’ composition than qualified or exceptional majorities 
do because they face more difficulties in overcoming the opposition delegation’s obstructive tendencies.  
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9.3  Methodology  
In the empirical section that follows (9.4 Results), I start with descriptive data at 
the aggregate (legislature) level. Then I move to the analysis of committee 
assignments at the deputy level. I also examine sub-samples to compare the 
determinants of committee assignments under different electoral rules. Finally, I 
switch the level of analysis to individual assignments, in order to test for the influence 
of committee-specific seniority on chairmanship.  
The dependent variable is the weighted sum of committee assignments of each deputy. 
Using a weighted sum allows me to examine the power held by a deputy in terms of 
assignments to more or less important committees and in terms of the leadership 
positions held within those committees, not just the count of her assignments. 
To construct the weighted sum of assignments I first classify the standing committees 
according to their importance. As explained above, I could not compute a transfers-
based stratification of committees because there are no committee-transfer requests 
in the Chamber.  
Instead, based on knowledge of the Argentine Chamber’s functioning, I scale 
committees according to objective measures: a) the timing of the increase in size of 
each committee, b) the timing of the increase in the count of Vice-Chairs and 
secretaries within each committee, and c) the longevity of each committee. These 
three criteria come from the reforms to the Reglamento approved by deputies.    
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Committees that were first increased in size by the successive reforms to the 
Reglamento were given a score from 1 (latest increase in size) to 6 (earliest increase in 
size).118 A similar codification is used for the timing of increases in the official number 
of Vice-Chairs and Secretaries, again from 1 to 6 (1 representing a less important 
committee). Finally, I computed the longevity of committees as the count of 
legislatures during which a committee existed, and rescaled this measure from 1 to 6, 1 
meaning youngest committees (older committees are assumed more relevant than 
newer ones).  The average score on those three measures gives the committee 
importance score. APPENDIX E shows the results of this classification.   
The position held within a committee (regular member, Secretary, Vice-Chair, Chair) is 
then used to create an ordinal ranking (from 1 to 4, respectively). Finally, multiplying 
the committee importance score and the position held within that committee before 
summing multiple assignments gives the total amount of power a deputy holds in 
committees. 
To test my main hypotheses, I predict deputies’ weighted sum of assignments using 
the following set of variables: 
Ruling Party: The ruling status of the party to which a deputy belongs (coded 1 for 
deputies from ruling parties and 0 for all other parties);  
Seniority: Either a freshman dummy that equals one if the deputy i is appointed to 
committees for the first time (to test for apprenticeship norm) or the count of four-
                                                            
118 There were 6 common patterns of timing for increase of committee size, explaining that values range from 1 
to 6. 
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year terms of the deputy i (both measures cannot be included at the same time due to 
collinearity); 
Cumulation: The total number of assignments of a deputy, thus netting out the 
“importance” component of her assignments predicted by the other variables;  
Chamber Position: A control variable that measures whether the deputy holds an 
authority position in the Chamber (i.e., President or Vice-president of the Chamber); 
Group Position: A control variable that measures whether the deputy holds an authority 
position in her delegation; 
Legislature Dummies: control variables correcting for the temporal increase in the 
number of committees; 
Regions: Dummy variables (the region of Argentina to which the deputy belongs), to be 
tested against the base of the Capital region.   
A significant and positive coefficient estimate for the Ruling Party variable would give 
support to the cartel hypothesis, since it implies that ruling-party members have more 
than a proportional share of assignments in committees, all else being equal.  
Seniority variables allow testing for apprenticeship and seniority norms.  
I also replace the Ruling Party indicator with five subtypes of ruling-party variables: 
regular pluralities, exceptional pluralities, regular majorities, exceptional majorities, 
and qualified majorities. Such sub-types variables are used to test the margin 
hypothesis. If this hypothesis is correct, then deputies from smaller ruling parties (e.g., 
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regular and exceptional pluralities) would garner more power in committees than 
deputies from majority ruling parties.  In the last part of the empirical section, I replace 
the seniority-in-Chamber measures with committee-specific seniority for a more 
robust test of the seniority norms hypotheses. Instead of considering legislators as 
units of analysis, I then focus on assignments, so that committee-specific seniority can 
be matched to the corresponding assignments.      
Unfortunately, I lack information on the background of deputies (such as prior 
occupation). If professional background is expected to predict the share of power in 
committees, I may face an omitted variable bias. This is true especially if the omitted 
variable is not orthogonal to my main independent variables (Kennedy 2008, 93) – 
seniority and party attachment. Yet, I found no reason to expect a strong correlation 
between the missing variable (professional background) and seniority in Chamber. 
Likewise, I do not expect the omitted variable to be correlated with the party in power. 
As such, I believe the resulting specification bias should not be severe. 
9.4  Results 
- Ruling-Party Shares in Chamber and Committees- 
The descriptive statistics for my main covariates are presented in APPENDIX E.   
A quick look at these results shows that the average deputy scores about 11 points in 
the weighted sum of committee assignments, my dependent variable. The most 
powerful deputy garnered above 40 points on that scale, while a few deputies did not 
secure a single assignment to committees. A clear majority of deputies (about 79%) in 
the sample are in their first legislative term. This fact confirms for the term 1946-2001 
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the idea of “amateur legislators” stressed by Jones et al. (2002) for the period 1983-
1997.   
A preliminary test of the cartel hypothesis consists of comparing the shares of seats of 
ruling parties with their shares of committee assignments across time. Table 57 
presents the share of committee assignments accruing to the ruling party as compared 
to its share of seats between 1946 and 2001. The last column shows the difference 
between the two shares in percentage points. I also performed tests to examine 
whether the percentage-point difference between the two shares is statistically 
significant.   
Table 57 - SHARE OF SEATS AND SHARE OF ASSIGNMENTS RULING PARTY AND TYPE OF MAJORITY-
PLURALITY/SINGLE PARTY-COALITION - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001 
 
Legislative 
Period 
Share of 
Seats 
      Majority-       
Plurality/ Single 
Party-Coalition 
Share of Committee 
Assignments 
Gap 
1946-1948 69.62 Majority Coalition 67.79 -1.83 
1948-1952 70.89 Single-Party Majority 68.90 -1.99 
1952-1955 91.25 Single-Party Majority 87.04 -4.21 
1955 92.77 Single-Party Majority 89.35 -3.42 
1958-1960 71.12 Single-Party Majority 68.47 -2.65 
1960-1962 58.33 Single-Party Majority 64.44 6.11 
1963-1965 37.50 Single-Party Plurality 38.13 0.63 
1965-1966 35.94 Single-Party Plurality 36.08 0.14 
1973-1976 60.08 Majority Coalition 54.95 -5.13 
1983-1985 50.79 Single-Party Majority 53.97 3.18 
1985-1987 50.79 Single-Party Majority 52.75 1.96 
1987-1989 44.49 Single-Party Plurality 47.02 2.53 
1989-1991 47.64 Single-Party Plurality 49.87 2.23 
1991-1993 45.53 Single-Party Plurality 50.67 5.14 
1993-1995 49.81 Single-Party Plurality 52.28 2.47 
1995-1997 50.97 Single-Party Majority 55.30 4.33 
1997-1999 46.30 Single-Party Plurality 52.06 5.76* 
1999-2001 
 
45.91 
 
Plurality Coalition 
 
52.31 
 
6.40* 
 
             Note: The shares are those of the ruling party in the Chamber. 
             Significance testing: Two-sample proportion tests (one-tailed); * = p < 0.05 
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At first glance, representation seems fair. For the first five legislatures opposition 
parties even managed to secure modest over-representation in committee 
assignments, though this disproportionality is non-significant. Only in later periods do 
ruling parties tend to have over-proportional shares of assignments, but only slightly 
so (only for the last two legislatures was the gap statistically significant). 
It is interesting to highlight that the most important over-representations belong to 
ruling pluralities, not to qualified majorities (although the latter register shares of 
committee assignments superior to 65%). As to the period 1960-1962, note the gap 
coincides with what was explained in a previous section about the interpretation of the 
proportionality rule made by the UCRI delegation in 1960 (that year the UCRI ruling 
party decided that committees should have 2/3 of UCRI members - see section 8.2). 
 
The portrait is transformed, however, as soon as I consider the importance of 
assignments. Table 58 shows the assignment of committee chairs from 1946 to 2001.  
While during the Sáenz Peña Law (1946-1962) ruling parties monopolized committee 
Chairs, from 1963 they secured over-representation in every legislative period. During 
the whole period they secured 387 (77%) of a total of 502 Chairs. 
Even in the “Chamber of the proportionality rule” (1963-1966), the percentage of 
Chairs secured by the feeble UCRP ruling plurality is higher than its share of seats in 
Chamber. Paying attention to the gaps of pluralities of the 1980s and 1990s we can see 
that the PJ (1989-1991/1991-1993) and the ALIANZA (1999-2001) behaved as cartels. In 
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particular, I want to highlight the fact that the gap of the PJ plurality of 1989-1991 is 
higher than the gap of the PJ majority of the 1995-1997 period. 
Table 58 - ASSIGNMENT OF COMMITTEE CHAIRS BY RULING, SECOND, THIRD, AND OTHER PARTIES - 
ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001 
Legislative 
Period 
Share of Seats CHAIRS   
Total 
Gap (%)    
( 2 - 1 ) 
Ruling 
Party/Coalition 
(1) 
Ruling 
Party  
RP (%)     
(2) 
Second 
Party 
SP 
(%) 
Third 
Party 
Other 
Parties 
OP 
(%) 
1946-1948 69.6 18 100.0 0 0,0 0 0 0,0 18 30.4 
1948-1952 70.9 20 100.0 0 0,0 0 0 0,0 20 29.1 
1952-1955 91.3 19 100.0 0 0,0 - - - 19 8.7 
1955 92.8 22 100.0 0 0,0 - - - 22 7.2 
1958-1960 71.1 21 100.0 0 0,0 0 - - 21 28.9 
1960-1962 58.3 20 100.0 0 0,0 0 - - 20 41.7 
1963-1965 37.5 11 47.8 4 17.4 2 6 26,1 23 10.3 
1965-1966 35.9 10 43.5 8 34.8 2 3 13,0 23 7.6 
1973-1976 60.1 21 87.5 3 12.5 0 0 0,0 24 27.4 
1983-1985 50.8 19 73.1 7 26.9 0 0 0,0 26 22.3 
1985-1987 50.8 20 76.9 3 11.5 2 1 3,8 26 26.1 
1987-1989 44.5 17 54.8 12 38.7 1 1 3,2 31 10.3 
1989-1991 47.6 24 80 5 16.7 1 0 0,0 30 32.4 
1991-1993 45.5 26 78.8 6 18.2 1 0 0,0 33 33.3 
1993-1995 49.8 29 76.3 8 21.1 1 0 0,0 38 26.5 
1995-1997 51.0 31 79.5 7 17.9 1 0 0,0 39 28.5 
1997-1999 46.3 26 59.1 9 20.5 5 4 9,1 44 12.8 
1999-2001 45.9 33 73.3 10 22.2 1 1 2,2 45 27.4 
Total 387 77,1 82 21.5 13,3 16  3,1 502 
N=502 
Note:  The number of committees chairs in the column “Total “may not coincide with the legal number of committee chairs. The reason is that 
in general some positions are vacant at the time of the publication of the booklets the Composition of the Chamber and Committees’ 
Memberships (“Cámara de Diputados de la Nación – Composición y Comisiones”).  
 
This fact confirms the terms of the bargain between the PJ and the UCR in 1989: the 
Presidency for the PJ before the November renewal and a larger share of chairmanships 
in all committees in exchange of two new positions for the UCR (see section 4). In 
addition, note that the highest gap (33.3%) belongs to the legislative period 1991-1993 
in which the PJ registered its lowest share of seats.       
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Table 59 shows the shares of chairmanships secured by ruling parties during the whole 
period in four of the most important committees. More than 94% of those positions 
were held by ruling parties. In fact, all the chairs from the Budget and the Foreign 
Affairs committees were controlled by ruling parties. 
 
Table 59 - DISTRIBUTION OF CHAIRS IN SOME IMPORTANT COMMITTEES - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF 
DEPUTIES 1946-2001 
 
 
Committee Ruling Party Opposition 
Constitutional Affairs 16 2 
Budget 18 0 
Foreign Affairs 18 0 
Education 15 2 
Total 94.4% 5.6% 
      Note: The Chair of the Committee on Education was vacant during one legislature. 
 
Thus, when weighting for the importance of assignments, these figures offer initial 
support for the cartel hypothesis. Ruling parties managed to assign their members to 
committee Chairs and also in authority positions inside those committees most 
important to Argentine legislators. To further explore this assertion, I turn to a more 
systematic examination of this relationship. 
-Determinants of Committee Assignments at the Deputy Level- 
Table 60 shows the results of models predicting the weighted sum of 
assignments in committees at the deputy level. Let me first consider whether deputies 
from ruling parties secure more power in committees as compared to other deputies, 
and whether this advantage lies within the bounds of statistical significance.   
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Table 60 - PREDICTING WEIGHTED COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS -  ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 
1946-2001 (OLS) 
 
Variables Freshman Model Seniority Model 
   
Ruling Party 1.943 *** 1.991 ***
 (0.187)  (0.188)  
Freshman -1.629 ***  
 (0.199)   
Chamber 
Seniority  0.632 ***
  (0.153)  
Group 
Position -2.54 *** -2.459 ***
 (0.342)  (0.346)  
Chamber 
Position -6.245 *** -6.174 ***
 (0.733)  (0.740)  
Cumulation 0.477 *** 0.482 ***
 (0.077)  (0.077)  
Buenos Aires 
(Province) -0.923 ** -0.911 ** 
 (0.294)  (0.296)  
Centro -0.714 * -0.719 * 
 (0.314)  (0.317)  
Litoral -1.032 ** -1.044 ** 
 (0.373)  (0.376)  
Norte -1.626 *** -1.618 ***
 (0.324)  (0.327)  
Cuyo -0.524  -0.514  
 (0.377)  (0.380)  
Sur  -1.462 *** -1.491 ***
 (0.410)  (0.414)  
Constant 5.915 *** 3.679 ***
 (0.532)  (0.537)  
R2 0.38  0.37   
N 3945  3945   
                                                             Note: The dependent variable is the weighted sum of committee assignments.   
             Legislature dummies are included in the regression (to control for the increase  
                                                             in the total number of committees over time), although the estimates are not shown. 
                                                             *** = p < 0.001 ; ** = p < 0.01 ; * = p < 0.05 
 
 
As the positive coefficient associated with the ruling-party variable indicates, all else 
being equal, members of the ruling party have surplus power in committees. In other 
words, ruling parties in the Argentine Chamber tend to have the upper hand in the 
strategic composition of committees, assigning super-proportions of their own 
deputies to important positions. The mean across the sample for total committee 
158 
 
 
power is 10.9 units. If the deputy belongs to the ruling party, she may expect to have 
about 2 more units than the average opposition deputy (Column 2, Table 60).   
Second, we may also test whether apprenticeship and seniority norms exist in the 
Chamber and compare the relative importance of such norms with the evidence of 
party dominance. We can see that the freshman variable’s estimate is negatively and 
significantly related to the power one deputy holds in committees (Column 1, Table 
60). In other words, freshmen typically are assigned to less relevant positions than 
seniors. In other words, the apprenticeship norm matters about as much as party 
dominance.  
 
I also performed a mean comparison test of the power in committees of freshmen and 
seniors of the ruling party and the opposition (actual data) that turn out significant. 
While the mean power of freshmen of the ruling party is 9.6, that of the freshmen of 
the opposition is 9.4. In the case of seniors, the mean of those from the ruling-party is 
13 and that of the seniors of the opposition is 11.6.  
As the “apprenticeship” norm states, mediocre assignments are guaranteed to 
incoming members. However, there is a tiny difference in favor of freshmen of the 
ruling party. There is also a slight difference in favor of seniors of the ruling party.   
In addition, following my model of Table 60 I predicted the value of the dependent 
variables after changing the values of the Freshman and Ruling Party variables. I kept all 
the other variables at the observed values. Results are shown in Table 61. 
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Table 61 - PREDICTED VALUES - POWER IN COMMITTEES SENIORS & FRESHMEN OF THE RULING 
PARTY/OPPOSITION – ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2001 
 
Ruling Party-Opposition/Seniors-
Freshmen 
Predicted Values 
Opposition Seniors                    10,677 
Opposition Freshmen                      9,048 
Ruling Party Seniors                    12,620 
Ruling Party Freshmen                    10,991 
 
On average, freshmen of the ruling party have more power than those of the 
opposition. Besides, the former have a little more power than seniors of the opposition.  
Using the seniority-in-Chamber variable (Column 2, Table 60) we find a similar pattern 
for the seniority-in-Chamber norm. Legislators are more likely to get higher status in 
committees if they have more experience in the Chamber. Yet, the magnitude of the 
seniority effect (for one additional term in the chamber) is slightly lower than that of 
the ruling party.  
The mean comparison test and the predicted values of Table 61 also show that 
seniority is a criterion to consider assignments, but the best combination still is be a 
senior in the ruling party. Most importantly, recall that very few deputies in Argentina 
are seniors. Indeed, the mode of the count of legislative terms over the whole time-
period is 1: 79% of deputies are at their first four-year term. Only 5% of all the deputies 
between 1946 and 2001 were in office for more than two four-year terms. Even though 
seniors benefited from their status, they represent a small minority in the Chamber.  
It can also be seen from the results that deputies from most regions are typically 
disadvantaged as compared to those from the reference region: the Capital. As the 
name indicates, this region comprises deputies from the capital of Argentina, the 
Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires (not to be confused with the province of Buenos 
Aires). Note that were the weighted committee assignments perfectly proportional to 
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the regional composition of the Chamber, regional dummies’ coefficient estimates 
should all remain zeros.   
The “Group Position” and “Chamber Position” variables are mere controls. Their 
negative coefficients simply mean that when deputies already occupy a leadership 
position within their delegation or within the Chamber, then they typically have less 
power in committees, all else equal.  As for the cumulation variable, as explained 
above, it is the count of assignments, thus netting out the impact of the other 
explanatory variables on the importance of each deputy’s assignments. 
 
Summarizing, committee assignments have been proportional during the 
period. This fact does not support the theory. By contrast, ruling party members were 
assigned to important committees, and occupied 77% of the Chairs from 1946 to 2001. 
Seniority and apprenticeship norms influence assignments, but they are not the criteria 
that define them. At this point, it is tempting to conclude that ruling-party dominance 
is at least partially supported by the data. However, observing the whole period 1946-
2001 may disguise important differences across time. For example, under PR (that is, 
from 1963 on), ruling parties tended to have slighter margins of victory. The cartel-like 
behavior may not be identical depending on margins of victory, as is predicted by the 
margin hypothesis. This is why I turn now to the analysis of the margin hypothesis. 
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-The Impact of the Electoral System and the Margin Hypothesis- 
The margin hypothesis states that smaller shares of victories induce 
governments to exhibit even higher super-proportions in committees as compared to 
larger governments. Small shares of victories became frequent in Argentina after the 
introduction of PR in 1963, yielding suitable data to test this hypothesis. Using 
dummies for five main ruling-party types and opposition, I can test whether small 
governments (pluralities) typically exhibit a different behavior than large governments 
(majorities).  
In the first column of Table 62, I compare the coefficient estimates of the five ruling-
party subtypes against the reference of all opposition deputies. Observing the 
estimates for those five ruling type variables, I find a pattern consistent with the 
margin hypothesis. The advantage of deputies from small ruling parties (regular and 
exceptional pluralities) is slightly higher than that of deputies from majorities, 
although the relationship is not clearly linear (the qualified majorities’ coefficient is 
larger than that of other majority types).   
However, a stricter test consists of measuring the significance of the differences 
between the estimates of ruling-party type variables. I first performed 10 tests, one for 
each possible pairing of ruling-party type estimates, to see whether those estimates 
are equal. In all cases, the results indicate that I cannot reject the null hypothesis 
(results not shown). To illustrate this, I rerun the regression in the second column of 
Table 62, this time using qualified majorities as the reference category. 
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Table 62 - TEST OF THE MARGIN HYPOTHESIS - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001 (OLS) 
 
Variables 
Opposition as 
Reference 
Qualified 
Majorities  as 
Reference 
Regular Plurality 2.027 *** 0.082  
 (0.330)  (0.588)  
Exceptional Plurality 2.288 *** 0.344  
 (0.402)  (0.629)  
Regular Majority 1.924 *** -0.020  
 (0.399)  (0.628)  
Exceptional Majority 1.565 ** -0.380  
 (0.535)  (0.720)  
Qualified Majority 1.945 ***   
 (0.485)    
Opposition   -1.945 *** 
   (0.485)  
Chamber Seniority 0.630 *** 0.630 *** 
 (0.154)  (0.154)  
Group Position -2.445 *** -2.445 *** 
 (0.347)  (0.347)  
Chamber Position -6.153 *** -6.153 *** 
 (0.741)  (0.741)  
Cumulation 0.475 *** 0.475 *** 
 (0.078)  (0.078)  
Buenos Aires (Province) -0.916 ** -0.916 ** 
 (0.296)  (0.296)  
Centro -0.721 * -0.721 * 
 (0.317)  (0.317)  
Litoral -1.048 ** -1.048 ** 
 (0.376)  (0.376)  
Norte -1.616 *** -1.616 *** 
 (0.327)  (0.327)  
Cuyo -0.518  -0.518  
 (0.380) (0.380) 
Sur -1.490 *** -1.490 *** 
 (0.414)  (0.414)  
Constant 3.722 *** 5.667 *** 
 (0.627)  (0.543)  
R2 0.37  0.37  
N 3945  3945  
                                   Note: The dependent variable is the weighted sum of committee assignments.  
                                             Legislature dummies are included in the regression (to control for the increase 
                                             in the total number of committees over time), although the estimates are not  
                                             shown. 
                                             *** = p < 0.001 ; ** = p < 0.01 ; * = p < 0.05 
 
 
It can be seen that other ruling-party types are not significantly different from qualified 
majorities. Therefore, the margin hypothesis is not supported by the data: there is no 
significant difference in the effects of margins of victory, all types of ruling parties 
exhibiting an equally over-proportional control of committee assignments.    
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From these results, it appears that the electoral system reform in Argentina has not 
affected committee assignment patterns. Certainly, PR has spawned different types of 
ruling parties compared to majority systems, but ruling parties had a similar tendency 
to produce super-proportions in important committee positions over the whole time-
period.     
-Committee-Specific Seniority- 
I found some evidence of a seniority-in-Chamber norm, even though it remains a 
marginal status in Argentina. Yet, I still have to consider committee-specific seniority 
and not just seniority in Chamber. More specifically, if the former exists, it should 
explain chairmanships’ assignments to committees within the ruling party. I test this 
hypothesis by replacing the previous measures of seniority in Chamber with 
committee-specific seniority (i.e., the number of terms a deputy has previously been 
appointed to a committee). Since I need to match committee-specific experience to 
the relevant committee, I change the level of analysis and consider the pool of 
assignments that took place during the time-period (I exclude the first legislature, 
1946-1948, since committee-specific data are not available prior to 1946). The 
dependent variable is now binomial. I code 1 the assignments as Chairs and 0 all other 
assignments. In other words, I am asking, over the pool of all assignments, which 
factors are more likely to lead to a Chair assignment compared to other positions?          
Besides the use of committee-specific seniority, the set of explanatory variables is 
similar as before but for two exceptions. First, authority positions in the Chamber (i.e., 
Presidents or Vice-Presidents of the Chamber) lead to perfect failure predictions: no 
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deputy holding a position of President or VP in the Chamber ever became Chair of a 
committee. These 69 cases were dropped. Second, I have rescaled all independent 
variables between 0 and 1, so that coefficient estimates may be compared in size even 
if I use a logit regression. 
Table 63 presents the results.  Note that because of rescaling, estimates are 
comparable in size.  Without including an interactive term between the ruling party 
and committee seniority variables (Model 1, left column), the estimates suggest a huge 
and statistically significant effect for deputies having prior experience in a committee. 
The impact of the ruling party is also significant, but committee seniority appears to 
increase one's likelihood of being assigned Chair (as compared to other committee 
positions) to a greater extent than belonging to the ruling party, all else equal.  Yet, 
including the interactive term "Ruling Party x Seniority" shows that having committee 
experience matters mostly among deputies from the ruling party (Model 2, right 
column).  Indeed, the constitutive term for the seniority variable, which represents the 
impact of committee experience among opposition deputies, has a marginal effect of 
about 0.06 points on the probability of being appointed Chair.  For ruling party 
deputies, the marginal effect of additional seniority increases to 0.17 points.  
Therefore, claiming that seniority matters more than being in power to explain 
chairmanship is misleading.  
Committee-specific seniority, I argue, weighs little as compared to party dominance. 
To test this claim, I plot in-sample predicted probabilities against experience for both 
opposition deputies and ruling-party members, using estimates of column 2, Table 63. 
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Figure 4 shows the plots. The dashed lines show the confidence intervals around the 
smoothed predicted probability curves.   
Table 63 - CHAIRMANSHIPS IN COMMITTEES, 1948-2001 (LOGIT) 
 
Variables Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effects 
Ruling Party 1.057 *** 0.037 0.761 *** 0.026 
 (0.115)   (0.132)   
Committee-Specific 
Seniority 4.369 *** 0.151 1.829 * 0.064 
 (0.376)   (0.824)   
Ruling Party * Seniority    3.127 ***† 0.109 
    (0.806)   
Group Post -0.221  -0.007 -0.147  -0.005 
 (0.247)   (0.247)   
Cumulation -0.196  -0.007 -0.271  -0.009 
 (0.442)   (0.446)   
Buenos Aires (Province) -0.188  -0.006 -0.181  -0.006 
 (0.148)   (0.149)   
Centro -0.208  -0.007 -0.179  -0.006 
 (0.161)   (0.162)   
Litoral -0.368  -0.011 -0.344  -0.011 
 (0.202)   (0.203)   
Norte -0.929 *** -0.025 -0.903 *** -0.025 
 (0.197)   (0.198)   
Cuyo -0.465 * -0.014 -0.455 * -0.014 
 (0.204)   (0.205)   
Sur -0.581 * -0.016 -0.564 * -0.016 
 (0.225)   (0.226)   
Constant -2.671 ***  -2.419 ***  
 (0.285)   (0.290)   
       
Pseudo-R2 0.09   0.09   
Log-likelihood -1780.826   -1771.725   
% Correctly Predicted 95.12   95.09   
N 10,064     10,064     
Notes: Binomial logit regression. All coefficients are rescaled from 0 to 1, so that coefficients above can be compared in size. Marginal effects 
are for a discrete change in the value of the independent variables (from 0 to 1). The first legislature (1946-1948) is dropped since committee-
specific seniority is unknown for that legislature.  Legislature dummies are included in the regression (results not shown). 
*** = p < 0.001 ; ** = p < 0.01 ; * = p < 0.05 
† = Interaction jointly significant with each of the constitutive term (p < 0.05). 
 
Although experience matters, this is mostly true for members of ruling party. The 
impact of experience among ruling-party members increases the probability of being 
assigned Chair from less than 0.1 to 0.8. In comparison the change in predicted 
probabilities remains trivial for opposition deputies. Thus, only having committee-
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specific experience is not sufficient per se for a deputy aspiring to become Chair; the 
ruling status of her party definitely matters for this aspiration to be fulfilled.  
 
FIGURE 4 - IN-SAMPLE PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF BEING ASSIGNED CHAIR, BY EXPERIENCE AND 
RULING PARTY - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES  
 
 
                                       Note: Based on the estimates of the logit regression (Table 7, Column 1). The dashed lines are the confidence intervals; the   
                                       solid lines are the smoothed curves of predicted probabilities.  
 
 
Since the 1940s, rules about assignments have not been modified, and 
Presidents have always been entitled by the Chamber to determine the allocation of 
committee seats. Even though the non-regulated phase of the committee assignment 
process was influenced by the style of each President, committee assignments have 
been proportional. By contrast, when weighting the meaningfulness of assignments, 
that is, when considering the importance of committees and their chairmanships, I can 
affirm that committees acted as agents of the ruling party. The over-representation of 
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Chairs secured by certain pluralities is remarkable. The change of the electoral system, 
and the type of majority or plurality did not alter the behavior of parties. Before and 
after PR, ruling majorities and pluralities had a similar tendency to get super-
proportional control of important committees, the small differences falling outside the 
bounds of statistical significance. In addition, we saw that apprenticeship and 
seniority-in-Chamber norms matter to the allocation of seats, but that they are not the 
criteria that define the process. Committee-specific experience is mainly used by ruling 
parties to discriminate among their deputies when deciding committee Chair positions. 
Recall, however, that very few legislators in Argentina are seniors. Therefore, even 
though those who manage to gain this experience are more likely to become Chairs, 
especially if their party is in power, the majority of assignments concern deputies 
having no prior committee experience.  
Before concluding this section, I would like to underline two aspects of the committee 
assignment process that were affected by the change of the electoral system. First, 
while during the Sáenz Peña Law (1946-1962) ruling parties monopolized committee 
Chairs, from 1963 on they secured a notable over-representation. The introduction of 
the PR system, however, did not affect the monopoly of ruling parties over the Chairs 
of the most important committees.  Second, after PR the allocation of committee seats 
is tied to the party composition of the directing board. The consultation of delegation 
leaders was almost inexistent in the journal of sessions before 1963 and became 
evident after that year. This consultation is limited to a handful of parties: those that 
compose the directing board. Decisive allies may be invited, most of all when a 
plurality rules the Chamber.   
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Part IV. Conclusion 
Did ruling parties determine the key features of the Chamber’s organization over 
time?  Did the reform or maintenance of the Chamber’s organizational rules and norms 
advantage them?  In other words, can the Cartel Theory explain the patterns of 
institutional development that were reconstructed in this chapter? I devote this part to 
summarize the patterns that were found, and to preliminary assess the merits and 
limits of the Cartel Theory to explain the role of ruling parties in the institutional 
development of the Chamber.  
 
I describe the institutional development of key units and the evolution of the 
prerogatives of ruling parties in Table 64. The reconstruction of the institutional 
development of the Chamber can be synthesized in the following patterns:   
 
Ruling parties have increased their power. The actual Reglamento advantages ruling 
parties in two crucial aspects: the control of floor proceedings (a lowered quorum; the 
reduction of all terms to speak on the floor; the right to nominate four highest 
functionaries, two of them in charge of the legislative affairs; the qualified majority to 
discuss questions of privilege; an increased number of deputies needed to demand a 
special session), and of the agenda (the de facto control of a reinforced CLP; the 
prerogative of Chairs to determine the majority report in case of tie; the prerogative to 
expedite the work in committees). 
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The rules and practices that form the core of the power of ruling parties remained 
untouched. The agenda-setting, committee-assignment, and referral powers, together 
with the absolute control of the human resources management, and the preparation 
and implementation of the internal budget, remained in the hands of the President of 
the Chamber. The procedure to elect the directing board, and the rules and practices to 
make the allocation of committee seats were never modified. These rules and practices 
secure a tight control of the organization and functioning of the Chamber. No Radical 
or Peronist majority/plurality/single-party/coalition changed them.     
Ruling parties have accommodated the rules of the Chamber at their convenience. Ruling 
pluralities and majorities have modified the Reglamento in their favor. Pluralities 
reintroduced lost prerogatives (1963), approved changes that accrued their advantages 
(1963; 1989), and even transformed the traditional structure of the Chamber in 
exchange of maintaining their pre-eminence (1989; 1996). Majorities also amended the 
Reglamento (1996), or reinterpreted it (from 1973 on) to increase their prerogatives and 
get rid of rules that limited their power (1955; 1996).   
Ruling parties have strategically used the committee system in their advantage.  The 
biannual renewals, the closings and re-openings due to military coups, and the 
influence of parties over the careers of legislators shaped an “amateur committee 
system” (paraphrasing Jones et al. 2002). Ruling parties kept control of the committee 
system securing their presence in the most important committees and getting 77% of 
the Chairs from 1946 to 2001. 
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Ruling parties have implemented PR in a particular way. In 1963, ruling parties lost their 
monopoly over the directing board and committee Chairs, and their power to reform 
the rules unilaterally. From that year on the Chamber would have mixed/bipartisan 
directing boards, parties would distribute committee Chairs and amendments would 
require the support of at least some allies. In a nutshell, ruling parties were obliged to 
learn to distribute.  
The Chamber, however, is far from the participative and proportional arena dreamt by 
the pluralities of 1963, and by the architects of the de facto government that 
introduced the PR system in 1962. The PJ and the UCR -with the help of the FREPASO 
in the late 1990s- successfully managed to attenuate the effects of PR in the Chamber. 
They did so implementing some criteria and practices that assured the pre-eminence of 
the ruling party:  
- The “mixed (proportional) directing boards” criterion of 1963 was rapidly 
abandoned to be replaced by criteria oriented to favor the ruling party. When the 
demands of the opposition put at risk its advantages, the ruling party responded 
creating the Third Vice-Presidency of the Chamber.  
- Ruling parties secured the control of the election of the directing board by 
replacing a mandatory roll-call voting system by a weighted voting system.  
- Facing the fact that they have to share committee Chairs, ruling parties created 
new positions (Vice-Chairs to all committees in 1963). When the opposition 
demanded more places in the committee system the response was the creation of 
standing committees (19 standing committees from 1983 to 1998), the creation of 
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new positions (second Vice-Chairs and Secretaries for all committees in 1987), and 
the enlargement of committees’ memberships (late 1990s).  
- They transformed the bona fide CLP in a new “instrument of control” of ruling 
parties.  
- The “consultation table” was limited to a small group of parties.  
Ruling parties have controlled the main legislative procedures. They kept during the 
whole period control of the election and composition of the directing boards, 
committee-assignments, creation of committees and enlargement of committees’ 
membership and leadership positions, and the election of the committee Chairs (Table 
64).  
Though ruling parties controlled these procedures, they did not behave as procedural 
coalitions regarding the creation of committees before the 1980s. This behavior is 
limited to a handful of cases in relation to the enlargement of memberships, and also 
limited to certain periods and positions in the case of the Vice-Chairs and Secretaries of 
committees. In addition, the proportional allocation of committee seats from 1946 to 
2001, the lowering of the number of deputies required to demand a roll-call vote 
(1996), and the failure to increase the power on the President of the Chamber (1996) 
do not support the predictions of the Cartel Theory. Except for the proportional 
allocation of committee seats and the creation of committees before the 1980s, the 
rest of the cases cannot be considered as “patterns.” Nevertheless, I will bring up all 
these issues in the final assessment (chapter VII).  
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On the whole, ruling parties did determine the key features of the Chamber’s 
organization over time. Their cartel behavior is present during the entire period. The 
introduction of the PR system obliged them to implement different strategies to 
preserve their pre-eminence. These strategies were successful to reach that goal. 
Nevertheless, they altered the traditional organization of the Argentine lower 
Chamber and they produced an enduring negative impact on its committee system.  
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Table 64 - INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF KEY UNITS AND PREROGATIVES OF  
RULING PARTIES AND SECOND/THIRD PARTIES 
ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001 
 
  1946 2001 
 
"The Hour" - 
Advantages of 
Pluralities (second, 
third and minor 
parties) 
- In minority reports 
- 
Three committee members may demand the inclusion of 
a bill in the committee agenda 
- Rules about delegations 
- Second Vice-Presidency of the Chamber (second party) 
- 
Nomination of two of the six highest functionaries of the 
Chamber (second party) 
 
Second parties have over-representation in First Vice-
Chairs -VC1- (64% on average from 1987 to 2001) 
 
Third Vice-Presidency of the Chamber (third delegation 
or party) 
1/5 of deputies can demand a roll-call 
(nominal) vote 
1/10 of deputies can demand a roll-call (nominal) vote 
Advantages of Ruling  
Parties 
- 
Qualified majority to discuss questions of privileges on 
the floor 
- Reduction of all terms to speak on the floor  
- Lowered quorum 
- De facto control of the CLP 
De facto prerogative to nominate four 
highest officials  
The right to nominate four highest officials of the 
Chamber  
- More power to committee Chairs 
 
They can fix the time to vote and the type of voting 
system to be applied on the floor 
 
They decide over the opportunity to express 
commemorations 
 
They can expedite the work in committees 
Monopoly of the positions on the 
directing board 
Over-representation on the directing board (Presidency 
and First Vice-Presidency) 
Monopoly of 19 committee Chairs 
Over-representation of committee Chairs  (72% on 
average from 1983 to 2001)  
- 
Over-representation in Second Vice-Chairs -VC2- (76% 
on average from 1987 to 2001)  
- 
The 1st plurality in committee Secretaries (44% on 
average from 1987 to 2001) 
Roll-call voting system to elect the 
directing board 
A de facto weighted voting system to elect the directing 
board 
A minimum of 5 deputies is required to 
demand a special session 
19 Chairs to distribute 
A minimum of 10 deputies is required to demand a 
special session 
45 Chairs to distribute 
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Table 64 - INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF KEY UNITS AND PREROGATIVES OF RULING PARTIES  
ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001 
(cont.) 
 
 
 
  1946 2001 
President 
Referral of bills  IDEM 
Agenda-setting  
Agenda-setting (controlling the CLP-
preparing the agenda if CLP does not 
meet) 
Committee assignments  IDEM 
Preparation and implementation of the internal 
budget 
IDEM 
Human resources management  IDEM 
Determines the functions of the highest 
functionaries  
IDEM 
- Chair of the CLP 
Election of certain Chamber's Officials - 
Committee Chairs 
Complete and exclusive control of the committee 
procedure and agenda 
Complete control of the committee 
procedure and agenda 
Control the permanent staff assigned to the 
committee 
IDEM 
Act as substitutes in case of absence or disability 
of members of the directing board 
IDEM 
- 
Determine the majority report in case of 
tie 
- 
Receive extra resources (mostly for staff 
salary)  
Legislative 
Procedures 
controlled by Ruling 
Parties 
Election and composition of the directing boards 
Creation of committees and election of their Chairs 
 
Committee assignments 
Enlargement of committees' memberships and leadership positions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
Getting to Know the Chilean Chamber of Deputies 
1945-2002 
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This chapter provides information about the organization of the Chilean 
Chamber of Deputies from 1945 to 2002. I present, first, a summary of the country’s 
politics which includes its multiparty system composed of manifold and changing 
coalitions (Part I), and then I turn to the Chamber’s organization (Part II). There I 
describe its main institutional changes, along with a detailed account of its 
membership, ruling parties, and coalitions.  
Part I.  Overview of Chilean Politics  
The purpose of this part is to situate the institutional development of the 
Chamber in its political context. To this end, section 1 briefly reviews constitutional 
changes and presidential periods, and section 2 offers a general description of Chilean 
political parties and coalitions. 
Section 1.  Constitutions and Presidents   
Chile is a unitary republic consisting of 15 regions and 53 provinces. It has a 
presidential form of government with a bicameral legislature. The original and clerical 
Constitution of 1833, in force until 1925, established that the president was elected for 
a five-year term by an electoral college, having the prerogative of immediate 
reelection.119 The Constitution of 1925 marked the beginning of a fully presidential 
                                                            
119 Immediate reelection was abolished by the constitutional reform of 1871 (government of President Federico 
Errázuriz Zañartu). In the 1833 Constitution the upper Chamber had 20 senators elected for nine-year terms by 
“departmental electors.” The indirect election of senators was abolished by the 1871 reform, which also reduced 
their term to six years. To learn about previous constitutional essays see Valencia Avaria (1986) or go to “Breve 
Historia Constitucional de Chile” http://www.bcn.cl/lc/cpolitica/resena_const and “Constitución Política” 
http://www.bcn.cl/lc/cpolitica/index_html, both links of the official site of the Library of the National Congress 
of Chile.  
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regime and the separation of Church and state. 120  It also abolished the electoral 
college establishing that presidents would be elected directly for six-year terms. If no 
candidate received and absolute majority, the election would be in the hands of 
legislators who should select between the two leading candidates by secret ballot in a 
joint session of Congress (Gil 1966; J. S. Valenzuela 1995). The next constitutional text 
was adopted in 198o. This document, which suffered many substantial reforms, is the 
actual Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile.121 In its original version presidents 
would be elected for eight-year terms. This term was reduced to four years for the 
period 1990-1994 (constitutional reform of 1989), extended to six years in 1994, and 
finally reduced to four years in the 2005 reform.122 The 1980 constitution eliminated 
the intervention of Congress to select the president in the absence of an absolute 
majority of the vote by substituting a runoff election between the two front runners (A. 
Valenzuela 1994, 148).  
From 1945 to 2002, eight presidential elections were held (Table 65). This period opens 
and closes with left-of-center governments (two Radical -1945-1952- and three 
Concertación -1990-2002- administrations).123  
 
                                                            
120The 1925 Constitution was written by a committee and approved by a plebiscite in July of this year. In this 
text the upper Chamber was composed of 45 members directly elected from 9 group of provinces 
(“agrupaciones provinciales”) for eight-year terms.  
121This constitution was approved by a plebiscite held on September 11, 1980 during the dictatorship of General 
Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. It established three types of senators: elected, designated, and for-life senators 
(former presidents). The 26 directly elected senators (2 senators per region - 13 regions) and the 9 designated 
senators would have eight-year terms.   
122 The 1989 constitutional reform was the result of a negotiation between the outgoing military government 
and political parties. This negotiation took place some months before the elections of December 1989, the first 
elections after almost 17 years of military government. The reform was approved by a plebiscite in July of this 
year. Among its many amendments it increased the number of elected senators from 26 to 38 by increasing the 
number of districts in certain regions. The 2005 constitutional reform eliminated all non-elected senators, both 
designated and former presidents.  
123 The first year of my research period (1945) coincides with the last year of the mandate of President Juan A. 
Ríos Morales. He was the second of three successive Radical governments elected by Center-left coalitions. 
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Table 65 - PARTY, TENURE, AND CAUSE OF TERM CONCLUSION OF CHILEAN PRESIDENTS 1945-2006 
 
President 
Party-Coalition in 
Government  a 
Period Term Conclusion 
Juan A. Ríos Morales (PR) b Democratic Alliance  Apr. 42 - Jan. 46 Resigned 
Alfredo Duhalde Vázquez  (PR) PR - PS Jan. 46 - Nov. 46 Interim 
Gabriel González Videla (PR) c PR - PC - PL  Nov. 46  - Nov. 52 
Completion of legal 
term 
Carlos Ibañez del Campo (IND) d 
ANAP - FENAFUI - 
MONAP  e 
Nov. 52 - Nov. 58 
Completion of legal 
term 
Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez 
(Right)  
CONS f - LIB  Nov. 58 - Nov. 64 
Completion of legal 
term 
Eduardo Frei Montalva (DC) g DC Nov. 64 - Nov. 70 
Completion of legal 
term 
Salvador Allende Gossens (PS) h Popular Unity  Nov. 70  - Sept. 73 
Overthrown by a 
coup d’état 
Military Coup 
Patricio Aylwin Azócar (DC) i   Concertación  March  90 - Feb. 94 
Completion of legal 
term 
Eduardo Frei Ruíz-Tagle (DC) j Concertación March 94 - Feb. 00 
Completion of legal 
term 
Ricardo Lagos Escobar (PS) Concertación March 00 - Feb. 06 
Completion of legal 
term 
a. For a list of political parties and coalitions see APPENDIX F.  
b.Juan A. Ríos Morales was twice deputy (1924-1927 -Congress was dissolved in 1924;- 1926-1930) and once senator for the PR (1930-
1938 -Congress was dissolved in 1934-) and once independent deputy (1933-1937). He resigned in January 1946 for health reasons. The 
Democratic Alliance (Alianza Democrática) that supported his government consisted of the Radical Party -PR- (Partido Radical), the 
Socialist Party -PS- (Partido Socialista), the Communists PC- (Partido Comunista), and the alessandrista Liberals.  
c. Gabriel González Videla was three times deputy for the PR (1930-1934; 1933-1937; 1937-1941), Chilean Ambassador to Portugal and 
Brazil, and senator for the PR (1945-1953).  
d. From 1927 to 1931 Colonel Carlos Ibañez del Campo ruled the country as virtual dictator. He was elected senator in 1949 for the 
Agrarian Labor Party (PAL).  
e. ANAP: People’s National Alliance (Alianza Nacional del Pueblo); FENAFUI: National Federation of Ibañistas (Federación Nacional de 
Fuerzas Ibañistas), and MONAP: People’s National Movement (Movimiento Nacional del Pueblo).   
f. Conservative Party (Partido Conservador).  
g. Eduardo Frei Montalva was Minister of Public Works of President Ríos Morales (PR) (1945-1946) and senator for the National 
Falange (1949-1957; 1957-1965) and for the Christian Democrat Party -DC- (Partido Demócrata Cristiano) (1973-1981). The military 
coup dissolved the Congress by Decree-law no. 27 (September 21, 1973).    
h. Salvador Allende Gossens was Health Minister of President Aguirre Cerda (PR) and four times senator (1945-1953; 1953-1961; 1961-
1969, and 1969-1973). The Popular Unity (Union Popular), the coalition created to support his candidacy in 1970,  consisted of the PS, 
the PC, the PR, the Social Democrat Party -PSD- (Partido Social Demócrata), the Movement for United  Popular Action -MAPU- 
(Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria), and the Independent Popular Action -API- (Acción Popular Independiente).  
i. Patricio Aylwin Azócar was twice senator for the DC (1965-1973; 1973-1981). The Coalition of Parties for Democracy -Concertación- 
(Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia) was composed of the DC, the PS, the Party for Democracy -PPD- (Partido por la 
Democracia), and 13 minor political groups.  
j. Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, the son of former president Frei Montalva, was a DC Senator when he was elected president.    
 
Source: Own elaboration upon data from Gil (1966), Petras (1969), Burnett (1970), Collier and Sater (1996), Etchepare Jensen (2001), 
Jobet (2003), Bizzarro (2005), and Oppenheim (2007).   
 
 
Between them we find an “apolitical” administration (Carlos Ibañez del Campo), 
followed by rightist (Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez Alessandri), reformist (Eduardo Frei 
Montalva), and leftist (Salvador Allende) governments. Four presidents were selected 
by the Congress (1946, 1952, 1958, and 1970), and only one reached the Presidency by 
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a majority of the popular vote (Frei Montalva in 1964). Since 1989, two presidents have 
obtained the majority of votes (Aylwin Azócar -1989- and Frei Ruíz-Tagle -1993-), and 
one has been elected after a presidential runoff (Lagos Escobar -1999-).   
As it is well known, on September 11, 1973, the Socialist president Salvador Allende 
was deposed by a military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. The de facto 
government blamed politicians, political parties, and the politicization and 
mobilization of the Chilean society for the crisis that had prompted its intervention. Its 
goals were the re-establishment of the rule of law, social pacification, and sustained 
capital accumulation (Taylor 2006).  
These goals were implemented in practice by a fierce bloody repression, neoliberal 
policies, the adoption of a new constitution, and the substantial change of the electoral 
system. General Pinochet left power in 1989 after being defeated in a plebiscite. 124 
Nonetheless, it would take more that fifteen years and three governments of the 
Center-left Concertación coalition to get rid of the authoritarian enclaves inherited by 
his dictatorship.125 
 
                                                            
124 This plebiscite, held on October 5, 1988, was established in the 1980 Constitution. It was a yes-no 
consultation to enable Pinochet to continue in power until 1996. The campaign for the “NO” was organized by 
the “Coalition of Parties for the NO” that would later become the Coalition of Parties for Democracy or the 
Center-left Concertación. The “NO” received the 54.7% of the votes.      
125 According to Manuel Garretón some transitions to democracy from military rule “typically occur within the 
institutional framework of the authoritarian regime, with one of the opposition's main problems being how to 
work from within this framework in order to change it and achieve democratic institutions.” The outcome, 
Garretón explains, is often incomplete democracy, a regime basically democratic but riddled with inherited 
authoritarian enclaves. The author distinguishes three authoritarian enclaves that remained during the 
transition to democracy: 1) the restrictions on popular sovereignty (e.g., Pinochet-controlled senatorial 
appointments, antimajoritarian features in the electoral system, and the autonomy of the armed forces from 
civilian control; 2) the ethical-symbolic enclave represented by all the unresolved cases of human rights 
violations, and 3) the continuing presence of Pinochet himself, who remained as commander-in-chief of the 
Chilean armed forces until 1998 (Garretón 1995, 147; 149).  
180 
 
 
As will be shown along this chapter, the interplay among parties of the three 
main blocs of the political system -the Right, the Center, and the Left- and the special 
role of Center parties in the formation of coalitions are the dominant and underlying 
patterns of Chilean politics. In addition, the formation and duration of presidential and 
legislative coalitions will be affected by a stressful dynamic of non-concurrent elections 
(see APPENDIX G). As J. S. Valenzuela (1995) explains, presidents who took office 
immediately before congressional elections were fortunate because this timing tended 
to strengthen their legislative support (e.g., 1952-1953; 1964-1965). The opposite 
situation, presidents that lost coalition partners or even saw their coalitions 
disintegrate, happened when presidential elections immediately followed legislative 
elections (e.g., 1957-1958; 1969-1970). In this situation coalitions and party leaders in 
Congress had little incentive to collaborate with the outgoing president (A. Valenzuela 
1994). Next section provides basic information about that interplay among parties at 
the national level to then turn to a detailed analysis of the effects of the 
aforementioned patterns on the lower Chamber.    
Section 2.  Political Parties and Coalitions126  
The presentation of an overview of the competitive and polarized multiparty 
Chilean system (A. Valenzuela 1994) is a defying enterprise. The goal of this section is 
to place my research into the historical context for the purpose of analysis. Having in 
mind this modest end, I identify five periods of the Chilean party system: 1) the 
hegemony of the traditional parties (19th century); 2) the Age of Parliament (1890s-
                                                            
126 This section draws mainly from the studies of Burnett (1970) and J.S. Valenzuela (1995).  
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1910s); 3) the reconstruction of the party system (1920s-1950s); 4) the gradual shift to 
the Left (1960s-1973), and 5) the stable multiparty system (1990s-2000s).  
During most of the nineteenth century Chilean politics was characterized by differences 
over Church-State issues. This was the time of the pre-eminence of the President over 
Congress and the hegemony of the Conservatives (CONS), the progressive -though 
oligarchic- Liberals (PL), and the Nationals -PN1857- (Partido Nacional) who 
“represented the upper bureaucracy and the banking, commercial, and industrialist 
groups” (Petras 1969, 97).  
Then follows what the authors call the Age of Parliament (Burnett 1970, 166) or “semi-
presidential” period (J. S. Valenzuela 1995, 15), a phase of 30 years that came after the 
eight-month Chilean civil war of 1891.127 This historical span is characterized by a 
polarized multiparty system “built upon profound ideological diversity [where] 
coalitions were necessitated by the failure of any single partisan structure to secure a 
congressional majority” (Burnett 1970, 166).128 Representative parties of this period 
were the middle-class Radicals -PR- (Radicales); the PN1857; the Liberal Democratic 
Party -PLD- (Partido Liberal Democrático), whose members longed for a powerful 
presidential system; the Democratic Party -PD- (Partido Democrático) that gathered 
former Radicals who split away from the party because it failed to capture the 
allegiance of the working class, and various socialist political associations.129  
                                                            
127 Dissensions on the approval of the 1891 national budget, and more broadly over the powers of the executive,  
led to an armed conflict between the Congress (supported by the Chilean Navy) and President José M. 
Balmaceda (Chilean Army sided with him). As J. S. Valenzuela (1995, 15) argues “the victory of the forces under 
congressional leadership produced significant changes in the nation’s political institutions.”       
128 During this period a new interpretation of the 1833 Constitution was implemented. This interpretation was 
that cabinets were required to have congressional majorities (J. S. Valenzuela 1995, 15).    
129 The PN1857 and PLD would disappear in the 1920s (J. S. Valenzuela 1995).  
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Following Burnett, I call the third period the reconstitution of the party system (1920s-
1950s), or the time of the emergence of mass-based political parties and the primacy of 
socio-economic issues (J. S. Valenzuela 1995). Typical of this period are the successive 
and changing coalitions among the dominant Radical Party and the Communists (PC), 
the Socialists (PS) and the Liberals and Conservatives.  
The slow decline of Conservatives, Liberals, and Radicals and the gradual shift to the 
Left among the electorate (Petras 1972, 107) characterize the fourth period (1964-1973). 
This new scenario, driven by electoral reforms and a changing social structure, showed 
the emergence of Left/Center-left fronts, the electorally successful Christians 
Democrats (DC), and finally the Popular Unity government of Salvador Allende (PS).  
Beginning after the return to democracy (1989), but rooted in political developments 
that took place during the last years of the dictatorship, the fifth period brought a more 
stable multiparty system divided into two polarized and consistent coalitions. This system 
is composed of reconstituted and reshaped pre-authoritarian parties and a handful of 
new political groups. Three successive coalition governments (of the Center-left 
Concertación) supported by a congressional majority are one of the main political 
features of this period.  
Considering these periods, my research starts almost at the end of the 
reconstruction of the party system (1945), covers the entire process of the Right decline 
and the progressive shift to the Left and ends after twelve years of political stability 
(2002). The subsequent section provides an account of the main events (coalition 
formation-splits-reunifications) that marked the development of Chilean political 
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parties from 1945 to 2002. Radicals, Socialists and Communists, and Christian 
Democrats are used as axes within which the rest of the parties are included.   
2.1  The Radicals 
The Radical Party -PR- (Partido Radical) was created in 1863. Its origins can be 
traced in the progressive wing of the Liberal Party. “The Radical party is the third major 
political structure [after the Conservatives and the Liberals] to evolve out of the 
political struggle of the last century” (Burnett 1970, 181). Though they originally called 
themselves “The Reds” (Los Rojos), Radicals evolved progressively to a centrist 
position. As Collier and Sater (1996, 240) put it, “[T]he single most important (and in a 
real sense the most popular) party between the 1930s and early 1960s, the Radical 
party combined delicately balanced and often competing interests.” Radicals held the 
presidency for 14 years (1938-1952) leading the Center-left (1938-1947) and Center-
right (1948-1952) coalitions that supported their governments. They were the largest 
party in the lower Chamber in 1945, 1949, 1957, and 1961.130  
During the administration of the third Radical President, Gabriel González Videla (1946-
1952), the repressive Law for the Defense of Democracy or “Accursed Law” (Ley de 
Defensa Permanente de la Democracia o “Ley maldita”) was enacted (1948). This law 
made illegal the Communist Party, “ordered the removal of all Communists voters from 
the electoral registry [26,384 voters], and gave the government power to confine 
Communist leaders to remote areas of the country” (Gil 1966, 73). It is important to 
                                                            
130 While Communists and Socialists rallied behind the candidacy of the first two Radical presidents - Pedro 
Aguirre Cerda (Popular Front coalition - 1938) and Juan A. Ríos Morales (Democratic Alliance coalition - 1942) 
- only the PC backed President Gabriel González Videla (the third Radical president), who won the elections 
with a plurality of votes (1946). The PL joined the PR-PC coalition after the elections and supported González 
Videla in the congressional election. 
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mention the passage of this law because it will impact the legislative arena in two ways: 
first, it will cause divisions in the main parties and second, it will mark the end of the 
Center-left coalition that ruled the Chamber from 1946 to 1948. At the Executive level 
the law banning the PC produced a rightist cabinet reshuffle. Although this coalition 
was successful in the congressional elections of 1949, as Petras (1969, 135) explains, 
“[T]he failure of middle-class-dominated coalitions to bring about promised changes 
led to the rise of the rightist, authoritarian Ibáñez, whose ideology claimed to be anti-
political […] above politics.”  
The independent Ibáñez del Campo reached the presidency (1952-1958) building a 
heterogeneous coalition. During his administration Radicals, as well as the rest of the 
traditional parties, were in the opposition. The electoral performance of the PR 
improved with the decline of Ibáñez del Campo and during its participation in Jorge 
Alessandri Rodríguez’s rightist government. President Alessandri Rodríguez had 
promised an “orthodox, free market model of development” for Chile (Oppenheim 
2007, 32). The failure of his administration, particularly regarding the situation of the 
middle-class, favored the surge of the Christian Democrats (1964) and, at the same 
time, the decline of Radicals who progressively lost their popular appeal. In words of 
Petras (1969, 154) “[A]s the malaise of the middle strata grew, the Christian Democrats 
filled the political vacuum on the center-left.” From then on the Radicals would never 
repeat their prior electoral performance, and successive splits would further reduce 
their electoral support.  
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In 1969, the PR decided to join several leftist parties to form the Popular Unity -UP- 
(Unión Popular) coalition that made possible the victory of Senator Allende (PS) in the 
presidential elections of 1970. This decision divided the party. Those opposed to 
Allende formed the Radical Democracy Party -PDR69- (Partido Democracia Radical), 
and supported the rightist candidacy of former President Alessandri Rodríguez. The 
other faction remained in the UP until the end of Allende’s government (September 11, 
1973).  
Parties resumed their role in the political process during a wave of protests and strikes 
against Pinochet (1983). The post-dictatorship political landscape became structured 
around support or rejection of military rule and its legacy (J. S. Valenzuela 1995, 56). 
The place of the Radicals was first in the Center-left Coalition of Parties for the NO -
Concertación de Partidos por el NO- and then in the Center-left Coalition of Parties for 
Democracy (Concertación).131 In 1994, the Social Democratic Party -PSD- (Partido 
Social Demócrata) joined the PR and formed the Radical Social Democrat Party -
PRSD94- (Partido Radical Social Demócrata) that backed the presidential candidate 
of the Concertación, Ricardo Lagos Escobar (PS) in 1999 (Bizzarro 2005, 559).   
 
 
 
 
                                                            
131 The Coalition of Parties for the NO was created to campaign against Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite in which 
he was defeated.  
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2.2  Socialists and Communists 
The Socialist Party -PS- (Partido Socialista) was created in 1933 when various 
leftist groups decided to merge.132  Jobet (2003) distinguished four phases in the 
development of the PS. From 1933 to 1938 it was a growing and revolutionary time for 
the party. Then a phase of government coalitions and internal divisions followed (1939-
1946). The third was the reorganization phase that would end in 1957 with the 
reunification of the Socialists. The fourth period was characterized by new strategies 
that resulted in the creation of successful leftist and Center-left coalitions. To these 
periods I add what I would call a restructuration phase after the banning of the party by 
the dictatorship and its later participation in the Concertación coalition. 
It will be immediately clear that my research covers the most challenging periods of 
the PS until its last merger in the late 1990s. Regarding their relationship with the PC, it 
is important to highlight that Socialists always disputed with Communists over the 
influence on the leftist electorate, the representation of working class interests, and 
rejected any alliance with non-labor parties, being in general less prone than 
Communists to participate in coalitions (J. S. Valenzuela 1995).  
The Socialist Labor Party -POS- (Partido Obrero Socialista), created in 1912, was 
transformed into the Communist Party -PC- (Partido Comunista) in 1922 (the Chilean 
section of the Third International). Contrary to Socialists, members of the PC displayed 
a sympathetic tendency toward electoral coalitions with traditional parties and 
                                                            
132 These groups were the New Public Action -NAP- (Nueva Acción Pública), the Revolutionary Social Action -
ARS- (Acción Revolucionaria Socialista) that had merged with the Unified Socialist Party -PSU- (Partido 
Socialista Unificado) before 1933, the Marxist Socialist Party -PSM- (Partido Socialista Marxista), and the 
Socialist Order -SO- (Orden Socialista). 
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parliamentary cooperation until 1973. Communists sought for Chileans a democratic 
revolution through elections and a multiclass (working-middle class) coalition (Petras 
1969). 
The PS and the PC participated in the Popular Front -FP- (1938) and in the Democratic 
Alliance (1942), the coalitions that backed the first two Radical presidents. 133 In 
contrast to the PC, the PS did not participate in the coalition that supported the 
candidacy of President González Videla (PR), but voted for him in Congress (since he 
had not been elected with a majority of votes). During González Videla’s government, 
the PS adopted an independent stand that turned to open opposition as repressive 
measures began to be adopted. In 1947, the PS formed an opposition front called the 
FRAS (Radical-Agrarian-Socialist Falange – (F)alange (R)adical (A)graria (S)ocialista) 
in order to coordinate the opposition to Radicals (Garay Vera 1990, 139).134  
The PC took the opposite path. In 1946, it got three cabinet positions and in the 1947 
municipal elections it became the third most popular party in the country. Nonetheless, 
when Liberals and Radicals abandoned the cabinet because they feared the influence 
and the electoral gains of the Communists - and also “bowing to the pressure of the 
United States” (J. S. Valenzuela 1995, 37) -, President González Videla decided to expel 
                                                            
133 In 1940 a faction of the PS led by César Godoy - who always opposed the participation of his party in the FP- 
withdrew to form the Socialist Workers Party -PST- (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores). Some members 
of the PST would join the PC in 1944. In 1943 the majority of the PS decided to adopt an independent position 
but a faction led by Marmaduke Grove announced that it would support the Democratic Alliance government. 
Some months later the PS decided to stay in the Democratic Alliance, collaborate with it in Congress, but to 
abandon any position in the executive power. In July 1944 Grove and his followers step out the party and 
organized the Authentic Socialist Party -PSA- (Partido Socialista Auténtico). The PS majority faction that 
was opposed to participate in the government was headed by the then former Minister of Health Salvador 
Allende. This group decided to break with the Democratic Alliance in July 1945 (Jobet 2003, 54). During the 
interim period of Duhalde Váquez (PR- Jan. 46-Nov. 46) the PS formed the People’s Front (Frente del Pueblo), 
a group opposed to the Democratic Alliance. Nevertheless, some of their members (Juan B. Rosetti and 
Bernardo Ibañez among others) decided to participate in Duhalde’s government.  
134 For the constitution of the FRAS see section 5.2 in this chapter.   
188 
 
 
the Communists of his government. He first broke off diplomatic relations with the 
Communist nations, and then introduced in Congress the Accursed Law.  
The banning of Communists caused the split of the PS into two factions. The one led by 
Rosetti and Ibañez, which kept the “Socialist Party” label, voted for the law, 
participated in González Videla’s cabinet, and joined the government for the 1949 
congressional elections. The other faction adopted the name of Popular Socialist 
Party -PSP- (Partido Socialista Popular). It represented the majority of the party and 
was led by Raúl Ampuero and the then Senator Salvador Allende. The Communists, 
despite their banning, did not radicalize or retreat into clandestinity. They continued to 
accept the rules of the Chilean political game exerting whatever marginal influence 
they could on the elections using different labels or joining Marxist and middle- to 
upper-class coalitions- (Drake 1978, 290).  
When the 1952 presidential elections were approaching, Senator Allende quit the PSP, 
went back to the PS and became the presidential candidate of the People’s National 
Front -FRENAP- (Frente Nacional del Pueblo), a coalition of Socialists, Communists, 
and small factions of the PR and the PD. The PSP, in turn, decided to support the 
candidacy of future President Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (IND), joining a coalition of 
various Ibañistas groups.  
The alliance between the PSP and Ibáñez lasted until October 1953. The PSP decided to 
go to the opposition because Ibáñez del Campo hadn’t sent to the Congress bills on 
agrarian reform, copper industry nationalization, and particularly the one to repeal the 
Accursed Law (Jobet 2003, 65).  
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In March 1956, the PSP, together with the FRENAP and the Peoples’ Democratic Party 
-PDPu49- (Partido Democrático del Pueblo), created the Popular Action Front -
FRAP- (Frente de Acción Popular). One of the goals of this front, particularly of the 
Popular Socialists, was to create an alliance composed only of labor parties leaving 
aside centrist groups they considered bourgeois parties.  
The FRAP constituted a cohesive opposition in Congress. Its representation almost 
doubled between 1957 and 1961 due to three events. First, in July 1957 the factions of 
the PS decided to reunify (ratifying in this occasion their opposition to bourgeois 
political groups and to “multiparty opportunism”). Second, the Law for Defense of 
Democracy was repealed in 1958. Therefore, the reinstated PC officially presented its 
own candidates for the 1961 elections. Third, the National Democrartic Party -
PADENA- (Partido Democrático Nacional) joined the FRAP in 1960.  
Senator Allende was the presidential candidate of the FRAP for the elections of 1958 
and 1964. The difference between Allende and the front-runner in 1958 (Jorge 
Alessandri Rodríguez -Right-) was tiny (2.7 points). In 1964, Allende also got the second 
place in the presidential race, though this time the difference with the DC Senator 
Eduardo Frei Montalva was 17 points. The PADENA left the FRAP and supported 
President Frei Montalva (DC) after his victory. Besides, young members of the PS left 
the party and formed in 1965 the Left Revolutionary Movement -MIR- (Movimiento 
de Izquierda Revolucionaria).  
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On December 17, 1969, the PS adopted a decision that countered its principles. It joined 
the bourgeois PR (and a handful of left parties) to form the Popular Unity -UP-, the 
successful coalition that backed Senator Allende for the 1970 presidential elections.135  
As Oppenheim (2007, 47) put it, “the six-year term of President Salvador Allende began 
with enthusiasm and excitement and ended, three years later, in death and tragedy.” 
After a favorable first year, political confrontation arose in 1972.136 The main dispute 
between government and opposition (and within the UP itself), was the creation of a 
Social Property Area -APS- (Area de Propiedad Social), or the socialization of industries 
that would be controlled by workers. This issue provoked the end of the cooperation of 
the DC with Allende, a split in the UP, and the establishment of a recalcitrant 
congressional opposition. The year 1972 was characterized by a deterioration of the 
economic situation, the burst of strikes and, finally, by a period of military participation 
in the cabinet (Nov. 72 to March 73). By 1973, the political center had disappeared, and 
the society was polarized. Two irreconcilable coalitions participated in the 
congressional elections of May 1973.137 The electoral results gave none of them the 
necessary votes to carry out their antithetical plans. This political stalemate was solved 
by the military coup of September 1973, openly supported by the opposition and the 
US government.        
                                                            
135 Allende’s rivals were former President Alessandri Rodríguez, supported by a coalition of the Right, and 
former legislator Radomiro Tomic Romero (DC). The electoral results (Allende 36.2%, Alessandri Rodríguez 
34.9%, and Tomic Romero 27.8%) brought the decision to the legislators. Congressional vote favored Allende. 
He received the support of the DC after signing a pact in which he promised to follow constitutional procedures 
and respect the democratic system. For the constitution of the Popular Unity see section 5.8 in this chapter. 
136 During 1971 the copper industry’s nationalisation passed unanimously through Congress, agrarian reform 
was fully implemented, and the expansion of social programs was supported by the DC.  
137 The coalitions were the leftist Federation of the Popular Unity and the Center-Right Democratic 
Confederation -CODE- (Confederación Democrática). See section 5.8 in this chapter. 
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Even though parties were banned in September 1973, the 1980 Constitution explicitly 
introduced an article to permanently ban parties of the Left. This prohibition included, 
of course, the PS and the PC. This provision was rewritten by the 1989 reform. 
Nevertheless, the legal status of leftist parties was definitely established in 1990, 
during President Aylwin’s administration. 138 
After the return to democracy, the PS divided into two factions: the Almeyda Socialists 
and the Núñez Socialists, named after their respective general secretaries. The latter 
faction, together with smaller groups, formed the instrumental Party for Democracy -
PPD- (Partido por la Democracia), and joined the Concertación. The former, together 
with Communists, the Christian left, and other groups created the Broad Party of the 
Socialist Left -PAIS- (Partido Amplio de la Izquierda Socialista) (Scully 1992, 196).  
Twenty-six years after the military intervention that overthrew President Allende (PS), 
another Socialist candidate, Ricardo Lagos Escobar, was elected president in the 2000 
presidential runoff. He was the third victorious candidate of the Concertación.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
138
 It is worth mentioning that the PS and the PC, and their leaders and members, “suffered the brunt of the 
repressive policies of the military regime, including torture, imprisonment, exile, and in some cases, physical 
extermination” (Scully 1992, 196). That may explain why Communists, breaking with their traditional behavior, 
adopted a strategy of struggle, including popular rebellion and acute forms of violence during the 1980s (Scully 
1992, 197).   
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2.3  The Christian Democrats  
The Christian Democratic Party -DC- (Partido Demócrata Cristiano) was 
created in 1957, when the National Falange -FN- (Falange Nacional) absorved the 
Social Christian Conservative Party -ConsSC- (Partido Conservador Social 
Cristiano). The FN and the ConsSC were both offshoots from the Conservative Party. 
Later the Agrarian Labor Party -PAL- (Partido Agrario Laborista) and the New 
Democratic Left (Nueva Izquierda Democrática), a split-away from the National 
Democratic Party, would also merge with the DC.  
Tenets of DC were Christianity (though DC welcomed Protestants, Catholics, Jews as 
well as non believers), democracy, humanism, revolution (in freedom), nationalism (of 
constructive cooperation with the US), and communitarianism. Its doctrine, coupled 
with the appeal of one of its most conspicuous leaders, Senator Eduardo Frei Montalva, 
made the DC the “new centrist alternative to both extremes” (Valenzuela 1994, 131). 
After Frei Montalva’s defeat in the presidential elections of 1958, the newly created DC 
increased its legislative representation, and shared the opposition to the government 
of President Alessandri Rodríguez (Right) with the FRAP.  Nevertheless, in the 1964 
presidential elections Liberals and Conservatives, who feared the increasing influence 
of the Left, backed up the candidacy of Frei Montalva. His slogan was “Revolution in 
Freedom” (“Revolución en Libertad”). He promised an active role of the state (based on 
substantial US direct aid), programmes oriented to incorporate new social actors, and 
agrarian reform. According to Burnett (1970, 186), “[T]he tactical efficacy of promising 
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revolutionary solutions to Chile’s problems, though within the context of political 
democracy, proved overwhelming in the 1964 and 1965 elections.”  
In spite of strong foreign and domestic support, the government was not capable of 
fulfilling its promises (at least at the extent of middle- and lower-class expectations). At 
the same time, the socio-economic reforms of the DC were too revolutionary for the 
Right (Liberals and Conservatives now unified in the National Party -PN66/Partido 
Nacional-). Therefore, the two blocs of parties of the Left and the Right became the 
DC’s opposition.  
The DC had a prime role in Allende’s (PS) administration. For one part, controlled by its 
left wing, it had the last word in Allende’s congressional election (November 1969). For 
the other part, this time led by right-wing members of their party, Christian Democrats 
forged with the Right the Democratic Confederation -CODE- (Confederación 
Democrática) coalition (1972). The constitution of the CODE contributed to the 
political deadlock and its members supported the military coup of September 1973.        
The first democratic president after sixteen years and a half of dictatorship was the DC 
Patricio Aylwin Azócar, the candidate of the Center-left Concertación. Aylwin Azócar 
and the following two presidents of the Concertación, Eduardo Frei Ruíz-Tagle (DC) and 
Ricardo Lagos Escobar (PS), had to “deal with the political challenges of democratic 
consolidation in Chile” (Oppenheim 2007, 211). One of the most difficult challenges 
they faced was the elimination of undemocratic features that remained in Chile’s 
political institutions. Main events in this long and laborious road to democratic 
consolidation were the arrest of then Senator Pinochet in London (October 1998), that 
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“broke forever the image of military impunity in Chile” (Oppenheim 2007, 210), and the 
2005 constitutional reform, that marked the end of the transition to democracy in 
Chile.  
As noted, parties and their coalitions structured around support or rejection of the 
military dictatorship. On the right wing side of the political spectrum two new parties 
emerged. They are the National Renewal Party -RN- (Partido Renovación 
Nacional), and the ultra-right Independent Democratic Union -UDI- (Unión 
Demócrata Independiente). Although they supported Pinochet’s intent to remain in 
power (the RN and the UDI campaigned for the “SI” in the plebiscite of 1988 in which 
Pinochet was defeated), they can be distinguished. The RN, the continuation of the 
dissolved PN66, participated in the discussions about the reform of the 1980 
Constitution whose approval facilitated the return to democracy. The UDI, by contrast, 
is composed of the hard-line generation of leaders that emerged from the 
dictatorship’s administration. Therefore, this party generally rejected any discussion of 
the institutional framework left by the military government. Understanding the 
mechanism of the new electoral system, RN and UDI have formed an alliance for each 
election: Democracy and Progress (Pacto Democracia y Progreso) in 1989, Union for 
the Progress of Chile (Union por el Progreso de Chile) in 1993, and Union for Chile 
(Union por Chile) in 1997.   
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Part II. The Description of the Chamber’s Political Organization139  
As I mentioned in chapter I, the analysis of patterns of institutional development 
demands knowledge of the organization of the Chamber through time. There is 
abundant (and varied) information about congressional elections’ results in Chile, but 
not much about the effects of electoral processes on the lower Chamber. Luis Valencia 
Avaria’s book (1986) about members of the executive and legislative powers is an 
impressive exception. Unfortunately, his study does not include information about the 
party of legislators. Beyond this, there is scarce information about the organization of 
the lower Chamber, and almost nothing about the parties or coalitions in charge of the 
direction of the Chamber. In the following sections I provide essential data about the 
Chamber’s organization (sections 3 and 4), and its partisan composition (section 5). 
Section 3.  Membership, Quorums, and Legislative Periods  
The Chilean lower Chamber is made up of 120 deputies elected for four-year 
terms from sixty electoral districts. The entire Chamber is renewed every four years, 
and deputies can be reelected indefinitely. The quorum is 1/3 of the total number of 
deputies. Ordinary sessions last from May 21st to September 18th and extraordinary 
sessions from September 19th to May 20th. The Chamber meets to the swearing-in 
ceremony of its members and the election of its directing board or Mesa on March 11th 
every four years. This membership, the electoral system in force, as well as the building 
of the National Congress situated in the City of Valparaiso, are novelties introduced by 
the dictatorship.    
                                                            
139 Except otherwise indicated, all data employed in the rest of this chapter were obtained from official 
publications of the Chilean Chamber of Deputies and the Library of the National Congress of Chile (see 
APPENDIX A).  
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The Constitution of 1833 fixed the proportion of one deputy for every “20,000 souls,” or 
fraction over 10,000 (rule 19). Deputies served for three-year terms and the Chamber 
was renewed every three years.  Ordinary sessions went from June 1st to September 1st. 
The quorum was the “absolute majority” of the total number of deputies. The 1874 
constitutional reform apportioned one deputy per “20,000 souls,” or fraction over 
12,000 (rule 19). 
The 1925 Constitution introduced substantial changes. First, deputies’ term was 
increased to four years and the entire Chamber came up for election every four years. 
Second, it lowered the quorum to 1/5 of the total number of deputies. Third, it enlarged 
the period of ordinary sessions (from May 21st to September 18th). Fourth, it allocated 
one deputy for every 30,000 people or fraction over 15,000. Fifth, it introduced the 
proportional representation system (rule 25), in J. S. Valenzuela’s opinion (1995, 31), a 
“modified D’Hondt method of proportional representation, with revamped multi-
member electoral districts.” This reform left behind the cumulative vote in force since 
1874, which in turn had replaced the winner-take-all system of the 1828-1873 period. 
The electoral law of 1938 established 28 electoral districts for the 25 provinces (these 25 
provinces were aggregated in 9 “group of provinces” or “agrupaciones provinciales”). 
The provinces of Santiago and Ñuble had 4 and 2 electoral districts respectively, and 
Llanquihue and Aysén formed one district (Gil 1966, 208). The 1930 census was used to 
determine representation in the lower Chamber. Following this census, seats increased 
from 132 to 147. It’s interesting to note that next censuses were ignored, and that the 
1930 census was used to apportion seats until the 1960s (Gil 1966, 208).  
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In 1958 and 1960 the electoral system underwent two substantive reforms. First, 
candidates were prohibited from running in more than one list for the same election 
(Law no. 12889). Second, pacts in lower Chamber and municipal elections were 
proscribed (Law no. 14089). Consider that before the reform “some candidates ran at 
the same time under the banner of two parties that were irreconcilably opposed, 
perhaps from the two ends of the national political spectrum. At times clericals, anti-
clericals, rightist, and leftist all got together on the same list, specially in the provinces” 
(Gil 1966, 216). These reforms also established a single ballot issued by the state (it 
would contain all party slates for any single type of election in a district), the 
strengthening of penalties for failure to register, and permanent voter lists (Gil 1966). 
140 
In 1967, a constitutional reform created the 10th « agrupación provincial » (provinces of 
Chiloé, Aysén, and Magallanes).141 Consequently, the Chamber increased its 
membership from 147 to 150 deputies. It is worth mentioning that three years later, 
during President Frei Montalva’s government (DC), the literacy requirement to vote 
was suppressed and the age to vote was lowered to 18 years old. 142  
As mentioned, the military government adopted a new constitutional text in 1980. 
Besides lowering the number of deputies, and increasing the quorum to 1/3, it 
established a requirement to be elected deputy: candidates should have completed the 
secondary school. It also gave the Executive Power the prerogative to dissolve the 
                                                            
140 Before the reform the order in which candidates’ names appeared on the ballot was decided by the party and 
each party printed and distributed its own ballots (Gil 1966, 217; A. Valenzuela 1994, 127).  
141 Law no. 16.672. 
142 Law no. 17.284.  
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Chamber of Deputies. Following the 1980 constitution, the electoral law established 
sixty districts that would elect 2 deputies each.143 This law is famous, not for the 
number of districts, but for the binominal electoral system it introduced. Blais and 
Massicotte (1997) note in their study of electoral systems of 166 countries that Chile 
has a peculiar rule that could not be fit into any category examined (i.e., plurality rule, 
PR, majority rule, and mixed systems). The authors explain that “Chile has two-
member districts. If the leading party gets twice as many votes as the second party, it 
wins the two seats; otherwise, the top two parties each win one seat” (Blais and 
Massicotte 1997, 126). This system gives undue political weight to the minority (A. 
Valenzuela 1994, Oppenheim 2007, Constitución Política-online). As Oppenheim 
argues (2007, 213) “with one third of the vote, the minority could claim one half of the 
elective seats.” More specifically, A. Valenzuela (1994, 111) says that this electoral law 
“was designed to promote a two-party system while favouring the parties of the Right 
by creating an unusual two-past-the-post system, in which the runner up has 
significant electoral advantages.”  
The most important change regarding the Chamber since 1980 was introduced by the 
constitutional reform in 1989, which suppressed the presidential prerogative to 
dissolve it.  
The institutional changes described resulted in eleven legislative periods from 1945 to 
2002. As we can see in Table 66, except for the 1973 legislative period, which lasted 
almost four months - May to September - and of course not considering the years of 
                                                            
143 Organic Constitutional Law no. 18.700. 
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military government, the Chamber always functioned effectively according to 
constitutional rules.  
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Table 66 - LEGISLATIVE TERMS AND NUMBER OF DEPUTIES - CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 
 
1945-2002 
 
Legislative 
Period 
1945  
1949 
1949   
1953 
1953  
1957 
1957  
1961 
1961   
1965 
1965   
1969 
1969   
1973 
1973 
ª 
1990   
1994 
1994  
1998 
1998  
2002 
Number of 
Deputies 
147 147 147 147 147 147 150 150 120 120 120 
 
           a. The military coup dissolved the Congress by Decree-law no. 27 (September 21, 1973).    
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Section 4.  Majorities and Pluralities in Control of the Chamber   
These eleven legislative periods were ruled by one single-party majority, one 
single-party plurality, and nine majority coalitions (Table 67). Center-left coalitions 
secured the majority of seats in three opportunities, and only the Centrist DC had once 
the plurality and once the majority in Chamber. Five majority coalitions were shared by 
parties of the Center and the Right, and one majority coalition by parties of the Right, 
the Center, and the Left.   
                  Table 67 - MAJORITIES-PLURALITIES / SINGLE PARTY-COALITION, RULING PARTY-COALITION, 
RIGHT-CENTER-LEFT SPECTRUM BY LEGISLATIVE PERIOD  
 CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002 
 
Legislative 
Period 
Majority-Plurality/ 
Single Party-Coalition 
Party-Coalition 
Right-Center-Left 
Spectrum 
1945-1949 Majority Coalition (O) a APL45-CONS-PA-PL-PLP C-R 
1949-1953 Majority Coalition LIDERS R-C-L 
1953-1957 Majority Coalition 
CONS-FENAFUI-MONAP53- 
PL-PR 
C-R 
1957-1961 Majority Coalition (O) ConsU-PL-PAL-IND-PN56 b C-R 
1961-1965 Majority Coalition DEMOCRATIC FRONT C-R 
1965-1969 Single-Party Majority DC C 
1969-1973 Single-Party Plurality DC C 
1973 Majority Coalition (O) CODE C-R 
1990-1994 Majority Coalition CONCERTACION C-L 
1994-1998 Majority Coalition CONCERTACION C-L 
1998-2002 Majority Coalition CONCERTACION C-L 
a. Coalition of parties of the opposition. 
b. Journal of Sessions, June 4, 1957, p. 107. 
 
 
Three alliances are identified as (O) or “coalitions of parties of the opposition” in the 
second column of Table 67. This distinction refers to the Executive-Legislative relations. 
It means that the coalition in control of the Chamber was not the coalition supporting 
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the Executive Power. In other words, in these three periods the national government 
did not have (was not able to form) a majority coalition in the lower Chamber. Note that 
the Chilean is a presidential system. Therefore, the only decisive coalitions are the pre-
electoral alliances (they are needed either to get the majority of votes in general 
elections or, until 1973, in the congress in the absence of a majority election).   
 
Table 68 - PARTY/COALITION, NUMBER, PERCENTAGE OF SEATS, AND TYPE OF RULING 
MAJORITIES/PLURALITIES BY LEGISLATIVE PERIOD 
CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES  
1945-2002 
 
Legislative  
Period 
Ruling Party-Coalition Seats (No.) Seats (%) 
Total Seats 
(No.) 
Majority/Plurality 
Type 
1945-1949 APL45-CONS-PA-PL-PLP 74 50,34 147  RM a 
1949-1953 LIDERS 80 54,42 147 RM 
1953-1957 
CONS-FENAFUI-MONAP 
53 -PL-PR 
75 51,01 147 RM 
1957-1961 ConsU-PL-PAL-IND-PN56 74 50,34 147 RM 
1961-1965 DEMOCRATIC FRONT 84 57,14 147    EM b 
1965-1969 DC 82 55,78 147 EM 
1969-1973 DC 56 37,33 150   RP c 
1973 CODE 87 58 150 EM 
1990-1994 CONCERTACION 69 57,5 120 EM 
1994-1998 CONCERTACION 70 58,32 120 EM 
1998-2002 CONCERTACION 69 57,5 120 EM 
a. Regular majority               (0.50 ≤  s ≤ 0.55)
b. Exceptional majority        (0.55 < s < 0.67)
c. Regular Plurality             (S ≤ 0.46) 
 
Majorities in control of the Chamber differ not only by their party or by their structure 
(single-party or coalitions), but also by number of seats they secured in Chamber. Using 
the typology presented in Chapter II (Regular Plurality: S ≤ 0.46; Exceptional Plurality: 
0.46 < s < 0.50; Regular Majority: 0.50 ≤  s ≤ 0.55; Exceptional Majority: 0.55 < s < 0.67; 
Qualified Majority: S ≥ 0.67), Table 68 shows that the Chilean lower Chamber was ruled 
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by six exceptional majorities, four regular majorities, adding to this list the lonely 
single-party regular plurality (1969-1973).       
In Table 68 we can also identify two blocs of majorities: from 1945 to 1961 regular 
majorities; since then, exceptional majorities. This difference can be appreciated in 
figure 5 too. Put it differently, we can see the effects of the 1958/1960 electoral reforms 
that reduced the number of parties in Chamber. According to Gil (1966, 216) “[T]he 
elimination of all electoral pacts (…) dealt a mortal blow to the callampa or fly-by-night 
party that flourished under the old system.” This effect will be also visible in the 
following description of the partisan composition of the Chamber by legislative periods.  
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Section 5.  Partisan Composition of the Chamber by Legislative Periods  
The reconstruction of the partnership of ruling coalitions, and of the detailed 
composition of the Chamber through time, is not an easy task due to the restless 
change of the Chilean multiparty system, particularly until the 1990s. To simplify as 
much as possible the presentation of this reconstruction, tables showing the complete 
composition of each period are included, paying attention to the Right-Center-Left 
distribution of parties and the membership of the eleven directing boards or Chilean 
Mesas. 144 
5.1 Legislative Period 1945-1949 
 
In 1945, a Center-right majority coalition shared the Chamber with a minority 
coalition that supported the Executive Power called the DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE 
(Table 70).  
The ruling coalition was composed of Conservatives, Liberals, the old Agrarian Party -
PA- (Partido Agrario), the Ibañista People's Liberation Alliance -APL45- (Alianza 
Popular Libertadora), and the Liberal Progressive Party -PLP- (Partido Liberal 
Progresista). 
 
 
 
                                                            
144 To designate the directing board of the Chamber -composed of the President and two Vice-Presidents- I use 
the Chilean term “Mesa.” 
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Table 69                       Table 70 
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-Center-Left Spectrum,                  Mesa, Ruling Coalition, and  
Number and Percentage of Seats                                        DEMOCRATIC  ALLIANCE - 1945  
Legislative Period 1945-1949 
Right-Center-
Left Spectrum 
Party Seats Seats (%) 
 
Mesa 
Position Party 
R   
CONS a 36 24,49 P  CONS 
PL b 31 21,09 VP1 PA  
PLP c 3 2,04 VP2 PL 
PD45 d 1 0,68 Ruling Coalition 
Subtotal RIGHT 71 48,3 Party Seats Seats (%) 
C   
PR e 40 27,21 APL45  1 0,68 
PD f 6 4,08 CONS  36 24,49 
FN g 3 2,04 PA  3 2,04 
PA h 3 2,04 PL  31 21,09 
APL45 i 1 0,68 PLP  3 2,04 
Subtotal CENTER 53 36,05 Total 74 50,34
L 
PPN45 j 15 10,2 DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE   
PS k 6 4,08 Party Seats Seats (%) 
PSA l 2 1,36 PR 40 27,21 
Subtotal LEFT 23 15,64 PPN45 15 10,2 
TOTAL 147 100 PD 6 4,08 
PS 6 4,08 
a. Conservative Party (Partido Conservador) 
b. Liberal Party (Partido Liberal) 
c. Liberal Pregressive Party (Partido Liberal Progresista) 
d. Democrat Party (Partido Demócrata) 
e. Radical Party (Partido Radical) 
f. Democratic Party (Partido Democrático) 
g. National Falange  (Falange Nacional)  
h. Agrarian Party (Partido Agrario) 
i. People's Liberation Alliance (Alianza Popular Libertadora)  
j. Progressive National Party (Partido Progresista Nacional) 
k. Socialist Party (Partido socialista) 
l. Authentic Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Auténtico) 
PSA 2 1,36 
Total 69 46,93
 
This coalition formed in May 1945 during the last year of the Radical President Ríos 
Morales. Several cabinet reshuffles that included Liberal ministers, the withdrawal of 
Socialists from the government, and divisions within the PR characterized Rios 
Morales’s administration. As Collier and Stater (1996, 245) point out, “given the level of 
political in-fighting it is no surprise that the opposition did well in the 1945 
congressional elections.”  
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The minority coalition grouped the following parties: PR, PPN45, PD, PS, and PSA. The 
“Progressive National Party” -PPN45- was actually a label used by the PC for these 
congressional elections. The Authentic Socialist Party -PSA- was a faction of the PS 
that had left the party in 1944 to support Ríos Morales’ administration.  
The Falangists -FN-, who were outside the pact but supported the DEMOCRATIC 
ALLIANCE, were a group of dissident Conservatives that had separated from the party 
in 1938, and would become the successful Christian Democrats in the late 1950s.145  
Finally, the lonely PD45 was a rightist splinter of the Democratic Party.  
In this Chamber rightist parties occupied 48% of the seats (Table 69). Though their pre-
eminence would last one more period, they will progressively decrease until reaching 
their lowest percentage in 1965 (Table 79). The main parties, PR-CONS-PL, belong to 
the Centre-right. As Table 70 shows, the most important party, the Radicals with 40 
seats, were part of the minority coalition.  
5.2  Legislative Period 1949-1953 
 
The ruling coalition in 1949 was the LIDERS. It was made up of (Li)berals, 
(De)mocrats, (R)adicals, and (S)ocialists (Table 72). This alliance was created to 
participate in the mid-term elections of 1949 that followed the approval of the 
Accursed Law promoted by the Radical President González Videla. Consequently, the 
LIDERS was formed by three parties (PR, PD, and PL), and one faction that had voted in 
favor of banning the Communists (the faction was the PS led by Juan B. Rosetti and 
                                                            
145 In the early 1930s young Conservatives, in contrast to the mainstream of the party, espoused the views of the 
social encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII and decided to implement them in the political realm. At the end of the 
decade they will become the Falangists.   
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Bernardo Ibañez who, helped by the government, kept for their group the label 
“Socialist Party”). As Drake argued (1978, 293), “González Videla new governing 
coalition with the Right retained control of Congress.”                   
 
Table 71                   Table 72 
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-Center-Left Spectrum,              Mesa, LIDERS (Ruling Coalition) and  
Party, Number and Percentage of Seats                FRAS - 1949  
Legislative Period 1949-1953 
Right-Center-
Left Spectrum 
Party Seats Seats (%) 
 
Mesa 
Position Party 
R   
PL 33 22,45 P  PR 
ConsT a 20 13,61 VP1 PS 
CONS 9 6,12 VP2 PD 
ConsSC b 4 2,72 LIDERS  (Ruling Coalition) 
PLP 2 1,36 Party Seats Seats (%) 
Subtotal RIGHT 68 46,26 PR 34 23,13 
C   
PR 34 23,13 PL 33 22,45 
PAL c 14 9,52 PD 6 4,08 
PRDem49 
d 8 5,44 PS 5 3,4 
PD 6 4,08 PLP 2 1,36 
FN 3 2,04 Total 80 54,42
ARCh49 e 1 0,68 FRAS 
Subtotal CENTER 66 44,89 Party Seats Seats (%) 
L 
PSP f 6 4,08 PAL 14 9,52 
PS 5 3,4 PRDem49 8 5,44 
PDPu49 g 1 0,68 PSP 6 4,08 
PSA 1 0,68 FN 3 2,04 
Subtotal LEFT 13 8,84 Total 31 21,08
TOTAL 147 100
a. Traditionalist Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Tradicionalista) 
b. Social Christian Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Socialcristiano)
c. Agrarian Laborist Party (Partido Agrario Laborista) 
d. Democratic Radical Party (Partido Radical Democrático)  
e. Chilean Renewal Action (Acción Renovadora de Chile) 
f. Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular)  
g. People's Democratic Party (Partido Democrático del Pueblo)  
 
The non-communist opposition grouped in the FRAS (Radical-Agrarian-Socialist 
Falange) formed by (F)alangists, Democratic (R)adicals, (A)grarians, and Popular 
(S)ocialists. The Democratic Radical Party -PRDem49- (Partido Radical 
Democrático) inside the FRAS was a faction of the Radicals who had opposed the 
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candidacy of President González Videla (PR) in 1946. The PSP was the majority of the 
PS led by Raúl Ampuero and Salvador Allende.  
The clandestine Communists, for their part, had forged a coalition with the PSA, the 
PDPu49, and the PRDoc49 for these elections.146 As we can see in Table 7, only the PSA 
and the PDPu49 secured 1 deputy each.   
Outside the coalitions are the Chilean Renewal Action -ARCh49- (Acción Renovadora 
de Chile), a group created for the 1949 elections that gathered independents who were 
disappointed of traditional parties; the factions of the Conservatives -the ConsSC and 
the ConsT-, and the PSA. 147 The Agrarian Labor Party (PAL) deserves special mention. 
It was created in December 1945 by the merger of the old Agrarian Party, the Ibañistas 
groups assembled in the People's Liberation Alliance -APL45- (Alianza Popular 
Libertadora), and the Nationalist Movement of Chile (Movimiento Nacionalista de 
Chile) (Garay Vera 1990). These groups advocated the formation of a corporate state 
and were disenchanted by traditional parties. In 1953 Agrarians will be the main party 
within the Ibañistas groups. 
In this Chamber rightist parties occupied 46% of the seats (Table 71). As it was in 1945, 
the main parties belong to the Centre-right (PR-CONS-PL), and the most important 
party was the PR, though this time it was part of the ruling coalition (Table 72).  
 
                                                            
146 The Doctrinaire Radical Party -PRDoc49- (Partido Radical Doctrinario) was composed of left wing 
members of the PR.  
147 The ConsT were in favour of the law banning the PC and the ConsSC against it. The Conservatives’ split 
formally took place after a complementary election held to replace Senator Miguel Cruchaga Tocornal who died 
in May 1949. The Journal of Sessions and the records of the Chamber, however, distinguish between ConsT and 
ConsSC since May 1949.     
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 5.3  Legislative Period 1953-1957 
 
“Eighteen parties obtained congressional representation” in the 1953 elections, 
says Etchepare Jensen in his study (2001, 19); “twenty parties,” according to Gil (1966, 
79); nineteen for Nolhen (2005, 280); “many parties,” for other authors, and finally 
nineteen parties in the Journal of Sessions (my principal source). The new parties in the 
Chamber were those that had backed Senator Ibáñez del Campo’s successful candidacy 
to the Presidency (Nov. 1952). Despite Ibañez’s efforts, they split in three groups for the 
1953 congressional elections (Table 74): 148  
- The ephemeral People’s National Alliance -ANAP- (Alianza Nacional del Pueblo) 
composed of the PAL, PSP, PDPu49, PRDoc49, and the Progressive Feminist 
Party -PPF- (Partido Progresista Femenino). 149 These were the best organized 
and more traditional groups of the Ibañismo;  
- The National Federation of Ibañistas -FENAFUI- (Federación Nacional de 
Fuerzas Ibañistas) which consisted of the National Christian Party -PNCr53- 
(Partido Nacional Cristiano), the ARCh49, the National Ibañista Movement -
MNI- Movimiento Nacional Ibañista, the National Union of Independents -UNI- 
(Unión Nacional de Independientes), and the Feminist Party of Chile -PFCh- 
(Partido Femenino de Chile). The FENAFUI was led by future Senator María de la 
Cruz Toledo. Their members were against traditional parties and also rejected the 
ANAP because they considered that this alliance belonged to the lazy and greedy 
group of existing parties, and   
                                                            
148 This description draws from Etchepare Jensen (2001). 
149 The PSP withdrew from the government in October 1953 and went to the opposition (Jobet 2003). 
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 Table 73                              Table 74 
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-Center-Left                          Mesa, Ruling Coalition, FENAFUI  
Spectrum, Party, Number and Percentage of Seats                           and ANAP - 1953   
Legislative Period 1953-1957 
Right-Centre-
Left Spectrum 
Party Seats Seats (%) 
 
Mesa 
Position Party 
R   
PL 22 14,97 P  UNI53 
ConsT 16 10,88 VP1 ConsT 
PNCr53 a 4 2,72 VP2 PR 
ConsU b 2 1,36 Ruling Coalition 
PLP 1 0,68 Party Seats Seats (%) 
Subtotal RIGHT 45 30,61 PL 22 14,97 
C   
PAL 26 17,69 PR 17 11,56 
PR 17 11,56 ConsT 16 10,88 
MNI53 c 6 4,08 MNI53 6 4,08 
UNI53 d 4 2,72 UNI53 4 2,72 
FN 3 2,04 PNCr53  4 2,72 
PRDoc49 e 3 2,04 ConsU  2 1,36 
PA 2 1,36 ARCh49 1 0,68 
ARCh49 1 0,68 MONAP53  1 0,68 
MONAP53 f 1 0,68 PLab53  1 0,68 
PLab53 g 1 0,68 PLP 1 0,68 
PD 1 0,68 Total 75 51,01
Subtotal CENTER 65 44,21 FENAFUI 
L 
PSP 20 13,61 Party Seats Seats (%) 
PS 12 8,16 MNI53 6 4,08 
PDPu49 5 3,4 PNCr53 4 2,72 
Subtotal LEFT 37 25,17 UNI53 4 2,72 
TOTAL 147 100 PLab53 1 0,68 
a. National Christian Party (Partido Nacional 
Cristiano) ARCh49 1 0,68 
b. United Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Unido) Total 16 10,88
c.  National Ibañista Movement (Movimiento Nacional Ibañista) ANAP 
d. National Union of Independents (Unión Nacional de 
Independientes)  Delegation Seats Seats (%) 
e. Doctrinaire Radical Party (Partido Radical Doctrinario) PAL 26 17,69 
f. People’s National Movement (Movimiento Nacional del 
Pueblo) PSP 20 13,61 
g. Labor Party (Partido de los Trabajadores) PDPu49 5 3,4 
PRDoc49 3 2,04 
Total 54 36,74
 
- The People’s National Movement -MONAP53- (Movimiento Nacional del 
Pueblo) led by former Colonel Ramón Alvarez Golsak. 
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The Chamber was ruled by a majority coalition of one Ibañista group (FENAFUI), and 
three traditional parties (the Conservatives, the Radicals, and the Liberals) (Table 74).150 
This mixed alliance was created six months after the victory of Ibáñez del Campo or, as 
Gil (1966, 79) argued, “when the Chilean electorate’s feelings against the traditional 
major parties where at the peak.” Even though Ibañistas’ seats were enough to get the 
majority, their high level of fragmentation and their ideological differences resulted in 
this unexpected coalition. This was not the predicted alliance for two reasons: first, the 
participation of Conservatives, Liberals, and Radicals countered the core message of 
President Ibánez del Campo’s campaign (the rejection of traditional parties); second, 
the largest party and main supporter of Ibáñez, the PAL, was not part of it. According 
to Garay Vergara (1990), this absence should not be a surprise, due to the intricate 
relation between the PAL and Ibáñez del Campo.   
The PS and the clandestine PC joined for these elections. They had supported Senator 
Allende for the presidential elections of 1952, and now were part of the opposition in 
Chamber.  
In contrast to precedent periods, Center parties were prevalent (44%); the Left secured 
one-third of the seats; the three main parties belonged to the Center (PAL), the Right 
(PL), and the Left (PSP); and the PAL was the party that secured most seats in Chamber 
(Table 73).    
Finally, it is interesting to mention that in May 1949 women were enfranchised (until 
1949 they could vote in municipal elections). Women voted for the first time at national 
                                                            
150 According to the database of the Library of the National Congress of Chile the campaign of the deputy of the 
PLP was supported by Ibáñez del Campo.   
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level in the presidential elections of 1952 and entered the Chamber in 1953 with a 
modest representation: one deputy, one senator.151 
5.4   Legislative Period 1957-1961 
 
President Ibáñez del Campo failed to fulfill his campaign promises. 
Furthermore, during his administration Chile suffered the worst inflationary episode of 
its history (Collier and Sater 1996).  
Table 75                           Table 76 
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-Center-Left                                    Mesa, Ruling Coalition and FRAP - 1957  
Spectrum, Party, Number and Percentage of Seats                       
Legislative Period 1957-1961 
 
Right-Center-
Left Spectrum 
Party Seats Seats (%) 
 
Mesa 
Position Party 
R   
PL 30 20,41 P  ConsU 
ConsU 22 14,97 VP1 PL 
PN56a 5 3,4 VP2 PAL 
CONS 2 1,36 Ruling Coalition 
Subtotal RIGHT 59 40,14 Party Seats Seats (%) 
C   
PR 36 24,49 PL 30 20,41 
FN 14 9,52 ConsU 22 14,97 
PAL 13 8,84 PAL 13 8,84 
PD 5 3,4 PN56 5 3,4 
IND b 3 2,04 IND  2 1,36 
MR57 c 1 0,68 CONS 2 1,36 
Subtotal CENTER 72 48,97 Total 74 50,34
L 
PS 7 4,76 FRAP 
PSP 5 3,4 Party Seats Seats (%) 
PT57 d 4 2,72 PS 7 4,76 
Subtotal LEFT 16 10,88 PSP 5 3,4 
TOTAL 147 100 PD 5 3,4 
a. National Party 1956 (Partido Nacional) 
b. Independents (Independientes) 
c. Republican Movement (Movimiento Republicano)  
d. Labor Party57 (Partido del Trabajo - Partido de los 
Trabajadores)  
PT57 4 2,72 
Total 21 14,28
 
                                                            
151 Actually, the first woman in Chamber was the Radical Inés Enríquez who was elected in a complementary 
election in 1950. The first woman elected to the Mesa (VP1) was the PPD Eliana Caraball Martínez (22.06.1993).  
 
214 
 
 
The chaotic situation at the end of Ibañez del Campo’s government benefited 
traditional parties. As Gil (1966, 80) put it, “the losers of 1953 were this time the 
winners (…) after the Ibañista fiasco, (…) voters were willing to put their faith again in 
the long-established political organizations.”    
Electoral results favored the PR -it became again the largest party in Chamber-, the PL, 
ConsU, and the FN. Therefore, the main parties again concentrated in the Center-right 
spectrum (Table 75).  
The majority coalition consisted this time of five parties: Conservatives (ConsU and 
CONS), PL, PAL, PN56, and Independents (Table 76).152 As Table 75 shows, the 
Ibañistas groups either disappeared or decreased considerably. The only party 
supporting the national government in this coalition was the PAL, which represented 
9% of the lower Chamber’s seats.  
The Popular Action Front -FRAP- (Frente de Acción Popular), created one year 
earlier, entered the Chamber with 21 deputies, a representation that was less than 
what they expected (Table 76). Actually the Left lost more than half of the seats it had 
secured in 1953.  
The three new parties are the National Party -PN56-, the Labor Party -PT57-, and the 
Republican Movement -MR57-. The first, which must not be confused with the future 
National Party of 1966, was formed by various splinters of the Agrarians, and was 
dissolved in 1958 after supporting the presidential candidacy of Alessandri Rodriguez 
(Right) (Bizzarro 2005, 553). The Labor Party (Partido del Trabajo o Partido de los 
                                                            
152 See Journal of Sessions June 4,  1957, p. 107.  
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Trabajadores) grouped former Ibañistas and clandestine Communists (e.g., Juan 
Acevedo Pávez, Juan Ahumada Trigo, and José Cademartori Ivernizzi). Finally, the 
MR57 was formed by conservative members that had backed President Ibánez del 
Campo, and that would support the presidential candidacy of Alessandri Rodriguez 
(Right) (Bizzarro 2005, 488).  
5.5         Legislative Period 1961-1965 
            
This was the first legislative period after the electoral reforms of 1958 and 1960 
that had prohibited candidates from running in more than one list for the same 
election, and proscribed electoral pacts (see section 3 in this chapter). These were also 
the first congressional elections for the flourishing Christian Democrats, for the 
reinstated Communists (the law banning the PC was repealed in 1958), and for the 
enlarged FRAP (Tables 77 and 78). As mentioned, this front was joined in 1960 by the 
PADENA or National Democrartic Party (Partido Democrático Nacional), “a residue 
of Carlos Ibañez’s followers who fused together in 1960” (Burnett 1970, 215).  
A majority Center-right coalition of PL, ConsU, and PR called the (National) 
Democratic Front ruled the Chamber (Table 78). 153 As Petras (1969, 180) put it 
“because of the combined opposition of the FRAP and the Christian Democrats, the 
right-wing parties needed the support of the Radicals to obtain congressional 
majority.” Collier and Sater (1996, 258) argue that the Radicals were invited into 
Alessandri Rodriguez’s government in August 1961, and that the front was formally 
                                                            
153 While some authors call this this front the “National Democratic Front” (Gil 1966), others call it the 
“Democratic Front” (Scully 1992, Collier and Sater 1996).   
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created in October of this year. Nonetheless, the coalition was already crystal clear in 
March 1961 when the Chamber elected a Radical president for the Mesa (Table 78). 
Table 77                   Table 78 
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-Center-Left                                                 Mesa, DEMOCRATIC FRONT (Ruling  
Spectrum, Party, Number and Percentage of Seats                                                        Coalition) and FRAP - 1961  
Legislative Period 1961-1965 
Right-Center-Left 
Spectrum 
Party Seats Seats (%) 
 
Mesa 
Positio
n 
Party 
R   
PL 28 19,05 P  PR 
ConsU 17 11,56 VP1 ConsU 
Subtotal RIGHT 45 30,61 VP2 PL 
C   
PR 39 26,53 
DEMOCRATIC FRONT (Ruling 
Coalition) 
DC a 23 15,65 Party Seats Seats (%) 
PADENA b 12 8,16 PR 39 26,53 
Subtotal CENTER 74 50,34 PL 28 19,05 
L PC
 c 16 10,88 ConsU 17 11,56 
PS 12 8,16 Total 84 57,14
Subtotal LEFT 28 19,04 FRAP 
TOTAL 147 100 Party Seats Seats (%) 
a. Christian Democrat Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano) PC 16 10,88 
b. National Democratic Party (Partido Democrático Nacional) PADENA 12 8,16 
c. PC Communist Party (Partido Comunista)  PS 12 8,16 
Total 40 27,2
 
 
The PR added 39 deputies to the PL-ConsU group composed of 45 legislators. This 
support brought to the Chamber the first exceptional majority coalition of the period.  
The subtotals in Table 77 show the beginning of a shift of the electorate toward the 
Center, moderate, and extreme Left. Except for the 1953-1957 period, two of the three 
main parties were always rightist groups. This time the centrist DC and the PADENA 
occupied this place and the Left almost doubled its representation. In particular, the 
reinstated PC secured 16 of the 28 seats of the Left.   
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5.6       Legislative Period 1965-1969 
 
For the first (and last) time, Christian Democrats secured a single-party 
exceptional majority (Table 80). According to J. S. Valenzuela (1995, 47), the 1965 
congressional elections took place “under the full glow of the newly inaugurated 
presidency of Eduardo Frei.” From then on the DC would be the largest single political 
party in Chile until 2001. Consequently, these elections marked the end of the long-
lasting supremacy of Radicals, who dropped from 39 to 20 seats.  
The tendency in favor of the Center-Left is now clear. The Right, which has always been 
the first (1945-1949), or second (1953-1961) bloc in the Chamber, occupies now the 
third place (6%) well behind the Left (22%) (Table 79).  
Table 79                                Table 80 
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-Center-Left                                          Mesa, Ruling Party and FRAP - 1965 
Spectrum, Party, Number and Percentage of Seats  
Legislative Period 1965-1969 
Right-Center-
Left 
Spectrum 
Party Seats Seats (%) 
 
Mesa 
Position Party 
R   
PL 6 4,08 P  DC 
ConsU 3 2,04 VP1 DC 
Subtotal RIGHT 9 6,12 VP2 DC 
C   
DC 82 55,78 Ruling Party 
PR 20 13,61 Party Seats Seats (%) 
PADENA 3 2,04 DC 82 55,78 
Subtotal CENTER 105 71,43 Total 82 55,78
L 
PC 18 12,24 FRAP 
PS 15 10,2 Party Seats Seats (%) 
Subtotal LEFT 33 22,44 PC 18 12,24 
TOTAL 147 100 PS 15 10,2 
Total 33 22,44
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These elections, however, marked a decrease for FRAP. Note that the Front lost one of 
its partners, the PADENA, which decided to support President Frei Montalva after his 
victory in the 1964 elections.  
5.7 Legislative Period 1969-1973 
 
 
The reforms implemented by President Frei Montalva’s administration (e.g., 
agrarian reform, new social programs, fiscal innovations, diversification of markets, a 
larger role of the state in Chilean industry) were too revolutionary for the Right, and not 
transformative enough for the Left -including the left-wing of the DC-. Furthermore, 
the “perennial Chilean problem of inflation continued to haunt the PDC government” 
(Collier and Sater 1996, 318).  
The polarized Chamber of 1969 reflected this situation. While the blocs of the Right and 
the Left increased their representation, the Center, particularly the DC, suffered 
important losses, but the PR modestly gained a handful of seats. Therefore, a coalition 
between the PR and the Right or the Left was at hand to get the control of the 
Chamber. Nevertheless, the traditional politics of compromise or coalition building in 
which the PR had a central role were over. The lack of agreement among the parties of 
the opposition allowed the DC to become again the ruling party, though this time a 
plurality one (Table 82).  
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Table 81                                     Table 82 
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-Center-Left                                              Mesa, Ruling Party and FRAP - 1969 
Spectrum, Party, Number and Percentage of Seats    
Legislative Period 1969-1973 
Right-Center-
Left Spectrum 
Party Seats Seats (%) 
 
Mesa 
Position Party 
R   PN66 a 33 22 P  DC 
Subtotal RIGHT 33 22 VP1 DC 
C   
DC 56 37,33 VP2 DC 
PR 24 16 Ruling Party 
Subtotal CENTER 80 53,33 Party Seats Seats (%) 
L 
PC 22 14,67 DC 56 37,33 
PS 15 10 Total 56 37,33
Subtotal LEFT 37 24,67 FRAP 
TOTAL 150 100 Party Seats Seats (%) 
a. National Party 
(Partido Nacional) PC 22 14,67 
PS 15 10 
Total 37 24,67
 
 
The new party in Chamber was the rightist National Party -PN66- (Partido Nacional) 
(Table 81). It was the result of the merger of the Liberal, Conservative (Unido), and 
National Action -AN- (Acción Nacional) parties in 1966. Note also that the 15 
Socialists deputies, though unified in Chamber, were divided into two factions: 9 
belonged to the PS, and 6 to the Popular Socialist Union -USP- Unión Socialista 
Popular, a Raúl Ampuero’s faction created in 1967.  
 
 
5.8           Legislative Period 1973 
             
The 1973 congressional elections offered Chileans two opposite coalitions: the 
Democratic Confederation -CODE- (Confederación Democrática), and the 
Federation of the Popular Unity -the label of the UP for these elections-. The result 
was that “each side drew up a joint slate, making polarization of Chilean politics 
complete” (A. Valenzuela 1994, 106).  
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The CODE was the exceptional ruling coalition (Table 84). It consisted of the following 
parties: PN66, DC, PADENA, Radical Democracy Party -PDR69- (Partido Democracia 
Radical), and the Left Radical Party -PIR- (Partido de la Izquierda Radical). The 
PDR69 was a Radical splinter. Their members left the party and joined right-wing 
groups when Radicals decided to support Salvador Allende in 1969. 154 The PIR was 
originally an Allende supporter that broke with the Popular Unity and joined the DC in 
1972 due to opposed views over the Social Property Area issue.  
The Federation of the Popular Unity gathered Socialists, Communists, Radicals, the 
Social Democrat Party -PSD- (Partido Social Demócrata), the Movement for United 
Popular Action  -MAPU- (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria), the Independent 
Popular Action -API- (Acción Popular Independiente), and the Christian Left Party - 
IC- (Izquierda Cristiana). The MAPU was formed by members of the left-wing of the 
DC that left the party to join the UP in May 1969. The API was a creation of a former 
Ibañista supporter (Senator Rafael Tarud). Finally, the IC was also a scission of the DC 
that rejected the relation of its party with the rightist PN66. Its members joined the UP 
in June 1971.  
These elections took place in the midst of a monumental economic and political 
national crisis. For both coalitions, the CODE and the UP, they “marked an apogee of 
conflict and testing” (Drake 1978, 329). 
 
 
                                                            
154 The PDR69 was led by Julio Durán, Inés Enriquez, and Angel Faiwovich. 
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Table 83                       Table 84 
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-                                    Mesa, CODE (Ruling Coalition) and  
Center-Left Spectrum, Party, Number                                             FEDERATION OF THE POPULAR UNITY - 
and Percentage of Seats                       1973 
Legislative Period 1973 
 
Right-Center-
Left Spectrum 
Party Seats Seats (%) 
 
Mesa 
Position Party 
R   
PN66 34 22,67 P  DC 
PDR69 a 2 1,33 VP1 PN66 
Subtotal RIGHT 36 24 VP2 PIR 
C   
DC 50 33,33 CODE (Ruling Coalition) 
PR 5 3,33 Party Seats Seats (%) 
API b 2 1,33 DC 50 33,33 
PIR c 1 0,67 PN66 34 22,67 
Subtotal CENTER 58 38,66 PDR69  2 1,33 
L 
PS 28 18,67 PIR  1 0,67 
PC 24 16 Total 87 58 
IC d 2 1,33 FEDERATION OF THE POPULAR UNITY 
MAPU e 2 1,33 Party Seats Seats (%) 
Subtotal LEFT 56 37,33 PS 28 18,67 
TOTAL 150 100 PC 24 16 
a. Radical Democracy Party (Partido Democracia Radical)  
b. Independent Popular Action (Acción Popular 
Independiente)  
c. Left Radical Party (Partido de la Izquierda Radical)  
d. Christian Left Party (Izquierda Cristiana)  
e. Movement for United Popular Action (Movimiento de 
Acción Popular Unitaria)
PR 5 3,33 
API 2 1,33 
IC 2 1,33 
MAPU 2 1,33 
Total 63 41,99 
 
 
The slogan of the opposition was “Not just a new Congress, but a new government” 
(Oppenheim 2007, 67). It wanted to impeach Allende to end his “transition to 
Socialism.” The government, in turn, accused the CODE of plotting a military coup. The 
results of the “electoral test” brought no solution. The CODE took control of the 
Chamber, but did not secure enough seats for impeachment. The UP surprised the 
opposition with its electoral performance. As Oppenheim (2007, 69) put it, “it was 
unusual for the party in power to gain seats in the midterm election.” For all intents and 
purposes, however, the UP remained a minority government.     
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         5.9  Legislative Period 1990-1994 
 
 
General Pinochet followed all the necessary steps he believed appropriate in 
order to put an end to the multiparty system (e.g., the adoption of a binominal electoral 
system in favor of the Right, and a new constitution that banned parties of the Left, to 
mention only legal means). Moreover, he built a new Congress in Valparaiso “as a 
means of deflating the egos of politicians by removing their main forum from Santiago” 
(Collier and Sater 2004, 382). 155  A. Valenzuela (1994, 112) argues, however, that “[T]he 
resurgence of a strong multiparty system in the aftermath of the military rule is vivid 
testimony to the failure of those measures.”  
The first-time concurrent presidential-legislative elections of 1989 brought to the 
Chamber an exceptional majority of the Center-left Concertación. In addition to the 
traditional DC and PR, it was composed of the Party for Democracy -PPD- (Partido 
por la Democracia) that assembled the centrist-leaning Núñez Socialists and other 
groups (Scully 1992, 196), and the Humanist-Green Aliance -AHVerde- (Alianza 
Humanista Verde) that was a progressive, environmental alliance (Table 86). The 
greens, led by Laura Rodríguez, came into being in the late 1980s with an ecological 
agenda (Bizzarro 2005, 549).  
 
 
 
                                                            
155 Collier and Sater argue that this new building was one of Pinochet’s final schemes, an “old deal with Admiral 
Merino,” and characterize it as a “half neo-Babylonian, half post-modernist atrocity across the street from the 
bus terminal” (Collier and Sater 2004, 382).  
223 
 
 
Table 85                  Table 86 
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-                                                                        Mesa, CONCERTACION  
Center-Left Spectrum, Party, Number and Percentage of Seats                             (Ruling Coalition) and DEMOCRACY  
Legislative Period 1990-1994                                                                                                    AND PROGRESS - 1990 
        
Right-Center-
Left Spectrum 
Party Seats Seats (%) 
 
 
Mesa 
Position Party 
R   
RN a 29 24,17 P  PPD 
UDI b 11 9,17 VP1 DC 
ILB c 8 6,67 VP2 UDI 
Subtotal RIGHT 48 40,01 CONCERTACION (Ruling Coalition) 
C   
DC 38 31,67 Party Seats Seats (%) 
ILA d 9 7,5 DC 38 31,67 
PR 5 4,17 PPD 16 13,33 
IND  1 0,83 ILA 9 7,5 
 
AHVerde 
e 1 0,83 PR 5 4,17 
Subtotal CENTER 54 45 AHVerde 1 0,83 
L 
PPD f 16 13,33 Total 69 57,5
PAIS89 g 2 1,66 DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESS  
Subtotal LEFT 18 14,99 Party Seats Seats (%) 
TOTAL 120 100 RN 29 24,17 
a. National Renewal Party (Partido Renovación Nacional) 
b. Independent Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata 
Independiente) 
c. Independents List “B” 
d. Independents List “A” 
e. AHVerde Humanist-Green Aliance (Alianza Humanista Verde) 
f. Party for Democracy (Partido por la Democracia). It can be 
better classified as a Center-left party.  
g. Broad Party of the Socialist Left (Partido Amplio de la 
Izquierda Socialista)  
UDI 11 9,17 
ILB 8 6,67 
Total 48 40,01
 
 
The ruling Concertación shared the Chamber with the Democracy and Progress 
coalition (Pacto Democracia y Progreso). This new coalition of the Right gathered the 
National Renovation -RN- (Renovación Nacional) and the Independent Democratic 
Union -UDI- (Unión Demócrata Independiente). RN was, and would be for the next 
two elections, the largest party inside the Right coalition (Table 86).   
“ILA” and “ILB” were the independents that run together with the Concertación and 
with Democracy and Progress, respectively (Table 85).  
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The Broad Party of the Socialist Left -PAIS89- (Partido Amplio de la Izquierda 
Socialista) was the party created by the harder-line Almeyda Socialists together with 
the PC, and the Christian left (Scully 1992, 196). The PC did not obtain congressional 
representation from 1989 to 2002.  
 
5.10  Legislative Periods 1994-1998_1998-2002 
 
After four years of reinforcement of democratic consensus enhanced by 
economic success, the second-time concurrent presidential-legislative elections again 
gave the victory to the Concertación.  
Table 87                    Table 88 
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-                                                                           Mesa, CONCERTACION (Ruling        
Center-Left Spectrum, Party, Number and                                                                           Coalition) and UNION OF THE 
Percentaje of Seats                                       PROGRESS FOR CHILE - 1994  
Legislative Period 1994-1998      
      
Right-
Center-Left 
Spectrum 
Party Seats Seats (%) 
 
Mesa 
Position Party 
R   
RN 29 24,17 P  PPD 
UDI 15 12,5 VP1 DC 
ILB 4 3,33 VP2 RN 
UCCP a 2 1,67 CONCERTACION (Ruling Coalition) 
Subtotal RIGHT 50 41,67 Party Seats Seats (%) 
C   
DC 37 30,82 DC 37 30,82 
PR 2 1,67 PS 15 12,5 
ILD b 1 0,83 PPD 15 12,5 
Subtotal CENTER 40 33,32 PR 2 1,67 
L 
PPD 15 12,5 ILD 1 0,83 
PS 15 12,5 Total 70 58,32
Subtotal LEFT 30 25 UNION FOR THE PROGRESS OF CHILE 
TOTAL 120 100 Party Seats Seats (%) 
a. Center-Center Union (Unión de Centro Centro 
Progresista) 
b.Independents List “D”   
RN 29 24,17 
UDI 15 12,5 
 ILB 4 3,33 
 UCCP 2 1,67 
 Total 50 41,67
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The Center-left coalition secured one more time the majority in Chamber. The PS, as an 
autonomous party, was part of it in 1994 (Table 88). 156  
The rightist coalition Union for the Progress of Chile (Unión por el Progreso de Chile) 
had a third associate, the Center-Center Union Party -UCCP- (Unión de Centro 
Centro Progresista), a small right-wing party led by Francisco Javier Errázuriz (Table 
88).  
 
Both coalitions held firm for the 1997 congressional elections. The new partner of the 
Concertación was then the Social Democrat Party -PRSD94- (Partido Radical Social 
Demócrata) (the merger of the PR with the Social Democrats in August 1994) (Tables 
89 and 90).  
The label chosen by the RN and the UDI for their coalition this time was Union for Chile 
(Unión por Chile). The union included the Party of the South -PSur- (Partido del Sur), 
a rightist party limited to the 8th, 9th, and 10th regions (Table 90).  
 
During these last three legislative periods the seats secured by each party remained 
relatively stable, the exception being the parties of the Right. While the UDI 
progressively increased its representation from 11 to 17 deputies from 1990 to 1998, the 
RN lost 6 seats in the 1998 elections (Tables 85, 87, and 89), though it remaind the main 
party of the Right.   
                                                            
156 As noted, during President Aylwin’s administration the PS was reinstated. Therefore, many Socialists that 
had used the PPD as an “instrumental party” in the 1989 elections opted to go back to the PS. 
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Table 89                    Table 90 
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-                                                                          Mesa, CONCERTACION  
Center-Left Spectrum,Party, Number and Percentage of Seats                                (Ruling Coalition) and UNION FOR 
Legislative Period 1998-2002                                                                                                      CHILE - 1998 
  
      
Right-Center-Left 
Spectrum 
Party Seats Seats (%) 
 
Mesa 
Position Party 
R   
RN 23 19,17 P  DC 
UDI 17 14,17 VP1 PPD 
ILB 6 5 VP2 PS 
UCCP 2 1,67 CONCERTACION (Ruling Coalition) 
PSur a 1 0,83 Party Seats Seats (%) 
Subtotal RIGHT 49 40,84 DC 38 31,67 
C   
DC 38 31,67 PPD 16 13,33 
PRSD94 
b 4 3,33 PS 11 9,16 
IND 2 1,67 PRSD94 4 3,33 
Subtotal CENTER 44 36,67 Total 69 57,49
L 
PPD 16 13,33 UNION FOR CHILE 
PS 11 9,16 Party Seats Seats (%) 
Subtotal LEFT 27 22,49 RN 23 19,17 
TOTAL 120 100 UDI 17 14,17 
a. Party of the South (Partido del Sur)  
b. Radical Social Democrat Party (Partido 
Radical Social Demócrata)  
ILB 6 5 
PSur 1 0,83 
Total 47 39,17
 
 
It is interesting to note that despite its clear majority, and in contrast to all precedent 
periods, the Concertación ruling coalition had from 1990 to 1998 a VP2 from the 
opposition in the Mesas (Tables 86 and 88). This decision, abruptly abandoned in 1998, 
was adopted during a period of “participative changes,” as we will see in the following 
chapter.  
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Politics of accommodation, creation and break up of alliances, splits, mergers 
and reunifications, the progressive decline of traditional parties and the late emergence 
of stable and cohesive political blocs, successive governments that cover all the 
ideological spectrum and even a dictatorship that failed to change the essence of the 
multiparty Chilean political system. The analysis of the institutional development of the 
Chilean lower Chamber is immersed in this context. This is a Chamber whose main 
institutional features are the result of the combination of a progressive democratic 
constitution of the 1920s and three fundamental legal instruments of the dictatorship: 
the constitution of 1980, the binominal electoral system, and the law of the National 
Congress. This is a Latin American lower Chamber that except for the years of military 
government has always functioned effectively according to constitutional rules. This is 
also a Chamber of majority coalitions in which Center parties have an essential role, and 
where dominant parties are as atypical as pluralities. The two unique cases, one of a 
single-party majority, the other of a single-party plurality, relate, of course, with a 
Center party, or, I may say, with the Center party of the Christian Democrats. Beyond 
this uncommon feature, nothing extreme can be said about Chilean ruling coalitions 
since their membership was always in the range of 50% and 58% of the seats. 
Regarding this range, 1961 marks the emergence of exceptional majorities, a tendency 
that continued until the 2000s. Contrasting with the restless change of coalitions and of 
the distribution of parties in the Right-Center-Left spectrum until the 1970s, after the 
return to democracy the Chamber was ruled by three successive exceptional majorities 
that belonged to the same coalition. The stability, consistency, and duration of these 
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ruling coalitions (and of those of the opposition) are a rara avis in the Chilean political 
history, and were all but the expected results after seventeen years of dictatorship.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
Reconstructing Patterns of Institutional Development  
Chilean Chamber of Deputies 
1945-2002 
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The general context portrayed in the last chapter gives the necessary descriptive 
tools that enable the analysis of the patterns of the Chamber’s institutional 
development. Now is the time to reconstruct these patterns, and find out if they 
support or contradict the predictions of the Cartel Theory. To reconstruct these 
patterns I specify when, by whom, how, and why rules and norms concerning the 
reforms to the Reglamento (Part I), the directing board system or Chilean Mesa (Part II), 
and the standing committee system (Part III) were modified or maintained. 
Throughout the study special attention is paid to the role played by ruling coalitions, 
the electoral system in force, and the ruling-coalition type in the Chamber at the time 
of the reform or maintenance of these organizational rules and norms. As it was for the 
Argentine case, the analysis is oriented by the expectations that come from the 
general hypothesis: when a legislative coalition becomes the ruling coalition in the 
Chamber, it will function as a procedural cartel, that is, it will usurp the rule-making power 
of the Chamber to its favor. Part IV presents the conclusion. I summarize the patterns 
found, and offer an initial evaluation of the merits and limits of the Cartel Theory 
regarding the Chilean case.     
The Chilean lower Chamber has been ruled by nine coalitions and only in two occasions 
by a single party (1965-1969; 1969-1973), as we saw in chapter V. For this reason, I will 
use throughout this chapter the terms “ruling coalitions” when referring to the parties 
(coalitions or single parties) that were in charge of the Chamber. The distinction 
between “ruling coalitions” and “ruling party” will be made in the tables. The terms 
“ruling party” will be used in the particular sections devoted to analyze patterns of 
development related to the legislative periods 1965-1969 and 1969-1973.  
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Part I. Reforms to the Reglamento  
 
In this part I study the four main general reforms to the Reglamento of the 
Chilean Chamber of 1967, 1969, 1990, and 1994, and one precise amendment that took 
place in 1953. Changes to the directing board system or Chilean Mesa, and to the 
standing committee system are dealt with later in this chapter. The predictions to be 
tested are: 1- Reforms to the Reglamento proposed by ruling coalitions are adopted on 
straight party-line vote; 2- The changes that are approved are those that suppress 
dispositions detrimental to ruling coalitions and/or accrue their advantages.  
To help understand the analysis it is important to keep in mind that: a) reforms to the 
Reglamento require a report of the standing Committee on Rules and House 
Administration before being considered on the floor; b) to refer to this committee I use 
the acronym “R&HA”; c) to designate the directing board of the Chamber -composed 
of the President and two Vice-Presidents- I use the Chilean term “Mesa”; d) Mesa 
members are part of the Committee on R&HA in their own right, and the President of 
the Chamber is its Chair; e) according to a Chilean legislative tradition, “technical 
committees” refer to all standing committees except the Hacienda Committee; f) 
reproducing the structure of chapter IV, the analysis of each reform begins with a brief 
description of the political situation in the Chamber as well as the proponents and their 
goals, follows with an account of the main amendments, and ends with a verdict about 
how well the Cartel Theory fares in this case.  
Changes in the standing committee system mentioned in this and next sections can be 
seen in APPENDIX H. 
232 
 
 
Section 1.  The 1953 Reform: “No More Dumb Deputies in this Honourable 
Chamber” 157  
This amendment, whose goal was to facilitate the creation of delegations to 
minor parties, was tabled two times (in June 1949 by Falangists and Agrarians, and in 
June 1951 by Falangists, Socialists, and Agrarians), and finally approved in June 
1953. In 1949 or 1951 this revision had no chance to pass. The minor groups that had 
tabled it were part of a fragmented opposition. The situation changed in 1953 when 
the Chamber was full of fragmented Ibañistas parties that had backed the candidacy of 
President Ibánez del Campo (IND). 
In the Chilean Chamber every deputy should belong to a delegation. Until 1953, parties 
with less than 12 deputies had to either gather and form an Independent delegation or 
enter in one of the delegations of the main parties. In the chambers of 1949 and 1953 
Independent delegations were not only overcrowded but also composed of ideologically 
different parties.158 These mega caucuses were difficult to represent (their leaders 
belonged to one of the multiple parties that composed them) and, despite their 
number and diversity, they only had a unique time allotted to make speeches on the 
floor. The reform authorized parties with less than 12 deputies to merge with other(s) 
minor parties until reaching the number of 12.  
This reform was not introduced by members of the ruling coalition in 1953 (CONS-
FENAFUI-MONAP53-PL-PR). Furthermore, Conservatives, Liberals, and Radicals did 
not benefit because each party had enough deputies to form its own delegations. 
                                                            
157 Deputy Galvarino Rivera (PLab53), Journal 02.06.53, p. 85. 
158 In 1949 there were 15 parties in Chamber, 11 of them with less than 12 deputies. In 1953 there were 19 parties 
in Chamber, 13 of them with less than 12 deputies (see Tables 71 and 73 in chapter V).  
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Nonetheless, it received their approval. The reason is that it benefited the 10 
fragmented Ibañistas parties, 5 of which were part of the group of parties that had 
nominated the President of the Chamber (FENAFUI). This means that the ruling 
coalition was “functioning” and that this time, in contrast to what happened in 1949, 
the reform was approved because it suppressed dispositions detrimental to one of its 
partners.  
Section 2.  The 1967 Reform: “Proportionality for All Parties and Equality 
for All Committees (Except for Hacienda)”  
As explained in the last chapter, the Chamber was ruled by a single-party 
majority only once (1965-1969 / Christian Democrat Party -DC-). The general 
amendment that took place in this period was tabled by the DC President of the 
Chamber, but the final report of the Committee on R&HA included many other changes 
proposed by other deputies. Its main goals aimed at limiting discretional committee 
assignments, expediting work in committees, reorganizing the time-allotting on 
the floor, and improving the congressional oversight of the Executive Power.  
The most significant changes introduced in the committee system were the creation 
and renaming of standing committees, a new procedure to assign committee 
seats, the prohibition of multiple assignments, and the limits set to the Hacienda 
Committee’s powers.159  
Regarding committee seats, the reform introduced a coefficient to make committee 
assignments, and established that a deputy may not serve simultaneously as a 
                                                            
159 One standing committee was created and six committees were renamed to match the ministries of the 
Executive Power. 
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member of more than two standing committees, unless explicit authorization of the 
Chamber. 160 
The delimitation of the jurisdiction of the Hacienda Committee tried to solve an old 
problem. This committee has always been the most influential and powerful institution 
of the committee system. In addition to its jurisdictional subject-matters (bills 
concerning public expenditures), the Hacienda Committee is referred bills reported by 
the rest of the committees (the “technical committees”) if they affect the federal 
budget, and the financial situation of the state and its corporations. This referral, 
known as the “financing analysis,” has troubled technical committees because 
Hacienda tends to exceed its jurisdiction reporting on (or vetoing) the whole bill or rules 
whose study belongs to the former. Chilean deputies called this extended (and 
controversial) analysis the “revision or control power” of Hacienda.  
To end this dispute the 1967 reform introduced: a) a detailed description of Hacienda’s 
jurisdiction; b) an explicit prohibition by which it could not analyze other parts of the 
bills not related to the “financing analysis”, and c) a mandate to technical committees 
directing that they should make an itemized list of the rules Hacienda must analyze 
before sending bills to the “financing analysis.” The reform, however, allowed referrals 
to Hacienda when “for whatever reason” technical committees did not report on their 
bills. During the debate deputies claimed to end with the “tutorial or control” role 
assumed by Hacienda, and demanded respect for the jurisdictions of the rest of the 
                                                            
160 For a detailed explanation of committee assignments and of this coefficient go to section 11.1 in this chapter.  
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committees. 161 Liberals, some Christian Democrats, and the Chair of Hacienda 
expressed their rejection to the reform but accepted it because their representatives in 
the Committee on R&HA had “given their word” to this change.  
Besides these significant changes, the opinion of the minority was introduced in 
committee reports (just the opinion, not “minority reports”), and the Chamber was 
allowed to fix deadlines to committees in order to report. As to the floor procedure, 
the new coefficient to allocate committee seats was also applied to allot time for 
debates. In addition, a minimum of 15 minutes was established for all delegations for 
the Incidentes.162 
Overall, this reform fixed objective rules to avoid discretional decisions. In this 
sense, it was a response to years of discussions and demands of fair play regarding 
committee assignments, the allotting of time on the floor, and the powers of the 
Hacienda Committee. To assess these changes in terms of the Cartel Theory it is 
necessary to distinguish between immediate and long-term effects. The direct and 
great gain of the ruling party was the reorganization of the time-allotting on the floor: 
the DC, with 72 deputies in 1967, passed from 30 to 88 minutes in the Incidentes. To 
secure this gain, it guaranteed a minimum of 15 minutes to delegations with less than 
12 deputies. The losers were the medium-size delegations of the opposition (Radicals 
with 19 deputies, Communists with 18 deputies, and Socialists with 17 deputies). These 
                                                            
161 Report of the Committee on R&HA, Journal 12.07.67, p. 1039. José O. Millas Correa (PC), Journal 20.07.67, p. 
1493.  
162 The period of “Incidentes” in the Chilean lower Chamber is similar to the “The Hour” in Argentina. 
Opposition deputies use this term to express their views about current events, justify their position in certain 
issues, and exercise the congressional oversight of the executive branch. 
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delegations, which had until 1967 a minimum of 30 minutes, lost an average of 9 
minutes per session. The power to fix deadlines to committees in order to report is 
another substantial gain of the ruling party because with a simple majority -a quick 
vote- it can expedite the analysis of bills of its interest. The suppression of multiple 
assignments is, by contrast, a loss for the majority party because it limits its negotiation 
power.     
As to Hacienda, beyond the introduction of bureaucratic measures, the immediate and 
chief effects were its new subsidiary role (from then on it would be referred bills that 
“for whatever reason” were not reported by technical committees), and the 
suppression of its control role (the financial analysis could not be extended to the whole 
bill). The new subsidiary role implied a gain to the ruling party because Hacienda was 
then over its control. As we will see in section 10, Hacienda will be always jealously 
defended by its members (no matter the party they belong to), and by ruling coalitions 
because of its jurisdiction. Hence, the Hacienda “problem” could be defined as a 
“Hacienda & ruling coalitions vs. technical committees’ affair.” For the same reasons, 
the suppression of its control role was an important loss for the majority party.  
Finally, the adoption of a coefficient to allocate committee seats had no direct impact 
because assignments had been already done at the beginning of the period. Therefore, 
its effects can only be appreciated in the following legislative periods. Nevertheless, by 
this reform the majority party renounced to “interpret” the proportionality rule, a 
discretional procedure that had enabled previous majority coalitions to have over-
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representation in the committee system.163  In a nutshell, by fixing “objective rules” the 
majority party gained more control of floor proceedings but lost important advantages. 
For these reasons the Cartel Theory is disconfirmed.   
Section 3. The 1969 Reform: “The Technical Amendment”  
This revision, proposed by three Christian Democrat deputies and reported by the 
unanimous consent of the Committee on R&HA, was presented and approved in less 
than one month. Its analysis took place right after the congressional elections of 1969 
in which the DC lost its majority, and before the renewal of the Chamber that would be 
controlled by a DC single-party plurality.  
The goal of this amendment was to address the errors and lacunas that had been 
detected since the approval of the 1967 reform, particularly regarding the legislative 
procedure inside committees. This was a “technical”, “apolitical” proposal “prepared 
with affection by experienced functionaries of the Chamber” that contained only 
“minima and essential” changes. 164  
Despite its “technical” character and overwhelming consensus, the Communists 
expressed their disagreement with this reform arguing that it was the wrong time to do 
it since “the next composition of the Chamber will be completely different from the 
actual membership.”165  
This general amendment introduced, among other changes, a title of 98 rules that 
adapted the procedure in force for the floor to the functioning of standing committees. 
                                                            
163 See section 11.1.  
164 Report of the Committee on R&HA, Journal 22.04.69, pp. 3155/65. 
165 Juan Acevedo Pávez (PC), Journal 22.04.69, p. 3167. 
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In particular, it suppressed the 1967 prohibition of multiple assignments, it ordered that 
Chairs of technical committees should be in charge of drafting the itemized list of rules 
Hacienda should study in the “financing analysis”, and enlarged the jurisdiction of the 
newly created (1968) Committee on Latin American Integration.166  
The “technical” tone of the debate changed completely when deputies discussed the 
reform to the functions of the Hacienda Committee. While the report of the Committee 
on R&HA proposed that Hacienda could analyze other aspects of a bill not related to 
the “financing analysis” if the committee agreed to proceed this way -this meaning the 
majority of the deputies present in the committee-, the President of the Chamber 
(Héctor Valenzuela Valderrama -DC-) and Patricio Phillips Peñafiel (Liberal) proposed 
that the committee could do so if only one of its members asked it. After a bitter 
exchange of opinions the Chamber approved the Committee on R&HA’s report. 167 
This “technical” reform had two important political gains for the ruling party. 
For one part, the President recovered the prerogative to make multiple assignments, 
an important legislative tool of negotiation. For the other part, the ruling party in 
Hacienda got back its “control” function. Note that when deputies approved the 
unanimous Committee of R&HA’s report they authorized Hacienda to analyze bills 
entirely if the majority of its (present) members decided so, skipping in this way the 
explicit prohibition established in 1967. In other words, Hacienda regained its revisory 
function. And when the powers of Hacienda increase, the power of the ruling party that 
controls it increases as well. And when that happens, the Cartel Theory is supported.   
                                                            
166 This revision also introduced changes to the rules related to censure motions against the Mesa (see section 
9). 
167 See section 10.3.  
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Section 4.  The 1990 Reform: “The Participative Reglamento”  
After the 1989 congressional elections that marked the end of the dictatorship, a 
multiparty group began the analysis of a new Reglamento for the Chamber.168 The 
result of five months of study was a real code (the new Reglamento has a preliminary 
title, four books, and 12 titles) that produced more that one hundred changes. The 
goals were oriented to update legislative rules to the political and social Chilean 
landscape of the 1990s, and to adapt them to the Constitution of 1980 and to the 
“Constitutional Law of the National Congress” adopted by the dictatorship. 169 The 
document of the multiparty group was reported in June by the Committee on H&RA 
which was made up of 8 deputies of the Concertación (the then ruling majority 
coalition), and 5 deputies of the Right. The new Reglamento was approved in July 1990.  
As an experienced DC deputy argued, until 1973 «only the President ruled and 
administrated the Chamber.”170 This long-lasting monopoly ended with the regulation 
of the functions of the Mesa and of the Committee on R&HA. With respect to the Mesa, 
the reform put in charge of it important decisions, namely the daily agenda-setting and 
committee-assignment functions, previously in the hands of its President. Likely, the 
administration, budgeting, and the human resources management, all presidential 
responsibilities shared with the Committee on R&HA, were definitely transferred to the 
latter. Nevertheless, new prerogatives were accorded to the President of the Chamber 
                                                            
168 The multiparty group was composed of 15 elected deputies: 8 from the Right (6 RN and 2 UDI), 6 from the 
Center-left (4 DC and 2 PR), and 1 independent. 
169 The Law no. 18.918, called the “Ley Orgánica Constitucional del Congreso Nacional,” was adopted by 
Pinochet’s administration on February 5, 1990, one month before the inaguration of President Patricio Aylwin 
Azócar (DC). It was reformed in 1991, 1994, 1999, and 2001 due its evident legal lacunas, and also to the limits 
and prohibitions it established to the Legislative Power.    
170 Baldemar Carrasco Muñoz (DC), Journal 06.06.90, p. 468. The 1990-1994 was his third term in the Chamber.  
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by the Constitutional Law of the National Congress: the rejection of bills and 
amendments. In the first case, the bill dies before referral. In the second case, the 
amendment is suppressed and not considered on the floor or in committee (this 
prerogative was also accorded to committee Chairs). 
This revision reduced the minimum size of delegations from 12 to 9 deputies (note that 
the Chamber had 120 deputies instead of 150), adding that each party could form one 
delegation per 9 deputies they had in the Chamber. In other words, from 1990 on there 
are parties with more that one delegation. Besides, the reform introduced the position 
of “Delegation Leader” and its functions. This leader represents the delegation in the 
also new “Leaders Delegation’s Meeting” chaired by the President of the Chamber, 
whose decisions are adopted by a weighted voting system.171 A decision adopted by the 
unanimous consent of these leaders is mandatory for the Chamber.   
The new Reglamento fixed a strict proportionality for the Incidentes and suppressed the 
minimum of 15 minutes established in 1967 (a motion raised by a PPD deputy to fix a 
minimum of 8 minutes for minor delegations was rejected). The use of these terms was 
organized on the basis of a rotation system (following a proposition of PPD and 
Socialist deputies).172 Also related to the procedure, the reform introduced a third type 
of voting: the abstention. This change, deputy Juan A. Coloma Correa (UDI) argued, 
would allow the expression of a “perfectly legitimate position.” 173      
                                                            
171 As mentioned in chapter IV by this system every delegation leader possesses a number of votes equal to the 
size of her delegation in the Chamber. 
172 By this system all delegations would be assigned the first term during the legislative period, according the 
first term of the rotation to the majority or first plurality party. 
173 Journal 06.06.90, p. 17. 
241 
 
 
Regarding the staff of the Chamber, this reform broke with a long tradition related to 
the election of the highest officials of the Chamber. Until 1973 only the Secretary 
General was elected (and could be removed) by the Chamber. From then on the 
Chamber would also elect (and remove) the Pro-Secretary and the Secretary-Chief of 
Committees.  
Concerning the committee system, this amendment ratified a decision adopted by the 
Chamber in March 1990 by which two new standing committees were created and six 
were renamed.  
During the debate the National Renewal Party (RN-Right) supported the reform but 
insisted on a proposal that had been rejected by the multiparty group, by the 
Committee on R&HA’s report, and that would be rejected on the floor. The proposition 
was to apply the proportionality rule to the election of committee Chairs. Members of 
the majority coalition replied that these positions would be elected as they had always 
been elected: according to political agreements. 174 Besides, RN deputies (and some DC 
members) criticized the lack of definition of committee jurisdictions, giving as an 
example the problems caused by the creation of the Committee on Human Rights, 
whose functions had began to interfere with those of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs.  
The willingness to encourage participation, collective decisions, to democratize, 
and decentralize the political and administrative control of the Chamber is evident in 
this reform. Clear signs were given since its inception, with the creation of the 
                                                            
174 Report of the Committee on R&HA, Journal 26.06.90, pp. 922/37. 
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multiparty group in charge of its drafting, and continued with the transfer of functions 
from the President to the Mesa and the Committee on R&HA, the creation of a 
“Leaders Delegation’s Meeting”, the introduction of “abstentions”, and the rotation 
system for the Incidentes.  
Nevertheless, these amendments, expected to have groundbreaking effects, did not 
lessen the power of the ruling coalition.  
First, the President of the Chamber chairs the Mesa and the Committee on R&HA, two 
institutions whose membership is monopolized (Mesa) or over-represented 
(Committee on R&HA) by the ruling coalition.175 In other words, functions were 
transferred from the exclusive sphere of the President to collective spheres controlled by 
the ruling coalition.  
Second, the new “Leaders Delegation’s Meeting” is also chaired by the President of the 
Chamber and, equally important, its decisions are adopted by a weighted voting 
system. Hence, this is another institution controlled by the ruling coalition.176  
Third, the Congressional de facto law accorded to the President of the Chamber a 
legislative prerogative by far more influential than the daily agenda-setting handed 
over to the Mesa: the rejection of bills and amendments.  
Fourth, the election of the highest officials of the Chamber by the majority of deputies 
reinforces the control of the legislative procedure by the majority coalition.177  
                                                            
175 See Parts II and III.  
176 Among other legislative priorities the Leaders Delegation’s Meeting decides together with the Mesa which 
bills are subject to "immediate treatment" since 1994.  
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Beyond these changes, the reduction of the minimum size of delegations seems to 
obey more to the new membership of the Chamber (120 deputies), than to favor minor 
parties. In fact, the new Reglamento suppressed the minimum terms for the Incidentes 
even though minor parties that were part of the Concertación ruling coalition insisted 
on their regulation. Finally, note that the willingness to democratize and decentralize 
the political control of the Chamber was not strong enough to alter the political 
character of the assignments of committee Chairs.   
To recapitulate, the transfer of functions from the President to the Mesa and the 
Committee on R&HA maintained the ruling coalition’s advantages in its sphere of 
influence. The new prerogatives of the President, the weighted voting system adopted 
by the new “Leaders Delegation’s Meeting”, and the election of the highest officials by 
the Chamber are effective and significant gains of the ruling coalition.  
The rejection of the persistent attempt of the opposition to change the election of 
committee Chairs is an interesting new situation to evaluate. It implies neither new 
prerogatives for ruling coalitions nor the maintenance of the status quo. The first 
conclusion (no new prerogatives) is obvious, but the second may be not so evident. 
Though rules haven’t been changed (the method to elect committee Chairs remains 
the same), the majority coalition has shown its strength by rejecting the intent of the 
opposition to change the rules. How did the majority reject the bill? By voting against 
it. This is a simple but not a self-evident explanation. The consensus to vote for or 
against a bill must not be taken for granted, specially in the case of coalitions. On the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
177 It is necessary to mention that in the Chilean lower Chamber these positions are filled with experienced 
functionaries with long legislative careers. 
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floor there is not a weighted voting system by which delegation leaders possess a 
number of votes equal to the size of her delegation in the Chamber. On the floor each 
vote counts. As Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2) explain, “[j]ust like members of other 
cartels, members of majority parties face continual incentives to “cheat” on the deals 
that have been struck. These incentives to cheat threaten both the existence of the 
cartel and the efficient operation of the relevant “market” (…) the structure that the 
majority party imposes on the House can be viewed as resolving or ameliorating 
members’ incentives to cheat, thereby facilitating mutual beneficial trade.”  In other 
words, each time ruling coalitions are challenged, the “structure they impose on the 
Chamber” is tested. A cohesive vote of a ruling coalition implies that this “structure” is 
working. When ruling coalitions show their strength by voting against bills that aim at 
suppressing their advantages their power is ratified and, consequently, the Cartel 
Theory is supported.       
   Section 5.         The 1994 Reform: The Old Reglamento Was Not so Bad, Was It?  
The analysis of this general revision began in 1991, almost a year after the 1990 
reform. The Committee on R&HA received more than 300 amendments, 220 of which 
were accepted. The final report, adopted by unanimous consent, was presented to the 
Chamber in May 1993. The amendment was approved in May 1994 (after the 
Chamber’s 1994 renewal). A majority coalition of the Concertación was for the second 
time in charge of the Chamber.  
The main goals of this last mega reform were to speed up debates and simplify the 
legislative procedure, regulate a transparent and accountable management of 
245 
 
 
legislative funds, encourage the public diffusion of legislative activities, and improve 
the congressional oversight of the executive branch.  
Concerning the legislative procedure, the most significant change was the new method 
to fix the quorum to “Chamber Agreements.” 178 The introduction of abstentions in 
1990, Juan A. Coloma Correa (UDI) explained, produced an unexpected outcome: in 
many occasions even though affirmative votes (e.g., 25 affirmative votes) were more 
than negative votes (e.g., 15 negative votes), the addition of the latter to the 
abstentions (e.g., 22 abstentions) exceeded the affirmative votes (37 votes), producing 
lack of agreement. This way of considering abstentions, however, was not always 
applied. In other occasions the Chamber had decided to count abstentions as 
affirmative votes, considering in this way the motion “approved.” The fact is, deputy 
Coloma Correa stated, that “in innumerable occasions there have been a clear majority 
to approve an issue, but we have stumbled on [this] obstacle.” 179 The measure adopted 
to solve the “unexpected outcome” was twofold. First, the Chamber would vote again 
and deputies who had abstained would be asked to vote in the affirmative or in the 
negative. Second, if the same result persisted, abstentions would be counted as 
affirmative votes.  
Other than the “abstention” issue, the revision reduced the terms allotted to speak in 
committees, on the floor, and during the period of Incidentes; limited “interruptions” to 
two minutes, and gave deputies the possibility of introducing in the Journal of Sessions 
                                                            
178 Among other decisions, a “Chamber Agreement” should be met to create special committees, make public 
secret documents, approve committee assignments proposed by the Mesa, fix deadlines to committees’ 
reports, and authorize deputies to travel outside the country. 
179 Report of the Committee on R&HA, Journal 10.05.94, p. 1582. 
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written speeches and commemorations. 180 As a measure of transparency, results of the 
electronic voting began to be entered on the Journal (i.e., the names of deputies 
recorded as voting in the affirmative, in the negative, and the abstentions).   
With respect to the committee system, the reform empowered standing committees to 
create subcommittees (to which they could delegate all or any of their functions except 
the power to report directly to the Chamber), created two standing committees, and 
renamed two committees.  
The Mesa gained and lost functions. For one part, it was assigned the preparation and 
implementation of the budget, and the adoption of all measures necessary to publicize 
the activity of the Chamber. For the other part, the agenda-setting functions that had 
been transferred from the President to the Mesa in 1990 were reassigned to the former 
because “the experience of these three years showed that it is the President of the 
Chamber who actually performs them.” 181 To put it another way, the practice showed 
what the Reglamento had established for more than one hundred years before the 1990 
reform.   
The amendment also modified the membership and functions of the Committee on 
R&HA. From then on, in addition to the Mesa members, it would be composed of 13 
delegation leaders. Pursuing transparency, the revision established that the committee 
would: a) appoint the staff of the Chamber following a Secretary General proposition, b) 
                                                            
180 The report proposed to shorten the following terms: a) Discussion in the general debate of a bill (from 30’ to 
15’), b) Discussion in the particular debate of a bill (from 10’ to 5’ each deputy), and c) Incidentes (from 3 to 1 
hour per week). Regarding the second amendment, note that during debates deputies can ask the President of 
the Chamber an “interruption” in order to make comments or observations about the subject matter on 
discussion. 
181 Report of the Committee on R&HA, Journal 10.05.94, p. 1507. 
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approve the Chamber’s budget prepared by the Mesa and the travels of deputies 
outside the country, and c) propose the Chamber the amount of official funds to be 
assigned to deputies and the membership of a committee in charge of auditing the 
implementation of the Chamber’s budget.  
Even though the DC, PPD, UDI, and PS supported the amendment two issues caused 
controversy among deputies. The first was the “motion to recommit issue” (i.e., the 
number of votes required to suspend a debate and bring back a bill to a committee, a 
powerful legislative tool for delaying a bill or introducing neglected amendments). The 
Committee on R&HA’s report suggested to increase this number from a simple 
majority to two-thirds of the deputies present on the floor, but the Concertación deputy 
José Viera-Gallo (PS) announced that they would reject this proposition. Coloma Correa 
(UDI) argued that this suggestion should be approved on behalf of transparency and 
asked Viera-Gallo to “be flexible.” Viera-Gallo replied “someone can be flexible, but not 
silly. Actually he [deputy Coloma Correa] wants the majority not to be the majority.” 182 
Finally, the Concertación proposition to reject the reform prevailed on the floor.  
... And the second controversial issue had to do with the Hacienda Committee. This 
time, the report of the Committee on R&HA sought to limit the power of Hacienda 
establishing that it could analyze other aspects of a bill not related to the “financing 
analysis” only by the unanimous consent of its members (the Reglamento in force 
required the agreement of its members). The proposal was rejected on the floor.  
                                                            
182 Journal 10.05.94, p. 1516. 
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As mentioned, this reform empowered standing committees to create subcommittees. 
In relation to Hacienda, the Committee on R&HA proposed the Mesa could order this 
committee to create subcommittees. This reform, refused by the whole committee, 
was also rejected on the floor because it “upsets Hacienda deputies,” and because 
“there are other legal means to speed its reports.” 183  
Though transparency amendments should not be underestimated, it is clear 
that some of the changes produced by this reform were oriented to correct the effects 
of the “1990 participative Reglamento.” The “abstention outcome,” an evident 
annoying surprise for the Concertación, was solved by way of interpretation; the terms 
allotted to speak were reduced; the President of the Chamber regained its agenda-
setting control, and the centralization of the administration was reinforced by the 
mandatory presence of delegation leaders in the Committee on R&HA, and by 
transferring functions of this committee to the Mesa.   
The reconsideration of certain amendments, however, was not only one aspect. The 
majority also stopped attempts to weaken two crucial powers. First, it retained the 
control of the motions to recommit. In this sense the majority coalition could continue 
either to delay or to revise bills according to its political convenience. Second, it 
preserved the influence of its majority in Hacienda in two senses. For one part, it 
rejected the unanimity to proceed with the “financing analysis” of bills. For the other 
part, it preserved the decision to create subcommittees inside Hacienda, avoiding in 
this way unexpected results of a mandatory fragmentation.      
                                                            
183 Andrés Palma Irarrazaval (DC), Journal 10.05.94, p. 1760. 
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While the centralization of functions imply a reassignment within the majority coalition 
(i.e., the coalition maintained its power), the interpretation of abstentions and the 
reduction of the terms to speak mean effective gains. The rejection of measures that 
would have suppressed important prerogatives is once more a ratification of the 
strength and cohesion of the coalition. Therefore, the Cartel Theory is supported by 
this reform.  
 
The main reforms to the Reglamento took place during the ruling of exceptional 
majorities (0.55 < s < 0.67), two of them in the late 1960s, and the other two in the early 
1990s. Through these reforms ruling coalitions gained and lost advantages, maintained 
and recovered lost functions, and retained their power. As to new advantages, the 
uniform and long terms to participate on the floor were progressively replaced by a 
proportional and more expedite system; Hacienda is allowed a subsidiary role; the 
Chamber can fix deadlines to committees to report, and has the right to elect the 
highest officials; abstentions are considered affirmative votes; the President and the 
committee Chairs got new powerful prerogatives from a de facto law, and the decisions 
of the new collective and participative “Leaders Delegation’s Meeting” are adopted by a 
weighted voting system. By contrast, when the majority ruling party introduced the 
coefficient to make committee assignments (1967), it suppressed an advantage that 
had benefited some coalitions during the 1940s and 1950s (see section 11.1).  
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Through an internal transfer and reassignment of prerogatives, ruling coalitions 
maintained the agenda-setting and committee-assignment functions, and the 
administration of the Chamber in its sphere of influence.  
Regarding the recovering of lost functions, Hacienda got back its power to revise bills, 
and the President (later the Mesa) regained the prerogative to make multiple 
assignments.  
Finally, ruling coalitions showed their strength to retain their advantages when the 
opposition tried to modify the political procedure to assign committee Chairs, the 
majority required for motions to recommit, and the powers of the Hacienda 
committee.  
The reform approved in 1953, for its part, shows how cohesive a ruling coalition can be 
in order to suppress rules detrimental to a handful of its members. This example is 
particularly important if we consider the strange membership of this coalition made up 
of Conservatives, Radicals, Liberals, and Ibañistas groups.  
Except for one amendment (the introduction of the coefficient to make committee 
assignments in 1967), the general patterns mentioned above support the predictions 
related to the behavior of procedural coalitions. If we pay attention to the chronology 
of the amendments, we will see that they do not belong to a special period. In this 
sense, the change of electoral system does not seem to affect them.  
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Part II. The Chilean Mesa  
 
The functions of the directing board of the Chamber or Chilean Mesa, and the 
rules and practices regarding its election procedure and partisan composition are 
analyzed in this part. In addition, section 9 deals with the censure motions that have 
been moved against them from 1945 to 2002, an institution that does not exist in 
Argentina.184 Except for this change, I follow the same structure as in chapter IV.  
 
Section 6 .  The Composition of the Mesas 
I present a description of the composition of the Mesas. I distinguish between 
members of the ruling coalitions and opposition, I identify the parties they belong to, 
the regions they come from, and finally I consider their experience measured by the 
number of terms they served in Chamber.   
Lower Chamber’s Mesas in Chile is an affair of ruling coalitions as the 94% of the last 
column in Table 91 shows.  Members of the Mesas belonged to the coalitions in control 
of the Chamber from 1945 to 1973 and during the 1998-2002 period. Only the Mesas of 
the first two periods after the return of democracy included a VP2 from the opposition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
184 The approval of a censure motion involves the removal of the Mesa.  
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TABLE 91 - RULING AND OPPOSITION COALITION/PARTY MEMBERS OF THE MESAS – CHILEAN 
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002 
 
Ruling-Opposition  
Coalition/Party 
Mesa Positions 
Total President VP1 VP2 
Ruling C/P 11 11 9 31 
% 100.0 100.0 81.8 93.9 
Opposition C/P 0 0 2 16 
% 0.00 0.00 18.2 6.06 
Total 11 11 11 33 
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 
The DC is the party that occupied most positions in the Mesas during the whole period 
(30%) (Table 92). It is also the only party that occupied all its positions. In second place, 
not far from the PPD and the Radicals, comes the Conservative Party with less than half 
of DC’s percentage (12%). 
TABLE 92 - MEMBERS OF THE MESAS BY PARTY - CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002 
 
Parties 
Mesa Positions 
Total 
President VP1 VP2 
DC 4 4 2 10 
% 36.36  36.36  18.18 30.30  
CONS 2 2 0 4 
% 18.18  18.18   0.0 12.12 
PPD 2 1 0 3 
% 18.18  9.09 0.00 9.09  
PR 2 0 1 3 
% 18.18        0.00 9.09 9.09  
OTHER  1 4 8            13  
% 9.09 36.36  72.72 39.39 
Total 11 11 11 33 
% 100.0 100.0          100.0 100.0  
 
From 1945 to 2002 Center parties occupied the majority of the Mesa positions. Parties 
of the Right and the Left each secured the Presidency twice (Table 93).  
The majority of the Presidents comes from the Metropolitana region (Santiago Capital 
City) which also concentrates 39% of the Mesa positions (Table 94). Distant from the 
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percentage of Santiago Capital City come the Bio Bio and the Araucanía regions. The 
latter, together with De los Ríos, Maule and Coquimbo, never reached the Presidency 
and had a modest representation in the VP1 and VP2 positions. As mentioned in 
chapter V, Chile has 15 regions, six of which are not included in Table 94 because they 
have never occupied a position in the Mesa during the period.   
 
TABLE 93 - MEMBERS OF THE MESAS BY RIGHT-CENTER-LEFT PARTIES - CHILEAN CHAMBER OF 
DEPUTIES 1945-2002 
 
Parties 
Mesa Positions 
Total 
President VP1 VP2 
RIGHT 
CONS 2 2 0 
11 
33,33 
% 18.18  18.18   0.0 
PL 0 1 2 
% 0.00   9.09 18.18 
PN66 0 1 0 
% 0.00   9.09 0.00 
RN 0 0 1 
% 0.00 0.00 9.09 
UDI 0 0 1 
% 0.00 0.00 9.09 
PIR 0 0 1 
% 0.00 0.00 9.09 
CENTER 
DC 4 4 2 
17 
51,51 
% 36.36  36.36  18.18 
PR 2 0 1 
% 18.18        0.00 9.09 
UNI53 1 0 0 
% 9.09       0.00       0.00 
PA    0 1 0 
%       0.00 9.09       0.00 
PAL    0 0 1 
%       0.00       0.00 9.09 
PD 0 0 1 
%       0.00       0.00 9.09 
LEFT 
PPD 2 1 0 
5 15,15
% 18.18  9.09 0.00 
PSP 0 1 0 
%       0.00 9.09       0.00 
PS  0 0 1 
%       0.00       0.00 9.09 
Total 11 11 11 33 
% 100.0 100.0          100.0 100.0  
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TABLE 94 - MEMBERS OF THE MESAS BY REGION – CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002 
 
Regions Directing Board Positions Total
President VP1 VP2 
Coquimbo 0 1 0 1 
% 0.00   9.09 0.00 3.03 
Valparaiso 1 1 0 2 
%   9.09   9.09 0.00 6.06 
O'Higgins 1 2 0 3 
%   9.09 18.18 0.00 9.09 
Maule 0 1 1 2 
%       0.00 9.09 9.09 6.06 
Metropolitana 6 3 4 13 
% 54,55 27,27 36,36 39.39 
Bio Bio 2 0 2 4 
% 18.18        0.00 18.18  12.12 
Araucanía 0 1 3 4 
%       0.00 9.09 27,27 12.12 
De los Ríos 0 0 1 1 
%       0.00       0.00 9.09 3.03 
De los Lagos 1 2 0 3 
%   9.09 18.18       0.00 9.09 
Total 11 11 11 33 
% 100.0 100.0         100.0 100.0 
 
 
TABLE 95 - TERMS IN CHAMBER OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MESAS - CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES  
1945-2002 
 
Terms in 
Chamber 
Mesa Positions Total 
President VP1 VP2 
1 1 0 1 2 
%   9.09 0.00   9.09 6.06  
2 3 5 5 13 
% 27.27 45.45 45.45 39.39  
3 2 3 3 8 
% 18.18  27,27 27,27 24.24 
4 3 1 2 6 
% 27,27   9.09 18.18  18.18 
5 2 1 0 3 
% 18.18    9.09 0.00 9.09  
7 0 1 0 1 
% 0.00   9.09 0.00 3.03  
Total 11 11 11 33 
% 100.0 100.0         100.0 100.0  
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As Table 95 shows, 94% of the members of the Mesa were seniors. Though 39% were 
deputies with 2 terms, seniors with 3 and more terms double the number of 
Presidencies held by two-term seniors, and occupied the same number of VP. 
Therefore, seniority in Chamber (measured by the number of terms in Chamber) is a 
variable to consider when explaining the election of the Mesa, particularly for the 
positions of President and most of all for VP1 (no VP1 was a freshman) (Table 95).  
Results shown in Table 96 corroborate the previous descriptive information. There we 
see the effect of the variables Metropolitana region, seniority, and ruling coalition on the 
probability of being elected President, VP1 and VP2.  
TABLE 96 - EFFECT OF REGION, SENIORITY, AND RULING COALITION OVER THE PROBABILITY OF 
BEING ELECTED PRESIDENT, VP1, AND VP2 - CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002 
 
  
President VP1 VP2 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Metropolitana 
Region  1.30* .61 .11 .68 .59 .63 
Seniority     .61*** .17            .61*** .16 .33 .19 
Ruling Coalition - - - - 1.31 .78 
Constant 
    -6.93*** .72        -6.44*** .63 
       -              
6.73*** .86 
R2 0.11 0.07 0.05 
N 1538   1538 1538 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001     
 
The logit regressions display positive and significant coefficients for the Metropolitana 
region and seniority in the case of Presidents, a positive and significant coefficient for 
seniority for VP1, but not significant for the Metropolitana region variable as expected 
(8/11 VP1 come from other regions). Ruling coalition is not considered for President and 
VP1 because it is a constant in these cases.  
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The good performance of seniority in Chamber is consistent with the fact that 53% of 
the deputies were seniors from 1945 to 2002 (28% with 2 terms and 15% with 3 terms). 
 We have now a general picture of the Mesas. In the Chilean lower Chamber 
directing boards were almost monopolized by ruling coalitions and senior deputies. The 
majority of their members belonged to Center parties, and came from Santiago City 
and the Southern regions of Bio Bio and Araucanía. Let’s turn to the analysis of their 
functions, rules, and practices regarding their elections, and the censure motions that 
were moved against them.  
Section 7.  Functions  
The prediction to test in this section is: The power of the members of the Mesa 
increases or is redistributed within the ruling coalition. In other words, ruling coalitions 
are expected to increase their advantages as Mesas acquire new functions, and/or are 
expected not to lose prerogatives when the functions of the Mesas are transferred to 
other institutions of the Chamber. 
 
The directing board of the Chamber, called the Mesa since 1925, is composed of a 
President and two Vice-Presidents (I refer to the latter as VPs, or VP1 and VP2). VPs 
substitute the President in case of illness or disability. The President and VPs are 
members of the Committee on R&HA in their own right since the 19th century. Despite 
the apparent image of a collective enterprise, the President is the central legislative 
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authority of the Chamber. The functions of the Mesa were for the first time regulated in 
the 1990 reform.  
In 1945, other than routine duties related to the sittings, the President had three main 
functions: agenda-setting (for public and secret sessions), the allocation of committee 
seats subject to Chamber’s approval (he also filled committee vacancies), and the 
referral of bills. In addition, the President chaired the Committee on R&HA. In 1967, the 
replacement of committee members was regulated as an administrative procedure, 
and in 1990 the agenda-setting (for public and secret sessions) and the committee-
assignment prerogatives were transferred from the President to the Mesa (the agenda-
setting for public sessions was reassigned to the President in 1994). From 1969 to 1994 
the President was designated Chair of the newly created “Leaders Delegation’s 
Meeting,” empowered to convene delegations’ meetings, and to reject bills and 
amendments.185 Regarding duties, the President must prepare the estimates of the 
Chamber and forward them to the Finance Minister (1990), and inform the citizenry 
about the activity of the Chamber every year (1997). Concerning the non-legislative 
functions, the internal budget and the administration and human resources 
management of the Chamber have always been in charge of the Committee on R&HA 
and the highest officials. In 1994, the preparation and supervision of the 
implementation of the internal budget was transferred to the Mesa, but its approval 
remained in charge of the Committee on R&HA.186  
                                                            
185 The President can convene these meetings whenever he considers them convenient and also suspend 
sittings during these meetings.  
186 From 1945 to 1973 a subcommittee of the Committee on R&HA audited the report of the implementation of 
the internal budget prepared by the Treasurer of the Chamber. Once approved in the Committee on R&HA, the 
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During these fifty-seven years the Mesa has gained functions. The head of the 
Chamber, for its part, has maintained and (re)gained functions. In addition, the Mesa 
and (its) the President were involved in a reciprocal transfer of functions, namely the 
agenda-setting, and the committee-assignments functions. This transfer implies a 
reassignment within the ruling coalition. These patterns support the prediction 
according to which the power of the members of the Mesa increases or is redistributed 
within the ruling coalition. Even though the main changes (for both the Mesa and the 
President) took place in 1990, they do not seem to be related to the type of ruling 
coalition or electoral system in force. These changes respond to an external factor (the 
de facto Congressional Law), and to the “participative” goals of the 1990 reform (e.g., 
the transfer of the agenda-setting function from the President to the Mesa). In the 
same sense, the centralization operated in the 1994 reform (the Mesa was transferred 
budgeting functions from the Committee on R&HA, and the President regained the 
agenda-setting function for public sessions) seems to be due to an assessment made by 
the Concertación of the effects of the “participative 1990 reform.” 
 Section 8.   The Election of the Mesas:  Procedure and Practice  
The analysis of the elections of the Mesas begins with a description of the 
procedure, and is followed by a study of the criteria applied to determine their partisan 
composition. The expectations in this case are: 1- The election of the members of the 
Mesa is by straight party-line votes controlled by ruling coalitions; and 2- No member of 
                                                                                                                                                                         
report was submitted to Chamber’s approval. In 1990 the subcommittee was transformed into an Auditing 
Committee appointed by the Committee on R&HA until 1994, and by the Chamber since then.  
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the opposition serves as President or VP of the Mesa. All the information about the 
election of the Mesas can be seen in APPENDIX I.   
The Mesa is elected for four-year terms at the beginning of the legislative period. An 
absolute majority of the deputies present in the Chamber is needed to elect its 
members and the vote is secret.187  
From 1945 to 2002 exactly the same procedure was applied at the beginning of each 
legislative period: the motion to elect the Mesa was moved by the provisional President 
of the Chamber, deputies voted by secret ballots, the Secretary General announced the 
number of votes each candidate had received, and the provisional President announced 
the final results. All eleven elections were made in one round.  
The extensive analysis of the 11 sessions devoted to elect the authorities of the 
Chamber from 1946 to 2002 shows that no candidate to any position of the Mesa 
different from the one proposed or supported by ruling coalitions was ever elected. This 
is the main pattern regarding the election of the authorities of the Chamber. In 
addition, two criteria were applied to determine the partisan composition of the Mesas: 
“The coalition/party in control of the Chamber takes all the positions” (1945-1973/1998-
2002) and “The President and VP1 positions belong to the majority coalition” (1990-1998). 
The first criterion implies that all positions go to the coalition or party in control of the 
Chamber, be it a majority or a plurality. It was applied from 1945 to 1973 and 
reintroduced in the legislative period 1998-2002. Except for 1957, Chamber records 
                                                            
187 The Mesa has always been elected by secret vote. Nevertheless, this mandatory type of vote was introduced 
in the 1990 reform.  
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show that the President of the Mesa was always picked from the first plurality in 
Chamber.188  An interesting election is the one of the 1969-1973 legislative period in 
which we can see (APPENDIX I) how the fragmentation inside the Chamber benefited 
the DC, the only single-party plurality in control of the Chamber from 1945 to 2002.189  
The second criterion (The President and VP1 positions belong to the majority coalition) 
was applied from 1990 to 1998. This criterion was the base of the “Political Pact for the 
Good Administration of the Chamber” between the Concertación and the ultra-right 
UDI. According to this pact, the Concertación would nominate the candidates for the 
Presidency and the VP1, and the UDI would do the same regarding the VP2 during the 
legislative period 1990-1994.190 The RN (the other rightist party), outside the pact, 
presented its own candidates. In APPENDIX I we can see how this pact worked through 
the sum of the votes in the 1990 election: the UDI (11 seats + some votes from rightist 
independent deputies) supported the Concertación (69 seats) candidates to the 
Presidency and VP1, and the latter did the same for the UDI nominee (Juan A. Coloma 
Correa) to VP2.   
The 1994-1998 period brought some changes. For one part, the administration pact 
included the RN. Therefore, the Right (RN and UDI) would nominate alternatively 
candidates for the VP2. The transfer of votes from the Concertación to the Right can be 
                                                            
188 In 1957 Conservatives had 24 seats and Liberals 30 seats. Nevertheless, the Conservative Héctor Correa 
Letelier was elected President.  
189 Besides, note that the 47 blank votes (Socialist, Radical, and Communist votes) must have been either 
counted as affirmative votes or excluded from the counting. Otherwise the DC could have never secured the 
positions of the Mesa since the majority of the deputies present is needed to elect them.    
190 This impressive agreement between the Centre-left Concertación and the ultra-right UDI, which included the 
Senate Mesa, was mentioned each time a member of the Mesa was elected from 1990 to 1994. See Journals 
26.09.91, p. 98; 15.09.92, p. 3051; 20.07.93, p. 1746; 21.07.93, p. 1943, and 18.08.93, p. 3070. 
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seen in the 1994 election for VP2.191 For the other part, a pact within the Concertación 
was implemented. According to this internal agreement the Presidency rotated PPD-
PS-DC, and the VP1 rotated DC-PS-PPD over the legislative period.192  
The pact between the Concertación and the Right broke up in January 1997 when the 
former disapproved the nomination of a UDI deputy to the VP2.193 Even though the last 
VP2 of the period was nominated by the Right, since 1998 the old criterion (the 
coalition/party in control of the Chamber takes all the positions) was re-established.194  
The first prediction -The election of the Mesa is by straight party-line votes 
controlled by ruling coalitions- is credited by the precedent analysis for the whole period 
and, consequently, for all type of majorities and pluralities, and disregarding the 
electoral system in force.  
The second prediction -No member of the opposition serves as President or VP of the 
Mesa- is valid for nine of the eleven periods. The two exceptions (1990-1994 and 1994-
1998) are neither related to a change in the electoral system, nor to the type of ruling 
coalition in Chamber. As the records of the Chamber show, a pact is at the base of 
those bipartisan Mesas in which the Concertación kept the lion’s share of the positions. 
In other words, only the votes of the Concertación enabled the opposition to get the 
                                                            
191 Though it was clear that the votes of the Concertación were enough to elect its candidates, the elected 
President expressed his surprise once he realized that the Right hadn’t voted for his candidacy after the 
counting of votes. See the speech of Jorge Schaulson Brodsky in Journal 11.03.94, p.11.    
192 The 1994-1998 administration pact was mentioned in Journals 11.03.94, p.11; 14.03.95, p. 10; 12.07.95, p. 8; 
19.03.96, p. 8; 19.11.96, p. 8, and 14.01.97, p. 10.  
193 The nomination of the UDI deputy Carlos Bombal was vetoed by the Concertación because of his 
participation in the abduction of Professor Alejandro Avalos Davidson of the Catholic University of Chile during 
the dictatorship. The Right argued that the administration pact did not include a “veto power” of the 
Concertación, that each party had the right to nominate its candidate, and that this candidate should be elected 
by the Chamber.     
194 The restoration of this criterion was made explicit in Journals 08.10.98, p. 9 and 11.03.99, p. 11.  
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VP2. This behavior, which is manifestly related with the participative and democratizing 
ambiance that reigned in the Chamber in the early 1990s, contradicts the predictions of 
the theory. Nevertheless, it is clear that the ruling coalition controlled the election of 
the Mesa since it vetoed the nomination of the Right in 1997 (the VP2 was finally 
occupied by a Concertación deputy). 
 As it happened with other short-lived participative measures adopted in 1990, the 
bipartisan Mesas last only a handful of years. Once the majority coalition decided that 
the pact was over, the traditional criterion (cartel behaviour) to elect the Mesa was 
applied again.       
Section 9.   Censure Motions 
Even though they were elected for four-year terms, only the Conservative-
Agrarian-Liberal Mesa of 1945 lasted its entire mandate, the rest of the legislative 
periods having on average three Mesas. From 1949 to 1973 this recurring rotation can 
be explained by resignations and censure motions. 195 Resignations, in particular, were 
related to coalitions’ break ups, loss of support from the delegation/s or the Chamber, 
or to “orders from the party.”196 As analyzed above, since the 1990s successive changes 
respond to political agreements, especially since 1994. In this section I deal with the 
censures moved against the Mesas. The expectation in this case is Censure motions 
moved against the Mesa are rejected. 
 
                                                            
195 The most unstable legislative period was the 1969-1973 term with five different Mesas (the Chamber was 
ruled by a DC single-party plurality).     
196 Journal 15.10.58, p. 72 and 12.12.62, p. 2859. 
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Censure or no confidence motions, which must be moved by a delegation, have been 
frequently used until 1973, and seldom since then.197 From 1945 to 2002, twenty-five 
motions were moved (Table 97).198 Twenty-two of them belong to the 1945-1973 term. 
Of these twenty-two motions, five were accepted and the rest was rejected. The three 
motions of the 1990-2002 period were rejected.   
All the rejected censure motions belong to periods in which ruling coalitions and the DC 
ruling party had the majority in Chamber. The best example of the strength of 
majorities to reject censure motions is the 1955 case: the President of the Chamber 
could not be removed even though it had been proven that he had delayed the analysis 
of a bill.199  
Successful censures, conversely, had their chance during the DC single-party plurality 
of 1969-1973, and after the LIDERS coalition broke up in 1950 (Table 97). In the last 
case, Liberals and Conservatives moved a censure against the Radical President 
because he allegedly delayed the analysis of a bill to introduce courses of religion in 
schools but, most of all, because the coalition that had elected him had disappeared. 200 
Nevertheless, note the censure motion was approved by a vote of 62 to 60 (Table 97). 
 
                                                            
197 During the period over analysis three changes were introduced to the censure motions’ procedure. Until 
1969 two deputies (one in favor and one against the motion) could speak during the debate. Besides, if the 
motion was accepted, it was not clear when the vacancy and the following election of the new Mesa took place. 
The 1969 reform allowed the participation of more deputies in the debate, declared the immediate vacancy of 
the positions and established the exact time for the election of the new Mesa. The 1990 reform established that 
delegation leaders are in charge of moving these motions.   
198 Withdrawn censure motions were not considered.  
199 The censure motion was rejected by a vote of 54 to 49 (Table 7). The debate of this censure can be found in 
Journal 11.05.55, p. 6132. The political scandal was so important that the President finally resigned seven days 
later. 
200 Journal October 1950. 
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TABLE 97 - APPROVED AND REJECTED CENSURE MOTIONS - CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES  
1945-2002 
 
Date 
Proponents of the 
Censure Motions 
(Parties)  
Mesa/Member of the Mesa 
censured (Party) 
Affirmative 
Votes 
Negative 
Votes 
Abstentions Result 
October 1950 Liberal-Conservative Radical President  62 60 -    A a 
26.12.50 b Falangist-Radical Socialist-Liberal-Democrat - 53 -   R c 
11.05.55 Renewal Action  President UNI53 (Ibañista) 49 54 - R 
14.08.57 Socialist 
Conservative-Liberal-
Ibañista 
37 56 - R 
29.04.58 Liberal-Conservative 
Radical-Agrarian-C. 
Democrat 
26 60 - R 
03.03.59 Socialist 
Radical-Democratic-
Socialist 
10 57 - R 
26.07.60 FRAP 
Radical-Democratic-
Socialist 
12 75 - R 
02.08.60 C. Democrat-FRAP 
Radical-Democratic-
Socialist 
30 74 - R 
26.10.65 
Socialist Christian Democrat 43 54 - R 
02.08.66 Radical Christian Democrat 36 57 - R 
11.10.66 Communist Christian Democrat 29 58 - R 
17.10.67 Communist Christian Democrat 31 55 - R 
27.12.67 Communist Christian Democrat 25 52 - R 
12.03.68 Radical Christian Democrat 22 51 - R 
05.11.68 Socialist Christian Democrat 15 61 - R 
03.09.69 
Communist-Radical-
Socialist 
Christian Democrat 54 51 23 A 
10.09.69 Christian Democrat MAPU-PC-PC (Left) 50 49 30 A 
05.05.70 
Radical- Christian 
Democrat 
Democratic Radicals 
(Right) 
73 27 1 A 
15.06.71 Christian Democrat Popular Unity 78 44 - A 
17.10.72 Communist Christian Democrat 37 67 - R 
25.04.73 Socialist Christian Democrat 24 61 - R 
01.08.73 Popular Unity DC-PN66-PIR (CODE) 36 70 - R 
04.12.90 National Renewal  Christian Democrat VP1 32 77 1 R 
09.09.98 RN-UDI (Right) Concertation 38 54 - R 
01.08.2001 RN-UDI (Right) Christian Democrat VP2 33 47 - R 
a. Approved. 
b. Before the vote the motion had been withdrawn.
c. Rejected.  
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Except for this case, all approved censure motions concentrate in the 1969-1973 period.  
In September 1969 Communists, Radicals, and Socialists removed a Christian 
Democrat Mesa on the grounds that it had obstructed the passage of a bill to 
nationalize the copper industry. The censure was approved by a vote of 54 to 51 with 
the helpful abstention of Liberals and Conservatives.201 This directing board was 
replaced by a leftist (MAPU-PC-PC) Mesa supported by Radical deputies.  
The day after the new Mesa was elected (10.09.69) Christian Democrats moved a 
censure motion owing to the “biased” (to the socialist project) speech gave by the new 
President after his election. They won by 1 vote. Conservatives, Liberals, and a handful 
of Radicals abstained.202 After the censure the Chamber elected a rightist Mesa made 
up of Democratic Radicals that opposed the candidacy of Allende and his socialist 
project.  
In May 1970 the Radical delegation, supported by Christian Democrats and parties of 
the Left, moved a censure against the rightist Mesa because it hadn’t convened a 
special session to consider a political affair that had a profound impact in the Chilean 
society.203 The rightist Nationals (Conservatives and Liberals) defended the Mesa, 
denounced that the censure was motivated by political interests, and criticized the 
“odious system of election and censure, censure and election by which Mesas last only 
minutes in the Chamber.”204  
                                                            
201 Journal 03.09.69, pp. 4075/81. 
202 Journal 10.09.69, pp. 4571/7. 
203 In May 1970 a DC engineer in charge of the implementation of the agrarian reform of President Frei 
Montalva was assassinated while presiding over a transfer of a fund to local peasants.    
204 Fernando Maturana (PN66), Journal 05.05.70, p. 5696. 
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In June 1971 Christian Democrats censured the leftist Mesa that had replaced the 
rightist Mesa removed in May 1970. DC deputies alleged two reasons: first, the 
Communist VP1 hadn’t respected the rules during a debate and second, the 
government of the Popular Unity was abusing its powers at all levels. The censure was 
adopted by 78 votes for and 44 against (Table 97).205  
Some days later the Chamber elected a Mesa of Christian Democrats. This Mesa would 
be safe from any censure because the alliance between them and the rightist Nationals 
against the Popular Unity was then operative.  
 
In short, the analysis shows that majority coalitions, despite their type or 
ideological composition, defend their Mesas fiercely. If they have to make a change, 
they arrange it internally by way of resignations, as a good cartel does. Pluralities, 
obviously, do not have this chance. If censure motions reach the floor it means that all 
previous negotiations have failed. Nonetheless, the Chilean case demonstrates that 
censuring a plurality is not an easy task, and that pluralities also defend their Mesas 
fiercely. The Radical Mesa of 1950 was removed by two votes, not at all a bad score for 
a recently broken coalition inside a fragmented Chamber. Christian Democrats, for 
their part, tried to regain the Mesa the day after they lost it, authoring all the censure 
motions until reaching their goal. After less than two years and three changes the 
Chamber came full circle electing again a DC Mesa.  
                                                            
205 Journal 15.06.71, pp. 151/4 (there was no roll-call vote). 
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In conclusion, the Mesa and (its) the President concentrate the most important 
legislative functions. The election and composition of the Mesas is in hands of the party 
or coalition that controls the Chamber. Only their votes can give the opposition the 
possibility to be part of the directing board. Otherwise, in order to reach the Mesa the 
opposition must wait for majority coalitions to break up, or congressional elections to 
bring a ruling plurality and then, try to censure it. But even if the opposition removes 
the ruling plurality, it must not expect to occupy the most coveted positions for a long 
time.  
The concentration of power in the Presidency and the Mesa, the uniform control 
of the election of the latter and of the censure motions, and the composition of almost 
all the Mesas of the period support the predictions of the Cartel Theory. By contrast, 
the participative bipartisan Mesas of the 1990-1998 disconfirm it. In the following 
section I analyze if this pre-eminence of the party or coalition that controls the 
Chamber applies to the structuring of the committee system.        
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Part III. Structuring the Committee System 
In this part I look for ties between ruling coalitions and the organization of the 
standing committee system. I try to find out if the Chilean committee system follows a 
routine and nondiscretionary procedure to allocate committee seats, or, by contrast, if 
committees are agents of the ruling party (Cox and McCubbins 1993). I begin with the 
evolution of the Chamber’s standing committee system (section 10), then I proceed 
with a systematic analysis of the process of committee assignments (section 11), and 
finally I offer my conclusion.   
 
Section 10.   The Evolution of the Standing Committee System  
 
In this section I describe the development of the standing committee system, and 
analyze if this process can be explained as an instrument of partisan control. Two 
“instruments of control” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 254) are examined: the creation of 
standing committees, and changes in committees’ memberships and leadership 
positions.   
10.1  The Creation of Standing Committees  
I consider the following expectations based on the assumption that ruling 
coalitions control the committee system: 1- The increase in the number of committees is 
not due to the need for matching the structure of ministries or for generating greater 
expertise but an answer to requests from members of ruling and opposition parties or 
coalitions to occupy a place in the committee system; 2- Ruling coalitions control this 
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process and get the majority of Chairs of the new committees. The description of the 
changes in the committee system can be followed in APPENDIX H. 
In the Chilean Chamber the development of the committee system followed one 
objective: to adapt the system to the political, economic, and social main issues of each 
period. This goal was reached in three ways: creating standing committees, 
transforming special into standing committees, and renaming pre-existent committees 
either to include new responsibilities or to match the ministries of the Executive.     
From 1945 to 2002 twenty-three committees were renamed and the number of 
standing committees increased from 13 to 19, while the number of deputies increased 
from 147 (1945) to 150 (1969) and then decreased to 120 (1990). During the whole 
period ruling coalitions kept for themselves the Chairs of the new committees.  
Before 1973 nine committees assumed new names and two standing committees were 
created. The extension of the jurisdictions of pre-existent committees to subjects such 
as mining, transportation, social security, or sports reflects the new socio-economic 
priorities of the period. The 1967 reform renamed six committees to match the 
ministries of the Executive Power and transformed the Special Committee on Housing 
into the standing Committee on Housing and Urban Affairs to consider pressing matters 
related to urban development and the shortage of adequate housing. The Committee on 
Latin American Integration was created in 1968. It was proposed by four Christian 
270 
 
 
Democrats (the President of the Chamber among them), one Socialist, and one 
Liberal.206  
In the period 1990-2002 the committee system increased by five units, one committee 
was dissolved (the unfamiliar Committee on Latin American Integration), and fourteen 
changed their names. In March 20, 1990, the second session after the return to 
democracy, deputies approved the creation of the standing committees on Natural 
Resources and on Human Rights, and also decided to rename six committees. This 
motion was proposed by the PPD President of the Chamber and immediately approved 
on the floor. Later, during the 1990 reform to the Reglamento’s debate, members of the 
Committee on R&HA explained that these changes aimed at modernizing the 
institutions of the Chamber to new worldwide socio-economic issues (Environment - 
Telecommunications - Social Development), and to pressing concerns of the Chilean 
society after the dictatorship (Human Rights). The 1994 reform renamed two 
committees, and created two standing committees: on Family and on Science and 
Technology. While the creation of the latter received great support, the Committee on 
Family was not welcomed by all deputies.207 Nonetheless, there was no opposition to its 
approval. Finally, on May 17, 2001, the Chamber approved by unanimous consent the 
                                                            
206 The original jurisdiction of this committee included the Latin American Free-Trade Zone created by the 
Montevideo Treaty (1960). The 1969 reform enlarged its jurisdiction to all matters concerning the Latin 
American Parliament. During the debate some deputies, especially the Chair of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, deputy Enrique Zorrilla (DC), expressed their doubts about the convenience of creating this committee 
or subcommittee (it was obvious that quite a few deputies, including Mr. Zorrilla, did not have the slightest idea 
that this committee had been created one year ago and that it was actually functioning).  Journal 27.11.68, p. 
1280. 
207 Many scientific groups demanded the creation of the committee on Science and Technology including the 
Chilean Science Academy.  
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creation of the Committee on Fisheries, one of the most important socio-economic 
activities in Chile. The motion was signed by deputies of the PS, PPD, and the UDI. 208 
 
10.2   Committees’ Memberships and Leadership Positions 
 
In the Chilean lower Chamber each committee is made up of 13 deputies since 
1935. The only exception to this rule is the Committee on R&HA whose membership 
increased from 13 to 16 in 1990 (13 deputies + the Mesa until 1994, and 13 delegation 
leaders + the Mesa since then).  
One of the most common concerns of Chilean deputies when debating about the 
creation of committees is the need to avoid multiple assignments. Furthermore, they 
limited assignments to two committees in 1967, suppressed this limitation in 1969, and 
lately tried to find ways to lower the number of deputies in each committee. Table 98 
reveals that assignments were on average stable until 1973, and that they began to 
increase in the 1990s as a consequence of the creation of new committees and the 
decrease in the number of deputies. Even though the average increase is modest (from 
1.5 in 1945 to 1.98 in 1998), deputies’ complains about the problems caused by their 
appointments to two or three committee never ceased.       
 
 
                                                            
208 The creation of this committee had been demanded since 1990 by deputies from all political parties.  
272 
 
 
TABLE 98 - COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS THROUGH TIME – CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002 
 
Legislative 
Period 
Number of 
Committees 
Number of 
Assignments 
           Average Number of      
Assignments per Deputy 
1945-1949 13 169 1,15 
1949-1953 13 169 1,15 
1953-1957 13 169 1,15 
1957-1961 13 169 1,15 
1961-1965 13 169 1,15 
1965-1969 13 169 1,15 
1969-1973 15 195 1,3 
1973 15 194 1,29 
1990-1994 16 211 1,76 
1994-1998 18 237 1,98 
1998-2002 18 237 1,98 
Total  2088  
Average 15 190 1,4 
 
Concerning leadership positions, Chairs are the only authorities of committees since the 
19th century. As mentioned, ruling coalitions monopolized the Chairs of all new 
committees. Though the magnitude of this control will be better estimated in the next 
section, here I analyze the value of being a Chair. In other words, what parties get when 
one of its members is the head of a committee.    
Chairs last in their position the whole legislative period (four years). They have complete 
and exclusive control of the committee procedure and agenda. Their prerogatives 
include the decision to hold secret sessions and to assign meetings the specific purpose 
of discussing current events (a kind of “incident(s)” meeting), the rejection of 
amendments, and the preparation of the itemized list of rules Hacienda should study in 
the “financing analysis.” The participative reform of 1990 had transformed the exclusive 
decision of Chairs to hold secret sessions into a majority decision. As it happened with 
other measures, this amendment was suppressed in 1994.  
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The impressive power of Chairs, coupled with the jurisdiction of the Hacienda 
Committee, gives an idea of the influential position of the Chair of this committee.   
 
- An Automatic Procedure or a Political Negotiation? 209 
In view of their significance it is no surprising to find debates over committee 
Chairs’ assignments. One of the most revealing debates thereof took place in 2000, 
during the third period of the Center-Left Concertación ruling coalition.  
On April 23, 1998, one month after the renewal of the Chamber, ten RN (Right) 
deputies tabled a bill to reform the Reglamento. Its goal was to apply the 
proportionality rule to the election of the Mesa and committee Chairs. 210 The 
Committee on R&HA reported this bill in November 1999 recommending its rejection 
(voting results: 5 in the affirmative, 8 in the negative). Seven months later the report 
was rejected on the floor (voting results: 37 in the affirmative -all from rightist parties-, 
48 in the negative -all from the Concertación-). Beyond voting results, this debate is 
particularly interesting because of the exchanges between the blocs of the Right and 
Centre-left, the alternative solutions proposed by the Concertación to solve the “Mesa 
and Chairs’ problem,” and the way the rightist opposition reacted to them. In this sense, 
the opposition, with 50 deputies -in a Chamber of 120 members-, complained about the 
election of the Mesa and committee Chairs that had taken place in 1998 because all the 
positions had been assigned to the Concertación. They claimed that minorities should 
be part of the administration and government of the Chamber for the sake of 
                                                            
209 Committee on R&HA’s report, Journal 07.06.00, p. 19.   
210 Journal 23.04.98, p. 57. This was actually their second attempt. A similar amendment had been tabled in the 
1990 reform to the Reglamento (see section 4 in this chapter). 
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democracy, transparency, and a responsible exercise of the congressional oversight of 
the Executive. The Concertación deputies replied that the election of these positions 
were traditionally a political affair, and that the adoption of an automatic procedure 
(e.g., the proportionality rule) should be part of a broader “democratization plan” that 
must include the abrogation of the authoritarian enclaves inherited by the dictatorship, 
the binominal electoral system that benefited the Right, and the suppression of 
designated and for-life senators.  
Nonetheless, to solve the “Mesa and Chairs’ problem” (better defined as the requests 
from opposition parties to occupy a place in the direction of the Chamber) the Concertación 
suggested the creation of a Third Vice-Presidency of the Chamber and of Vice-Chairs in 
committees (déjà vu?). The RN deputies firmly refused this proposition. They argued 
that far from improving the administration of the Chamber, the creation of bureaucratic 
new positions would be inefficient, would cost a lot of money, and would be impossible 
to explain to the public opinion. What they wanted, and they failed to get, was an 
“equitable distribution of positions according to the representation of each party in 
Chamber.” 211 
 
In short, the evolution of the standing committee system does not fully credit the 
Cartel Theory. The goals pursued by the consensual (and modest) increase of the 
number of standing committees are the antithesis of the first prediction (the increase in 
the number of committees is not due to the need for matching the structure of ministries or 
for generating greater expertise but an answer to requests from members of the ruling and 
                                                            
211 Gustavo Alessandri Valdes (RN) and Baldo Prokurica (RN), Journal 07.06.00, pp. 19/24. 
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opposition parties or coalitions to occupy a place in the committee system). The second 
prediction (ruling coalitions control this process and get the majority of Chairs of the new 
committees), by contrast, is supported since ruling coalitions controlled the creation of 
new committees and monopolized their Chairs. This tie between ruling coalitions and 
Chairs (all of them, new and old ones) has a simple explanation: Chilean Chairs 
concentrate powerful prerogatives. This is also the rationale behind the Concertación’s 
solution (the Argentine solution) to the “Mesa and Chairs’ problem”: the creation of new 
positions, but no proportional distribution of control and power (Chairs).  
Finally, the stable memberships and leadership positions of the Chilean committee 
system contradict the predictions of the theory.212  
 
10.3  The Most Important Committees 
Despite the equality of standing committees in terms of membership and 
authorities, it may be clear by now that Hacienda is by far the most important 
committee in the Chilean lower Chamber. In this section I confirm this pre-eminence, 
and show that there are a handful of committees that are also considered important by 
Chilean deputies, though to a lesser extent if compared to Hacienda. To address this 
issue I consider the place accorded to committees by constitutional laws, Reglamentos, 
and deputies in the principal debates of the period 1945-2002. I begin, of course, with 
                                                            
212 The prediction for the enlargement of committees’ memberships was: Although the enlargement of 
committees’ memberships is meant to enhance the representation of delegations in the committee system, ruling 
parties control this process and maintain their prevalence in the distribution of committee seats. The predictions in 
the case of the of leadership positions were: 1- The increase in committee leadership positions is due to requests 
from opposition parties to occupy a place in the directing boards of committees; 2- Ruling parties control this 
process and keep the lions’ share of the new committee leadership positions.  
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Hacienda, then turn to the Committee on R&HA, and finally deal with a proposal that 
tried to stratify committees. This analysis is helpful in two ways: to grasp the 
advantages of controlling Hacienda, and to better understand the patterns of 
committee assignments that are analyzed in the next section.   
Hacienda is one of the most traditional committees in the Chamber together with 
Defence, Agriculture, Commerce, Mining, Education, and the Committee on R&HA. It is 
also the only standing committee whose jurisdiction was always defined in the 
Reglamento -technical committees are only listed-, and in the de facto Constitutional 
Law of the National Congress of 1989.213  As mentioned, in addition to its jurisdiction, 
Hacienda is referred bills reported by technical committees to carry out the “financing 
analysis” or if, for whatever reason, they did not report it (subsidiary role). Hacienda can 
analyse not only rules related to the “financing analysis,” but also the rest of the bill if its 
members believe it may relate to financing matters (the controversial role known as the 
“revision or control power”). Bills that fall into Hacienda’s jurisdiction cannot be analyzed 
on the floor without its report even with the unanimous consent of the Chamber. This 
pre-eminence was confirmed in 1989 when the Constitutional Law of the National 
Congress defined its jurisdiction, and mandated that its members would be part, in their 
own right, of the special bicameral committee in charge of analyzing the National 
Budget every year.   
Discussions about Hacienda powers, particularly its revision or control power over bills, 
have been recurrent. In my view, the most important exchange of opinions thereof took 
                                                            
213 The jurisdiction of the dissolved and almost unknown Committee on Latin American Integration was defined 
in the Reglamento from 1969 to 1973.     
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place in 1969, when the DC President of the Chamber, together with Patricio Phillips 
Peñafiel (Liberal), tried to lower the requirements to exercise the “control power.” 
Phillips Peñafiel argued that Hacienda should have the power of revision because it was 
composed of the “most competent and experienced people,” and because its work had 
prevented the approval of “legal aberrations that came from technical committees.” 214 
These comments were repudiated by Christian Democrats, Radicals, and Socialists who 
argued that the approval of this reform would imply that “only Hacienda should exist in 
the Chamber,” or accept that “the thirteen members of Hacienda are the more talented, 
the wisest and smarter deputies in the Chamber,” and that this would be “humiliating 
for the rest of the deputies.” 215 It is also interesting to note that Eduardo J. Clavel 
Amion (PR) claimed that truth must be told about the way deputies were assigned to 
Hacienda: “simply exerting political pressure.” 216  
As to the Committee on R&HA, its existence is implied in the Constitutional Law of the 
National Congress, and its jurisdiction is defined in the Reglamento only since 1990.217 
Nevertheless, it has always been attractive because of its membership and assumed 
functions: the Mesa is part of it, the amendments to the Reglamento require its report, 
and it is in charge of the preparation, approval, and auditing of the internal budget, and 
of the administration and human resources management of the Chamber.218 As noted, 
it is the only committee that has 16 members since 1990. The most visible sign of its 
                                                            
214 Patricio Phillips Peñafiel (PL), Journal 22.04.69, pp. 3179/80. 
215 See debate in Journal 22.04.69, pp. 3176/88. 
216 Eduardo J. Clavel Amion (PR), Journal 22.04.69, p. 3180. 
217 The constitutional law establishes that the Chamber will have “a committee in charge of its administration.” 
Before the 1990s the Reglamento mentioned this committee just to mandate that it should not accord 
permanent economic benefits to deputies even with the unanimous consent of the Chamber.  
218 In 1994 the preparation and supervision of the implementation of the internal budget were transferred to the 
Mesa.  
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valuable functions was given by the Chamber in 1994, when the reform to the 
Reglamento mandated that 13 delegations leaders should be part of it (in addition to the 
Mesa).   
The gap in terms of relevance and workload between the committees on Hacienda, 
Constitutional Affairs, Interior,219 Foreign Affairs, R&HA, and the rest of the committees 
was highlighted during debates, and through bills tabled to the consideration of the 
Chamber.220 Of all the records analyzed, the most authoritative example is the initiative 
tabled by Gutenberg Martínez (DC) while being President of the Chamber. 221 The goal 
of his bill was to define the committees on Constitutional Affairs, Hacienda, Interior, and 
Foreign Affairs as “exclusive committees” (i.e., their members may not serve on any 
other committee), and to reduce the number of deputies of the rest of the committees. 
It is a fact supported by statistical evidence, the bill reads, that these four committees 
are referred a great volume of bills, and that they hold many more meetings than the 
rest of the committees. 222  The report of the Committee on R&HA rejected the proposal 
on the grounds that it would break the proportionality rule, and harm minor parties’ 
representation in the committee system. The bill was criticized on the floor. Despite the 
objections, during the debate deputies recognized the de facto stratification of 
committees. Furthermore, some of them complained about the evidence that the 
committees on Constitutional Affairs, Hacienda, Interior, and Foreign Affairs were 
                                                            
219 Among other domestic political issues, this committee reports legislation concerning the structure, status, 
and power of regions, provinces, and municipalities; boundary disputes, and matters relating to public lands. 
220 I addition to the debates already cited see the following Journals 26.05.65, pp. 121/32 and 12.05.94, pp. 1757; 
1762.  
221 Deputy Gutenberg Martínez (DC) was President of the Chamber from November 1996 to March 1999.  
222 Journal 10.03.98, pp. 172/175. 
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actually control committees, blaming the “untouchable and exclusive” referral power of 
the President of the Chamber for this situation.223  
Even though the Chilean lower Chamber never had exclusive or semi-exclusive 
committees, the precedent analysis demonstrates that there has always been 
stratification, legally regulated in the case of Hacienda and R&HA, and explicitly 
declared by deputies in the case of Constitutional/Foreign Affairs and Interior. The next 
subsection, among other issues, analyzes this stratification in terms of committee 
assignments.     
 
Section 11.  Committee Assignments  
Did ruling coalitions influence committee assignments in the Chilean lower 
Chamber? Or, by contrast, considering that 53% of its deputies are seniors, was the 
allocation of seats a pre-determined procedure?  This section deals with these questions 
presenting first, a detailed description of rules and practices on assignments. Then, I 
summarize the predictions and the methodological approach I apply to the analysis of 
the allocation of committee seats highlighting some changes I made for the Chilean 
case.  Finally, I present the results and conclusion.  
11.1  The Committee Assignment Process: Rules and Practices  
In the Chilean lower Chamber committee assignments are made every four 
years immediately after the Chamber renewal. Seats are allocated applying a 
                                                            
223 Journal 10.03.98, pp. 12/8. 
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coefficient that is obtained dividing the total of committee seats by the total of 
deputies.224 This coefficient is then multiplied by the number of deputies of each party 
and the result indicates their number of seats in the committee system. In case of 
fractions, a special law regulating this issue is applied.225 Since 1990 the Mesa is in 
charge of preparing the assignment slate for each party. Its proposal is then submitted 
to Chamber’s approval.226 Once assignments are made, each committee elects its Chair 
(majority of votes is required).  
Beyond the Reglamento’s rules, the study of the sessions that approved assignments 
reveals that consultations with delegation leaders are part of the process, especially 
since 1965, and unavoidably since the 1990s. For instance, in 1994 committee 
assignments were postponed four months because delegations were not able to reach 
an agreement. 227 This method to allocate committee seats was not always applied 
(until 1967 the Reglamento mentioned only the “proportionality rule”), and when 
applied, was not always accepted by all parties. In what follows we will see that: a) 
before the coefficient was introduced there was a controversy about the interpretation 
of the “proportionality rule:” while majority coalitions claimed that the PR rule implied 
the use of two coefficients (one for the parties of the majority, and one for the parties of 
the minority), minor parties claimed that the PR rule should be applied to “parties” 
using a unique coefficient; b) in 1965 minor parties disagreed on the allocation of 
                                                            
224 As mentioned, this coefficient was introduced in the 1967 reform. Before 1967 the only criterion regulated in 
the Reglamento to allocate committee seats was the “proportionality rule.” As we will see immediately, 
problems related with the interpretation of the “proportionality rule” before the 1960s caused the adoption of 
the coefficient.  
225 Law of July 9, 1878. This law is always published as an appendix in the Reglamento.   
226 Before the 1990s the committee-assignment function was in charge of the President of the Chamber who 
should also submit the proposal to Chamber’s approval. 
227 Journal 12.07.94, p. 2332. 
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committees made by the Presidency, and c) in 1971 one party tried to impose a new 
criterion.      
- The Interpretation of the Proportionality Rule 
Before 1967, the allocation of committee seats was approved by the Chamber 
following a proposal of its President who also filled vacancies when deputies ceased to 
be members of committees. Presidents, based on the proportionality rule, fixed the 
proportions of each party, consulted delegation leaders, and made the proposition to 
the Chamber. Finally, party leaders assigned the positions internally (Andrade Geywitz 
1945). This peaceful depiction cannot be extended to the 1957-1961 and 1965-1969 
periods, even though the same procedure was in force.    
The main debate about the interpretation of the proportionality rule took place in 1957. 
Then the Chamber had 13 committees composed of 13 members each. This amounted 
to a total of 166 committee seats to assign.228 That year the criterion applied by the 
Conservative President of the Chamber, Héctor Correa Letelier, was that the majority 
coalition that had elected the Mesa (74 deputies), had the right to occupy the majority of 
seats in every committee (7 seats in every committee + 4 seats in Committee on 
R&HA=88 seats), and that the minority (73 deputies) had the right to be assigned the rest 
of the seats (78 seats). To proceed this way Correa Letelier had established two different 
coefficients to determine the number of seats each party would have in the committee 
system: one for the parties of the majority, and one for the parties of the minority.229 
                                                            
228 The President and VPs (Mesa) are members of the Committee on R&HA in their own right. Therefore they 
are excluded from the counting.   
229 The coefficient for the majority was obtained dividing 88 committee seats by 74 deputies (1.18). For 
instance, Liberals with 31 deputies had 37 seats to occupy in committees. The coefficient for the minority was 
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Correa Letelier and Hugo Zepada Barrios (PL) argued that committee assignments had 
been established according to the rules in force, and following the same procedure 
applied in 1941, 1945, and in 1949. This proposal was refused by Radicals and 
Falangists. They claimed that the Mesa did not respect the proportionality rule, that the 
precedents they invoked did not exist because committee assignments were not 
related to majorities or minorities but to parties, that there should be one coefficient for 
all parties, and that it should be the result of dividing the total of committee seats (166) 
by the total of deputies (147). Despite their claims, the proposal of the majority was 
approved. 230  
 
- Minor Parties and the Allocation of Committees 
The coefficient that Radicals and Falangists had demanded in 1957 (166/147=1.12) 
was applied in 1965 by the Christian Democrat President of the Chamber, Hugo E. 
Ballesteros. Almost all parties agreed with his proposal, except for Liberals and 
Conservatives who then formed the Independent delegation with 9 members. Their 
main criticism was that the assignment had been unfair because they hadn’t got a seat 
in Hacienda. The majority party and the largest pluralities, they argued, chose the 
“most important committees leaving minorities in the less important ones.”231 
Considering the committees Liberals and Conservatives were assigned to, it is clear that 
they referred to Education, Defence, Health, Mining, Agriculture, and Public Works. 
José Millas Correa (PC) argued that the problem of Liberals and Conservatives came 
from the election results (March 7, 1965), and had nothing to do with the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
1.06 (78 seats divided by 73 deputies). In this way Radicals, with 36 deputies, had right to 39 seats in 
committees.       
230 Journal 04.06.57, pp. 107-121.  
231 Journal 26.05.65, p. 127. 
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proportionality rule, adding that this explained why “they did not get a seat in the most 
important committee of the Chamber.”232     
 
- The Opportunity to Allocate Committee Seats 
In 1971 some members of the DC left the party and formed the Christian Left 
Party.233  In view of their new status in Chamber -they did not belong to the DC 
delegation any more-, they wanted to be assigned seats in committees in 
representation of their new party. Therefore, they demanded a reallocation of seats 
arguing that assignments should change every time the membership of the Chamber 
changed for whatever reason during the legislative period. This interpretation was 
disapproved on the floor. The prevalent criterion was that the allocation made at the 
beginning of each legislative period holds for the whole four-year term.234  
 
Recapitulating, the committee assignment process in the Chilean lower 
Chamber has the following features: a) it is made every four years and holds for the 
entire legislative period; b) Chamber’s approval has always been a requisite; c) until 
1967 the PR system was used as the criterion to allocate seats; d) the PR criterion was 
sometimes applied to majorities and minorities using two coefficients (at least in 1945 
and 1957), and sometimes to parties using one coefficient (at least in 1965); e) after 1967 
a unique coefficient is used to allocate seats; f) the President of the Chamber made the 
assignment proposal until 1973; g) since the 1990s this proposal is in charge of the Mesa, 
and h) the traditional consultation with delegation leaders has become unavoidable 
                                                            
232 Journal 26.05.65, p. 131. 
233 See chapter V, section 5.8. 
234 Journal 01.12.71, pp. 1737/47. 
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since the 1990s. Consequently, Chilean deputies have passed from a relatively 
discretional process to a regulated system. To put it differently, they have limited their 
power over the committee assignment process by an amendment to the Reglamento in 
1967. This change, adopted with the vote of the powerful and unique DC single-party 
majority, is a decision that counters a cartel behavior. Furthermore, in the 1990s the 
Concertación deepened this “limitation-of-the-power” process when, after accepting a 
VP2 of the opposition, it decided to transfer the committee-assignment function from 
the President to the Mesa.  
What was the difference for ruling coalitions between the allocation of seats based on 
majorities and minorities using two coefficients and on parties using one coefficient? To 
what extent did the coefficient introduced in 1967 change the allocation of committee 
seats? How did this “limitation-of-the-power” process affect the influence of ruling 
coalitions over committee assignments? Did seniority in Chamber or seniority in 
Committees play a role in assignments? I address these questions in the next section.  
 
11.2  Predictions  
To find out whether committee assignments respond to norms of committee-
government models, or to party-centered theories, I test identical expectations and 
apply the same methodology as those used for the Argentine case. Detailed 
information about predictions and methodology has been introduced and explained in 
chapter IV. Therefore, before presenting the results I summarize the predictions and 
highlight methodological changes I made for the Chilean case.    
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In reference to predictions that may limit the influence of parties I consider the 
seniority and apprenticeship norms. The seniority norm is evaluated in two senses: as 
chamber seniority (i.e., total service in Chamber) and as committee-specific seniority. 
The apprenticeship norm, as mentioned, suggests that the committee allocation 
process guarantees mediocre assignments to freshmen.  
To investigate if the ruling status (be it related to majorities/pluralities - 
coalitions/parties) is the key to understand the assignment process, I test whether 
party ratios in standing committees are consistently set in ruling coalitions’ favor, and 
examine the extent to which they have super-proportional share of seats in important 
committees and of Chairs in committees (see predictions in Table 3 in chapter II).  
Finally, adapting the margin hypothesis of Young and Heitshusen (2003) to the Chilean 
case, I examine if ruling coalitions’ incentives to influence committee composition vary 
by party margins (i.e., regular plurality -s ≤ 0.46-, regular -0.50 ≤  s ≤ 0.55- or exceptional 
majorities -0.55 < s < 0.67-).235 
 
11.3  Methodology  
In the empirical section that follows (11.4 Results), I start with descriptive data at 
the aggregate or legislature level. Then I move to the analysis of committee 
assignments at the deputy level. Finally, I switch the level of analysis to individual 
assignments, in order to test for the influence of committee-specific seniority on 
chairmanships.  
                                                            
235 The margin hypothesis was introduced in chapter II.  
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The dependent variable is again the weighted sum of committee assignments of each 
deputy. To construct it I first classify the standing committees considering their 
importance. This stratification is based on the following indicators: a) the place 
accorded to committees by constitutional laws and Reglamentos; b) the importance 
accorded to committees by deputies in debates and bills, and c) the longevity of each 
committee. These three criteria come from the extensive analysis of legislation, 
debates, and bills related to the committee system from 1945 to 2002, and to the 
evolution of the committee system through time.  
Since I want to have a comparable scaling to the one used for Argentina, I transformed 
those indicators in an index which is in the same scale (i.e., 1-6).  Therefore, I rescaled 
the three indicators into 1-6 variables. Then, I took their average value as a measure 
of committee importance, the final measure being a 1-6 scale. As to legislation, 
committees were given a score from 6 (those whose jurisdictions were detailed in 
constitutional laws and Reglamentos) to 1 (committees only listed in the Reglamento). 
About debates and bills, committees were given a score from 6 (those whose 
jurisdictions were debated, whose relative importance was signalled by deputies, which 
were identified as “control” committees, and that were classified as exclusive 
committees) to 1 (committees qualified as inferior, less important or secondary and 
those that were referred to as “the rest of the committees”). Finally, I computed the 
longevity of committees as the count of legislatures during which a committee existed, 
and rescaled this measure from 1 to 6, 1 meaning youngest committees (older 
committees are assumed more relevant than newer ones). The average score on those 
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three measures gives the committee score. APPENDIX J shows the results of the 
stratification.   
The position held within a committee is then used to create an ordinal ranking. To 
make the measure comparable to Argentina, I gave Chairs 4 points and regular 
members 1 point.  Therefore, Chairs and regular members in Chile have the same 
scores as in Argentina.    
 Overall the variable 'committee power' is constructed with measures of committee and 
position importance that are comparable in scale.  Thus, even though it is not possible 
to use the same indicators to build the power index (since the valuation of committees 
in Argentina is based on different grounds), this approach helps making the dependent 
variable comparable across the two countries. 
To test my main hypotheses, I predict deputies’ weighted sum of assignments using 
identical independent variables (Ruling Party (Coalition), Freshman, Seniority, 
Cumulation, Chamber (Mesa) Position and Group Position) with the only exception that, 
because there are too many regions in Chile, I included a dummy variable for the 
Metropolitana (Santiago) region only.   
As mentioned in the Argentine case, a significant and positive coefficient estimate for 
the Ruling Coalition variable would give support to the cartel hypothesis, since it implies 
that ruling coalition members have more than a proportional share of assignments in 
committees, all else being equal. Seniority variables allow us to test for apprenticeship 
and seniority norms. I also replace the Ruling Coalition indicator with three subtypes of 
ruling coalition variables: regular pluralities, regular majorities, and exceptional 
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majorities. Such sub-type variables are used to test the margin hypothesis. If this 
hypothesis is correct, then deputies from regular pluralities (actually in the only single-
party regular plurality of 1969) would garner more power in committees than deputies 
from regular/exceptional majorities.   
Finally, as I did for Argentina, in the last part of the empirical section I replaced the 
seniority-in-Chamber measures with committee-specific seniority for a more robust 
test of the seniority norms hypotheses. Instead of considering legislators as units of 
analysis, I then focus on assignments, so that committee-specific seniority can be 
matched to the corresponding assignments.      
 
11.4  Results 
- Ruling Coalition Shares in Chamber and Committees- 
The descriptive statistics for my main covariates are presented in APPENDIX J.  
The average deputy scores about 5 points in the weighted sum of committee 
assignments, my dependent variable. The most powerful deputy garnered above 27 
points on that scale, while a few deputies did not secure a single assignment to 
committees. A majority of deputies (about 53%) in the sample are seniors.   
A preliminary test of the cartel hypothesis consists of comparing the shares of seats of 
ruling coalitions to their shares of committee assignments across time.  
Table 99 presents the share of committee assignments accruing to ruling coalitions as 
compared to their share of seats between 1945 and 2002. The last column shows the 
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difference between the two shares in percentage points. I also performed proportion 
tests to examine whether the percentage-point difference between the two shares is 
statistically significant.   
Except for 1945-1949 and 1957-1961, representation is fair, even favorable to the 
opposition since the 1970s. In other words, a very small over-representation was found 
only for the regular majorities (0.50 ≤  s ≤ 0.55) of 1945 and 1957 - before the introduction 
of the coefficient in 1967 - though this disproportionality is non-significant.  
TABLE 99 - SHARE OF SEATS AND SHARE OF ASSIGNMENTS RULING COALITIONS – CHILEAN 
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002 
 
Legislative 
Period 
Share of Seats
  Share of 
Committee 
Assignments 
GapMajority-Plurality/ Single Party-
Coalition 
 
1945-1949 
 
Majority Coalition  50,34 54,44 4,10
1949-1953 
 
Majority Coalition 54,42 55,62 1,20
1953-1957 
 
Majority Coalition 51,02 50,89 -0,13
1957-1961 
 
Majority Coalition  50,34 53,85 3,51
1961-1965 
 
Majority Coalition 57,14 57,99 0,85
1965-1969 
 
Single-Party Majority 55,78 56,21 0,43
1969-1973 
 
Single-Party Plurality 37,33 38,46 1,13
1973 
 
Majority Coalition  58,00 57,73 -0,27
1990-1994 
 
Majority Coalition 57,50 56,40 -1,10
1994-1998 
 
Majority Coalition 58,33 58,23 -0,11
1998-2002 
 
Majority Coalition 57,50 57,81 0,31
            Note: The shares are those of the ruling coalitions in the Chamber. 
            Significance testing: Two-sample proportion tests (one-tailed); * = p < 0.05 
 
While the gap those years is in the range of 4.1 and -0.13, after 1967 it is more stable 
(1.13 and -0.27). The change of the electoral system (before an after the 1990s) does not 
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seem to have an impact on ruling coalitions’ shares. In short, the cartel prediction fails 
since ruling coalitions had no significant over-representation when share of committee 
assignments are compared to share of seats.    
 
Results of Table 99 confirm, however, the information obtained through debates’ 
analyses. In this sense: a) in the 1945-1949 and 1957-1961 periods ruling coalitions tried 
to secure as much as committee seats as possible applying the “two coefficients 
procedure”; b) the most proportional period before the introduction of the coefficient 
(1967) was 1965-1969, that is, when the DC single-party majority decided to strictly 
apply the proportionality rule considering one coefficient for all parties; c) the power of 
the DC single-plurality in 1969 is once again present in its tiny over-representation in 
committees; d) excluding 1969-1973, since the introduction of the coefficient (1967) 
committee assignments are more proportional than before, particularly since the 1990s 
when consultation with delegation leaders became unavoidable, and e) while the first 
period after the return of democracy -the participative 1990-1994 period- was the best 
for the opposition in terms of committee assignments (-1.10), the 1998-2002 period 
shows the efforts of the majority coalition to regain lost ground.   
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TABLE 100 - ASSIGNMENT OF COMMITTEE CHAIRS BY RULING COALITION AND OPPOSITION – 
CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002 
 
            
 
The assignment of committee Chairs from 1945 to 2002 (Table 100) reveals a plain over-
representation of ruling coalitions during the whole period: they secured 136 (86%) of a 
total of 159 Chairs. No matter the type of ruling coalition or electoral system, the over-
representation goes from 69% to 100% of the Chairs.  
The exception is again the period of the DC single-party plurality (1969-1973). But even 
in this case, note the DC got 53% of the Chairs while having 37% of the seats in 
Chamber, and 38% of committee seats.  
Through the gaps we can see that the tendencies previously mentioned for 1945-1949 
and 1957-1961 (ruling coalitions that sought to control the committee system as much 
             
Legislative 
Period 
Share of 
Seats Ruling  
Number of 
Chairs Ruling 
Coalition
Ruling 
Coalition 
(%) (2)
Number of 
Chairs 
Opposition
Opposition  
(%) 
Total Gap  
(%) (2-1)
Coalition (1) 
1945-1949 50,34 12 92,3 1 7,7  13 42.0
1949-1953 54,42 9 69,2 4 30,8  13 14.8
1953-1957 51,02 10 76,9 3 23,1  13 25.9
1957-1961 50,34 12 100,0 0 0,0    12a 49.7
1961-1965 57,14 13 100,0 0 0,0   13 42.9
1965-1969 55,78 13 100,0 0 0,0   13 44.2
1969-1973 37,33 8 53,3 7 46,7   15 16.0
1973 58,00 15 100,0 0 0,0   15 42.0
1990-1994 57,50 12 75,0 4 25,0   16 17.5
1994-1998 58,33 15 83,3 3 16,7    18 25.0
1998-2002 57,50 17 94,4 1 5,6     18b 36.9
Total                 - 136          85,5 23         14,5 159            - 
               N=159        
a. The Chair of the Committee on Agriculture was vacant in 1957.   
b. The Chair of the Committee on Fisheries is not counted because it was created in 2001.  
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as possible), 1990-1994 (the participative beneficial period for the opposition), and 
1998-2002 (the majority in search of its lost ground) remain for Chairs’ assignments. In 
addition, if we consider that the four Chairs of the opposition of the 1990-1994 period 
went to the UDI, we can appreciate the effects of the “administration pact” between 
the Center-left Concertación and the ultra-Right UDI at the Chairs’ assignments level. 
Therefore, the assignment of committee Chairs supports the prediction for the entire 
period.      
 
Table 101 shows the shares of chairmanships secured by ruling coalitions from 1945 to 
2002 in the five most important committees.  
TABLE 101 - DISTRIBUTION OF CHAIRS IN MOST IMPORTANT COMMITTEES – CHILEAN CHAMBER OF 
DEPUTIES 1945-2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
 
 
    N=55 
 
We see that 93% of those positions were held by ruling coalitions. The monopoly in the 
Committee on R&HA is not unexpected since its Chair is the President of the Chamber, 
who always belonged to the ruling coalition. The fact that an opposition party chaired 
Hacienda has a simple explanation that confirms previous analyses: the Chair belonged 
to the ultra-right UDI during the participative period (1990-1994 or the best period for 
the opposition). Foreign Affairs was chaired by a Conservative in 1949, that is, when the 
    
Committee Ruling Coalition Opposition 
Constitutional Affairs 11 0 
Hacienda  10 1 
Foreign Affairs 10 1 
R&HA 11 0 
Interior 9 2 
Total 92.7% 7.3% 
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Chamber was reorganized after the effects of the banning of the PC. Finally, Interior 
was once chaired by a Conservative (1949), and by a deputy of the rightist RN (1994).  
Thus, when weighting for the importance of assignments, these figures offer initial 
support for the cartel hypothesis. Regardless the type of majority, plurality or electoral 
system, ruling coalitions over-represented and even monopolized committee Chairs in 
general, and also Chairs inside those committees most important to Chilean legislators. 
To further explore this assertion, I turn to a more systematic examination of this 
relationship. 
-Determinants of Committee Assignments at the Deputy Level- 
Table 102 shows the results of models predicting the weighted sum of 
assignments in committees at the deputy level. I first consider whether deputies from 
ruling coalitions secure more power in committees as compared to other deputies, and 
whether this advantage lies within the bounds of statistical significance.   
The mean across the sample for total committee power is 4.9 units (APPENDIX J). 
According to the results, being member of the ruling coalition increases the 'power-in-
committees' score of a deputy by 0.97 points, as compared to opposition members, all 
else being equal. Hence, while Table 99 indicates that there is no significant difference 
between the share of assignments and the share of seats, a deeper look at assignments 
reveals that ruling coalitions tend to have surplus power in committees. 
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TABLE 102 - PREDICTING WEIGHTED POWER IN COMMITTEE SYSTEM – CHILEAN CHAMBER OF 
DEPUTIES 1945-2002 (OLS)  
 
Variables Freshman Model Seniority Model 
   
Ruling Coalition 0.970*** 0.948*** 
 (0.157) (0.157) 
Freshman -1.432***  
 (0.164)  
Chamber Seniority  0.650*** 
  (0.073) 
Group Position 0.347 0.394 
 (0.230) (0.229) 
Mesa Position 3.530*** 3.435*** 
 (0.546) (0.547) 
Cumulation 2.836*** 2.851*** 
 (0.154) (0.154) 
Santiago 0.460* 0.421* 
 (0.184) (0.184) 
Constant 1.067*** -0.822* 
 (0.326) (0.345) 
R2 0.33 0.33  
N 1538 1538  
* p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
 
I also test whether apprenticeship and seniority norms exist in the Chamber, and 
compare the relative importance of such norms with party dominance. Considering the 
freshman and seniority variables’ estimates (Column 1 and Column 2, Table 102, 
respectively), I cannot claim that the fact of being a newcomer or to have more than 
one term in the Chamber is trivial. Freshmen are assigned mediocre positions and 
seniority matters regarding the allocation of seats.  
As I did for Argentina I performed a mean comparison test of the power in committees 
of freshmen and seniors of the ruling party and the opposition with actual data that 
turn out significant. While the mean power of freshmen of the ruling coalition is 4.1, 
that of the freshmen of the opposition is 3.7. For seniors, the mean of those from the 
ruling coalition is 6.5 and that of the seniors of the opposition is 4.5. Again, mediocre 
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assignments for newcomers and the significance of seniority are confirmed. But this 
time, we can see the difference between members of the ruling party and of the 
opposition for both, norms and particularly in the case of seniors.   
Following the model of Table 102 (as I did for Argentina), I predicted the value of the 
dependent variables after changing the values of the Freshman and Ruling Coalition 
variables. I kept all the other variables at the observed values. Results are shown in Table 
103. 
TABLE 103 - PREDICTED VALUES - POWER IN COMMITTEES SENIORS & FRESHMEN OF THE RULING 
PARTY/OPPOSITION – CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2002 
 
Ruling Party-Opposition/Seniors-
Freshmen 
Predicted 
Values 
Opposition Seniors 5,019 
Opposition Freshmen 3,588 
Ruling Party Seniors 5,989 
Ruling Party Freshmen 4,558 
 
Ruling-coalition seniors have on average much more power than those of the opposition 
but the latter perform better than freshmen of the ruling coalition. The difference 
between ruling coalition and opposition freshmen remains.   
In sum, seniority-in-Chamber and apprenticeship norms are criteria considered for 
appointments in the Chilean Chamber. The fact of belonging to the ruling coalition is an 
advantage, namely for seniors.  
As to regions, the results show that deputies from Santiago are slightly advantaged in 
committees as compared to deputies from other regions.   
Note also that deputies holding positions in the Chamber (in the Mesa or as delegation 
leaders) are more likely to have power in committees too. Thus, Chilean deputies tend 
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to cumulate Chamber positions and important committee positions. This finding 
coincides with the fact that the Mesa members (during the whole period) and 
delegations leaders (since 1994) are part of the Committee on R&HA in their own right.  
Obviously, those who have multiple assignments necessarily have more power overall. 
In this sense, note the cumulation variable controls for multiple-assignments. By 
controlling for cumulation, I net out the effect of multiple assignments and observe 
power by assignment. Results do not change much if I omit cumulation. 
As explained in the Argentine case, the fact of observing the whole period (1945-2002), 
may disguise important differences across time. Therefore, the next step considers the 
relevance of the margin hypothesis and the effects of the change of the electoral 
system. 
-The Impact of the Electoral System and the Margin Hypothesis- 
The margin hypothesis states that smaller shares of victories lead parties in 
control of the Chamber to exhibit even higher super-proportions in committees as 
compared to larger ones. In this sense, note that the Chilean lower Chamber was ruled 
by regular majorities (0.50 ≤  s ≤ 0.55) until 1961, and by exceptional majorities (0.55 < s < 
0.67) since then -excluding of course the DC single-party plurality of 1969-1973-. This 
means first, that I have two clear blocs that relate to different margins of victory and 
second, that the change of the electoral system (from PR to binominal in 1990) did not 
cause this difference. 
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In order to test the margin hypothesis I use dummies for three ruling coalitions’ types 
and opposition.  
In the first column of Table 104, I compare the coefficient estimates of these three 
subtypes against the reference of all opposition deputies. Observing the estimates for 
those three variables, I do not find a pattern consistent with the margin hypothesis. The 
cartel effect is significant for regular and exceptional majorities, not for pluralities. In 
addition, note that there is no significant difference between types. 
Therefore, the margin hypothesis is not supported by the data because the ruling 
coalitions’ types that exhibit (an almost equal) over-proportional control of committee 
assignments are regular and exceptional majorities.    
TABLE 104 - TEST OF THE MARGIN HYPOTHESIS – CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002 
(OLS) 
 
Variables Opposition as Reference 
Exceptional Majorities as 
Reference 
Regular Plurality 0.645  -0.454  
 (0.511)  (0.554)  
Regular Majority 0.815 ** -0.284  
 (0.253)  (0.332)  
Exceptional Majority 1.099 ***   
 (0.216)    
Opposition  -1.099 *** 
  (0.216)  
Chamber Seniority 0.653 *** 0.653 *** 
 (0.073)  (0.073)  
Group Position 0.390  0.390  
 (0.229)  (0.229)  
Mesa Position 3.445 *** 3.445 *** 
 (0.547)  (0.547)  
Cumulation 2.857 *** 2.857 *** 
 (0.154)  (0.154)  
Santiago 0.415 * 0.415 * 
 (0.184)  (0.184)  
Constant -0.766 * 0.333  
 (0.355)  (0.416)  
R2 0.33 0.33  
N 1538 1538  
        *** = p < 0.001 ; ** = p < 0.01 ; * = p < 0.05 
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From these results, it appears that the electoral system reform in Chile has not affected 
committee assignment patterns. I also examine sub-samples to compare the 
determinants of committee assignments under different electoral rules (PR until 1973 - 
binominal system since the 1990s), and no important differences were found (results 
not shown). The passage from the PR to the binominal system in 1989 did not affect the 
tendency of ruling coalitions to produce super-proportions in important committee 
positions over the whole time-period.     
-Committee-specific Seniority- 
In this section I consider committee-specific seniority norm. As mentioned, if the 
norm exists, it should explain chairmanships’ assignments to committees within the 
ruling coalition. As done before in the Argentine case, I test this hypothesis by replacing 
previous measures of seniority in Chamber with committee-specific seniority (i.e., the 
number of times a deputy has previously been appointed to a committee). Since I need 
to match committee-specific experience to the relevant committee, I change the level 
of analysis and consider the pool of assignments that took place during the time-period 
(I exclude the first legislature, 1945-1949, since committee-specific data are not 
available prior to 1945). The dependent variable is now binomial, I code 1 the 
assignments as Chairs and 0 all other assignments. The question to be answered is 
again: over the pool of all assignments, which factors are more likely to lead to a chair 
assignment compared to other positions?          
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TABLE 105 - CHAIRMANSHIPS IN COMMITTEES, 1949-2002 (LOGIT) 
 
Variables Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effects 
Ruling Coalition 1.518 *** 0.076 2.102 *** 0.106 
 (0.238)   (0.549)   
Committee Seniority 2.279 *** 0.152 3.272 *** 0.212 
 (0.400)   (0.891)   
Ruling Coal.* Seniority    -1.596  -0.078 
    (1.306)   
Group Post -0.302  -0.014 -0.303  -0.014 
 (0.279)   (0.278)   
Mesa  Position 0.878 * 0.064 0.887 * 0.064 
 (0.377)   (0.376)   
Cumulation -2.419 ** -0.121 -2.453 ** -0.119 
 (0.737)   (0.738)   
Santiago 0.247  0.013 0.241  0.012 
 (0.201)   (0.201)   
Constant -3.000 ***  -3.153 ***  
 (0.420)   (0.445)   
      
Pseudo-R2 0.11   0.11   
Log-likelihood -457.997   -457.285   
% Correctly Predicted 92.39   92.39   
N 1,919     1.919     
Notes: Binomial logit regression. All variables are rescaled from 0 to 1, so that coefficient estimates above can be compared in size. 
Marginal effects are for a discrete change in the value of the independent variables (from 0 to 1).  
The first legislature (1945) is dropped since committee-specific seniority is unknown for that legislature.  Legislature dummies are included 
in the regression (results not shown). 
*** = p < 0.001 ; ** = p < 0.01 ; * = p < 0.05 
 
 
Besides the use of committee-specific seniority, the set of explanatory variables is 
similar as before but for one exception. I have rescaled all independent variables 
between 0 and 1, so that coefficient estimates may be compared in size even if I use a 
logit regression. 
Table 105 shows the results. The left column shows the baseline model while the right 
column shows a model in which I added an interactive term between the party and 
seniority variables. The first model shows that the ruling coalition and committee 
seniority variables have a large influence on the probability of being assigned Chair, as 
the statistically significant estimates reveal. Those results support the idea that 
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seniority-in-committee norm matters to become Chair. Having committee experience 
increases the likelihood of being assigned Chair as compared to a regular member 
position.   
FIGURE 6 - IN-SAMPLE PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF BEING ASSIGNED CHAIR, BY EXPERIENCE AND 
RULING COALITION - CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 
 
Note: Based on the estimates of the logit regression (Table 105, Column 2). The dashed lines are the confidence intervals; the solid lines are the 
smoothed curves of predicted probabilities. 
As I did for Argentina, I test an interactive term (model 2) to confirm whether 
committee experience matters only for ruling party members. The non-significant 
estimate for the interaction term, however, indicates that the effect of committee 
seniority is about the same among ruling coalition and opposition deputies.        
In other words, committee-specific seniority matters in Chile, but it matters for 
opposition and ruling coalition members equally. As before, to test this claim, I plot in-
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sample predicted probabilities against experience for both opposition deputies and 
ruling-coalition members, using estimates of column 2, Table 105. Figure 6 shows the 
plots. The dashed lines show the confidence intervals around the smoothed predicted 
probability curves. The figure illustrates that committee experience matters in both 
cases: the confidence intervals in the two panels clearly overlap.  
Recall, however, that when focusing on the aggregate level of assignments rather than 
on the assignment level (Tables 100 and 101), results showed a definite over-
representation of ruling coalitions during the whole period.  
 
The descriptive data at the aggregate level shows that committee assignments 
have been relatively fair during the whole period, and more proportional and stable 
since the introduction of the coefficient. By contrast, Chairs belong to ruling coalitions 
almost exclusively in all committees and, in the case of the most important, only a pact 
or the fact of being ideologically close to the ruling coalition can exceptionally make a 
Chair available to the opposition. The determinants of committee assignments at the 
deputy level demonstrate that ruling coalitions tend to have the upper hand in the 
strategic composition of committees. The condition of belonging to the ruling coalition 
is important, but not the only factor considered when the time of assignments comes: 
apprenticeship and seniority-in-Chamber norms are part of the decision. In the Chilean 
lower Chamber pluralities do not exhibit higher super-proportions in committees as 
compared to majorities. Committee-specific experience matters for all those who 
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envision the possibility of becoming Chairs. The combination “committee-specific 
experience + ruling coalition” guarantees the fulfillment of that project.   
  
Chilean deputies have built a conservative committee system. Its structure, 
which is quite stable, has been shaped by the political, economic, and social main 
concerns of each period, and changes have been adopted by consensus. Chilean 
deputies have also restrained their power over the committee assignment process. The 
allocation of committee seats, somewhat imbalanced until the 1960s, has become 
progressively more proportional and considers committee seniority and apprenticeship 
norms. But this is a partial portrait of this traditional arrangement. Two other features 
of this system are: its stratification and its over-proportion of senior ruling-coalition 
members in committee Chairs. This concentration of power, almost undisputed in the 
most important committees, remained during the whole period despite the type of 
majority, plurality, or electoral system. Only majority coalitions can “give” a Chair to the 
opposition. If this opportunity appears, only seniors can take advantage of it.  Since the 
1990s, it is clear that Chilean ruling coalitions are ready to alter the traditional structure 
of the system creating new bureaucratic positions, but not to renounce to the power 
that comes from chairmanships. To sum up, the existence of a fairly objective and 
stable committee system is as true as the uniform cartel behavior displayed by ruling 
coalitions regarding its most important positions.         
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Part IV. Conclusion 
 
Now is the time to summarize the patterns found, and to begin the assessment 
of the merits and limits of the Cartel Theory to explain the role of ruling coalitions in 
the institutional development of the Chamber. As it was for Argentina, the evaluation 
will be guided by the following questions: Did ruling parties determine the key features 
of the Chamber’s organization over time?  Did the reform or maintenance of the 
Chamber’s organizational rules and norms advantage them?   
Table 106 at the end of this conclusion synthesizes the changes to be mentioned in the 
following paragraphs.   
The comprehensive analysis of the aspects considered in Parts I to III shows that the 
development of the Chamber is characterized by five patterns that defy any type of 
ruling majority, plurality, or electoral system.  
First, ruling coalitions have increased their power. The Reglamento of 2002 gives ruling 
coalitions advantages that did not exist in 1945. During this fifty-seven years they have 
achieved a tighter control of floor proceedings (through a proportional and expedite 
time-allotting on the floor), and of the legislative agenda (e.g., the President can reject 
bills and amendments; Chairs can reject amendments; Hacienda has subsidiary and 
control functions; the President chairs a leaders’ committee whose decisions are 
adopted by a weighted voting system, and ruling coalitions have the prerogative to fix 
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deadlines to committees to report). In addition, they have six new committee Chairs to 
distribute internally, or to use as a tool of negotiation.  
Second, errors (loss of advantages) were immediately fixed (reassigned). Considered as 
two blocs of reforms, the 1967-1969 and the 1990-1994 general amendments have 
something in common. Unfavourable rules to ruling coalitions that had been approved 
in 1967 and 1990, were respectively suppressed by the 1969 and 1994 reforms. In the 
case of the first bloc, two explicit prohibitions established in 1967 (multiple assignments 
and the control prerogative of Hacienda) were suppressed in 1969. As to the second 
bloc, the 1994 reform reinterpreted (the “abstention surprise”), or directly eliminated 
some of the “participative reforms” of 1990 (the transfer of the agenda-setting function 
from the President to the Mesa, and the transformation of the exclusive decision of 
Chairs to hold secret sessions into a majority decision). In addition to reforms to the 
Reglamento, consider also that the “administration pact” (1990-1998) that gave the 
opposition a handful of Chairs and the VP2 of the Mesa was abandoned in 1998.   
Third, ruling coalitions considered certain rules and practices non-negotiable. When I look 
at the institutional development of a Chamber, I consider not only changes but also 
untouched rules and practices. During the period over analysis the referral power, which 
ensures control over the flow of legislation and perpetuates committees’ stratification, 
remained in hands of the President despite deputies’ complains. Three other rules and 
practices that form the core of the majority coalition power not only remained but 
resisted direct attempts to be reformed. They are the jurisdiction and functioning of 
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Hacienda, the political processes to elect the Mesa and committee Chairs, and the 
control of motions to recommit (Table 106).  
Fourth, ruling coalitions have forged a committee system that combines stability, 
proportional membership, seniority and apprenticeship norms with a tight and persistent 
political control of its main positions. As mentioned, two strong tendencies are evident 
in this case. For one part, the intention to maintain an organized, proportional, and 
manageable committee system. For the other, the decision to exercise a firm and 
irrevocable control of key committees’ positions.    
Fifth, ruling coalitions have controlled the main legislative procedures. Though majority 
coalitions renounced to interpret the proportionality rule in their advantage when they 
established the committee-assignment coefficient in 1967, they kept during the whole 
period control of the election and composition of the Mesas, the censure motions, the 
creation of committees, and the election of the powerful committee Chairs.  
 
The predictions of the theory did not fare well to explain the behavior of ruling 
coalitions in all the cases. In particular I want to mention the decision to renounce to 
the interpretation of the proportionality rule to make committee assignments, and the 
suppression of the control role of Hacienda-even though it was regained later- (1967); 
the participative measures adopted in 1990, namely the “administration pact” that gave 
important positions to the opposition and even weaken the power of Chairs -again, 
even though these measures were abandoned in the short term-; and the proportional 
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assignments in committees, and the conservative development of the committee 
system during the whole period.  
 
Inside a conservative structure, and despite different arrangements and political 
complexities, many and varying ruling coalitions have defended their prerogatives and 
managed to keep and increase their power. The five patterns aforementioned 
demonstrate that Chilean coalitions did determine the key features of their lower 
Chamber’s organization over time using its rule-making power to their favor. Beyond 
its many remarkable peculiarities, the defying Chilean case confirms the predictions of 
the Cartel Theory.    
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TABLE 106 - INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF KEY UNITS AND PREROGATIVES OF MAJORITY COALITIONS 
CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002 
 
  1945 2002 
President 
Referral of bills  IDEM 
Agenda-setting (public and secret sessions) Agenda-setting (public sessions) 
Committee assignments subject to Chamber’s 
approval  
- 
Chair of the Mesa and the Committee on R&HA IDEM 
- Chair of the LDM a 
- 
Organization of delegations' meetings any time and 
suspension of sittings during these meetings 
- Rejection of bills, motions, and amendments  
Mesa 
- 
Committee assignments subject to Chamber’s 
approval  
- 
Agenda-setting (exclusive for secret sessions and the 
weekly order of business of simple bills; shared with 
the LDM for bills subject to "immediate treatment")  
- 
Preparation and supervision of the implementation of 
the internal budget 
Committee on 
R&HA 
Preparation, supervision of the implementation, 
and auditing of the internal budget and human 
resources management shared with highest 
officials  
Human resources management shared with highest 
officials  
- 
Nomination of the Auditing Committee (internal 
budget) subject to Chamber's approval  
- Approval of the budget 
Chairs 
Complete and exclusive control of the committee 
procedure and agenda 
IDEM 
- 
Preparation of the itemized list of rules Hacienda 
should study in the “financing analysis" 
- 
Change of meetings' purpose (e.g., to discuss current 
events)   
- Rejection of amendments
Advantages Ratified 
by Majority 
Coalitions 
Political election of the Mesa 
Political election of committee Chairs 
Motions to recommit 
Hacienda's control function  
Hacienda's functioning (decision to create subcommittees)  
Legislative 
Procedures 
controlled by 
Majority Coalitions 
Election and composition of the Mesas
Committee Assignments 
Censure motions 
Creation of committees and election of their Chairs
a. Leaders Delegation’s Meeting 
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TABLE 106 -  INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF KEY UNITS AND PREROGATIVES OF MAJORITY COALITIONS 
CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002 
(cont.) 
 
  1945 2002
 
Hacienda de facto control function 
Hacienda control and subsidiary functions 
established in the Reglamento 
Advantages 
Majority 
Coalitions 
Interpretation of the PR rule to allocate 
committee seats 
- 
- Deadlines to committees in order to report 
General time allotting on the floor and 
Incidentes  
Proportional time allotting on the floor and 
Incidentes  
- 
Reduction of all terms to speak on the floor, during 
Incidentes and in committees 
- 
Decisions of the LDM are adopted by a weighted 
voting system 
- 
Decisions adopted by the unanimous consent in the 
LDM are mandatory for the Chamber 
Election of the Secretary General of the 
Chamber  
Election of all highest officials of the Chamber  
- Abstentions are counted as affirmative votes 
13 committee Chairs to distribute 19 committee Chairs to distribute 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VII 
Conclusion 
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I have a direct knowledge of the Argentine Congress because I worked there 
during the 1990s and early 2000s. Even though I did not work in the Corporación, I 
visited it many times. In particular, I went to Valparaiso to conduct fieldwork first for my 
Masters’ thesis and then for this dissertation. My first research focused on a 
comparison of the management of both Chambers. I was surprised by the differences I 
found between them and us. The way they hired functionaries, their small committee 
system (only one authority per committee?), their tri-partisan Mesas composed of 
members of a coalition, their detailed Reglamento, and their Code of Official Conduct... 
The list is long. I always admired the structure and organization of the Corporación, so 
dissimilar from ours.  
I chose the Chilean and the Argentine Chambers to test the Cartel Theory because of 
their contrasts and because both of them are, in turn, different from the U.S. House. 
How would the theory fare in these Latin American legislatures, immersed in so divergent 
political contexts, with distinct party and electoral systems? The patterns of institutional 
development of the Chilean and Argentine lower Chambers found in this work are 
captivating for two reasons. First, despite our differences, our ruling parties have 
behaved as procedural coalitions. Second, the Chilean Chamber surprised me twice. The 
Cartel Theory not only fares well in the Corporación. It fares better than in Argentina and 
the U.S. House.  
In this conclusion I present a summary of my research in two steps. Part I displays the 
main results based on the predictions laid out in chapter II. Part II presents them 
according to the distinction made by Cox and McCubbins between active and latent 
procedural power, and explains what happens with the results that do not support the 
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theory. Then, I discuss the negative agenda power in Chile, and the origins of the 
powerful legislative parties in Argentina (Part III). The last part concludes by suggesting 
three avenues of research.     
 
Part I. What Have We Learned About the Institutional Development of the  
Chambers?  
 
Chapter I explained why the institutional choices of legislators matter, and 
introduced the studies that associated the organization of the Chambers to parties. I 
pointed out that despite their time-bound and partial focus, they provided valuable 
information about the functioning of the Chambers. The purposes and main questions of 
the dissertation followed this review. I explained that the reconstruction of the patterns 
of the institutional development of the Chambers, and the examination of the role 
played by parties in this evolution were my main tasks.  
 
Chapter II presented the theory and the methodology. It introduced the general 
hypothesis, a series of predictions based on the Cartel Theory, and the notion of 
institutional development. In particular, I indicated that the Reglamentos and the 
directing board and committee systems were the aspects of the organization chosen to 
my research. The last part of the chapter described the time frame of the research, the 
datasets used for the analyses, and the fieldwork conducted in Argentina and Chile.  
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Chapter III and V presented a view of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies and of 
the Corporación. Their comparison shows how different the political context and the 
composition of the Chambers have been during the period. We learnt that institutional 
stability was the norm before and after the military coup in Chile. General elections and 
presidential and legislative terms always followed constitutional rules. The violent 
military coup of 1973 was a disgraceful exception to Chile, “the Latin American country 
that stood out for its long tradition of representative democracy” (A. Valenzuela 1994, 
91). At the legislative arena level, we saw how the six diverse and transient majority 
coalitions that ruled the Chamber until the 1960s, and the more stable Concertación 
ruling coalitions of the 1990s, reflected the competitiveness of the Chilean party system 
in which there are “no giants (…), no party or tendency with a clear majority” (A. 
Valenzuela 1994, 103). Only twice the Chamber was ruled by a single party, one of them 
a single-party plurality (1969-1973). No majority secured more than 58% of the seats. 
From 1945 to 2001 the number of deputies decreased from 147 to 120, and the Chamber 
witnessed the decline of traditional parties and the emergence of new groups and 
coalitions.  
The Argentine chapter showed that institutional instability -due mainly to successive 
military coups- was the norm in the country between the 1950s and early 1980s. The 
recurrent social and economic crises seem more difficult to be eradicated from its political 
landscape. Different presidential and legislative terms were found from 1945 to 2001. The 
Argentine lower Chamber was ruled by all types of pluralities and majorities. Unlike Chile, 
most of them (15 out of 18) were ruling parties, either the PJ or the UCR. Radicals or 
Peronists were also the principal partners of the three coalitions of the period. Differing 
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from the Corporación, we saw that this Chamber increased its membership from 158 to 257 
deputies between 1945 and 2001. Peronists and Radicals have witnessed the emergence 
and dissolution of third parties and a myriad of provincial parties.  
In particular, we learnt that both countries changed their electoral system during the 
period. In both cases, a de facto government produced the reform. The timing of the 
change and the new electoral system chosen, however, differed. The de facto 
government of 1962 in Argentina, pursuing to end Peronist landslides, annulled the 
Sáenz Peña Law and established the PR system (Snow 1965). Conversely, in 1987 
Pinochet’s administration adopted a binominal system that left behind the PR system 
of the 1925 Constitution. The reform aimed at forming two moderate blocs to destruct 
the old and unstable Chilean multiparty system (A. Valenzuela 1994). The composition 
of the Argentine Chamber after the 1960s, and that of the Corporación after the 1990s, 
show that both de facto governments failed in their attempts.  
 
Chapters IV (Argentina) and VI (Chile) were devoted to the reconstruction task. 
There I presented the results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses. Here I 
summarize them mentioning first the prediction (as it was stated in chapter II), and 
second if it was supported or not by the results. I offer a brief comment in each case. The 
findings are the following: 
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REFORMS TO THE REGLAMENTOS 
1 – Reforms to the Reglamento proposed by ruling parties or coalitions are adopted on 
straight party-line vote  
Supported.   
Nine reforms to the Reglamento (four in Argentina and five in Chile) were adopted on 
straight party-line vote. 
One case (the failed voting on the President’s right to vote issue in Argentina) does not 
support the prediction.  
2- The changes that are approved are those that suppress dispositions detrimental to 
ruling parties or coalitions and/or accrue their advantages  
Partially supported.  
Argentina. The general reforms of 1955, 1963, and 1989 support the prediction. In the 
1989 and 1996 general reforms, the ruling party altered the structure of the Chamber to 
maintain its preeminent status in the Chamber.  
One amendment (not to be confused with a general reform) does not support the 
prediction (the number of deputies needed to demand a roll-call vote was reduced in 
1996).  
Chile. In the successive general reforms ruling coalitions lost (1967; 1990) and regained 
(1969; 1994) functions. There was also an internal transfer and reassignment of 
prerogatives within ruling coalitions. In the 1990s ruling coalitions resisted direct 
attempts of the opposition to suppress their prerogatives.   
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One amendment does not support the prediction: the introduction of the coefficient to 
make committee assignments in 1967. 
I considered prediction no. 1 “supported” because only one vote was lost by a ruling 
party in 1996. In Chile, by contrast, no vote was lost by ruling coalitions. Prediction no. 
2 is “partially supported” because two amendments in nine general reforms benefited 
opposition parties. This means that I consider (in this and in the rest of the cases) the 
predictions strictly and for both countries at the same time. Therefore, it is important 
to pay attention to the description that follows each prediction. Despite the partial 
confirmation, the results show a clear tendency to support the cartel behavior.  
DIRECTING BOARD SYSTEM 
1 - Election procedure. The election of the members of the directing board or Mesa is by 
straight party-line votes controlled by ruling parties or coalitions 
Supported. 
In both Chambers no candidate to any position of the directing board or Mesa different 
from the one proposed or supported by the ruling party or coalition was ever elected. 
2 - Censure motions moved against the Mesa are rejected (only in the Corporación) 
Supported. 
Majority coalitions rejected all censure motions.  
Censure motions were approved in case of coalition break up or when the Chamber was 
ruled by a plurality (only 1969-1973).   
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3 - Partisan composition. No member of the opposition serves as President or Vice-
President of the directing board or Mesa 
Supported. 
Argentina. The prediction is supported until 1963. After that year there were mixed or 
bipartisan directing boards in which ruling parties got the lion’s share of the authority 
positions.  
Chile. The prediction is supported until 1990 and after 1998. During the periods 1990-
1994 and 1994-1998 a pact between ruling parties and the opposition gave the latter 
the VP2.  
4 - Power (functions). The power of the members of the directing board or Mesa 
increases or is redistributed within the ruling party or coalition 
Supported.  
Argentina. The head of the Chamber kept its powers during the whole period.  
Chile. The Mesa has gained functions. The head of the Chamber, for its part, has 
maintained and (re)gained functions. The Mesa and (its) the President were involved in 
a reciprocal transfer of functions. 
In this second aspect two predictions (election procedure and functions) are supported 
for both countries during the whole period. Censure motions (2), supported, only apply 
to Chile. Regarding the partisan composition of the directing boards, in Chile only two 
periods had a VP2 from the opposition, and in Argentina ruling parties always kept the 
lion’s share of the positions. The tendency, again, is in favor of the cartel behavior.  
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STANDING COMMITTEE SYSTEM 
1 - Committees are agents of the ruling party or coalition 
Partially supported.  
Not all the following predictions, which derive from that main one, are supported.  
Creation of standing committees 
2 - The increase in the number of committees is not due to the need for matching the          
structure of ministries or for generating greater expertise, but an answer to requests 
from members of ruling and opposition parties or coalitions to occupy a place in the 
committee system. 
Not supported.  
Argentina. In the period 1946-1976 the prediction is not supported. The creation of 
committees was due to the need for matching the ministries, or dealing with social 
problems. Since 1983 the prediction is supported.  
Chile. The prediction is not supported. Idem Argentina period 1946-1976. 
3 - Ruling parties or coalitions control this process (creation of committees) and get 
the majority of Chairs of the new committees 
Supported. 
Argentina. Ruling parties controlled the process. They monopolized the new Chairs until 
1976, and secured the majority of them (68%) since 1983.  
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Chile. Ruling coalitions controlled the creation of new committees and monopolized 
their Chairs.  
Membership 
1 - Enlargement of committees’ memberships. Although the enlargement of 
committees’ memberships is meant to enhance the representation of delegations in the 
committee system, ruling parties or coalitions control this process and maintain their 
prevalence in the distribution of committee seats 
Not supported. 
Argentina. Ruling parties controlled the process during the whole period. They 
maintained their prevalence in the distribution of committee seats after the 
enlargement twice during the 1960s, and twice at the end of the 1990s. The rest of the 
cases do not support the prediction.   
Chile. There was no enlargement of committees’ memberships. 
2 - Creation of leadership positions. The increase in committee leadership positions is 
due to requests from opposition parties to occupy a place in the directing boards of 
committees. Ruling parties or coalitions control this process and keep the lion’s                                   
share of the new committee leadership positions 
Partially supported. 
Argentina. Ruling parties controlled this process but did not get the lion’s share of all 
the new positions. The over-representation of ruling parties is clear since 1973 in the 
case of Secretaries (after 1985 there was a decline), and since 1989 for VC2. The 
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distribution of VC1 was mostly equivalent until 1987. After that year it benefited the 
second party in Chamber.  
Chile. No new leadership position was created.  
Committee assignments 
1 - The allocation of committee seats is controlled by ruling parties or coalitions 
Supported. 
Argentina. Since the 1940s rules about assignments have not been modified, and 
Presidents have always been entitled by the Chamber to determine the allocation of 
committee seats. 
Chile. Ruling coalitions have limited their power over the committee assignment process 
(1967), but have controlled the process during the whole period. Chamber’s approval has 
always been a requisite. The President of the Chamber made the assignment proposal 
until 1973. Since the 1990s this proposal is made by the Mesa.  
2 - Partisan composition. Party ratios in committees are consistently set in ruling 
parties’ or coalitions’ favor 
Not supported. 
In both Chambers committee assignments have been proportional.  
3 - Ruling parties or coalitions have super-proportional share of seats in important 
committees 
Supported. 
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Members of ruling parties or coalitions had the upper hand in the strategic composition 
of committees. 
Seniority and apprenticeship norms matter about as much as party dominance (they are 
not the main criteria).  
Seniority remains a marginal status in Argentina (79% of deputies are at their first four-
year term). More than half of the deputies in the Corporación are seniors (53%).   
Chairmanships 
1 - Assignment process. The assignment of committee Chairs is controlled by ruling 
parties or coalitions. 
Supported. 
2 - Partisan composition. Ruling parties or coalitions have super-proportional share of 
chairmanships 
Supported.  
Predictions 1 and 2 are supported in the Chambers for the whole period. In addition, 
parties and coalitions almost monopolized the Chairs of the most important committees.     
Seniority-in-Committee matters in both Chambers as much as ruling party to become 
Chair but the influence of the norm seems to be stronger in the Corporación.  
Regarding both types of seniority norms (in Chamber and in Committee) consider that 
the harmonious and constant four-year renewals in the Corporación helped to build an 
organization composed of a majority of seniors whose experience is well valued. In the 
Argentine Chamber, by contrast, a conflictive combination of biannual renewals and 
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successive military coups, coupled with the diversified careers of the Argentine 
politicians (Jones et al. 2002; Jones and Hwang 2005), shaped a lower Chamber of 
newcomers who skipped the cursus honorum to reach important positions.  
Margin Hypothesis 
Not supported.  
There is no significant difference in the control of the standing committees’ 
compositions among types of majorities/pluralities.   
In this third aspect, though the predictions related to the “creation of the standing 
committees” and the “membership” are partially supported, the tendency regarding 
the cartel behavior in the Corporación is negative. In the case of committee 
assignments we have for the first time a “not supported” prediction for both Chambers 
for the whole period (prediction no. 2). This proportionality may be related also with 
the negative result of the margin hypothesis. No matter the type of majority or 
plurality, committee assignments have been proportional. The other two predictions (1 
and 3 of “committee assignments”), by contrast, are supported. The predictions about 
committee Chairs are both supported. The tendency is in favor of the support of the 
Cartel Theory, though the structuring of the committee system has been stronger in 
the Argentine lower Chamber.      
 
Let us turn now to the analysis of the results considering this time the general 
hypothesis.  
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Part II. The Results vis à vis the General Hypothesis - Parties as Procedural  
Coalitions  
 
Despite their differences, the various majorities and pluralities, single-parties 
and coalitions that ruled the Chilean and Argentine Chambers have determined the key 
features of their organizations from the 1940s to the 2000s. This process was not 
neutral. The aforementioned results show that making use of the rule-making power of 
their Chambers, parties and coalitions maintained and adopted a constellation of 
organizational rules and norms that advantaged their interest. In the words of Cox and 
McCubbins, they behaved as procedural coalitions. 
The general hypothesis is when a legislative party or coalition becomes the ruling party or 
coalition in the Chamber, it will function as a procedural coalition, that is, it will usurp the 
rule-making power of the Chamber to its favor. 
In order to analyze the results vis à vis this hypothesis it is useful to refer to the 
distinction made by Cox and McCubbins between “active” and “latent” procedural 
power. Active procedural power is related to the scheduling power either to expedite 
(positive agenda power), or delay (negative agenda power) the progress of a bill. 236 The 
latent procedural power refers to the substantive advantages the majority party can 
                                                            
236 According to Cox and McCubbins examples of positive agenda power include the prerogative a committee 
can have to craft special rules, the U.S. Speaker’s ability to allow motions to “suspend the rules and pass” a 
particular bill, and the President’s right under the urgency procedure to send bills to the top of the assembly’s 
agenda (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 353). The first two cases do not apply to the Chilean and the Argentine 
Chambers. The Chilean President (Executive Power), however, can declare the urgency procedure. As 
mentioned in chapter I, this parallel procedure is one of the most important subjects in the subfield (executive-
legislative relations), and perhaps one of the reasons that explain the lack of comprehensive studies about the 
agenda control in the Chambers. Therefore, my analysis focuses on the negative agenda-setting power.  
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attain simply by structuring the committee system (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 8, 253, 
259).  
To that distinction I add what I call a “second type” of latent procedural power. It relates to 
the control of floor proceedings, either to lessen the ruling parties’ task of disciplining the 
troops on the floor or to limit the participation of the opposition during the session.  
I consider these procedural powers in sections 1 to 3. In the last section I explain how rules 
and norms that do not support the general hypothesis affect my analysis. I use the 
acronym RP to refer to ruling majorities/pluralities, single-parties/coalitions.  
 
Section 1.  Setting the Agenda  
 
The Chilean and Argentine RP controlled the election and monopolized/secured a 
super-proportional share of what Carroll, Cox, and Pachon (2006, 154) call “mega-seats”, 
that is, members of the directing boards and Chairs of standing committees that are in 
charge of the day-to-day legislative agenda.  
Argentine RP created powerless Vice-Chairs and Secretaries in committees and a Vice-
Presidency and positions in the Chamber to avoid sharing those mega-seats with the 
opposition or, in terms of Cox and McCubbins, to avoid sharing the agenda-setting power. 
Chilean RP controlled the election of the Mesa and the chairmanships without creating 
new positions (because the opposition rejected this option), and consistently retained this 
political prerogative when the opposition demanded its share of mega-seats.  
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All in all, both RP maintained the control of those mega-seats and, consequently, of the 
agenda-setting power. The difference is that the Argentine Chamber was affected in its 
structure, and in its budget by the creation of these powerless new positions.  
Both RP also cartelized the agenda via offices that are endowed negative agenda-setting 
power. These offices are the Presidency, the Mesa (Chile), the Committee on 
Parliamentary Business -CLP- (Argentina), the chairmanships, the Hacienda Committee 
(Chile), and the Committee on R&HA (Chile).   
The Argentine and Chilean Presidents never lost the referral power and chair all the offices 
that have a say in the agenda of the Chamber (CLP -Argentina-; the Leaders Delegation’s 
Meeting and the Mesa -Chile-). The agenda-setting power was either maintained in the 
sphere of the Presidency, or redistributed inside the RP (i.e., the Chilean Mesa and the 
Argentine CLP).    
Chilean Presidents, in particular, are legally authorized to exercise an extreme version of 
the “speaker’s veto over scheduling” (Cox and McCubbins 1994, 227): they can reject bills 
and amendments (as mentioned in chapter VI this implies that “bills die before referral”). 
Chilean Chairs, in addition to their exclusive and complete control of the committee 
agenda, have also that extreme version of negative agenda-setting power: they can reject 
amendments. I highlight the fact that bills or amendments in these cases are not delayed 
but eliminated. That is why I talk about an extreme version of the “speaker’s veto over 
scheduling.” Note also that the rules that established these vetoes over scheduling were 
adopted by the Congressional Law of Pinochet. Chilean RP never amended these 
prerogatives even though that law was criticized and several times modified to suppress 
“authoritarian enclaves.”  
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In Argentina Presidents and Chairs have substantial though traditional negative agenda-
setting power. Argentine Presidents (who concentrate administrative, budgetary and 
legislative functions) can exercise negative agenda-setting power over bills when they 
decide the referral (e.g., the bill is referred to as many committees as possible, including 
the Committee on Budget), or later, in the CLP, when they can veto the placement of the 
bill in the order of business.  In both cases, the difference with Chile is that the bill “is 
alive,” despite its fate inside the legislative labyrinth. Argentine Chairs, who can also veto 
the placement of the bill in the committee agenda, have a kind of positive agenda power: 
they can determine the majority report in case of tie (expediting in this way the passage of 
a bill to the consideration of the CLP).  
The extreme version of the “speaker’s veto over scheduling” in the hands of the Chilean 
Presidents and Chairs (who also have the traditional negative agenda-setting power) is a 
powerful tool to cartelize the agenda, a tool their Argentine counterparts do not have. To 
put it differently, RP in both Chambers are strong, though Chilean RP are more powerful 
(cartelized) than Argentine’s.  
The Chilean and Argentine RP have behaved as cartels regarding the defence of their 
directing boards in two different ways.  
In Chile RP controlled the censure motions to the Mesas. In this sense, they secured the 
bedrock of the RP power (the very foundation from which derives all the prerogatives).  
In Argentina RP cartelized the defence of their directing boards differently: RP never 
regulated censure motions. This is an issue that “does not reach the floor.”  
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Chilean RP have two other mighty tools to cartelize the agenda that Argentine’s do not 
have: the control and the subsidiary prerogatives of Hacienda. By the former, Hacienda can 
extend the “financing analysis” to parts of the bills not referred to its report. By the latter, 
Hacienda can report bills that technical committees do not report. In reference to this 
negative agenda power of Hacienda, it is important to mention that its equivalent in 
Argentina (the Committee on Budget) also exercises a control function (since bills 
authorizing the expenditure of money need its approval). The point is that the Argentine 
Committee on Budget, though criticized for its powers by the rest of the committees, 
never had Haciendas’ prerogatives, namely the “extension of the financing analysis” and 
the subsidiary role.   
Finally, Chilean RP, in contrast to their Argentine’s counterparts, hold a larger share of 
seats in the Committee on R&HA because the Mesa belongs to this committee in their 
own right. R&HA, as mentioned, is in charge of reporting all reforms to the Reglamento.  
 
Section 2.  Structuring the Committee System  
Some of the aforementioned measures to cartelize the agenda (i.e., the monopoly/ 
super-proportional share of mega-seats which includes the Chairs of standing committees, 
the negative agenda power of Chairs, the jurisdictions of Hacienda (Chile) and Budget 
(Argentina), and the special membership of the Chilean R&HA) can also be considered as 
measures adopted by RP to structure the committee system.  
In the next paragraphs I mention other aspects of the committee system cartelized by 
both RP: the chairmanships, the committee assignment process, the creation of standing 
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committees, the (re)defining of their jurisdictions, and the enlargement of their 
memberships and leadership positions.  
Both RP assigned committee Chairs in a “systematically partisan fashion” (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993, 13) during the whole period, namely to the most important committees. 
Furthermore, Chilean RP ratified this norm against the will of opposition parties.      
Argentine RP went one step further in the cartelization of the committee system: 
committee assignments never received floor approval. The second, non-regulated phase of 
the committee assignment process begins and ends in hands of the President of the 
Chamber. This is another “issue that does not reach the floor.”  
In addition, Argentine RP used the rule-making power of the Chamber to avoid sharing the 
power resident in the committee system with the opposition (enlarging committees’ 
memberships -early 1960s; late 1990s- and creating standing committees -since the 
1980s- and leadership positions -1963; 1987- in a systematically partisan fashion).  
Chileans RP, for their part, progressively redefined the jurisdiction of Hacienda and 
rejected every bill oriented to weaken its power, particularly in the 1990s.   
 
Section 3.  Controlling Floor Proceedings  
In addition to controlling the agenda and structuring the committee system, the 
Argentine and Chilean RP adopted rules and norms to get a tighter control of floor 
proceedings (what I called the second type of “latent power”). These rules and norms tend 
either to facilitate the task of disciplining the troops on the floor (a role generally 
performed by the RP’s delegation leader), or to limit the participation of the opposition / 
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complicate its decisions imposing qualified majorities, or thresholds to move or table 
motions.  
Among the first type (rules and norms that facilitate the discipline on the floor), we find 
the voting system to elect directing boards (Argentina), the lowered quorum (Argentina), 
and the consideration of abstentions as affirmative votes (Chile).  
As to the election of the directing boards in Argentina, RP have replaced the roll-call 
voting system by a weighted voting system. It is true that this system is more expedite. 
But it is also very effective to avoid surprises on the floor (e.g., speeches of a faction of the 
party that disagrees with the distribution of Chairs and encourages “indiscipline”), and 
makes definitely more difficult the use of the right to speak to rebel deputies inside the 
RP.      
A lowered quorum (Argentina), no matter how minor the amendment may be, is always 
beneficial for RP. The records of the Chamber show that sometimes the presence of only 
one deputy makes the difference to open or continue a session.  
The consideration of abstentions as affirmative votes (Chile) is a great relief for RP: rebel 
deputies inside a RP in general do not vote on the negative but abstain. If this happens, 
there is no need to worry about the final result of the vote.    
Examples of the second type of measures (those that tend to limit the participation of the 
opposition or to complicate its decisions) are the qualified majorities required to discuss 
questions of privilege (Argentina); the reduction of all terms to speak on the floor 
(Argentina); the proportional time allotting on the floor and in the period of Incidentes 
(Chile); the reduction of the period of Incidentes (Chile); the suppression of The Hour 
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(Argentina);  the control of motions of recommit (Chile), and the increased number of 
deputies to demand a special session (Argentina).   
 
Section 4.  Rules and Norms that Do Not Support the General Hypothesis  
 
Ruling parties in the Argentine and the Chilean Chambers are alike in another 
sense. As shown in Part I, they have approved rules that weakened their power, and I 
also found some patterns that contradict the Cartel Theory. In particular I should 
mention the proportional committee assignments during the whole period in both 
Chambers, the decision to fix a coefficient to allocate committee seats (Chile), the 
“participative decisions” adopted in the Corporación in the early 1990s, the approval of 
rules that benefited minorities (Argentina), and the failed attempt to accrue the power 
of RP (Argentina).  
How do these decisions affect the precedent analysis? In response to an article that had 
underlined the existence of similar rules in the U.S. House, Cox and McCubbins (1997) 
argued that majority parties can lose several battles on the margin but still benefit 
substantially from the rules as a whole. What matters is the “overall partisan impact of 
the rules (…) if the changes consistently decrease, or consistently increase, the power 
of majority party leaders” (Cox and McCubbins 1997, 1385). In my cases, there is no 
doubt that ruling parties and coalitions continued to benefit from the “rules as a whole” 
despite the adoption of some decisions that suppressed their benefits or disadvantaged 
them. Besides, those rules and patterns did not affect the prerogatives that form the 
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core of the RP power. Furthermore, the patterns of cartel behavior found in the Chilean 
and Argentine Chambers consistently increased the power of their RP through time.   
 
Part III. Specificities. Negative Agenda-Setting Power in Chile and Powerful  
Legislative Parties in Argentina 
The authors reviewed in chapter I saw no difference between the agenda 
control exercised in the Argentine and Chilean Chambers (Carey 2002, Alemán 2006). 
Discussing the (positive) agenda control of Chilean Presidents, Carey argues that “the 
formal agenda control of officers of the Chilean Congress within the legislature is akin 
to that found elsewhere” (Carey 2002, 238).    
The results of this research show that this is not the case. Chilean RP have endowed 
several offices with negative agenda-setting power. Some of them are more powerful 
than their Argentine’s counterparts.  
These results are not just important to establish a difference between Chambers. In my 
view they should be considered to nuance the claims about the overriding influence of 
the Executive Power over the Chamber in Chile. The urgency procedure, for instance, is 
a positive agenda (and strong) agenda power of the Executive to expedite (skipping 
legislative steps, reducing times) the analysis of a bill. The weekly meetings between 
legislators of the coalition and the ministries of the Executive are another (positive) way 
to set the agenda. Besides these tools, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that 
the Chamber, itself, has strong negative agenda-setting powers to delay or even 
eliminate the passage of a bill. This fact should be acknowledged and considered 
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together with the influence of the Executive when assessing the success of ruling 
coalitions in the Corporación.  
How can this difference between Argentina and Chile be explained? Commenting on the 
agenda-setting power of majorities in the U.S. House, Cox and McCubbins give an 
explanation that I consider useful to answer this question. The authors argue that 
“legislative parties— especially in systems where floor voting discipline is costly to 
secure, such as the U.S. — specialize in controlling the agenda, rather than in 
controlling votes. That is, they seek to determine what is voted on to begin with, rather 
than to dictate their members’ votes issue by issue (although they do regularly seek 
votes on the margin)” (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 15). 
This may explain why there is more negative agenda-setting power in the Corporación. I 
am not saying that Chilean coalitions are not disciplined on the floor. 237 Rather, I simply 
wish to point out four facts. First, coalitional intra-organizational dynamics are different 
from single-parties’ (namely regarding the process of decision-making and the 
distribution of legislative benefits and mega-seats), and demand a coordination 
between each party’s and the alliance’s goals. Second, except for the Concertación, 
Chilean coalitions were temporary alliances whose partners changed from one 
legislative period to another. Third, while the Chilean Chamber was ruled by nine 
majority coalitions, its Argentine equivalent was only three times in the hands of 
alliances. Fourth, the Argentine lower Chamber is considered an organization with high 
levels of party discipline (Jones 2002).    
                                                            
237 Regarding the unity of Chilean coalitions on the floor see Ames 2002; Maureira 2007; Alemán and Saiegh 
2007.    
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Therefore, the great variety of Chilean ruling coalitions, given the challenges that their 
intra-organizational dynamics impose, may have influenced the creation of a system 
with several offices endowed with substantial negative agenda-setting power, rather 
than one specialized in controlling the troops on the floor.  
 
In the case of Argentina, the literature argues that the substantive cohesion on the floor 
“stems primarily from a combination of institutional rules governing the elections and 
intralegislative organization” (Jones 2002, 184). Mustapic (2002) stresses the functions of 
the President of the Chamber, party leaders, and their influence on the behavior of 
legislators, mainly through the allocation of committee positions. The success of the 
majority party -the PJ- in the 1989-2003 period, Jones and Hwang (2003b) explain, stems 
from its functioning as an effective cartel. In Argentina “this majority control is based on 
a similar mix, but with distributive incentives easily dominating ideology and party 
reputation” (Jones and Hwang 2003b, 16).  
My analysis suggests that the success of the “strong” Argentine ruling parties to control 
the Chamber is also due to a less evident process of creation and distribution of 
powerless but permanent positions to the opposition. In this way, ruling parties satisfied 
the demands of the opposition and kept the control of the Chamber. As I mentioned, this 
process impacted the structure and the budget of the Chamber. In my opinion, the 
committee system is the first collateral damage of this process.  
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Part IV. Avenues of Research 
 
Researchers have only begun to discover Latin American legislatures. This 
dissertation could be considered as part of this effort. To make further progress in this 
fascinating subfield I think we should explore certain institutional tools, and extend this 
type of analysis to other Chambers. In this sense, I envisage three avenues of research. 
First, the impact of the extreme version of the “speaker’s veto over scheduling” 
Chilean Presidents and Chairs have needs to be ascertained. In particular, we need to 
look at which bills or amendments are left out of the agenda. It would be important to 
know the origin of the bills (deputies of the opposition/ruling party), but also the 
content of the bills rejected. This negative agenda-setting power is in force since the 
1990s. The comparison between legislative periods would tell us if ruling coalitions 
agreed or disagreed on the legislation that should not pass through the years. Likewise, 
a systematic comparison between this extreme veto power and the power of referral of 
the Argentine President would be extremely useful. No doubt, Chilean Presidents are 
stronger in this sense, but we should not underestimate the negative agenda-setting 
power of a President that has forty-five committees at her disposal to decide the 
referral. In Argentina bills may be “alive” but hopelessly lost in the legislative labyrinth.  
Second, we need to compare the negative agenda-setting power of the 
Committee on Parliamentary Business -CLP- (Argentina) and the Leaders Delegation’s 
Meetings -LDM-. These institutions are clearly different: one is loosely defined 
(Argentina), the other is regulated and bases its decisions in a weighted voted system. 
334 
 
 
Their composition, however, is similar. They are composed of party leaders and chaired 
by the Presidents of the Chambers. Until know we know something about the CLP, but 
almost nothing about the LDM. Which one is more effective from the point of view of 
the ruling parties’ or coalitions’ interests? What is the role of Presidents? Are all 
decisions in the LDM adopted by the weighted voting system? What is the place of the 
opposition in this case?  
These first two avenues are oriented to assess which strategy, the loosely regulated 
Argentine style or the hyper-regulated Chilean style, serves better the goals of the 
agenda-setting power.  
Finally, the comparative and diachronic study of the institutional evolution of 
other legislatures needs to be conducted. In this sense, I would choose Colombia and 
Mexico. Again, my choice follows the line of “different countries, different political 
contexts, different Chambers.” Once the differences established, the task is to analyze 
the behavior of their parties. The conventional wisdom that tells us about the dominant 
(and of course real) role of powerful Executives must not halt our efforts to explore the 
role of deputies in the design of their institutions. I tried to show in this dissertation that 
this is a fruitful line of research. 
  
Works on Latin American legislatures focus on parties as floor voting coalitions and on 
the relation between Congress and the Executive Power. Some of them have begun to 
explore what happens inside the Chambers. This dissertation, following Cox and 
McCubbins, provides a view of the influence of parties as procedural coalitions. As the 
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authors did for the U.S. House, I showed that cohesion on the floor, though important, 
is not the only measure of party strength. What happens before a bill is considered in 
the Chamber matters as much.     
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APPENDIX A 
 
OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS 
Argentine Chamber of Deputies 
- Rules of the Chamber  (“Reglamento de la Honorable Cámara de Diputados de la Nación”). 
Editions from 1955 to 2001.  
 
- Composition of the Chamber and Committees’ Memberships (“Cámara de Diputados de la 
Nación – Composición y Comisiones”);  
Editions from 1964 to 2000.  
-  
- Journals of Sessions of the Chamber of Deputies (“Diario de Sesiones de la Honorable Cámara 
de Diputados de la Nación”). 
Editions from 1946 to 1997.  
Online debates from 1998 to 2001 (“Versiones Taquigráficas Online”). 
http://www.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dtaquigrafos/frames.html   
-  
- Database - Argentine deputies (“ La Memoria Legislativa Argentina”) - Chamber of Deputies    
http://www.archivodiputados.gov.ar/ 
 
- Laws about party and electoral systems (1946-2001). 
 
- National Constitutions of 1853; 1949; 1994.  
 
 
Chilean Chamber of Deputies 
- Rules of the Chamber  (“Reglamento de la Cámara de Diputados de la Nación”). 
Editions from 1861 to 1973. 
Online editions since 1990 http://www.camara.cl/camara/camara_LOC.aspx 
 
- Journals of Sessions of the Chamber of Deputies (“Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de 
Diputados de la Nación”). 
Editions from 1945 to 1973.  
Online debates from 1990 to 2002 (“Versiones Taquigráficas Online”). 
-  
- Organic Constitutional Law no. 18.700 (“Ley Orgánica Constitucional del Congreso 
Nacional”) 
Printed version of 1990  
Online version http://www.camara.cl/camara/camara_LOC.aspx 
 
- Database - Chilean deputies (“Reseñas Parlamentarias”) Library of the National Congress of 
Chile. 
http://biografias.bcn.cl/pags/biografias/index.php 
- Laws about party and electoral systems (1945-2002). 
 
- National Constitutions of 1833; 1925; 1980; 2005.  
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DEFINITIONS  
Bill. Other than bills, the Chambers analyze and pass resolutions, declarations (Argentina) and 
motions (Chile). I will use the term “bill” to refer to all of them. . 
Corporación. The Chilean lower Chamber.   
Delegation. The principal organizing unit of parties in the Chambers also known as bloc, party 
fraction, or caucus (Jones and Hwang 2003a).    
Floor or plenary. The body of deputies in a sitting of the Chambers.   
Freshmen. Deputies in their first term.  
Journal.  The Journal of Sessions of the Argentine or Chilean Chamber of Deputies.    
Legislative period. The legislative period in Chile and Argentina is the time the Chambers function 
between two elections. In Chile the legislative period last four years. It opens with the election of the 
Mesa and the committee assignments and coincides with the four-year terms of its deputies. In 
Argentina the legislative period lasts two years. It opens with the election of the directing board and 
the committee assignments but does not coincide with the four-year terms of its deputies. Note that 
in Argentina one-half of the Chamber is renewed every two years and that the directing board is 
elected every year.   
Mega-seats. Carroll, Cox, and Pachon (2006, 154) explain that “depending on the assembly in 
question, mega-seats are positions such as those held by the chief executive, cabinet ministers, the 
presiding officer, members of the directing board, and chairs of permanent committees”. 
Assemblies elect (or influence the appointment of) these officials who are in charge of the day-to-
day legislative agenda.  
Procedural coalitions. Alliances formed by those legislators who join to distribute/benefit from the 
institutional advantages (select the institutional leaders of the chamber, structure its committee 
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system, and get a disproportionate share of staff and other legislative resources). Morgenstern gives, 
in my view, a clear and brief definition when he argues that procedural coalitions, which may be quite 
different from floor coalitions, are formed by “those legislators who join to elect legislative leaders, 
approve voting rules, select staff, and dole out committee assignments, or generally organize the 
legislative business” (Morgenstern 2002, 10). 
Ruling party or coalition.  The party or coalition in control of the Chamber.  
Second (Third) party or coalition. The party or coalition that comes in second (third) place in terms 
of number of seats. 
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APPENDIX B
 
PARTIES AND COALITIONS  
IN THE ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES  - 1946-2001 
 
ACh  1991 Action for El Chaco (Acción Chaqueña) 
 
ALIANZA  1999 
Alliance for Jobs, Justice, and Education (Alianza por el Trabajo, la 
Justicia y la Educación) 
FREPASO – UCR 
APer 1991 Afirmación Peronista 
 
APFe  1973 Federalist Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular Federalista)  
DemP - MPJ - MPPam –  
PRBsAs – PUnPo 
APR  1973 Revolutionary Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria)  PC - PCRev – PI 
APSL 1965 Popular Action for San Luis (Acción Popular Sanluiseña) 
 
APTuc 1965 Provincial Action from Tucuman (Acción Provinciana de Tucumán) 
 
AR  
1997 Action for the Republic (Acción por la República)
 
BSJ  1973 Bloc from San Juan (Bloquista de San Juan) 
 
BUJ 1985 Bloc of the Justicialist Unity (Bloque de la Unidad Justicialista) 
 
CG 1995 Corriente Grande 
 
CONSR  1946 Conservative Party (Partido Conservador) 
 
CRSJ  1973 
Cruzada Renovadora from San Juan (Cruzada Renovadora de San 
Juan)  
DemC 1963 Democratic Christian Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano) 
 
DemMza 1985 Democratic Party from Mendoza (Partido Demócrata de Mendoza) 
 
DemN  1946 National Democratic Party (Demócrata Nacional)  
 
DemP 1946 Progressive Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Progresista) 
 
DPBB  1960 
Provincial Defense White Flag Party (Partido Defensa Provincial 
Bandera Blanca de Tucumán)  
D&J 1997 Justice and Development (Desarrollo y Justicia) 
 
FC-S 1997 Civic-Social Front (Frente Cívico-Social) 
 
FEDInt 
1999 Federal Inter-bloc (Interbloque Federal) 
DemMza - DemP - PRSlta –
PAutC – BSJ – CRSJ - D&J – 
LIB - MOPOFU  
FedPCe  1963 
National Federation of Center Parties (Federación Nacional de 
Partidos de Centro)  
CONSR- Dem – DemU - LIB –  
PN – PDCCF - DemN - PAM -  
FG 1993 Frente Grande 
 
FPCtes 1965 
Provincial Movement from Corrientes (Movimiento Provincial 
Correntino)  
FPNu 1997 New Party Front (Frente Partido Nuevo) 
 
FPProv  1963 Federation of Provincial Parties (Federación de Partidos Provinciales)  
CRSJ - BSJ - DPBB – MFDSlta 
 - PStgo   
FREJCat 
1985 FREJULI from Catamarca (FREJULI de Catamarca) 
 
FREJULI 1973 Justicialist Front of Liberation (Frente Justicialista de Liberación) 
 
FRep  1989 Republican Force (Fuerza Republicana)
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FREPASO 1995 Front of a Country in Solidarity (Frente País Solidario).  
 
H&L 1989 Humanism and Liberation (Humanismo y Liberación) 
 
LAb 1995 Línea Abierta 
 
LeI 1946 Labor & Independent Party (Partido Laborista e Independiente) 
 
LIB  1958 Liberal Party (Partido Liberal de Corrientes) 
 
MAS  1991 Movement to Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo) 
 
MAS - IZU 1989 
Movement to Socialism - Unified Left (Movimiento al Socialismo - 
Izquierda Unida)  
MAzB  1995 Blue and White Movement (Movimiento Azul y Blanco) 
 
MFDSlta 1963 
Federal Democratic Movement from Salta (Movimiento Federal 
Democrático de Salta)  
MFPam 1983 
Federal Movement from La Pampa (Movimiento Federalista 
Pampeano)  
MID 1965 
Movement of Integration and Development (Movimiento de 
Integración y Desarrollo)  
MODIN 1991 
Dignity and Independence Movement (Movimiento por la Dignidad y 
la Independencia)  
MOPE 1991 Peronist Movement (Movimiento Peronista) 
 
MOPOF 1991 
Popular Movement from Tierra del Fuego (Movimiento Popular 
Fueguino)  
MoReCi 1995 Civic Renovation Movement (Movimiento de Renvación Cívica) 
 
MPCat 1973 
Popular Movement from Catamarca (Movimiento Popular 
Catamarqueño)  
MPJ 1973 Popular Movement from Jujuy Movimiento Popular Jujeño) 
 
MPMza 1965 
Popular Movement from Mendoza (Movimiento Popular de 
Mendoza)  
MPN 1963 Popular Movement from Neuquén (Movimieto Popular Neuquino) 
 
MPPam 1973 Popular Movement from La Pampa (Movimiento Popular Pampeano) 
 
MPProv  
1963 Popular Provincial Movements (Movimientos Populares Provinciales)  
APSL - APTuc - FPCtes –
MPMza - MPN -PBla - PBTr – 
PLN - PUnPo -  
PUNSCruz - PyJu - 3B 
MPPSL 1973 
Provincial Popular Movement from San Luis (Movimiento Popular 
Provincial de San Luis)  
MPSal 1973 Popular Movement from Salta (Movimiento Popular Salteño) 
 
MS&Er 1999 Movimiento Social y Entrerriano 
 
National 
Front 
1646 Frente Nacional  PL - UCR-JR - LeI - UCR-Iri 
NOGroup 
 
Deputy belongs to no group 
 
PACh 1973 Action for Chubut Party (Partido Acción Chubutense) 
 
PAIS 1995 PAIS 
 
PAL  1963 Partido Autonomista Liberal de Corrientes 
 
PAM 1965 Alliance for Misiones (Partido Alianza Misionera) 
 
PAutC 
1983 Autonomist Party from Corrientes (Partido Autonomista de 
Corrientes)  
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PBJub 1989 White Party of Retired People (Partido Blanco de los Jubilados) 
 
PBla  1963 White Party (Partido Blanco) 
 
PBTr  1963 White Labor Party (Partido Blanco de los Trabajadores) 
 
PC 1995 Communist Party (Partido Comunista) 
 
PCB 1993 Popular Christian Bloc (Bloque Popular Cristiano) 
 
PCRev  1973 Christian Revolutionary Party (Partido Cristiano Revolucionario) 
 
PDCCF  1963 
Democratic Conservative Party from the Federal Capital (Partido 
Democrático Conservador de la Capital Federal)  
PdeC 1960 Parties of the Center (Partidos de Centro)  LIB - DemN 
PFed 1987 Federal Party (Partido Federal) 
 
PI  1983 Intransigent Party (Partido Intransigente) 
 
PJ  1946 Peronist/Justicialist Party (Partido Peronista/Justicialista) 
 
PJ/17 Oct 1985 Peronist Bloc October 17 (Bloque Peronista 17 de Octubre) 
 
PJ/FR  1985 PJ Renewal Front (PJ Frente Renovador) 
 
PLab 1946 Labor Party (Partido Laborista) 
 
PLN 1963 National Labor Party (Partido Laborista Nacional) 
 
PN 1963 National Party (Partido Nacional) 
 
POLe 1973 Legal Orientation Party (Partido Orientación Legalista) 
 
PPC 1973 Popular Christian Party (Partido Popular Cristiano) 
 
PPRN  1973 Provincial Party from Rio Negro (Partido Provincial de Rio Negro) 
 
PProvMSL 1973 
Provincial parties from Mendoza and San Luis (Partidos Provinciales 
"Mendoza y San Luis")  
PRBsAs 1973 
Renovation Party from Buenos Aires Province (Partido Renovador de 
la Provincia de Bs. As.)  
PRSlta 1985 Renovation Party from Salta (Partido Renovador de Salta) 
 
PSA 1963 Argentine Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Argentino) 
 
PSD 1963 Democratic Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Democrático) 
 
PStgo 1963 
Provincial Party from Santiago del Estero (Provincial de Santiago del 
Estero)  
PSUC 1987 
Unified-Christian Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Unificado-
Cristiano)  
PUnPo 1965 Popular Union Party (Partido Unión Popular) 
 
PUNSCruz 1965 
National Unity Party from Santa Cruz (Partido Unión Nacional de 
Santa Cruz)  
PURN  1946 
Unified Party of the National Revolution (Partido Unificado de la 
Revolución Nacional)   
P&J 1995 Justice and Participation (Participación y Justicia) 
 
ReDe 1995 Republican & Democratic (Republicano Democrático) 
 
UB 1999 Unity from Bs. As. (Unidad Bonaerense) 
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UCeDe  1983 Union of the Democratic Center (Unión de Centro Democrático) 
 
UCR  1948 Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical) 
 
UCR/Anti  1946 Antipersonalista UCR (UCR-Antipersonalista) 
 
UCR-Bl 1946 Bloquista Radical Civic Union (UCR Bloquista) 
 
UCR-CN 1946 Radical Civic Union - National Commitee (UCR-Comité Nacional) 
 
UCR-Iri 1946 Irigoyenista Radical Civic Union  (UCR-Irigoyenista) 
 
UCR-JR 1946 Radical Reorganizing Group (UCR-Junta Renovadora) 
 
UCRI 1958 
Intransigent Radical Civic Union - the Intransigent Radicals- (UCR 
Intransigente)   
UCRP 1958 People's Radical Civic Union -the People's Radicals- (UCR del Pueblo) 
 
UdelPA  1963 Union of the Argentine People (Unión del Pueblo Argentino) 
 
US 1987 Socialist Unity (Unidad Socialista) 
 
3B 1963 Three Flags (Tres Banderas) 
 
    
 
Note: The year in the second column refers to the first register of the party or coalition 
 in the booklets of the Composition of the Chamber and Committees’ Memberships  
(“Cámara de Diputados de la Nación – Composición y Comisiones”
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APPENDIX C  
ELECTION OF THE DIRECTING BOARDS – ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001 
YEAR 
PARTY 
DIRECTING 
BOARD (P-VP1-
VP2-VP3) 
PRESIDENT VP1 VP2 VP3 
1946 
UCR/JR-PLab-
LeI 
Each delegation 
voted for its 
candidate 
Each delegation voted for 
its candidate 
Each delegation voted for 
its candidate 
- 
1948 -1952-1955 PJ-PJ-PJ " " " 
- 
-
1958-1960 / 
1960-1962 
UCRI-UCRI-UCRI " " " 
- 
-
1963 
UCRP-UCRI-
UdelPA 
UCRP, UCRI, 
UdelPA, DemC, 
DemP, and PSD 
voted for the UCRP 
candidate 
UCRP, UCRI, UdelPA, 
DemC, DemP, and PSD 
voted for the UCRI 
candidate 
UCRP, UdelPA, PSD and 
DemP voted for the UdelPA 
candidate  
- UCRI, MPProv, and DemC 
voted for the MPProv 
candidate 
PSA, FPProv, and FedPCe voted for their candidates 
1965 UCRP-PJ-MID 
UCRP, PJ, 
MID, and 
UCRI 
voted for 
the UCRP 
candidate 
UCRP, PJ, MID, and UCRI 
voted for the PJ candidate 
UCRP, PJ, MID and UCRI voted 
for the MID candidate - 
PSA, FPProv, and FedPCe voted for their candidates 
1973 
PJ-PJ (PPC)-PJ 
(MID) 
All delegations 
voted for the 
PJ candidate 
PJ voted for PJ (PPC) PJ voted for PJ (MID) 
- 
UCR, APFe, and PAL voted 
for UCR 
UCR, APFe and PAL voted for 
APFe 
PProvMSL, APR and PCRev voted for their candidates  
1983 UCR-UCR-PJ 
All delegations 
voted for the 
UCR candidate 
UCR, PJ, DemC, BSJ, MPJ, 
LIB, MFPam, MPN, and 
UCeDe voted for the UCR 
candidate 
UCR, PJ, DemC, UCeDe, and 
MPN voted for the PJ candidate 
- 
PI voted for the PJ 
candidate 
PI voted for the PI candidate 
BSJ, MPJ, LIB, and MFPam voted 
for the BSJ candidate 
1985 
UCR-UCR-PJ 
(FR) 
All delegations 
voted for UCR 
All delegations voted for 
the UCR candidate  
UCR, PJ, DemC, DemP, BSJ, 
PRSlta, MPN, MPJ, and MPCat 
voted for the PJ (FR) candidate 
- 
PAutC, LIB, DemP, and UCeDe 
voted for the PAutC candidate 
PI voted for the PI candidate 
1987 UCR-PJ-UCeDe 
Majority of 
delegations 
voted for the 
UCR candidate
All delegations for the PJ 
candidate 
UCR, UCeDe, AutC, DemMza, 
DemP, PAL, PPRN, PRSlta, 
PRBsAs, APTuc, and PFed voted 
for the UCeDe candidate 
- 
DPBB abstained  
The President of the Chamber 
and Deputy Alsogaray voted for 
the UCeDe candidate 
PJ-FR, DemC, PI, MPN, MPCat, 
MID, Soc, Unidad Justicialista, 
MoPoJu, and DPBB voted for the 
MPN candidate  
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ELECTION OF THE DIRECTING BOARDS – ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001 
(cont.) 
YEAR 
PARTY 
DIRECTING 
BOARD (P-
VP1-VP2-VP3) 
PRESIDENT VP1 VP2 VP3 
1989 PJ-PJ-UCR 
Majority of 
delegations 
voted for PJ 
PJ, UCR, DemC, HyL, FR, 
MPN, PRSlta, MPJu, PI, 
MPRioN, PBlanco, Unidad 
Soc, and ACR San Juan 
voted for the PJ candidate 
PJ, UCR, DemC, HyL, 
MPN, PRSlta, MPJu, PI, 
MPRioN, PBlanco, and 
Unidad Soc voted for 
UCR 
- 
UCeDe and 
IU abstained 
IU, UCeDe, DemP, Lib y 
AutCtes, and 
PDMza abstained 
ACR San Juan voted for 
the MPN candidate 
IU, UCeDe, DemP, LIB y 
AutCtes, PDMza, and FR 
abstained 
1991 PJ-PJ-UCR 
Majority of 
delegations 
voted for PJ Majority of delegations 
voted for the PJ candidate 
Majority of delegations 
voted for the UCR 
candidate 
- 
MAS 
abstained 
1993 PJ-PJ-UCR 
Majority of 
delegations 
voted for the 
PJ candidate 
Majority of delegations 
voted for PJ 
Majority of delegations 
voted for UCR 
- 
FG 
abstained 
FG abstained FG abstained   
1995 PJ-PJ-UCR 
Majority of 
delegations 
voted for the 
PJ candidate 
Majority of delegations 
voted for the PJ candidate 
Majority of delegations 
voted for the UCR 
candidate 
- 
FREPASO 
abstained 
FREPASO abstained 
FREPASO and CG 
abstained 
  
1997 
PJ-PJ-UCR-
FREPASO 
Majority of 
delegations 
voted for the 
PJ candidate 
Majority of delegations 
voted for the PJ candidate 
Majority of delegations 
voted for the UCR 
candidate 
FREPASO, PJ, UCR, 
PAIS,  MPPSL, ReDe, 
and Lab voted for the 
FREPASO candidate 
LIB, BSJuan, 
RSlta, DemP 
and DMza 
voted for the 
DemP 
candidate 
LIB, BSJuan, RSlta, DMza, 
and DemP voted for the 
Dmza candidate  
LIB, BSJuan, RSlta, 
DMza, and DemP voted 
for the LIB candidate  
DMza, LIB, 
BSJuan,RSlta, DemP, 
PAutC, MPJu, and 
D&J voted for the 
BSJuan candidate 
UCR, 
FREPASO, 
AR, and 
CRSan Juan 
abstained   
MPJu and D&J voted for 
the UCR candidate 
FRTucuman voted for the 
BSJuan candidate 
MPN, MOPOF, 
FRTuc, and FPNu for 
the provincial parties 
candidate 
  
UCR and FREPASO 
abstained   
MPN voted for the UCR-
FREPASO candidate 
  
    
MPJu and D&J voted for 
the FREPASO candidate 
  
    FPNu abstained   
1999 
UCR-
FREPASO-PJ-
FEDInt 
All 
delegations 
voted for the 
UCR 
candidate  
All delegations voted for 
the FREPASO candidate  
All delegations voted for 
the PJ candidate 
ALIANZA, BFed, and 
UB voted for the 
FEDInt candidate 
      
AR and PJ voted for 
the AR candidate 
      
PNCtes, MPN, and 
FR voted for the 
MPN candidate 
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APPENDIX D  
CREATION STANDING COMMITTEES - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001 
1946-48 1955 1963-65 1973-76 1983-85 1987-89 1989-91 
20/09/48 06/05/55 22/12/63 23/07/65 26/11/73 09/05/84 21/12/87 13/09/90
Aboriginal 
Affairs 
(Manuel 
Sarmiento-
U.C.R /IRI) a 
Finance 
(Mario A. 
Guberville-
PJ) 
Housing 
(Isidro G. 
Balbi-PJ) 
Energy & 
Fuels (Isidro 
G. Balbi-PJ) 
Science & 
Technology 
(Salvador 
Busacca-
FREJULI) 
Family, Women 
& Childhood 
(Florentina G. 
Miranda-UCR-
Olga Riutort -PJ) 
Economy 
(Guido Di 
Tella-PJ) 
Taxation 
(Alberto E. 
Balestrini-
PJ) 
 
Industry 
(Eloy 
 P. Camus-PJ) 
  
Natural 
Resources 
(Hugo A. 
Franco-
FREJULI) 
Regional 
Development 
(Alejandro 
Manzur-UCR) 
Mining 
(José 
Furque-
UCR) 
 
 
Commerce  
(Guillermo 
De Prisco-PJ) 
  
Turism & 
Sports 
(Carlos O. 
Aragonés-
FREJULI) 
 
Drug 
Addiction 
(Eugenio 
Lestelle-
PJ) 
 
 
Comunicatio
ns (Oscar E. 
Bidegain-PJ)       
 
Transportati
on (Dorindo 
Carballido-
PJ)  
      
1991-93 1993-95 1995-97 1997-99 
19/12/91 30/09/92 01/12/93 21-21/09/95 05/06/96 18/03/98 03/06/98 
Population 
and Human 
Resources 
(Evaristo 
Iglesias-
UCR) 
Human 
Rights 
(Claudio 
Mendoza-
PJ) 
Culture 
(Ramón 
Giménez-PJ) 
Cooperative 
Affairs NGO 
(Emilio M. 
Garbino-PJ) 
Mercosur 
(Fernando 
Lahoz-PJ) 
Small Business 
(Rodolfo Rodil-
FREPASO) 
People with 
Disabilities 
(Elsa López-
PJ) 
Sports 
(Héctor 
Alvarez-PJ)  
Elderly (Omar 
Bruzzo-UCR) 
  
Consumers 
Protection 
(Mario Das 
Neves-PJ)  
Turism 
(Dante 
Camaño-PJ)  
Ports, 
Fisheries & 
Maritime 
Affairs (José 
Castillo-PJ) 
  
Homeland 
Security (Rafael 
Bulacio-RD)  
     
Freedom of 
Expression 
(Carlos Balter-
PD)  
a. In parenthesis () the party and name of their first Chair. 
 
Note: The committees on Aboriginal Affairs and on National Territories were dissolved in 1955 and in 1958, respectively. 
National Territories returned to the committee system as part of the Committee on Urban Affairs in 1963 to disappear again 
in 1991. The increase in the number of committees was due to the creation of new committees and to the division of the 
jurisdictions of three of them: the original committees on Industry and Commerce and on Communications and 
Transportation were divided in 1955 and the committee on Tourism and Sports was divided in 1991. Therefore the Chamber 
ended up with six committees instead of three (on Industry, on Commerce, on Communications, on Transportation, on 
Tourism, and on Sports).  
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ENLARGEMENT OF COMMITTEES’ MEMBERSHIP - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 
1946-2001 a 
 
STANDING COMMITTEES 
NUMBER OF MEMBERS BY LEGISLATIVE PERIOD 
1946  
1948 
1 955 
1960  
1962 
1963  
1965 
1983  
1985 
1991  
1993 
1993    
1995 
1997  
1999 
1999  
2001 
Constitutional Affairs 7 9 11 15 15-25 15-28 15-29 15-31 15-33
General Legislation 9 11 15 15-25 15-28 15-29 15-31 
Foreign Affairs 7 9 11 15 15-25 15-28 15-29 15-33 15-37
Budget  19 23 31 15-34 15-35 15-39 15-41
Education       7 9 11 15 15-25 15-28 15-29 15-31 15-33
Science & Technology  - - - - 15-25 15-28 15-29 15-31 
Culture - - - - - - 15-25 15-27 15-31
Judiciary 7 9 11 15 15-25   15-27 15-31
Pensions  7 9 14 15 15-25   15-27 15-31
Health  9 11 15 15-25   15-27 15-31
Family, Women & 
Childhood 
- - - - 15-25     15-27 15-31 
Elderly - - - - - - 15-25 15-27 15-31
Criminal Legislation 7 9 11 15 15-25   15-27 15-31
Labor 7 9 14 15 15-25   15-27 15-31
Defense 9 11 15 15-25   15-27 15-31
Public Works 7 9 11 15 15-25   15-27 15-31
Agriculture  7 9 11 15 15-25   15-27 15-31
Finance 9 11 15 15-25 15-28 15-29 15-31 
Industry (and Commerce) 7 9 - - - - - - -
Industry - 9 11 15 15-25 15-29 15-31 
Commerce 9 11 15 15-25 15-29 15-31 
Energy & Fuels  - - - - 15-25 15-28 15-29 15-31 
Communications (and 
Transportation)   
9       15-25 - - - - 
Comunications - 9 11 15 15-28 15-29 15-31 
Transportation  - 9 11 15 15-28 15-29 15-31 
Regional Development - - - - 15-25 15-28 15-29 15-31 
Urban Affairs 7 9 11 15 15-25   15-27 15-31
Fisheries & Maritime 
Affairs 
- - - - - - 15-25 15-27 15-31 
Housing  - - - 15 15-25   15-27 15-31
Rules 7 9 11 15 15-25   15-27 15-31
Impeachment Procedure 7 9 11 9 15-25   15-27 15-31
Natural Resources - - - - 15-25   15-27 15-31
Turism & Sports  - - - - 15-25 15-28     
Economy - - - - - 15-25   15-27 15-31
Mining - - - - - 15-25   15-27 15-31
Drug Addiction - - - - - 15-25   15-27 15-31
Taxation - - - - - - 15-25 15-27 15-31
Population and Human 
Resources  
- - - - - 15-25   15-27 15-31 
Sports - - - - - 15-25   15-27 15-31
Turism - - - - - 15-25   15-27 15-31
Human Rights - - - - - 15-25   15-27 15-31
Cooperative Affairs & NGO - - - - - - 15-25 15-27 15-31
Mercosur  - - - - - - - 15-27 15-31
Small Business  - - - - - - - 15-27 15-31
Consumers Protection - - - - - - - 15-27 15-31
Homeland Security  - - - - - - - 15-27 15-31
Freedom of Expression  - - - - - - - 15-27 15-31
People with Disabilities - - - - - - - - 15-31
National Territories 9 9 11 - - - - - -
Aboriginal Affairs 7 - - - - - - - -
No. Deputies 158 166 192 192 254 257 257 257 257
a. The resolutions that enlarged a limited group of committees are not included. 
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CREATION OF LEADERSHIP POSITIONS - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1963-2000 
 
STANDING COMMITTEES 
COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP POSITIONS BY LEGISLATIVE PERIOD 
1963 1987 1994 1998 1999 2000 
Constitutional Affairs P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S P+VP1+VP2+3S     P+VP1+VP2+4S
General Legislation P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S   P+VP1+VP2+3S   P+VP1+VP2+4S
Foreign Affairs P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S P+VP1+VP2+3S P+VP1+VP2+4S   P+VP1+VP2+4S
Budget  P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S P+VP1+VP2+3S     P+VP1+VP2+4S
Education       P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S   P+VP1+VP2+3S   P+VP1+VP2+4S
Science & Technology    P+VP1+VP2+2S     P+VP1+VP2+3S 
Culture     P+VP1+VP2+3S     P+VP1+VP2+4S
Judiciary P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S     P+VP1+VP2+3S 
Pensions  P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S   P+VP1+VP2+3S   
Health  P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S P+VP1+VP2+3S     
Family, Women & 
Childhood 
  P+VP1+VP2+2S P+VP1+VP2+3S     
 
Elderly       P+VP1+VP2+3S   
Criminal Legislation P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S   P+VP1+VP2+3S   
Labor P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S     P+VP1+VP2+3S 
Defense   P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S     P+VP1+VP2+3S 
Public Works P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S P+VP1+VP2+3S     P+VP1+VP2+4S
Agriculture  P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S   P+VP1+VP2+3S   P+VP1+VP2+4S
Finance P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S   P+VP1+VP2+3S   
Industry  P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S     P+VP1+VP2+3S 
Commerce P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S     P+VP1+VP2+3S 
Energy & Fuels   P+VP1+VP2+2S     P+VP1+VP2+3S 
Communications    P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S   P+VP1+VP2+3S   
Transportation  P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S   P+VP1+VP2+3S   
Regional Development   P+VP1+VP2+2S     P+VP1+VP2+3S 
Urban Affairs P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S   P+VP1+VP2+3S   
Fisheries & Maritime 
Affairs 
        P+VP1+VP2+3S 
 
Housing  P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S     P+VP1+VP2+3S 
Rules P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S   P+VP1+VP2+3S   
Impeachment Procedure P+VP+S P+VP1+VP2+2S     P+VP1+VP2+3S 
Natural Resources   P+VP1+VP2+2S P+VP1+VP2+3S     
Turism    P+VP1+VP2+2S   P+VP1+VP2+3S   
Economy   P+VP1+VP2+2S P+VP1+VP2+3S     
Mining   P+VP1+VP2+2S     P+VP1+VP2+3S 
Drug Addiction   P+VP1+VP2+2S     P+VP1+VP2+3S 
Taxation          P+VP1+VP2+3S 
Population and Human 
Resources  
        P+VP1+VP2+3S 
 
Sports         P+VP1+VP2+3S 
Human Rights         P+VP1+VP2+3S 
Cooperative Affairs & 
NGO 
      P+VP1+VP2+3S   
 
Mercosur          P+VP1+VP2+3S 
Small Business       P+VP1+VP2+3S   
Consumers Protection       P+VP1+VP2+3S   
Homeland Security        P+VP1+VP2+3S   
Freedom of Expression        P+VP1+VP2+3S   
People with Disabilities         P+VP1+VP2+3S 
No. Deputies 192 254 257 257 257 257 
          P: Chair 
          VP: Vice-president- VP1: 1st Vice-president - VP2: 2nd Vice-president 
          S: Secretary - 1S: 1st Secretary - 2S: 2nd Secretary - 3S: 3rd Secretary - 4S: 4th Secretary 
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APPENDIX E 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS - ARGENTINE LOWER CHAMBER 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Committee Power 10.885 6.867 0 40.2 
Ruling Party 0.547 0.498 0 1 
Regular Plurality 0.124 0.330 0 1 
Exceptional Plurality 0.093 0.291 0 1 
Regular Majority 0.099 0.298 0 1 
Exceptional Majority 0.065 0.247 0 1 
Qualified Majority 0.165 0.372 0 1 
Freshman 0.525 0.499 0 1 
Seniority (in legislative terms) 1.270 0.588 1 5 
Experience (committee-specific) 0.408 0.756 0 8 
Cumulation 2.607 1.654 0 11 
Group Position 0.076 0.265 0 1 
Chamber Position 0.014 0.118 0 1 
 
 
 
 
WEIGHTING OF COMMITTEES BY IMPORTANCE - ARGENTINE LOWER CHAMBER 
 
Committee Score Committee Score 
Budget  5.67 Natural Resources 2.45 
Foreign Affairs 5.67 Family, Women & Childhood 2.35 
Constitutional Affairs 5.00 Energy & Fuels  2.31 
General Legislation 4.33 Urban Affairs & National Territories 2.31 
Education       4.33 Economy 2.25 
Public Works 4.00 Science & Technology  2.12 
Agriculture  3.67 Housing  2.08 
Health  3.67 Regional Development 2.02 
Pensions  3.33 Tourism & Sports  1.88 
Transportation  3.33 Sports 1.88 
Finance 3.04 Elderly 1.63 
Labor 3.00 Mines 1.59 
Communications & Transportation   3.00 Drug Addiction 1.59 
Rules 3.00 Cooperative Affairs & NGOs 1.53 
Defense 3.00 Small Businesses 1.43 
Urban Affairs 3.00 Consumers Protection 1.43 
Criminal Legislation 3.00 Homeland Security  1.43 
Industry 3.00 Freedom of Expression  1.43 
Commerce 3.00 Population and Human Resources  1.39 
Communications 3.00 Port Activity, Fishing & Maritime Affairs 1.29 
Judiciary 2.67 Taxation 1.29 
Impeachment Procedure 2.67 Human Rights 1.29 
Industry & Commerce 2.67 Aboriginal Affairs 1.10 
Culture 2.63 Mercosur  1.10 
National Territories 2.57 People with Disabilities 1.00 
Tourism 2.55   
 
Note: See text for details on coding. 
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                                                                   APPENDIX F
                       POLITICAL PARTIES AND COALITIONS IN CHILE - 1945-2002
 
PARTIES 
 
   
AN   1964 National Action (Acción Nacional)  
API   1969/1973 Independent Popular Action (Acción Popular Independiente)  
APL45   1945 People's Liberation Alliance (Alianza Popular Libertadora)  
ARCh49  1949 Chilean Renewal Action (Acción Renovadora de Chile)  
CONS  19th Century Conservative party (Partido Conservador)  
ConsSC  1949 
Social Christian Conservative Party (Partido Conservador 
Socialcristiano) 
 
ConsT  1949 
Traditionalist Conservative Party (Partido Conservador 
Tradicionalista) 
 
ConsU  1953 United Conservative party (Partido Conservador Unido)  
DC  1957/1961 Christian Democrat Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano)  
FN  1938/1945 National Falange  (Falange Nacional)   
IC    1971/1973 Christian Left Party (Izquierda Cristiana)  
LDP  19th Century Liberal Democratic Party (Partido Democrático Liberal)   
MAPU   1969/1973 
Movement for United Popular Action (Movimiento de Acción 
Popular Unitaria) 
 
MNI53   1953 National Ibañista Movement (Movimiento Nacional Ibañista)  
MONAP53   1953 People’s National Movement (Movimiento Nacional del Pueblo)  
MR57  1957 Republican Movement (Movimiento Republicano)   
PA   1931/1945 Agrarian Party (Partido Agrario)   
PADENA  1960/1961 National Democratic Party (Partido Democrático Nacional)   
PAL   1945/1949 Agrarian Labor Party (Partido Agrario Laborista)  
PC  1922/1945 Communist Party (Partido Comunista)   
PD   19th Century Democratic Party (Partido Democrático)  
PD45  1945 Democrat Party (Partido Demócrata)   
PDPu49  1949 People's Democratic Party (Partido Democrático del Pueblo)   
PDR69  1969 Radical Democracy Party (Partido Democracia Radical)   
PFCh  1953 Feminist Party of Chile (Partido Femenino de Chile)  
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PIR  1971/1973 Left Radical Party (Partido de la Izquierda Radical)  
PL 19th Century Liberal party (Partido Liberal)  
PLab53  1953 Labor Party (Partido de los Trabajadores)   
PLD  19th Century Liberal Democratic Party (Partido Liberal Democrático)  
PLP  1945 Liberal Pregressive Party (Partido Liberal Progresista)   
PN1857  19th Century National Party  (Partido Nacional)    
PN56 1956/1957 National Party (Partido Nacional)   
PN66  1966 National Party 1966 (Partido Nacional 1966)  
PNCr53  1953 National Christian Party (Partido Nacional Cristiano)   
PNP   1958 Popular National Party (Partido Nacional Popular)  
PPD  1989 Party for Democracy (Partido por la Democracia)  
PPF  1953 Progressive Feminist Party (Partido Progresista Femenino)   
PPN45  1945 Progressive National Party (Partido Progresista Nacional)   
PR  19th Century Radical Party (Partido Radical)   
PRDem49  1946/1949 Democratic Radical Party (Partido Radical Democrático)   
PRDoc49 1949 Doctrinaire Radical Party (Partido Radical Doctrinario)   
PRSD94  1994 Radical Social Democrat Party (Partido Radical Social Demócrata)  
PS  1933/1945 Socialist Party (Partido Socialista)  
PSA  1945 Authentic Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Auténtico)   
PSD   1965 Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Demócrata)  
PSP   1948/1949 Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular)  
PST  1940 Socialist Workers Party (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores)   
PSur   1997 Party of the South (Partido del Sur)  
PT57  1957 Labor Party (Partido  del Trabajo - Partido de los Trabajadores)   
RN  1989 National Renewal Party (Partido Renovación Nacional)  
UCCP  1997 Center-Center Union (Unión de Centro Centro Progresista)   
UDI  1989 
Independent Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata 
Independiente) 
 
UNI53  1953 
National Union of Independents (Unión Nacional de 
Independientes)  
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USP  1967 Popular Socialist Union (Unión Socialista Popular)   
 
 
 
COALITIONS 
 
 
 
   
AHVerde  1990 Humanist-Green Aliance (Alianza Humanista Verde) 
Humanist Party  
- Green Party 
ANAP  1953 People’s National Alliance (Alianza Nacional del Pueblo)  
PAL - PSP - PDPu49  
- PRDoc49 - PPF  
CODE   1973 Democratic Confederation (Confederación Democrática) 
PN66 - DC - PADENA  
- PDR69 - PIR  
CONCERTACIÓN 
1989/1993/ 
1997 
Coalition of Parties for Democracy (Concertación de Partidos por 
la Democracia)  
DC - PS - PPD (see tables  
86-88-90)   
Democracy and Progress   1989 (Pacto Democracia y Progreso) RN - UDI 
Democratic Alliance  1945 Alianza Democrática  PR - PS - PC  
Federation of the Popular 
Unity  
1973 (Federación de la Unidad Popular)  
PS - PC - PR - PSD - MAPU  
- API - IC 
FENAFUI  1953 
National Federation of Ibañistas (Federación Nacional de Fuerzas 
Ibañistas)  
PNCr53 - ARCh49 - MNI - 
UNI - PFCh 
FP  1938 Popular Front (Frente Popular) PR - PS - PC  
FRAP  1956 Popular Action Front (Frente de Acción Popular) PSP - PS - PC - PDPu49    
FRAS    1947 
Radical Agrarian Socialist Falange (Falange Radical Agraria 
Socialista) 
FN - PRDem49 - PAL - PSP 
(N)DF   1961 (National) Democratic Front (Frente Democrático -Nacional-) CONS-LIB-PR  
PAIS  1989 
Broad Party of the Socialist Left (Partido Amplio de la Izquierda 
Socialista)  
Almeyda Socialists - PC  
- Christian Left  
UP  1969 Popular Unity (Unidad Popular)  
PS - PC - PR - PSD - MAPU  
- API - PIR 
Union for Chile 1997 (Unión por Chile)  RN - UDI - Psur 
Union for the Progress of Chile  1993 (Unión por el Progreso de Chile) RN - UDI - UCCP 
 
 
Note: The year in the second column refers to the legislative period in which the party  
entered in Chamber. When the second column has two years the first one refers to the  
year of creation of the party or faction.  
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APPENDIX G 
DATE OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL 
ELECTIONS  CHILE 
1945-2002 
Year 
Presidential 
Election 
Congressional 
Election 
   1945 a    04/03 
1946  04/09  
1947    
1948    
1949    06/03 
1950    
1951    
1952  04/09  
1953    01/03 
1954    
1955    
1956    
1957    03/03 
1958  04/09  
1959    
1960    
1961    05/03 
1962    
1963    
1964  04/09  
1965    07/03 
1966    
1967    
1968    
1969    02/03 
1970  04/09  
1971    
1972    
1973    04/03 
Military government 1973-1989 
 
   1989 b  14/12  14/12 
1990    
1991    
1992    
1993  11/12  11/12 
1994    
1995    
1996    
1997    11/12 
1998    
1999  12/12  
2000  16/01  
2001 16/12
a. The 1925 Constitution established a five-year term for presidents. According to the electoral law, presidential  
elections took place sixty days before the end of that term, and congressional elections were held “every four 
years, the first Sunday of March of the last year.” Electoral laws no. 6834 of 1941, 9334 of 1949, 12891 of 1958, 
14852 of 1962, and 17902 of 1973. 
b. Since 1989 congressional elections are held every four years “ninety days before the renewal of the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Senate, if this day coincides with a Sunday. If not, elections will be held next immediate 
Sunday.” (Electoral law no. 18,700). Following this chronogram and given that the renewal of the Chambers takes 
place in March every four years, all elections beginning in 1989 were held in December (that is, ninety days before 
this renewal). The presidential term has changed three times since the adoption of the 1980 Constitution. The 
constitutional reform of 2005 reduced from six to four years the presidential term, and established that 
presidential and legislative elections must be held on the same day. 
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APPENDIX H 
 
CREATION AND RENAMING OF STANDING COMMITTEES  
 
CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             1945-1949 1953-1957 1965-1969 
  1956 1967 1968 1969 
1- Interior     
    
2- Foreign Affairs         
3- Constitution, Legislation &  
Justice 
        
4- Education         
5- Hacienda          
6- Defence 
  
6- National 
Defence & Sports a 
    
7- Roads & Public Works   
  
  
7- Public Works 
& 
Transportation  
8- Agriculture & Colonization         
9- Asistencia Medico-Social e 
Higiene (Health) 
  9- Public Health     
10- Labor & Social Legislation   
10- Labor & Social 
Security  
    
11- Industry 
11- Mining & 
Industry 
11- Mining      
12- Economy & Commerce    
12-Economy & 
Transportation     
  
12-Economy, 
"Fomento" & 
Reconstruction  
13- Interior Surveillance & 
Rules (R&HA) 
  
  
15- Interior Regime, 
Administration & 
Rules (R&HA)   
    
13- Housing & 
Urban Affairs (DC) 
b 
    
    
  
14-Latin American 
Integration            
(Wilna Saavedra 
Cortes - DC) c   
a. The Special Committee on Sports was created in 1954. Its first Chair was Sergio Ojeda Doren (UNI53).  
The 1967 reform merged it with the Committee on Defense creating the Committee on Defense & Sports.  
Its first Chair was José R. Monares Gómez (DC). 
b.       Committees in bold and italics types are new committees. In parenthesis () the party and name of their first Chair. 
c.        In 1990 this committee merged with the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
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CREATION AND RENAMING OF STANDING COMMITTEES  
 
CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002 
(cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1990-1994 1994-1998 1998-2001 
March 1990 June 1990 1994 2001 
  
1- Interior, 
Regionalization, 
Planification & Social 
Development   
    
  
2- Foreign Affairs, 
Interparliamentary Affairs 
&  Latin American 
Integration 
    
  
4- Education, Culture, 
Science & Technology, 
Sports & Recreation 
4- Education, Culture, 
Sports & Recreation 
  
  6- National Defence     
  
7- Public Works, 
Transportation &  
Telecomunications 
    
8- Agriculture, Rural 
Development &  Maritime 
Affairs 
  
8- Agriculture, Silviculture 
& Fisheries 
8- Agriculture, Silviculture 
& Rural Development  
10- Health        
12- Mining & Energy       
13- Economy, "Fomento" & 
Development 
      
16- Internal Regime, 
Administration & Rules 
(R&HA) 
  
18- Internal Regime, 
Administration & Rules 
(R&HA) 
19- Internal Regime, 
Administration & Rules 
(R&HA) 
14- Housing & Urban 
Development 
      
9- Natural Resources & 
Environment                   
(Gutenberg Martinez 
Ocamica -DC-)  
      
15- Human Rights & 
Citizenship                     
(Maria A. Maluenda Campos 
-PPD-)  
      
    
16- Family                    
(María A.Saa Díaz -PPD-) 
  
    
17- Science & Technology     
(Joaquín Palma Irarrazaval 
-DC-) 
  
      
18- Fisheries, Aquaculture 
&  Maritime Affairs           
(Rafael Arratia 
Valdebenito -DC-) 
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APPENDIX I 
 
ELECTION OF THE CHILEAN MESAS 1945-2002 
 
Date Position Candidates 
Candidates' 
Party 
Candidates' Coalition 
Number of 
Seats of the 
Party/Coalition  
Votes 
obtained by 
each 
candidate 
Total of 
Votes 
Cast/Total 
Seats in 
Chamber 
22/05/45 
P 
Coloma Mellado, Juan Cons CONS-PA-PL  74 73 
141 for P/147; 
136 for VP/147 
Faivovich Hitzcovich, Angel PR DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE 69 68 
VP1 
del Pedregal Artigas, 
Alberto 
PA CONS-PA-PL 74 72 
Cifuentes Sobarzo, Carlos PD DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE 69 63 
Echevarria Moorehouse, José CONS CONS-PA-PL 74 1 
VP2 
Atienza Pedraza, Carlos PL CONS-PA-PL  74 72 
Godoy Urrutia, César PPN45 DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE 69 63 
Zepeda Barrios, Hugo PL CONS-PA-PL 74 1 
24/05/49 
P 
Brañes Farmer, Raul PR LIDERS 78 79 
138/147 
Coloma Mellado, Juan ConsT - 20 52 
Concha Molina, Lucio ConsT - 20 1 
- - - -   6 B a 
VP1 
Tapia Moore, Astolfo PS LIDERS 78 78 
Zepeda Barrios, Hugo  PL LIDERS 78 52 
Ojeda, Juan Efrain PSP FRAS 31 1 
- - - -   7 B 
VP2 
Cifuentes Sobarzo, Carlos  PD LIDERS 78 78 
- - -     60 B 
26/05/53 
P 
Castro Palma, Baltasar UNI53 FENAFUI-ConsT-PR 75 77 
138/147 
Lea-Plaza Saenz, Alfredo PAL ANAP 54 61 
VP1 
Correa Letelier, Héctor ConsT FENAFUI-ConsT-PR 75 77 
Chelén Rojas, Alejandro PSP ANAP 54 61 
VP2 
Montane Castro, Carlos PR FENAFUI-ConsT-PR 75 77 
Minchel Balladares, Luis PDPu49 ANAP 54 59 
Bustamante del Campo, 
Sergio 
PAL ANAP 54 2 
22/05/57 
P 
Correa Letelier, Héctor ConsU 
ConsU-PL-PAL-IND-
PN56/58 
74 73 
141/147 
Sandoval Vargas, Nestor  PR - 36 33 
Musalem Saffie, Jose  FN - 14 33 
- - - -   2 B 
VP1 
Sepulveda Garcés, Sergio PL 
ConsU-PL-PAL-IND-
PN56/58 (O) 
74 73 
Morales Adriasola, Raul PR - 36 33 
Pablo Elorza, Tomas CONS - 2 34 
Del Rio Gundian, Humberto PL 
ConsU-PL-PAL-IND-
PN56/58  
74 1 
VP2 
de la Presa Casanueva, 
Rafael 
PAL 
ConsU-PL-PAL-IND-
PN56/58  
74 73 
Brucher Encina, Raul PR - 36 33 
Gormaz Molina, Raul IND - - 33 
David Lebon, Alfonso PAL 
ConsU-PL-PAL-IND-
PN56/58  
74 1 
Palma Vicuna, Jose FN - 14 1 
a. Blank votes 
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ELECTION OF THE CHILEAN MESAS 1945-2002 
(cont.) 
 
Date Position Candidates 
Candidates' 
Party 
Candidates' Coalition 
Number of 
Seats of the 
Party/Coalition  
Votes 
obtained 
by each 
candidate 
Total of Votes 
Cast/Total Seats 
in Chamber 
24/05/61 
P 
Schaulsohn Numhauser, 
Jacobo 
PR DEMOCRATIC FRONT 84 80 
139/147 
Fonsea Aedo, José  PADENA FRAP 40 57 
Morales, Raul PR DEMOCRATIC FRONT 84 1 
Sivori Alzerreca, Carlos DC - 23 1 
VP1 
Loyola Vazquez, Gustavo ConsU DEMOCRATIC FRONT 84 82 
Sivori Alzerreca, Carlos DC - 23 55 
Fonsea Aedo, José Roman PADENA FRAP 40 1 
- - - -   1 B 
VP2 
Huerta Muñoz, José PL DEMOCRATIC FRONT 84 81 
Godoy Urrutia, César PC FRAP 40 57 
- - - -   1 B 
25/05/65 
P 
Ballesteros Reyes, Eugenio DC DC 82 79 
133/147 
Marin Millie, Gladys PC FRAP 33 25 
Morales Abarzúa, Carlos PR - 20 19 
Momberg Roa, Hardy PL - 6 7 
Lorca Valencia, Alfredo PL - 6 1 
- - - -   2 B 
VP1 
Isla Hevia, José Manuel DC DC 82 80 
Allende Gossens, Laura PS FRAP 33 25 
Enríquez Frodden, Inés PR - 20 19 
Monckeberg Barros, 
Gustavo 
ConsU - 3 7 
- - - - 2 B 
VP2 
Papic Ramos, Luis DC DC 82 80 
Lazo Carrera, Carmen PS FRAP 33 25 
Amión, Eduardo Clavel PR - 20 19 
De la Fuente Cortés, Gabriel PL - 6 7 
- - - -   2 B 
4/6/69 
P 
Valenzuela Valderrama, 
Héctor 
DC DC 56 51 
139/150 
Phillips Penafiel, Patricio PN66 - 33 32 
Silva Solar, Julio DC - 56 1 
Pareto Gonzalez, Luis DC - 56 1 
- - - -     47 B 
- - - -   6 N b 
VP1 
Videla Riquelme, Pedro DC DC 56 52 
Tagle Valdes, Jose PN66 - 33 31 
Giannini Iniguez, Osvaldo DC - 56 1 
- - - -     47 B 
- - - -    6 N 
VP2 
Stark Troncoso, Pedro DC DC 56 52 
Amunategui Johnson, 
Miguel 
PN66 - 33 31 
Cardemil Alfaro, Gustavo DC - 56 1 
- - - - 47 B 
- - - - 6 N 
b. Null votes.  
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ELECTION OF THE CHILEAN MESAS 1945-2002 
(cont.) 
 
Date Position Candidates 
Candidates' 
Party 
Candidates' Coalition 
Number of 
Seats of the 
Party/Coalition  
Votes 
obtained 
by each 
candidate 
Total of Votes 
Cast/Total Seats 
in Chamber 
23/05/73 
P 
Pareto Gonzalez, Luis DC CODE 87 76 
136/150 
Palestro Rojas, Mario PS 
FEDERATION OF THE 
POPULAR UNITY 
63 57 
Leighton Guzman, 
Bernardo 
PN66 CODE (O) 87 1 
    - - 2 B 
VP1 
Lorca Rojas, Gustavo PN66 CODE (O) 87 78 
Tejeda Oliva, Luis PC FPU 63 57 
Arnello Romo, Mario PN66 CODE (O) 87 1 
VP2 
Muñoz Barra, Roberto PIR CODE (O) 87 75 
Salvo Inostroza, Camilo PR 
FEDERATION OF THE 
POPULAR UNITY 
63 57 
- - - - 4 B 
11/03/90 
P 
Viera-Gallo Quesney, José PPD CONCERTACION 69 84 
120/120 
Matthei Fornet, Evelyn RN - 29 35 
- - - - 1 V c 
VP1 
Dupré Silva, Carlos DC CONCERTACION 69 85 
Horvath Kiss, Antonio ILB  - 29 34 
- - - - 1 V 
VP2 
Coloma Correa, Juan  UDI - 11 84 
Prokurica Prokurica, Baldo RN - 29 34 
- - - - 2 V 
11/03/94 
P 
Schaulsohn Brodsky, Jorge PPD CONCERTACION 70 65 
120/120 
Chadwick Piñera, Andrés UDI 
UNION FOR THE 
PROGRESS OF CHILE 
50 51 
Valenzuela Herrera, Felipe PS CONCERTACION 70 1 
- - - - 3 V 
VP1 
Latorre Carmona, Juan 
Carlos 
DC CONCERTACION 70 68 
Prochelle Aguilar, Marina RN 
UNION FOR THE 
PROGRESS OF CHILE 
50 51 
Rocha Manrique, Jaime PR CONCERTACION 70 1 
VP2 
Espina Otero, Alberto RN 
UNION FOR THE 
PROGRESS OF CHILE 
50 95 
Martinez Ocamica, 
Gutemberg 
DC CONCERTACION 70 1 
- - - - 24 V 
11/03/98 
P 
Martinez Ocamica, 
Gutemberg 
DC CONCERTACION 69 71 
120/120 
Cristi Marfil, Maria  RN UNION FOR CHILE 47 45 
- - - - 4 V 
VP1 
Muñoz D'Albora, Adriana PPD CONCERTACION 69 67 
Ulloa Aguillón, Jorge UDI UNION FOR CHILE 47 45 
- - - - 8 V 
VP2 
Naranjo Ortiz, Jaime PS CONCERTACION 69 68 
Garcia-Huidobro, Alejandro UCCP - 2 42 
Avila Contreras, Nelson PPD CONCERTACION 69 1 
- - - -    4 B 
- - - -    5 V 
c. Void votes.  
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APPENDIX J 
 
 
                 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS - CHILEAN LOWER CHAMBER 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Committee Power 4.856 3.673 0 27,0 
Ruling Party 0.531 0.499 0 1 
Regular Plurality 0.097 0.296 0 1 
Regular Majority 0.381 0.485 0 1 
Exceptional Majority 0.521 0.499 0 1 
Freshman 0.474 0.499 0 1 
Seniority (in legislative terms) 1.894 1.106 1 9 
Experience (committee-specific)  a    1.237         0.516     1  4 
Cumulation 1.353 0.606 0 4 
Group Position 0.144 0.351 0 1 
Chamber Position 0.021 0.144 0 1 
N=1542 
a.The unit of analysis is assignments (N=2088). 
 
 
 
WEIGHTING OF COMMITTEES BY IMPORTANCE 
CHILEAN LOWER CHAMBER
    
Committee Score 
Hacienda 5,33 
Internal Regime, Administration & Rules (R&HA) 3,67 
Constitution, Legislation & Justice 3,00 
Foreign Affairs, Interparliamentary Affairs & Latin American Integration 3,00 
Mining 3,00 
Interior, Regionalization, Planification & Social Development   3,00 
Agriculture, Silviculture & Rural Development 2,67 
Labor & Social Security  2,67 
Education, Culture, Sports & Recreation 2,67 
Public Works, Transportation &Telecomunications 2,67 
National Defence 2,67 
Health  2,67 
Economy, "Fomento" & Development 2,67 
Housing & Urban Development 1,67 
Science & Technology    1,33 
Natural Resources & Environment  1,33 
Human Rights & Citizenship  1,33 
Family  1,00 
Latin American Integration   1,00 
Fisheries, Aquaculture & Maritime Affairs 1,00 
Note. See text for details on coding. 
 
